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Experiencing the Anned Struggle: The Soweto Generation and After 
Lynda von den Steinen 
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This study explores the experiences of the rank-and-file soldiers ofUmkhonto 
we Sizwe and the Azanian People's Liberation Anny. Extensive interviews by the 
author and other researchers reveal the voices of the soldiers themselves. The African 
National Congress and Pan African Congress archives at the University of the 
Western Cape and the University of Fort Hare supplement and verify these oral 
testimonies, as do some published sources. 
Most previously published materials about the armed struggle against 
apartheid have already focused on diplomacy, strategy and tactics, operations, 
leadership, and human rights abuses to the neglect of the soldiers' actual experiences. 
This study complements these with significant new oral history materials from the 
Soweto generation of soldiers and their successors. When dealing with MK, many 
authors have documented issues of the camp structure in Angola, and operations 
inside South Africa, so much of this detail is only addressed briefly, leaving space to 
explore the soldiers' experiences. In the case of APLA, very little has been written on 
its history, and more detail is provided on these subjects. 
This study therefore deals with the soldiers' politicisation and motivation for 
joining the armed struggle, their experiences in leaving South Africa and training in 
exile, the crises in exile which limited their effectiveness for a time, their return to 
fight in South Africa, and their difficulties in the "new" South Africa. These materials 
reveal that vast problems remain facing these veterans of the struggle against 
apartheid, and that they have the potential, if properly supported and employed, to 
contribute substantially to the development of present day South Africa. Conversely, 
if their neglect continues, they also have the potential to bring vast harm to the 
country. Further use of the investigative tools of oral history, especially if extended to 
the former soldiers' vernacular languages, is necessary to augment the history of 
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Wars are often summed up as the decisions of leaders and the 
movements of armies. It is often forgotten that these depend on 
ordinary soldiers, who make personal sacrifices to achieve advances 
and victories, and who suffer the consequences of retreats and defeats 
physically. But their experiences are usually obliterated in the 
manufacture of histories and may even be lost to popular memory. 
The result is the propagation of an official mythology of war, with 
heavy emphasis on its abstract and glorious aspects. l 
The History of Liberation Struggles 
With the dawning of the 'New South Africa', many avenues opened up in the 
study of South African history. One such opportunity came in writing the history of 
the liberation struggle against the system of apartheid. Many works had been written 
on this subject already, but due to the constraints of researching while the struggle 
was going on, they often told only pieces of the story. Also, in their focus on certain 
aspects of the liberation struggle that were key concerns at the time, such as political 
structures, diplomacy, and ideology, these works neglect other aspects of the history, 
such as the story of the 'ordinary people' involved in the struggle. 
Many problems arose in past works focusing on liberation movements in 
Southern Africa. O e major restraint on research has been the lack of source material 
on which to base a study. Until the release of Nelson Mandela and unbanning of the 
liberation movements in 1990, and even beyond until the election of the Government 
of National Unity in April of 1994, utmost secrecy was necessary to the survival of 
the liberation movements both inside the country and in exile. This condition made it 
extremely difficult for researchers to gain access to detailed and accurate information. 
Often information came only from official sources in South Africa, which were 
1 Barnes, Teresa A. (1995). The Heroes' Struggle: Life after the Liberation War for Four Ex-
combatants in Zimbabwe. In Bhebe and Ranger, (eds), Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War, Harare: 











notoriously biased against the liberation movements, or from defectors or police 
agents. Even if these testimonies were true, which was not always the case, one 
person's story or one group of people's stories, especially the case of those who had 
been 'turned' by the South African police, is rarely representative of the entire group 
he or she comes from. Infonnation also came through the liberation movements 
themselves, in the fonn of recruitment material, pamphlets, and journals, which were 
usually biased towards the liberation movements. Furthennore, even if it had been 
possible to obtain accurate and detailed intelligence of the operations of the liberation 
movements, many scholars would have hesitated to use this infonnation as its 
publication could have endangered the liberation movements and jeopardised their 
efforts. In his book on Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the armed wing of the African 
National Congress (ANC), Howard Barrell acknowledges that: "the story this book 
tells remains only a sketch ... ANC and MK security remains an issue at the time of 
writing.,,2 Indeed, many people who were involved in the struggle took the issue of 
security so seriously that they still hesitate to reveal anything today. While there is 
little doubt that many of the writers involved in documenting the history and workings 
of the liberation struggle in South Africa had good intentions to do as much justice to 
the topic as possible, it is impossible to ignore the circumstances that restrained them 
from successfully accomplishing this. 
Beyond the issue of scarcity of sources as a problem in writing the history of 
liberation struggles came the question of loyalties. While the struggle against 
apartheid was going on, the loyalties of the authors had a major effect on the products 
they produced. Colin Leys and John S. Saul discuss this problem in relation to the 
history of the liberation struggle in Namibia: 










The history of the South West Africa People's Organization 
(SW APO), the liberation movement that came to lead that struggle, has 
been particularly prone to either demonization or canonization. For 
South African historians of the struggle SW APO have been 'terrorists,' 
'communists', 'hapless bunglers', while too much of the solidarity 
literature presents a SW APO incapable of error and free of all 
shortcomings. 3 
This problem also arises in the literature about the liberation struggle in South Africa. 
In recent years, the development of South African history has taken great 
strides. More and more participants in the struggle are writing and publishing their 
memoirs and even those who were not leaders have started to do so. Oral history has 
advanced considerably, and many collections of people's stories have been 
assembled. More critical and analytic studies have also started to emerge, moving 
away from the strict division between pro- and anti- liberation struggle points of view, 
and more objective viewpoints are now often found in recent histories. However 
there is still ample room for new interpretations and investigations in the exploration 
of the history of the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. It is an opportune 
time to rewrite the history of the liberation movements and to take advantage of the 
vast range of sources now available, explore new aspects that were not addressed in 
the past, and look at these issues from a greater distance. 
A Brief History of Umkhonto we Sizwe 
The African National Congress was founded in 1912 under the name of the 
South African Native National Congress. Originally it was a rather elitist 
organisation, focusing on the rights of the small professional black middle class. In 
1944 this emphasis changed dramatically with the formation of the ANC Youth 
League. The Youth League stressed the ideas of African Nationalism, and eventually 
3 Leys, C., and Saul, J. (1995). Namibia's Liberation Struggle: the Two Edged Sword, London: James 











introduced the 'Programme of Action' in 1949 after the election of the National Party 
(NP) the preceding year. This 'Programme of Action' proposed mass action in non-
violent resistance against the rapid entrenchment of racist laws as opposed to the 
earlier methods of petitioning the government conducted by only a few elites. This 
programme was implemented in the Defiance Campaign of the early fifties, which 
saw boycotts, stay-aways, civil disobedience, and other forms. of non-violent 
resistance gain much support. In 1955, the ANC, together with other like-minded 
organisations, convened the Congress of the People and adopted the Freedom Charter, 
which provided general guidelines for aSouth Africa under democratic rule. With the 
Sharpeville Massacre of 1960, however, it became clear that the government was 
more than willing to meet passive resistance with deadly force, and a new strategy 
had to be developed. The ANC was banned (along with other organisations) and 
many of its members fled into exile, or situated themselves underground in order to 
keep the organisation together. 
Umkhonto we Sizwe, or the 'Spear of the Nation', was launched on 16 
December 1961 in all of th  main urban centres of South Africa. Originally 
conceived as an independent organisation, largely in order to distance it from the 
traditionally non-violent ANC, its members came from the ANC, the South African 
Communist Party (SACP), and other organisations in the Congress Alliance. Its 
manifesto claimed that MK was to be seen not as an alternative to traditional and 
more peaceful methods of struggle, but as a complement to these. The first few years 
of MK's existence saw its units execute many successful sabotage attacks, but the 
membership remained limited and carefully selected, with small cells of members 
moving underground within the country, organising and executing attacks on strategic 



















































































































































































































































































































techniques were quite amateur, with many homemade devices being used to blow up 
railway lines, power stations, police stations, pass offices, and the like. This first 
phase ofMK's operations came to a dramatic halt with the arrest, trial, and sentencing 
to Robben Island of the leaders caught in Rivonia in 1963. The rest of the 1960s and 
the beginning of the 70s saw little MK activity within South Africa, aside from a few 
pamphlet bombs, as the ANC tried to rebuild the organisation in exile. The only 
visible attempt on their part to infIltrate South Africa during this period occurred in 
1968, when they sent a group of soldiers to accompany the Zimbabwe African 
People's Union (ZAPU) into Zimbabwe, in hopes of opening a trail into South Africa. 
The soldiers, split into different groups, clashed with the Rhodesian forces, and all of 
the soldiers were captured or killed. Some escaped as far as Botswana before being 
imprisoned. 
The early 1970s saw the re-emergence of black opposition to the government 
inside the country, particularly linked with the Black Consciousness movement and 
the formation of trade unions, with an increase in strikes, school boycotts, and other 
unrest. However, the ANC played little part in this new wave of protest. The march 
and resultant massacre that sparked the Soweto uprisings in 1976 in South Africa 
caught the ANC off guard, and their recently rebuilt underground struggled to 
capitalise on the unrest inside the country. The uprising and the resultant government 
repression, however, led to a large number of South Africans fleeing into exile and 
joining MK there to get training for operations inside the country and for guerrilla 
warfare. The following years saw a dramatic increase in attacks within South Africa. 
While operations did increase and recruits did become well-trained soldiers, 
whether trained in Angola or in sympathetic, usually Eastern Bloc countries, reliable 











students who had left anticipating a six-month training programme and immediate 
return to South Africa as a liberation army found themselves stuck in exile, most often 
at the camps in Angola. Some did see action in Angola in assistance of the 
Movimento Popular de Liberta~ao de Angola (MPLA), fighting against the South 
African sponsored Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNIT A). 
Morale eroded, complaints multiplied, and in January of 1984 outright mutiny erupted 
in the Angolan camps. Dealt with harshly by the ANC leadership, the mutinies in 
January and May of that year highlighted the disgruntlement and disillusionment of 
the MK troops, and efforts were made by the leadership to address the problems. 
Activities inside the country by MK units continued to focus on sabotage 
attacks and an avoidance of "soft targets," attempting to avoid any loss of life. A 
special operations unit undertook some high profile attacks, including the bombing of 
the Sasolburg refinery in 1980, an attack on the Voortrekkerhoogte Air Force Base by 
rocket launcher in 1981, and the bombing of the Koeburg nuclear research station in 
1982. Another upsurge ofMK- activity occurred in 1985, following a push to get all 
of the soldiers based in Mozambique into South Africa in the wake of the Nkomati 
Accord of 1984, which would make infiltration from Mozambique prohibitively 
difficult. In the mid 1980s, another round of uprisings backed by a broader based 
group of organisations came to the fore inside the country. Concerns about soft 
targets relaxed, and security personnel, informers and collaborators became legitimate 
targets, though civilian casualties were still discouraged. With the support of the 
ANC aligned United Democratic Front (UDF), an umbrella body consisting of many 
smaller community based organisations, the profile of the ANC strengthened, and MK 
attacks were met with a good reception from the oppressed masses of South Africa. 










complement the activities and campaigns of the mass movement. During this period, 
increasing numbers of recruits were trained to be MK soldiers inside the country, 
rather than having to go into exile to receive training, thus facilitating a faster 
reinforcement of the fighting power inside the country. 
By 2 February 1990, when South African president F.W. De Klerk announced 
the unbanning of the ANC, PAC, and other organisations and the release of Nelson 
Mandela and other political prisoners, MK was well established as an armed wing, 
and well known to the general popUlation of South Africa. After entering into "talks 
about talks" with the national party government, the ANC officially suspended the 
armed struggle in August 1990, and depended on non-violent mass action to 
strengthen their position in the negotiations. However, given the huge upsurge of 
violence in the early 1990s between the ANC and other black organisations, 
particularly the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), some former MK soldiers organised 
themselves into Self Defence Units (SDUs) and continued their work in defence of 
ANC supporters. After the elections in 1994, which brought the ANC to power, some 
MK soldiers joined the integ ated South African National Defence Force (SANDF), 
some took up positions in the new ANC led government, and many others simply 
tried to readapt to life in South Africa and struggled to find their place in the new 
South Africa. Many still struggle with this today. 
A Brief History of the Azanian People's Liberation Army 
The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) was established in 1959, as a faction that 
split from the ANC. They particularly took offence with the Freedom Charter's claim 
that "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white." With a manifesto 











including anyone who owed their primary allegiance to Africa and accepted the idea 
of majority rule as Africans and a strong emphasis on reclaiming land from the 
oppressors, they quickly found many supporters. Their early days were also beset 
with challenges. When a country wide anti-pass protest on 21 March 1960 led to the 
Sharpeville massacre, resultant protests and a notable march of about 100,000 PAC 
supporters in Cape Town, the government responded quickly by banning both the 
ANC and PAC. The fledgling organisation faced a huge challenge with this banning 
and when combined with a policy of their leaders actively participating in any actions, 
they also found most oftheir leaders arrested during their participation in the anti-pass 
protests in 1960. The decision to turn to violence lacked clear articulation by the 
PAC, and the Poqo (isiXhosa for alone or pure) movemept that arose in the early 
1960s had a much larger, more grassroots based participation than MK. Poqo formed 
its strongest branches in areas with a well-established PAC following; particularly in 
the Western Cape and the Transvaal. Their operations focused on personnel of the 
South African police, informers, traditional leaders working with the apartheid 
government, and white civilians. A number of attacks were carried out, particularly in 
the Western Cape in the early 1960s. 
The PAC set up its headquarters in exile in Lesotho, led by Potlako Kitchener 
Leballo. Leballo announced in 1962 that South Africa would be liberated by 1963. 
He went on to calIon all of the PAC and Poqo branches immediately to focus on 
recruiting, with a target of 1000 members per branch to be reached. Then a general 
insurrection planned for 8 April 1963 would involve attacks on police stations and 
economic targets, then the assassination of white people at random. Shortly before 
the proposed insurrection, the Lesotho police captured a list of the PAC membership, 












round up of members, the PAC, like the ANC, found itself struggling to establish its 
organisation in exile, to gain support and financial backing internationally, and to 
build up their strength outside of the country. 
Based in Zambia, then in Tanzania, and particularly plagued by leadership 
struggles, the governments of their host countries had to step in to help settle feuds on 
a number of occasions, and eventually the PAC found themselves faced with an 
ultimatum from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), that they must work on 
infiltrating soldiers back into South Africa before any more recruits could be 
accommodated or funding given them. Under threat of being de-recognised a plan 
was formed by the leadership which involved· co-operation with the Zimbabwe 
African National Union (ZANU) in Zimbabwe and Comite Revulucion8rio de 
Moyambique (COREMO) in Mozambique. In 1968, twelve APLA soldiers were sent 
into Zimbabwe and on to Mozambique, and hoped to eventually reach South Africa in 
what became known as the Villa Peri operation, and while they did engage with and 
kill some Portuguese soldiers, all of the APLA men were either killed or captured. 
Problems within the PAC in exile continued, and leadership feuds led to the 
expulsion of many members and much unrest. When the Soweto uprisings occurred 
in 1976, the PAC found itself too weak and strife filled to take full advantage of the 
situation. While the Africanist ideology of the PAC seemed much more compatible 
with the black consciousness oriented youth than the ANC's multiracial and 
communist associated organisation, the internal problems crippled the organisation 
and left them too involved in the leadership battle to properly recruit, train and focus 
the youth towards the fight in South Africa. The Soweto generation that found its 
way into exile to join the PAC were often thrust into the leadership battle and many 











Problems of indiscipline, infighting, and occasionally outright violence characterised 
the APLA cadres based in Tanzania. P. K. Leballo finally stepped down in May 1979 
to be replaced by a three man executive committee led by David Sibeko, Vusi Make, 
and Elias Ntloedibe. The assassination of David Sibeko in June 1979 by APLA 
members in Tanzania illustrated the depths of the divisions and indiscipline, and 
marked a low point in the history of the PAC and APLA. When John Poke1a, recently 
released from Robben Island and escaped to exile, stepped into the leadership position 
in 1981, efforts began to re-educate, organise, and focus the APLA troops back to the 
South African scene began in earnest. Training for the APLA recruits took place at 
bases in Tanzania, in other sympathetic African countries, and in Middle Eastern and 
Asian countries, particularly China. With Pokela's death in 1985, Johnson Mlambo 
took over the mantle of the leader of the PAC, and the recent restructuring and 
reorganisation of the armed wing began to payo f. 
After more than 20 years of inactivity, APLA attacks inside South Africa 
resumed in the mid-1980s. APLA strategies focused attacks on the South African 
police and anny, white fanners, black informers and collaborators, and white 
civilians. APLA soldiers were often encouraged to find and appropriate money and 
weapons from the enemy to support their operations, as reliable methods of funding 
and supply from outside the country were difficult to maintain. The highly publicised 
Scorpion gang who operated in Alexandra from December 1986, marked the first 
publicised attacks by APLA on South African soldiers in over two decades. APLA's 
commanders started a policy of grenade warfare in 1987, which proved successful in 
raising awareness of APLA and the PAC in the minds of the South African population 











With the 1990 announcement that saw the beginning of the end of MK's 
anned struggle, APLA stepped onto the scene as the only liberation anny still 
operating. The PAC asserted its opposition to the negotiations between the ANC and 
the National party, claiming that important issues, especially that of reclaiming the 
land for the African people, were being set aside. for expediency. APLA attacks 
continued through the early 1990s, and captured the attention of the population, 
particularly with attacks on white civilians at the King Williams Town Golf Club in 
1992, and the Heidelburg tavern and St. James church in Cape Town in 1993. Armed 
robberies also received a lot of attention, asserted by APLA to be part and parcel of 
reclamation of the wealth stolen 'from them by white people and necessary for the 
supply of the units, but condemned by many as outright criminality. The PAC 
leadership lacked strict control over APLA, and often appeared at odds with their 
anned wing. When they announced a suspension of anned struggle early in 1994, 
some attacks still continued, but by the first democratic elections on 27 April 1994, 
APLA no longer operated. During this period, APLA caught the attention of many 
South Africans, arid highlighted many doubts people were having about the 
negotiations and the compromises being made. This was believed by many political 
commentators to be a good opportunity for the PAC to capitalise on the support and 
turn it into votes, but in the end, they failed to do so. Some APLA soldiers ended up 
absorbed into the new SANDF, but many others have faced the same problems as the 
MK soldiers in the adaptation to the new South Africa. Further, while much has been 














A number of books and articles have been written about Umkhonto we Sizwe 
Autobiographical accounts written about and by the original leaders and members of 
MK cover the decision to turn to violence and the original sabotage campaigns, as 
well as a few that touch on the later development and operations of MK. Most of 
these either strictly toe the ANC party line, or strongly oppose it. Nelson Mandela's 
Long Walk to Freedom4, which covers his whole life, from birth, through his activities 
in the ANC and MK, to his incarceration on Robben Island and his release, and Natoo 
Babenia's Memoirs of a SaboteurS, which talks of his activities as a saboteur in both 
South Africa and India, are among the autobiographies which focus in part on the 
early sabotage campaigns of MK and the authors' parts in them, often stressing the 
ANC party line about the role and ideology of MK. Ronnie Kasrils' autobiography, 
Armed and Dangeroui also deals with the early sabotage campaigns, then moves on 
to the nature of his work in exile in MK, his return to South Africa in 1990, and the 
pr()cess of transition, but also toes the ANC party line. He discusses his life and his 
motivations and includes several detailed descriptions of his activities. Fish 
Keitseng's autobiography, Comrade Fish: Memories of a Motswana in the ANC 
Underground, documents his life as an ANC operative.7 Bruno Mtolo8 and Mwezi 
4 Mandela, Nelson. (1994). Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela, London: 
Little, Brown and Company. 
S Babenia Natoo, as told to Edwards, lain (1995) Memoirs of a Saboteur, Bellville: Mayibuye Books. 
6 Kasrils, Ronnie. (2004). Armed and Dangerous: My Undercover Struggle Against Apartheid, 
Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball. 
7 Keitseng, Fish. (1999). Comrade Fish: Memories of a Motswana in the ANC Underground, 
Gaborone: Pula Press. 
8 Mtolo, Bruno. (1966). Umkhonto we Sizwe: the Road to the Left, Durban: Drakensberg Press. (Mtolo 











Twala's9 autobiographies provide the counter-view to these, taking a particularly anti-
ANC point of view, dealing with the early sabotage campaign and the mid-70s to 
1990s, respectively. Recently, more participants, who were not at the leadership 
level, have begun publishing their memoirs of their time and experiences in the armed 
struggle. Three notable examples of these are Jama Matakata's Hills of HopelO, 
which covers an MK. operative's life story and time in MK and on Robben Island, 
Conny Braam's Operation Vula,l1 which deals with a Dutch woman's participation in 
Operation Vula, an operation established to improve communications between the 
exile leaders and the leaders inside South Africa, during the late 1980s and early 
1990s, and Thula Bopela and Dluxolo Luthuli's Umkhonto we Sizwe: Fightingfor a 
divided people,12 in which two former MK. soldiers tell their personal stories. 
'Official' ANC historians notably including Francis Meli,13 John Pampa1lis,14 and 
Govan Mbeki IS also deal with the formation, strategies, heroes, and ideology of MK 
within a broader history of the ANC and its struggle against apartheid. These are all 
restricted by their loyalties, and tend to deal primarily with the leadership, diplomacy, 
strategy, and ideology of ANC. They are largely similar, dealing with the same 
9 Twala, Mwezi, and Bernard, Ed. (1994). Mbokodo Inside MK: Mwezi Twala- A Soldier's Story, 
Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers. 
10 Matakata, Jama. (2004). Hills of Hope, Pietennaritzburg: Nutrend Productions. 
11 Braam, Conny. (2004). Operation Vula, Bellevue: Jacana. 
12 Bopela, Thula and Daluxlo Luthuli. (2005). Umkhonto we Siswe: Fighting for a divided people, 
Alberton: Galago Publishing. 
13 Meli, Francis. (1988). A History of the ANC: South Africa Belongs to Us, Harare: Zimbabwe 
Publishing House. 
14 Pampallis, John. (1991) Foundations of the New South Africa, Cape Town: Maskew Miller 
Longman. 
IS Mbeki, Govan. (1992). The Struggle for Liberation in South Africa: A short history, Cape Town: 












leaders, events, and speeches, and covering the struggle from the ANC side. Comrade 
Jack, published in 2001, provides a rare look inside MK training and conditions in 
Angola, and includes political lectures and diary excerpts from Jack Simons, who 
taught soldiers at the MK camps in Angola 1 6. There are a few collections of oral 
testimonies by South Africans who went into exile17, and these include a few accounts 
by MK soldiers. However, in their relatively unstructured format, which tends simply 
to print the testimonies of the interviewees, often abridging them and focusing on 
different aspects from each interview, it is very difficult to find continuity and 
similarities amongst people's testimonies. 
Many academic works exist which focus on the nature of the ANC in exile, 
including the command structure and operations of MK, as well as speculations about . 
the degree of influence of the Communist Party, and issues of international alliances, 
among others. Tom Lodge's many articles and chapters of books on MK18 as well as 
Howard Barrell's work19 are very helpful but also focus mostly on the above issues. 
Lodge's several articles focus largely on the state of the ANC and MK in exile in 
particular periods, outlining the past, present, and possibilities for the future, looking 
16 Sparg, Marion, Schreiner, Jenny, and Ansell, Gwen. (Eds). (2001). Comrade Jack: The political 
lectures and diarty of Jack Simons, Novo Catengue, Johannesburg: STE Publishers. 
17 See for example; Bernstein, Hilda. (1994). The Rift: The Exile Experience of South Africans, 
London: Jonathan Cape; and Majodina, Zonke. (1995). Exiles and Homecomings: the Untold Stories, 
Johannesburg: Heinemann Publishers (Pty) Ltd. 
18 See for e.g.; Lodge, Tom. (1991). Guerrilla Warfare and Exile Diplomacy: The African National 
Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress. In Lodge, T. and Nasson, B. All, Here, and Now: Black 
Politics in South Africa in the 1980s, USA: Ford Foundation; (1989). Black Politics in South Africa 
Since 1945, Johannesburg: Ravan Press; (1989) People's war or Negotiation? African National 
Congress Strategies in the 1980s. In South African Review, vol. 5, Johannesburg: Ravan Press; (1988) 
State of Exile: The African National Congress of South Africa, 1976-86. In Frankel, Philip, Pines, 
Noam, and Willing Mark. (Eds). State Resistance and Change in South Africa, Johannesburg: Southern 
Book Publishers; (1986). 'Mayihlome!- Let Us Go To War!': From Nkomati to Kabwe, The African 
National Congress, January 1984-June 1985. In South African Review, Vol. 3, Johannesburg: Ravan 
Press, 226-247; (1992). The African National Congress in the 1990s. In South African Review, vol. 6, 
Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 44-78. 











primarily at the diplomatic and political sides of things. He does discuss training in 
his chapter of State, Resistance, and Change20, but draws this information only from a 
small number of ex-MK soldiers, and generally those who were police informers or 
who were captured and tried by the South African government. This gives a limited 
view of MK and its soldiers. Barrell's short book benefits from his personal 
participation in the struggle and provides a good basic history of MK, but again 
focuses largely on the leaders, strategies, and well-known events. Several articles 
deal with mainly ideological and strategic issues,21 analysing the party line or 
discussing the conditions necessary for the ANC to be successful in its endeavours, 
but these mostly rely on extensive theory and guesswork and tend to avoid empirical 
evidence. Ellis and Sechaba22 provide us with an in-depth look at the relationship 
. between the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP) in exile, dealing in 
large part with Umkhonto we Sizwe, but focus extensively on the issues of leadership 
and strategy of MK, leaning toward the theory that the SACP had a large degree of 
control over MK. Vladmir Shubin often contradicted their claims in his history of the 
ANC and MK, and his position as a Soviet Central Committee member and a 
representative of the So iet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee provided a unique 
perspective23 . Stephen Davis' Apartheid's Rebels also provides an in depth view on 
20 Lodge, State of Exile, 234-6. 
21 See for example; Johns, Sheridan. (1973). Obstacles to Guerrilla Warfare- A South African Case 
Study." In JournalJor African Studies, vol.1l, no.2; Marcum, John. (l972). The Exile Condition and 
Revolutionary Effectiveness: Southern African Liberation Movements. In Potholm, C.P. and Dale, R., 
(eds). South African in Perspective: Essays in Regional Politics, New York: The Free Press; and 
Fatton, Robert. (1984). The African National Congress of South Africa: The limitations of a 
Revolutionary Strategy. In The Canadian Journal oj African Studies, vol. 18. 
22 Ellis, Stephen and Sechaba, Tsepo. (1992). Comrades Against Apartheid: The ANC and the South 
African Communist Party in Exile, London: James Currey. 












and history of the ANC and MK.24 Only a few books try to provide general histories 
of MK itself, and even these focus mainly on leaders, campaigns, and diplomacy?5 
Howard Barrell also wrote an impressive PhD thesis about the contradiction between 
MK's obvious failure as a military force and its apparent success politically.26 A 
mini-thesis written by Nicole "Nicky" Martina VanDriel provided an indepth look at 
the Luthuli Detachment and the Wankie Campaign of 1967.27 An articles by 
Raymond Suttner addressed the different and enduring cultures encompassed in the_ 
ANC, including the MK and exile experiences and the early years of MK.28 More 
recently, the South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET)'s first two volumes 
of The Road to Democracy in South Africa examine many aspects of ANC and MK 
histories, and make use of their rich base of oral interviews.29 All of these add to the 
history of MK, but most do not look closely at the lives of the rank and file soldiers, 
and this focus is still largely missing from the available literature. While books about 
the ANC abound, the armed wing is not as well covered. 
24 Davis, Stephen M. (1987). Apartheid's Rebels: Inside South Africa's Hidden War, New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
2S See for example; Karis, T. and Gerhart, G. (1997). From Protest to Challenge: A documentary 
History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1990. vol. 5: Nadir and Resurgence, 1964-1979 
Pretoria, Unisa Press; and Barrell. MK: The ANC's Armed Struggle. 
26 Barrell, Howard. (1993). Conscripts to Their Age: ANC Operational Strategy 1976-1986, 
Unpublished thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of a PhD in Politics, Oxford. 
27 Van Oriel, Nicol (Nicky) Martina. (2003 June). The ANC's First Armed Military Operation: The 
Luthuli Detachment and the Wankie Campaign, July-September 1967, A mini-thesis submitted in 
partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree ofMA in the Department of History, University of 
the Western Cape. 
28 Suttner, Raymond. (2003). Culture(s) of the African National Congress of South Africa: Imprint of 
Exile Experiences. In Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 21. No.2; Suttner, Raymond. 
(2003). Early History of the ANC Underground from the M-Plan to Rivonia. In South African 
Historical Journal 49, 123-146. 
29 South African Democracy Education Trust (2004). The Road to Democracy Volume 1 [1960-1970}, 
Cape Town: Zebra; and (2006). The Road to Democracy Volume 2 [1970-1980}, Pretoria: Unisa. 
Six chapters in the first volume focus on the ANC and MK in the 1960s, and five in the second look at 











The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and its anned wmg, The Azanian 
People's Liberation Anny (APLA) have had far less written about them. Early books 
were usually biographies of leaders, particularly Robert Sobukwe and Patrick 
Duncan3o• Articles and studies of the PAC are few and far between, and mostly 
written by Tom Lodge.31 Bernard Leeman's works provide much detail on the 
relationship between Lesotho and the PAC, and of the history of the PAC, but come 
from a very biased viewpoint.32 More recently, chapters in the South African 
Democracy Education Trust's (SADET) Road to Democracy series have focused on 
the PAC in and Poqo in the 1960s, and on the PAC and APLA both in exile and inside 
South Africa in the 1970s.33 Academic studies focusing on aspects of the history of 
the PAC are also becoming more common, including an excellent study by 
Kwandime Kondlo on the PAC in exile, one by Ali Hlongwane on Zephania 
Mothopeng, and another by Daddy Alfred BudiMahlangu, also on the PAC in 
30 See for example: Pogrund, Benjamin. (1997). How Can Man Die Better?: the Life of Robert 
Sobukwe, Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball; Driver, C.J. (2000). Patrick Duncan: South African and Pan 
African, Cape Town: David Phillip; and Ntloedibe, Elias. (1995). Here is a Tree: political biography of 
Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe, Ga-Rankua: Century-Turn. 
31 Lodge, Tom. (1994). The Pan-Africanist Congress, 1959-1990. In Liebenberg et al, The Long 
March: The Story of the Strugglefor Liberation in South Africa, Pretoria: HAUM; Lodge, Tom. 
(1991). Guerrilla Warfare and Exile Diplomacy: The African National Congress and the Pan Africanist 
Congress. In Lodge and Nasson, All, Here, and Now: Black Politics in South Africa in the 1980s, USA: 
Ford Foundation, 174-202; Lodge, Tom, (1983). Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945, 
Johannesburg: RavanPress, 231-260, 295-362. 
32 Leeman, Bernard. (1985). Lesotho and the Struggle for Azania: Africanist Political Movements in 
Lesotho and Azania: The Origins and History of the Basotholand Congress Party and the Pan. 
Africanist Congress, London: University of Azania; and Leeman, Bernard. (1996). The Pan Africanist 
Congress of Azania. In Alexander, Peter, Hutchison, Ruth and Schreuder, Deryck. (Eds). Africa Today: 
A Multi Disciplinary Snapshot of the Continent in 1995, Canberra: The Humanities Research Centre, 
The Australian National University. 
33 Maaba, Brown (2004). The PAC's war against the State; and Mathabatha, Sello. (2004). The PAC 
and Poqo in Pretoria. In South African Democracy Education Trust. (2004). The Road to Democracy 
Volume 1 [1960-1970}, Cape Town: Zebra; Ka Plaatjie, Thami. (2006). The PAC's Internal 
Underground Activities, 1960-1980, and The PAC in Exile. In South African Democracy Education 











exile.34 Two recent memoirs, Mxolisi Ace Mgxashe's Are You With Us?" The Story 
of a PAC Activist 35 and Letlapa Mphahlele's Child of the Soil: My Life as a Freedom 
Fighter,36 also give excellent accounts of the early days of the PAC in the former and 
the life and times of an APLA commander in the latter. Aside from these, very little 
has been published on the PAC, and even less on APLA. 
Focus of the Study 
The history of the armed struggle includes many aspects, most of which have 
been covered by other authors. A number of these are personal accounts of soldiers, 
mostly from leadership positions. Much has been published on the strategies and 
tactics of the armed wings, and a lot has also covered the leaders, their speeches, and 
official documents released to the press and used as propaganda. Some articles 
provide status reports on the ANC and PAC in exile, written at different points in their 
history, which usually include many allusions to the past, details about recent 
developments, and predictions about what the future will bring. The struggle is also 
often approached looking at the response of the apartheid state to black resistance, 
documenting torture and repression inside South Africa, white politics, and military 
incursions into neighbouring countries by the South African government, which 
34 Kondlo, Kwandime Merriman. (2003). In the twilight of the Azanian Revolution: The exile history of 
the Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania 1960-1990, submitted in fulftlment ofD. Litt. Et Phil., Rand 
Afrikaans University; Hlongwane, Ali. (not dated). The Lion of Azania: The Story ofZephania 
Mothopeng (1913-1990), Masters dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand; Mahlangu, Daddy 
Alfred Budi. (1990). From South Africa to Azania?: A Critical Analysis of the Pan Africanist Congress 
in Exile 1962-1990, BA(Hons) thesis, University of Cape Town. 
35 Mgxashe, Mxolisi "Bra Ace." (2006). Are You With Us?" The Story of a PAC Activist, Cape Town: 
NB Publishers. 












became common in the early to mid 1980s. There are also several "official" histories 
of the liberation movements, usually written by those who participated in it, as well as 
books written from the apartheid state's point of view, which usually demonise or 
dismiss the resistance movements. Some current debates focus on the character of the 
relationship between the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP) in 
exile, and often deal with their relationship to MK. Some study is given to leadership 
problems in the PAC in exile and much has been written about individual leaders, 
such as Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, Robert Sobukwe, and others. Howard 
Barrell's Ph.D. thesis looked at the issue of whether or not MK was successful, and 
why. The South African Democracy Education Trust's The Road to Democracy in 
South Africa, Volumes 1 (1960-1970) and 2 (1970-1980) provide many chapters on 
the- ANC, MK., the PAC, and APLA, and add new material to their history and draw 
largely on oral interviews carried out by the organisation.37 All of these issues and 
focuses are vital and add something to the history of the armed struggle. However, 
this study is not intended to be an extension of these, but rather a complement to 
them. For this reason, many of the commonly approached aspects of the history of 
the armed struggle will not be broached in this thesis. Some of them will come into 
play in different topics of the study, but the purpose here is not to continue these 
debates, but rather to offer a new dimension to this history. 
While South Africa never experienced a guerrilla war on the scale of the 
Zimbabwean, Angolan, Namibian, or Mozambiquean liberation struggles, the armed 
wings of the ANC and the PAC did playa significant role in the conflict between anti-
apartheid forces and the National Party government. That the extent of this role is 
37 South African Democracy Education Trust. (2004). The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 
1, 1960-1970, Cape Town: Zebra Press; and (2006). The Road to Democrr;zcy in South Africa, Volume 












hotly debated is irrelevant to this study, as MK. and APLA clearly deserve a place in 
the history of South Africa's struggle. The Rankean tradition of great leaders and 
villains and great battles and events must not eclipse the history of the lesser-known 
people and the everyday aspects of life in an exiled and underground army. The 
"ordinary" soldiers ofMK and APLA deserve their place in history as well. 
It is in this proposed context that this study will look at the lives of the rank-
and-file soldiers ofMK. and APLA. In exploring the backgrounds of the soldiers, the 
ways in which they became acquainted with and joined the armed wings, their 
experiences in the training camps, holding camps, and forward areas of the struggle, 
and their current place in South African society, a better understanding emerges of 
their contribution to and place in the "new South Africa". Hopefully, this will move 
away from an "official mythology" and towards an understanding of the "personal 
sacrifices" and experiences that Barnes sees lacking in current accounts of liberation 
struggles.38 
As the study will focus on the "ordinary soldier" and hopes to add to current 
material on MK and APLA, it will look primarily at the "Soweto generation" of 
recruits and their successors. Estimates indicate that only between 300-800 recruits 
had crossed over the borders to join MK by 1965/9 as compared to around 3000 in 
the two years immediately following the Soweto uprising alone40• With an estimate of 
over 11,000 recruits in the time between the Soweto uprisings and un-banning of the 
38 See opening quote by Barnes. 
39 The figure of300 comes from Lodge, Tom, Black Politics in South Africa since 1945, 237, where he 
estimates the total from the years 1961-1964, and 800 comes from Barrell, Howard, MK: The ANC's 
Armed Struggle, 19, covering the same period. 











ANC in 199041 , the scope of the operation clearly expanded in the mid-1970s, and 
MK moved from its traditionally small group of elite saboteurs towards a larger anny 
being trained for guerrilla warfare in South Africa. APLA figures are much harder to 
come by, though a few estimates are available. In the years before the Soweto 
Uprisings, estimates of APLA's number are around a few hundred soldiers. They also 
received an upsurge of recruits in the years following the Soweto Uprisings, the 
Township Revolts of the 1980s, and, as opposed to MK, many recruits joined APLA 
in the early 1990s. Overall estimates of APLA's numbers range from 6,000-8,00042, 
and 6,000 names were submitted for enrolment when the transformation of the South 
African National Defence Force began in earnest43• Many of the activists from the 
Soweto generation left South Africa long after the uprisings had quietened as well, 
after long tenns in detention or prison or further activities in South Africa, or both. 
Despite this massive influx of recruits in the post-Soweto period, most writings that 
deal with this period of the anned struggle's history focus on the leadership and 
international relations involving the ANC, PAC, African countries, Communist 
countries, and Western countries. Although the uprisings in the mid-1980s in South 
Africa did not result in the same kind of exodus into exile since both MK and APLA 
were trying to enlarge the struggle within the country and keep the recruits inside 
South Africa, the soldiers who joined MK and APLA in this period also have useful 
contributions to make to the history of the organisation. When dealing with MK, 
many authors have documented the structure of the camps in Angola, and operations 
41 This number is an estimate based on calculations between Howard Barrell and Ronnie Kasrils, from 
von den Steinen, L. Interview with Howard Barrell, 9 December 1998, Cape Town. 
42 Mashike, Lephophotho and Mafole Mokalobe. (2003). Reintegration into Civilian Life: The case of 
former MK and APLA combatants, in Track Two, Vol. 12 Nos. 1 and 2, 10. 
43 Lodge, Tom. (1995). Soldiers of the Storm: A Profile of the Azanian People's Liberation Army. In 
CiIIiers, Jakkie and Markus Reichardt. (Eds). About Tum: The Transformation of the South African 











inside South Africa, so much of this detail is only addressed briefly, leaving space to 
explore the soldiers' experiences. In the case of APLA, very little has been written on 
its history, and more detail is provided on these subjects. 
Sources 
By the very nature of an underground and exiled organisation faced with a 
ruthless and unscrupulous enemy, documentation of many decisions, operations, and 
events is not available for study. Even that which is available, now that many 
. documents have been released for public viewing, is very limited. Much information 
has been lost, and much has been limited by issues of security, as well as just plain 
bad record keeping and misadministration. While general numbers of the soldiers 
involved in MK and APLA have been put forward, these only touch on raw numbers, 
and few statistics are available on the areas the soldiers came from, their back~ounds, 
gender, race, and age breakdowns, or other issues whose examination would be very 
useful. Having said this, however, many sources are available to deVelop a picture of 
MK and APLA conditions and experiences. Published personal accounts provide 
some information on life in the two armed wings, their training camps, and official 
policies, actions, and ideas, though many contradictory stories arise in these.44 Also 
available are the ANC and PAC submissions to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) documenting the "official" histories of the movements as well as 
the human rights violations that its members admit to committing during the struggle. 
The TRC also includes many amnesty hearings and submissions in their website, 
which give pertinent information on the SUbject. For another side of the story of 
abuses in MK camps, one must look at books like Twala's, articles in Searchlight 












South Africa:. and Amnesty International's report which emerged when Bandile 
Ketelo exposed the abuses publicly in 199045, as well as information in Ellis and 
Sechaba's book about this topic. Similarly dissident accounts can be found of the 
situation in the PAC, including Henry Isaacs' unpublished book, Struggles Within the 
Struggle: An Inside View of the PA C of South Africa,46 and testimonies of people who· 
left APLA because of the problems they met there47• Additionally, many documents 
from the ANC, the PAC, and the NP government are now available from the period in 
question, all of which provide more background for the study. Particularly helpful 
here are the collections of the Mayibuye Centre at the University of the Western Cape 
and the ANC and PAC archival collections at Fort Hare University. Many oral 
accounts exist in the 'Wolfie Kodesh Collection (Historical Papers & Oral History of 
Exile Interviews)' and the 'Hilda Bernstein collection' at the Mayibuye Centre, and 
the PAC archives at Fort Hare notably include boxes upon boxes of questionnaires 
filled out by people when they were applying to join APLA, and while the 
questionnaires changed with time, and many portions did not get filled out,· certain 
trends emerge showing areas with particularly large numbers joining APLA, issues 
that led people to the PAC, popular routes out of the country, and organisations that 
channelled recruits to the PAC. The ANC London and Lusaka Collections at the 
Mayibuye Centre were opened for researchers initially, but have since been closed on 
orders of the ANC to allow their historians to go through them thoroughly, which 
does not bode well for the freedom of information contained therein, and has taken 
4S Such as Ketelo, Bandile, et. aI. (1992). A Miscarriage of Democracy: the ANC Security Department 
in the 1984 Mutiny in Umkhonto we Sizwe. in Searchlight South Africa, 5, 35-65; and Amnesty 
International. (1992). South Africa: Torture, Ill-Treatment and Executions in African National 
Congress Camps AFR 53-27-92, London. 
46 Isaacs, Henry. (not dated, but from the mid-1980s). Struggles Within the Struggle: An Inside View of 
the PA C of South Africa, unpublished manuscript. 
47 Such as a testimony from one man who joined and resigned from APLA and later MK, published in 











years so far with no sign of re-opening the collections. Luckily this author was able 
to access these collections before they were closed. Additional information can be 
found in the numerous journals published during the struggle, including ANC 
publications Sechaba, Dawn, and Mayibuye, South African Communist Party 
publications Umsebenzi and African Communist, and PAC publications Azanian 
Combat, Azanian News, and Azanian Woman. Also available for perusal are records 
of some of the trials of MK and APLA soldiers, though obtaining them often proved 
prohibitively difficult to access. Newspaper and journal articles from the time also 
provide infonnation for the study. 
The largest wealth of information for this project, however, comes from oral 
interviews with ex-combatants. Many of these had already been done, and can be 
found in the oral history collection of the Mayibuye Centre.48 Others done by SADET 
were also available for study. Many others haveheen undertaken by the author, in an 
attempt to find answers to specific questions, or to provide a wider pool of 
interviewees. Nevertheless, several concerns surround the validity of oral history. 
While it is very useful in gathering information about historical events, movements, 
and ways of life, it is also only as accurate as human memory and nature allow it to 
be. But this is also true of non-oral historical sources. However, with the use of 
many interviews, using a broad base of people and correlating the oral testimonies 
with written sources, they can provide a wealth of information and add profound 
depths to many historical subjects. Together, the oral histories and archival material 
support each other to provide a detailed and infonnative picture of the lives of MK 
and APLA soldiers. 
48 The W olfie Kodesh Collection (Historical Papers and Oral History of Exile Interviews) and the Hilda 











The Nature of Oral History and Issues Arising from Interviews 
Over the last few decades, oral testimony has become widely accepted as a 
valuable and credible source for historians. It allows people who would generally be 
excluded in traditional sources except as statistics to add their voices to the historical 
record. Oral sources can also provide information to fill gaps in official 
documentation and can provide in depth eyewitness accounts that remain unmatched 
by other sources. They also provide a human· side to history, allowing for the 
exploration of emotions, motivations, and values that take history beyond the tradition 
of names, dates, and events. 
Using oral testimony in history, however, is problematic. The biggest problem 
facing historians trying to collect and -- utilise oral testimonies is simply the 
characteristics of human nature. Memory is fallible, and What-people remember may 
or may not be correct. Even if they remember things perfectly, that does not change 
the fact that many people will change details or choose to remember them differently 
in order to protect their image or to impress.their interviewer. Slim and Thompson 
point out that: "The process of ordering, discarding, selecting and combining means 
that memory is always a combination of the objective and subjective, and of facts, 
interpretation and opinion.,,49 Additionally, there is no way of telling if a particular 
testimony is really representative of the larger population group on which one is 
trying to gather information. It is necessary to find a way to separate these different 
aspects of oral testimony in order to decide what is true and what is not. In simply 
looking at the testimony itself, it is often impossible to do this, but when one 
testimony is compared with many others and is correlated with other sources, such as 
letters, newspaper articles, police records, and official documents, to name only a few 
49 Slim, Hugo and Thompson, Paul (1995). Listeningjor Change: Oral Testimony and Community 











possibilities, it becomes much easier to gain a clear picture of what has actually 
happened. By matching many different sources, it is often possible to find out which 
statements are true and which are fallacious. One man, interviewed during a project 
for SADET on the 1976 Uprisings in Cape Town, claimed complete responsibility for 
setting off the students' protest march in Cape Town, after claiming direct influence 
over the students in Soweto50• Direct questioning of people who were involved in the 
student protests at the time revealed. that his claims were entirely fallacious. 51 
Occasionally, different stories may be irreconcilable, but the advantages of using the 
oral testimonies far outweigh this danger. One cannot simply discard such 
information because it is not perfect. If perfection were the standard, little evidence, 
oral or written, would survive scrutiny. 
Another problem of collecting oral testimonies is that it necessarily involves a 
process between at least two people, the interviewer and the interviewee. Their 
relationship will often influence the resulting product. Issues of gender, age, racial, 
cultural and linguistic differences, as well as their feelings towards one another, can 
make interviews more or less successful. Jeremy Seekings, who used extensive 
interviews in books on youth politics and on the United Democratic Front, mentioned 
that he saw real differences in the results of interviews between people he got along 
with and respected and those he didn't. He noted that the interviews with the former 
ended up being much more useful and contained much more information than the 
50 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Danile Landingwe, 24 July 2001, Cape Town, SADET Oral 
History Proj ect. 
51 e.g. von den Steinen, L. Interview with Nothando Nolutshungu, August 2001, Mowbray, Cape 
Town, SADET Oral History Project. This claim was also refuted by Geoffrey Mamputa, Taruni 











latter. 52 Unfortunately this is difficult to avoid, but it is important to be conscious of 
this problem so that one can strive to avert it. 
Another difficulty arises with the question of hindsight. When people relate 
things that have happened in their past, they do so through the values and ideas they 
have in the present. This may distort the way things actually were, as they are seen 
through different eyes than they were at the time in question. For example, one UeT 
student wrote a thesis on the changing perceptions of the experience of being 
imprisoned on Robben Island. She found that during different periods, people relating 
their stories of this experience would focus on completely different aspects. When the 
apartheid government was still in power, prisoners of Robben Island described it as a 
horrible place to be, with terrible guards, devastatingly hard labour, and very little 
liope. Now that the new government has taken over and"Robben Island has become a 
monument to the struggle against apartheid, ex-inmates focus rather on" the positive 
aspects of their experiences there, talking of the camaraderie, educational 
opportunities, and the idea of Robben Island as a political university. 53 Seekings 
recommends one way to get around this. He suggests that rather than simply asking 
what happened and why, which allows for filtering through current views, it is better 
to focus on certain issues and events and ask the interviewees to relate them through 
the eyes of the past. For example, an interviewer who wished to find out how the 
soldiers in MK or APLA saw their experiences upon joining the organisation would 
have various ways to go about the interview. Asking simply what conditions were 
52 von den Steinen, L. Conversation with Jeremy Seekings, 3 October 1997, University of Cape Town; 
the relevant books are Seekings, Jeremy (1993). Heroes or Villains?: Youth Politics in the 1980s, 
Johannesburg: Ravan; and (2000). The UDF: A History of the United Democratic Front in South Africa 
1983-1991, Cape Town: David Philip. 
53 Rioufol, Veronique. (1999). The Maktng ofa New Pastfor a "New" South Africa: The 











like when they got to the training camp might elicit explanations tempered by ~urrent 
knowledge about the logistics, resources, and leaders. But a question asking what 
they expected the camps to be like, then what their first impressions were, and finally 
how they think it should have been, with the benefit of hindsight, should provide a 
more objective viewpoint. By separating the past values and ideas from the present in 
this way, it is easier to arrive at something near what they thought at the time. 
Another suggestion by Seekings is to create "a window" to the past. Rather than just 
accepting that the camp commanders were corrupt or that the leadership didn't care, 
the interviewer should ask for specific examples of this, so that there are concrete 
stories to augment the generalisations. 54 
As much as hindsight can distort an event in an interview, it can also clarify 
things in a way that cannot always be found in resources from the time in question. 
For example, witnesses in a trial might not tell things exactly the way they happened 
in order to protect themselves or someone else from the consequences of punishment. 
However, twenty years later, when the threat of punishment is no longer there, they 
may be much more candid than they were at the time. In this way, sometimes oral 
testimonies about past events can be more accurate than things like trial transcripts 
recorded at the time of an event. Trevor Lummis also notes that: 
The retrospective element in oral history is important because it asks 
questions of the past which reflect present interests and seeks evidence 
which was not produced at the time. That evidence is collected within 
a changed culture and, therefore, is not vulnerable to the biases and 
pressures of the period which produced it however much it may be 
shaped by the biases of its own day. 55 
This retrospect also allows interviewers and researchers to discover material that has 
been unavailable before. By finding gaps in existing documentation of a time or 
S4 von den Steinen, L. Conversation with Jeremy Seekings, 3 October 1997, University of Cape Town. 











event and asking about the issues not addressed in the available sources, the record of 
an event or time can be augmented by oral history. 
In the end, the most important thing is for a person collecting oral evidence of 
historical events to be fully aware of the pitfalls inherent to such a project and to do 
his best to avoid it. Also, by gleaning as much information as possible from many 
different people involved in the event in question and from integrating. the oral 
evidence with written sources and documents, it is possible to gain a more complete 
picture of historical events and to add to existing material available on some subjects, 
as well as to add a new, human perspective unattainable through traditional sources. 
As to the interviews conducted by the author, many problems arose and 
influenced this study. The first problem was that without any sort of regional, gender, 
age and background breakdowns of the soldiers of MK and APLA, it was simply 
impossible to establish a picture of what a representative group of soldiers would look 
like. In the absence of this guide, the author attempted to find a variety of different 
people who experienced different aspects of the armed struggle, both men and 
women, those who joined as students and as adults, and those who emerged satisfied 
with their contribution and their experiences and those who did not, as well as people 
of diverse backgrounds. Some attempt was made as well at regional distribution 
among the interviewees, but as the author is based in Cape Town, proportionally more 
interviewees either came from the Eastern or Western Cape or now reside there. 
However, it was possible to interview several people in Cape Town when they were 
visiting from other parts of the country, and the interviewees spent their time in MK 
and APLA in various parts of the country, providing more diversity. 
Many contacts were available, some from VCT students who returned from 











participation in the struggle. Others were found through official channels and still 
others from acquaintances who knew ex-MK and APLA members. Even with 
references however, many people were reluctant to speak of their experiences. Of 
fourteen calls to members of Parliament, even when furnished with the names of their 
friends and colleagues as referrals, only two responded and agreed to be interviewed. 
Many other contacts were sometimes unwilling to talk about their experiences, some 
because they feared reprisals against them if they were frank, others because they just 
wanted to forget, and a few because they couldn't see the importance of sharing their 
memories. 
Many people who were interviewed or approached for interviews were 
distrustful of the interviewer. This largely comes from cultural and political issues, as 
many were not eager to talk to a young, white, American woman whose politics were 
unknown to them. Some distrusted the motives of the interviewer, or worried that 
their words might be twisted in ways they did not intend. Although these worries 
were unfounded, it is understandable that they would not immediately trust someone 
they did not know well, and who came from a very different background. This 
problem was exacerbated by many people's experiences with foreign researchers. In 
the years immediately after the first democratic elections in 1994, many foreign 
researchers came to South Africa, interviewed many people, then went home, 
published books, and made money from their research. A number of people have 
expressed reluctance to contribute to other peoples' studies and then be left behind 
and forgotten. Many articles and books were published that address the issues from 
the authors' point of view rather than somewhat objectively or from the participants' 
point of view, which has made people even more wary of talking to just anyone. The 











justified, about American government activities and interference in foreign affairs 
came up when one APLA operative, introduced to the author by a stalwart and trusted 
PAC member, refused to believe that she was anything but a CIA agent. That 
particular source was adamant in his belief and unapproachable for an interview. The 
very nature of apartheid system and the struggle to defeat it made the race of the 
interviewer an issue. Nevertheless, all of the people who did agree to be interviewed 
were very open and friendly, willing to share their experiences and able to look at 
themselves critically and delve into their deep emotions and experiences. To these the 
author is very grateful, and from them much was learned. 
As for interviews conducted by others and available to the author, these 
provided more of a problem. With an already completed interview, one has to be 
satisfied with the questions asked at the time, and cannot explore issues which were 
not touched on or clarify ones that were not clear. Sometimes, the interviewer's 
methods were much different than the ones used by this author, often asking closed 
questions in the style of, "Wasn't it like this," or "Don't you mean to say this," which 
limits the responses from the interviewee, and can make a difference in the answers 
that are received. These interviews, however, did allow for a larger regional base and 
for some ideas from people who might not be available to be interviewed today, due 
to their current positions, or on a couple of occasions, from people who are now 
deceased. 
Overall, the interviews that were compiled for this study are very rich and 
informative, and the ex-soldiers as a group are very intelligent, open, and honest about 
their experiences and their feelings, which brings about pictures of life in MK and 
APLA which are very detailed and human, and rarely documented. Perhaps in the 











soldiers themselves will write histories, autobiographies, and fictional accounts of 
their experiences, but for the time being, this study hopes to start down this path in the 













There was a girl 
There was a girl 
eight years old, they say 
her hair in spiky braids 
her innocent fist raised in imitation 
Afterwards, there was a mass of red 
some tom pieces of meat 
and bright rags fluttering: 
a girl in a print dress, once, they say. 1 
"Vacancies. Government of Azania. Majors, Lieutenants, Captains. 
Duties: To train and lead 50 million Blacks. 
Apply: SASO, BPC before the reach of the 4th Century of racist oppression.,,2 
Introduction 
Politicisation comes from many things. Life can politicise, events can 
influence, and people can sway others towards finding their stand in politics. There is 
one thing the people who joined Umkhonto we Sizwe and the Azanian People's 
Liberation Anny have in common: at some point in their lives they came to have 
certain opinions about the country they lived in, the government that ruled them, and 
what their role was in attempting to change things. Some learned from their families 
and their position in society very early on that something was wrong with the way 
they lived. Others found themselves gradually coming to terms with their society and 
the things therein with which they did not agree. Many were recruited into politics by 
I Brutus, Dennis. (1980). There was a Girl. In Feinberg, Barry. (ed). Poets to the People: South African 
Freedom Poems, London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 10. 
2 Slogan at Turfloop University, mid-1970s, cited in Hirson, Baruch. (1979). Year of Fire, Year of Ash: 











friends, neighbours, relatives, peers, or elders. Some simply found themselves caught 
up in the events of the times in which they lived. A few can point to a particular point 
in their lives when their views changed irrevocably. Many were discouraged by 
others as they pursued what they thOUght was right. But whatever the cause, their 
opinions and views about the society they lived in and their own roles in it guided 
them towards joining MK and APLA. 
Background 
The 1950s were years of open and robust protest for many people. The early 
fifties saw the Defiance Campaign against unjust laws, in which people from all walks 
of life offered themselves for arrest for contravening many of the apartheid laws, 
particularly the pass laws and the Separate Amenities Act. The theory behind this 
campaign was that by filling the jails, the government would see that the laws were 
unjust, unenforceable and unfair, and change accordingly. The Congress of the 
People in 1955 resulted in the Freedom Charter, a crucial document of the liberation 
struggle still celebrated today. Various campaigns followed this, notably the anti-pass 
crusade of 1960, which resulted in fierce government repression and the Sharpeville 
massacre. A year later both the ANC and the PAC despaired of achieving change 
through peaceful means and fonned and launched anned wings, Umkhonto we Sizwe 
and Poqo respectively. By 1963, with the arrest of many key leaders of MK and 
Poqo, the government largely crushed resistance. The 1960s saw a resultant wave of 
repression and new laws from the government and was a time of defeat, fear, and lack 
of opposition to the apartheid regime. While some did work to rebuild the 
underground, and MK managed to set off a few pamphlet bombs, this period 











and student protests, usually at a tertiary level, and the rise of Black Consciousness 
and its allied organisations. The youth of the early to mid-1970s, who were to 
become the fighting force in the revival of resistance to apartheid, were largely born 
around the time of the previous wave of resistance and grew up in a period when 
harsh repression forced acquiescence on the part of most of the black population of 
South Africa. Brooks and Brickhill characterised this generation as: "a generation 
reared in a period of defeat but which has never known defeat itself.,,3 The Soweto 
uprisings, details of which can readily be found elsewhere, began in mid-1976.4 The 
uprising lasted until 1978, when the apartheid government finally crushed it. In 1983, 
the United Democratic Front (UDF) was launched, and the next year saw the 
beginning of township revolts which lasted until 1987. These periods of unrest, 
particularly the first one, were largely dominated by the youth and characterised by 
unprecedented levels of violent resistance to the apartheid government. Most of the 
people who joined Umkhonto we Sizwe and the Azanian People's Liberation Army 
came from these two periods. 
Politicised by Life 
The discovery of politics for these youths happened in many ways. For some, 
simple existence sufficed to awaken their interest in politics. By the 1970s, most 
forced removals had already been undertaken, some bantustans were approaching 
independence, and citizenship in South Africa and the right to live in the cities 
3 Brooks and BrickhilI. (l980). Whirlwind before the Storm, London: International Defence and Aid 
Fund for Southern Africa, 67. 
4 See particularly Hirson, Brooks and Brickhill, Kane-Bennan, John. (1978). Soweto: Black Revolt 
White Reaction, Johannesburg: Ravan; Mashabela, Harry. (2006). A People on the Boil: Reflections on 
June 16 1976 and Beyond, Johannesburg: Jacana; Hopkins, Pat and Grange, Helen. (2001). The Rocky 
Rioter Teargas Show: The Inside Story of the 1976 Uprising, Cape Town: Zebra; and Ndlovu, Sifiso 











became more and more problematic for the majority of Africans. Contrasts between 
their township living arrangements and those of the whites in neighbouring suburbs 
were hard to miss. Many had witnessed police brutality at first hand and its effects on 
their families and themselves. In circumstances like this, there was often little need 
for subsequent events or outside organisations to bring the realisation of unfairness 
and despair at the lot of the Africans to the youth. 
The harassment of a child's parents left an effect on many of the young people 
who would later enlist to fight against apartheid. No matter how old, these children 
were aware of their parents' fear, and often made the connection between the fear of 
their parents and the white run police force that induced it. Reverend Barney 
Ngakane, a prominent Soweto leader explained: 
Every black home is a political school. The husband comes home 
every day and tells his wife how he has been kicked around and 
arrested for things like pass offences. The children are listening and 
they take all this in. This is why African school children have become 
politically aware so easily. 5 
This is also acknowledged by the youth themselves. One man who became active in 
the Soweto uprisings traced his political awareness to his childhood: 
One of our duties that one can recall there was brewing home brew ... 
that was made in the back yard at that time. And it was [ an] illegal 
affair ... Now as infants we would be in some way told to go and play 
at the top of the sand dunes there so that when we see [the police] we 
would then indicate . . . then I mean conceal everything so that when 
the boer boys come there's nothing, only the smell would be 
remaining. Its [ sic] one thing that is still very, very clear to my mind. 
This was going on- this was my first contact with a white man. I then 
from that stage, that age, had seen them as people- when they come 
here they never come peacefully. When you see a white coming to 
your area, we'd know it means trouble6 
S Rev. BameyNgakane, quoted in Kane-Berman, 25. 











Another young girl recalled the forced removal of her family, who resisted the move. 
She was about 5 years old, and remembered that police and their dogs used to come 
every day around two in the morning to harass her family to move. Her parents 
feared the police, and this was not lost on her. 7 Run-ins with the police when the 
youths were at very impressionable ages taught them at an early age what sort of 
society they were living in and what their family's position was within it. 
Often apartheid dictated the family situation itself, with the men being forced 
to go to the cities for work, and families having to stay in the reserves. Sometimes 
even the women remaining at home had to leave to get work, and the children were 
left with their extended families. One man remembers; 
I've never seen my father. When my mother was staying far away 
from me and I grew up with ... my aunt you see, who took me as [her] 
son. So all those things I could question, why should our people- I 
mean why should this thing happen you see. And I could see ... [if] 
people [weren't] forced to work far away and so on and so on, I would 
be having a father and mother . . . So it- I could see some sort of 
immorality of the reginie you see. Being I mean what I am- I think 
that I am partly the victim. Because they- it was not their choice. 
Even if my mother neglected me at an early stage ... it was not [her] 
choice to do that. 8 
The basic premises of apartheid often resulted in children having broken homes, and 
this influenced them greatly. 
Children also noticed differences in the living conditions of blacks and whites. 
Many had parents who were domestic workers and were able to see the insides of the 
white houses, which were nothing like their own. One woman remembered: 
My mum used to take us to her work, place of employment and, you 
know, there was that element whereby you find that the employers 
were having two fridges full of food, you know . . . and by that time, 
we didn't have any fridge at home and we didn't have any electricity 
. . . they had kids not far from where they were staying, they had a 
7 Kodesh, W. Interview with Veronica (Mpho) Msimanga, 17 August 1993. 











playing ground and at one time I said to my mum, 'momma may I 
please go and play with those kids?' She said no, you can't go there 
because you will be arrested, its not permissible,' and I said, 'why?' 
She said, 'no, its only white kids who are supposed to play there'. And 
at my age, at eleven, I wished I was white because all those kids have 
these opportunities. 9 
Another noted that: 
My mother was a domestic servant at Rondebosch [in Cape Town] 
... and life was totally [the] opposite of the life that you are used to 
... big houses; there's no house that is that same [as] another one. 
Unlike where we're staying and the carriages, every house is the same. 
There's electricity when we entered their kitchens. There's fridges, 
whatever, the life of the white man which was a contrast to what we 
are used to. 10 
Some did not even need to go into the homes of white people with their mothers to 
realise the situation. One man explained: "When we went into town and saw the 
relative lUXury in which white people lived, this made an indelible impression on our 
young minds."ll Another young man asserted: 
The economic and social conditions of the blacks in this country are 
such that no normal person or right thinking person could tolerate 
them. In Soweto where I lived, I have seen children die because of 
malnutrition. I have seen my people slaughter one another so as to get 
bread in order to survive. In my own family I have seen my brothers 
and uncles going endlessly to town in a fruitless search for work. I 
have seen my own father struggle to bring us up. In as far as housing 
is concerned, one need only look at Alexandra Township, crime-
ridden, foul-smelling with the long-forgotten walks being used for 
sanitary purposes. It hardly compares with the posh white suburb, 
Kew, just 300 metres away. These things have not passed unabsorbed 
in my mind. 12 
The huge differences in the quality of living conditions between the black and white 
communities made a big impression on many black children, and often gave them 
9 Bernstein, H. Interview with Caesarine Gwanamakuru. No date. 
10 Interview with Petane. 
11 Excerpt from Mosima Gabriel Sexwale's statement to the court in the "Pretoria 12" trial, from 
Benson, Mary. (ed). (1981). The Sun Will Rise: Statements from the Dock by Southern African Political 
Prisoners, London: International Aid and Defence Fund, 66. 











their first glance at how unfair life was in South Africa. These experiences sometimes 
had a very negative effect on the self-esteem of the youngsters. One woman 
remembered: "When I was still a baby, my mother used to ask me, 'what do you want 
to be?' I said, 'I want to be a white man.' Because I saw a white man as the 
person." 13 
Another major politicising factor for this generation was the issue of forced 
removals. The government compelled many families to leave their homes and move 
to new and usually worse living conditions in the 1960s. This memory had profound 
effects on these children. One man recalled the forced removal of the community 
where he grew up with his grandmother. A teacher in his school talked to the class 
intimately about the removals, and told them never to forget it. She. asserted: 
"Anywhere black people have good places, good land, they are chased away just as 
you do with a dog. If a dog is sitting in a nice ~pot in the shade, one will kick him 
away to sit in the SpOt.,,14 Another girl recalled being moved with her family from a 
nice place attached to a 'coloured' family's house to Naledi township in 
Johannesburg. She remembered arriving at the new place and finding the family 
living in a small four roomed house with another family, eight people in all, and an 
outside toilet. They also had to cook outside, by digging a hole, making a fire, and 
using it as a stove. This change in her environment played a large part in her political 
development. 15 One woman had a very personal response to the issue of forced 
removals. She remembered that after her family was removed from Cape Town, she 
moved to the Eastern Cape, where she contracted tapeworms, and had to have two 
13 Bernstein, H. Interview with Joyce Stofile, no date. 
14 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Thabang Makwetla, 23 September and 12 October 1998, Cape 
Town. 











operations. She said: "In fact at that time I was interpreting it according to my age. It 
was like if I was not sent to the Eastern Cape, I could have not got these [tape ]worms 
from the Eastern Cape. So that was basically my involvement and that was my 
anger." 16 Another man remembered: 
We were staying at Addersvlei. It was a mixed area, we were staying 
. . . Chinese, you know people of the other races. When we were 
removed to Guguletu it was only us. As a young chap that didn't 
matter. But as you were growing up you then began to realise that it's· 
only people of your skin that you see around. There's no longer other 
race . . . There were so many meetings around whether the families 
would be going or not ... you'd see parents gathering at certain houses 
and notice that the debates were very, very tense. Because the mood 
from them was not as jolly as we were used to.17 
Some didn't even have to be moved themselves to have this effect them. One woman 
remembered the removal of Crossroads and the KTC squatter camp in Cape Town: 
People were transported in big trucks being taken all the way from 
Cape Town and being dumped somewhere there near the Transkei and 
then people had to find [their] way back. It had a serious impact on 
me. And the KTC squatter camps, I remember one night when we 
were with some friends, white friends, I mean they were shocked when 
they saw the situation there. The situation was terrible, it was raining 
and people were sitting outside without blankets.I8 
The moving of people from comfortable communities to new and unknown places 
which usually had worse conditions than their previous homes was a sure way to 
foment dissatisfaction in the children of these families. 
Sometimes less consequential issues led youths towards politics. One in 
particular remembered the influence of rugby and the sports boycott of the early 
1970s that got him involved in politics. With activities such as sports playing such a 
significant role in the lives of the youth, it is not surprising that this issue became his 
16 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Thandi Zonke. July 2001, for the SADET Oral History Project. 
17 Interview with Petane. 











training ground. He recalled the issue of non-racial sport being in vogue at the time, 
and noted: "So that came with a lot of politics in fact, because we began now to see in 
a practical way, defiance of all these ... measures and acts of the apartheid acts and 
al1. .. We had a very good slogan, which was saying ... 'No nonnal sport in an 
abnonnal society. ",19 A few people credited reggae music as the key factor in their 
politicisation. The "Africa for the Africans" slogan of Marcus Garvey and the 
revolutionary messages often mentioned in reggae songs led some people directly into 
the PAC which advocated the same slogan.2o In these ways, some basic issues 
surrounding the lives of the youth found expression later on a larger scale in the 
politics of the country itself .. 
Another hotbed of politicisation was the school. Many students who didn't 
know of politics before getting to school began to explore and learn about the' 
situation in which they found themselves. Some who had attended more progressive 
schools found their circumstances different from the norm. One woman recalled that 
she went to a multi-racial boarding school, and then transferred to a township school. 
She noted: 
Well things were quite different then at that school because we were 
used to mixing with all the races . . . We also had quite a hard time 
there because of this problem of ours that we are used to mixing really 
with everybody and all of a sudden we find ourselves exposed to all 
kinds oflaws and things ... well it was not easy to adjust.2 
This change in circumstances helped her realise that there were different ways of 
doing things than those that were done in the townships. Others discovered politics 
19 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Lemmo Kalako, 10 June 1998, Cape Town. 
20 APLA questionnaires, from the PAC archives at the University of Fort Hare. 












through their teachers, particularly history teachers. One man remembers two 
dynamic history teachers who influenced his ideas: 
The man who was teaching us history then was a very articulate and a 
dramatic person. He would start a battle to your mind and dramatise 
the whole scene . . . At the end of the day the British, because our 
fighting ... was not with the Boer boy it was the British themselves that 
we were fighting. Superior... arms, military fonnations, military 
science, they were quite superior but we were putting our resistance 
there, fighting very fierce and hard. And after each battle, they would 
gain ground, they would capture certain lands. You know we fight 
back, we try to recapture those, they would again defeat us in battle, 
gain some more. So one's knowledge then was a little bit advanced by 
knowing that well, we are living the way we are living because we had 
been defeated in this battles. . . . I was [ a] history student at high 
school taught by ... another dramatic teacher. When we were learning 
about the French Revolution, it had then you know came with many 
answers and to that infonnation that we were having that it is possible 
for people [to] mobilise, organise and rise against whatever system that 
they are sick and tired of . . . As small groups we were beginning to 
study these things very, very serious. Try and see whether there 
couldn't be any solutions to our problems as the French had done.22 
Others also remembered their history teachers. One girl recalled that they learned 
history from a good teacher, who would explain things to them in details. Then in and 
out of this history class, they would read banned books and pass them around, and this 
inspired them.23 Some had more negative experiences with their teachers, but found 
politics through the experiences nonetheless. One woman remembered: 
When I went to high school, I went to Vlakfontein Technical High 
where two-thirds of the teaching staff was white and most of them 
were Afrikaner, only a few were English-speaking, so they were from 
the SADF, they had this mentality in them that they will deal with us 
and all that. And looking at the South African situation, for a white 
person, an Afrikaner for that matter, a real Afrikaner, to come and 
teach at the black school, it shows that they are the rejects because if 
they were good, they wouldn't have come to our school ... You are in 
this situation where apartheid is seriously practised right inside the 
school yard. For instance they had a white staff room, catered for by 
the school and there was an old black man cleaning it, it was very 
22 Interview with Petane. 










clean and there was a black staff room which looked like a toilet, you 
know. And that thing affected US.24 
Other young students found themselves frustrated by their future opportunities. One 
man related: 
As a young man, I would have liked to advance myself so that I could 
secure myself a desirable future. But the question I had to ask myself 
was what were the prospects? This is the question that brings about 
frustration bordering on desperation to a great majority of young 
blacks. I knew that I could not be what I really wanted to be if in the 
. opinion of the powers that be, such an occupation was unfit for blacks. 
That is to say if I wanted to be a pilot, having the necessary 
intelligence and ability, I still needed a further feature before I could 
qualify. That is, in order to be a pilot I would have to be a white 
man.is 
Government restrictions on young black people usually won the government more 
frustrated adversaries than complacent citizens. 
Some of the youth from this generation also found politics through their 
family connections. Many had parents, grandparents, or extended family members 
who had been involved in resistance in earlier years. One boy who grew up in 
Athlone, Cape Town, had a family in the Unity Movement. Occasionally his home 
served as a safe house for family members hiding from the police. As a young child, 
he knew not to say a word regarding the fugitives living with them. He would listen 
to the news and notice that the way life was did not conform to the morals of his 
family. By the time he was 11, he wrote a letter to the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) asking them to: "take me out of this 
place to somewhere without the racist terror of South Africa.,,26 Others had family 
members who had spent time in prison for their activities in the early 1960s. One 
24 Bernstein, Interview with Gwanamakuru. 
2S Excerpt from Naledi Tsiki's statement to the court, from Benson, 70. 











recalled: "My father was politically involved. He belongs to that detachment of the 
50s and he was arrested during the 1960, early 1960s and he spent some time on 
Robben Island, about 3 years and he came out round about 1968 ... I was six years 
old then. So throughout my upbringing he used to not hide his political beliefs and 
the way he ... his world outlook.,,27 A woman who later joined the armed struggle 
had a similar background: "I grew up there, you know like politics it was something 
that was in the family, because my grandfather was a politician, both sides, my 
mother and my father, my [grandfather] was in Robben Island. So, in fact I was 
involved from the school level in politics?S" Another related: "I lived with my 
grandparents and my grandfather had a big influence on my political development. 
During his time he was the president of the ANC in the Western Cape as well as a 
member of the SACP and SACTU [the South African Council of Trade Unions].,,29 
Another man cannot remember when he first became involved in politics: "There's no 
particular period where I can say I began to get particularly active. I come from an 
ANC family, both my mother and my father.,,3o Bandile "Blacks" Joyi explained: 
I was born in Cape Town, my father was involved in the PAC, in its 
fonnation. I think I got the influence from him. And in general I got 
the influence from the family, because our family as Joyis, we are from 
the Madiba clan, which is very political historically of course. Firstly I 
experienced the apartheid system through some other things that they 
have done to my family. My father was never allowed to own a home, 
a house, because of his political involvement. He was working 
somewhere, at K Gate wire and fence, where he was constantly under 
surveillance by the security branch. That affected me as the first born. 
And as a result I became politically clear at an early age of about 
fifteen. I knew what was happening. 31 
27 Interview with Zola Tyikwe (Vincent Madla1a). Interviewer unknown, no date. 
28 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Chief P.O. Pumla Mapipa, 19 August 2004, Simonstown Naval 
Base. 
29 Interview with Thamsanqa (Thami) Ngwevela. Interviewer unknown, no date. 
30 Bernstein, H. Interview with Mongezi Stotile, no date. 











Other parents did not have direct political affiliations, but their attitudes still 
influenced their children. One man eloquently recalled: 
[My father], who I suspect of having bequeathed me a lion's share of 
his genes, was a very rebellious character: Almost something unheard 
of in the Ermelo vicinity before, he regularly boxed the ears of the 
white farmers who kept on reminding him of his "inferior" skin colour 
when his intellect, and what an intellect was that- surpassed theirs. A 
shrewd and successful timber contractor, he spent lots of his earning[s] 
on several court cases against the whites who he felt "had to be taught 
a lesson against their vulture-like descending behind the generalized 
ruination of Africans.,,32 
In these ways, family influence often played a critical role in the politicisation of 
these young people. 
The early 1970s 
For those who did not discover politics at an early age, as well as for those 
who did, the early 1970s were a period of great change and burgeoning resistance to 
the apartheid government. The first half of this decade led many less aware young 
people to become newly politicised and saw those who already had political leanings 
develop their ideas further. A wave of strikes across the country, the rise of Black 
Consciousness and its related organisations, and student protests at many universities 
brought the realities of the situation in South Africa and the possibilities of 
challenging it to the forefront of many young minds. The independence of Angola 
and Mozambique in 1975 further brought the possibility of winning the liberation 
struggle to the attention of the youth. Long before the Soweto uprisings, many young , 
South Africans began to become politically involved in earnest. 











The workers' strikes in the early 1970s were not mentioned by many ex-MK 
and APLA soldiers as a direct influence on their political awareness, but they 
definitely provided an important component of the re-emergence of resistance to the 
government. With strikes hitting every big city in South Africa, most saw their results 
in the adults staying at home, and noticed that this was a new element in the recent 
political trends in the country. Baruch Hirson notes in his book, Year of Fire, Year of 
Ash, that the long period of industrial peace in the 1960s gave way to large scale 
strikes in many industries, starting in Durban in 1969 and continuing until the 
outbreak of the Soweto uprising in June of 1976. Many of the strikes gained 
concessions from both their employers and the government, but as the wave gained 
momentum, they were more often met with fierce repression on the part of the police. 
and the government. Some of the student organisations were involved in the strikes, 
providing support for the workers, and the Black Consciousness Movement won some 
workers into its folds. 33 If nothing else came to the youth from the strikes, they would 
have seen that it was possible to win on some issues, but for those that didn't have 
clear memories of the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, it also brought home the point 
that the police were ready and willing to suppress resistance with brute force. 
The Black Consciousness Movement became a powerful ideological force 
during this period, particularly among students. The ideas embraced by the 
movement found their way into the consciousness of the majority of the youth who 
came of age in this period. Largely supported by university and school students, the 
movement and its priQ.ciples did not find much support from other parts of the 
community, except from those who were touched by its outreach programs, although 
it did attract some of the more intellectually inclined black professionals. John Kane-











Berman identified three main thrusts of the Black Consciousness philosophy, namely 
'psychologica1liberation', 'the weaning of blacks away from dependence on whites', 
.and the unity of 'all black people in South Africa, including Indians and Coloured 
people. ,34 The first principle was a reaction to the fact that through long-term 
oppression of the black population, they began to see themselves as inferior to the 
whites. As mentioned above, some black children would· wish to be white, as the 
white people were the ones they admired for their status in society .. The same woman 
who once told her mother she wanted to be a white man when she grew up was just 
entering her teen years at this time and she remembered: "Everyone was becoming . 
aware, Black Consciousness was spreading. I like it because it made you to be proud 
of your colour." She also noted that it made people react against things like skin 
lightening cream and made them come to believe that "black is beautiful.,,35 The 
second principle of moving away from dependence on whites was largely focused on 
providing black leadership rather than white, as is best illustrated in the creation of a 
new black student organisation in July of 1969. Rather than the black students 
remaining a part of the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), a largely 
white-led organisation, The South African Students' Organisation (SASO) emerged as 
the forefront of black student politics. One student active in this period noted: 
You know during that period black consciousness was popular in the 
township and of course it was sort of to try and conscientise especially 
students to try and understand what role they're going to play in 
society. We shall not be submissive especially to whites as it is known 
as blacks we've been oppressed and segregated by the apartheid 
regime . . . It was during that period especially during the 70s when 
most of us started to realise what is important is to try and help in 
black organisations like for instance trying to form civic associations 
where we can try to conscientise our people about their plight. 36 
34 Kane-Berman, 103-4. 
35 Kodesh, Interview with Msimanga. 











-- -- --- -- --- -----------
Some students got involved with Black Consciousness oriented community outreach 
programs, which often focused on cultural activities and sports, while others worked 
to bring services to the communities themselves, such as health clinics and legal 
advice. One young medical student remembered being involved in clinics in the 
townships during this period.37 The final objective of uniting people under a common 
label of 'black' didn't really see results until the uprisings themselves, particularly in 
Cape Town, but laid the basis for co-operation between the African, Coloured, and 
Indian communities that would become more noticeable particularly during the 
township revolts of the mid-1980s. 
Many black student organisations came into being during this period. One of 
the most popular was the South African Students' Organisation, which was created in 
1969 as something of 'an amalgam of already existing elements' .38 This organisation 
was one of the main initiators of the community outreach programmes mentioned 
above. The South African Students' Movement (SASM), originally based in the 
Transvaal but eventually gaining support in other parts of the country, became a 
widespread and well-supported organisation in this period. SASM particularly 
focused on providing discussion forums for the youth. Many ex-MK and APLA 
soldiers went through discussion groups connected to SASM which led to their further 
exploration and understanding of political issues. Others created their own study 
groups, as one man remembers: "The Union of Self Study (USS) was founded 
ostensibly to help students with their studies, but secretly we sought to participate in a 
37 Kodesh, W. Interview with Ayanda Ntsaluba, 20 April 1993 










world that was changing at an incredible speed around US.39 Many people who spent 
these years in universities and schools mentioned both of these organisations, and had 
been involved in them and politicised by them. Other student organisations were also 
present, such as the National Youth Organisation (NA YO) and its regional branches, 
which was also remembered by some of the youths from this period. 
Two particular SASO campaigns had a large effect on some of the students at 
this time. The first is referred to as the "May Revolt," which took place at the 
Turfloop University in 1972. Confrontations between students and authorities had 
occurred at the beginning of the year, and sparks flew in April when Onkgopotse 
Tamothibi (Abraham) Tiro gave a graduation speech there. He openly criticised the 
black education system and the government and challenged the graduates actively to 
work against the system rather than working within it. One youth from this period 
recalled attending the graduation as his sister was one of the graduates, and points to 
this speech as one of the first moments he became aware of politics. He recalled that 
all the way home for three hours, the adults discussed the speech, thought it would put 
everybody in trouble, and anticipated an outburst of unrest. He had trouble 
understanding why they were all so negative about the speech when it had been 
hugely popular and got more applause than any other.40 The adults were right about 
one thing: it did lead to unrest. Tiro was expelled, and a group of 1,146 students who 
protested his expulsion was also expelled. This led to a boycott of lectures at several 
other schools in the country. Hirson explained the ramifications of the boycotts: "As 
a result of the wave of boycotts, students were suspended, staff members resigned, 
39 Mphahlele, Letlapa. (2002). Child of this Soil: My Life as a Freedom Fighter, Cape Town: Kwela, 
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bursaries were suspended, and hundreds of students just left the universities.,,41 Many 
of the students who belonged to SASO or the Student Representative Committees 
were told not to come back to the universities. 
The other key campaign involving SASO showed the great influence of 
international events on the students inside South Africa. In 1974, the organisation ' 
called for rallies to celebrate the coup in Portugal which led to the independence of 
Mozambique and Angola in 1975. This coup was largely attributed to the huge 
expenses, both monetary and human, that the Portuguese government accrued due to 
the guerrilla warfare waged by the liberation movements in the two countries as well 
as the bleak outlook for swift victory. SASO called for "Viva FRELIMO" rallies to 
celebrate the imminent independence of Mozambique, and the success of the Frente 
de Liberta~ao de M09ambique (FRELIMO), the main Mozambiquean liberation 
movement. This was an exciting moment, as this was the first country that shared a 
border with South Africa to achieve independence through a liberation struggle and 
guerrilla war. Meetings for this organisation were banned for the crucial week, but at 
Turfloop University the students gathered under the auspices of the Student 
Representative Council (SRC) and held their rally. Hirson explained: 
Twelve hundred students gathered for the meeting, but were ordered to 
disperse by a force of 82 policemen, equipped with guns, gas pistols 
and police dogs. Assaults by the police and stone throwing by 
students, attacks on two white members of staff and two white 
technicians, and the arrest of two students ended the day ... The action 
lasted for over a week, but was ended just before the college 
authorities could issue an ultimatum. Students returned to preparations 
for the examinations which they were not prepared to forego, and their 
arrested comrades remained in police custody.42 
41 Hirson, 87. 
42 Hirson, 90. 











Large scale arrests and detentions of SASO and Black Consciousness leaders at this 
time led to a weakening of the movements which never regained their strength, but 
their influence continued to be felt and those touched by their ideas did not turn back 
from the political road they had undertaken. John Kane-Berman noted: 
The liberation of Mozambique and Angola and the guerrilla wars being 
waged in Namibia and Rhodesia are likely to have had an impact on a 
fairly wide cross-section of blacks, firing them with the expectations of 
major change . . . Moreover, to the extent that black South Africans 
saw the withdrawal of South African military forces from Angola as a 
sign that white power was not invincible, this too would have had an 
important psychological impact.43 
The state of regional political affairs made this generation ripe for action and, in some 
ways, positive that their efforts could make a difference, while still having little doubt 
of the might of the South African regime and the repression with which their efforts 
would be met. 
The Soweto Uprisings 
The 16th of June 1976 saw the beginning of a two-year long uprising that 
would become a turning point in South African history. On this day, unarmed African 
students marched through Soweto to protest the imposition of Afrikaans as a medium 
of instruction for some subjects in their schools and encountered police, who 
proceeded to cut them down with bullets. This was followed by a long drawn out 
spate of fights, protests, boycotts, stay-aways, and general unrest throughout South 
Africa. The government's response to the resistance was not a total surprise, as they 
were known to put down protest with great force and little mercy, but the nature of the 











school children, many of them still wearing their uniforms. The youths' response to 
the repression was unprecedented, violent, and often fearless. 
The uprising grew out of the many influences in the years before. In 1976, a 
series of school boycotts and student meetings protested this same issue. The 
government had decreed that all African students at a certain level in their schooling 
would have to learn mathematics, social studies, geography and history in Afrikaans. 
Many students didn't speak the language, and many teachers had the same problem. 
One woman who was active in school politics at the time explained: "Just imagine 
trying to learn maths or history in Afrikaans, it was.just like learning it in Greek or 
something. ,,44 Furthermore, the students saw Afrikaans as the language of oppression, 
being imposed on them by the oppressors themselves. The same woman noted: 
They wanted us to learn history in Afrikaans, can you imagine trying 
to say a year in Afrikaans? Trying to say 1966 in Afrikaans? And the 
history they taught us was distorted. They would teach you about 
Shaka, they made me hate him. They make you hate your own history 
and heroes and not to like yourself or the next person who's black.4s 
Whatever the reasoning, this issue made the school children come out in force to 
reject this government imposition of the language on their studies. They finally 
decided to organise a huge march to protest, and met their fate at the hands of the 
police. 
When the police opened fire on the students, they were not met by the terrified 
fleeing of the past generations. The students grabbed anything at hand and hurled it at 
the police. They then went on a rampage against anything in the township that 
belonged to the government. Schools were torched, beerhalls burnt down, 
administration buildings destroyed, vehicles and shops attacked, and police stoned. 
Kane-Berman reported that in the first month or so of the uprising: 
44 Kodesh, Interview with Msimanga. 










Country-wide it was reported that more than 100 buildings belonging 
to the Boards were damaged or destroyed, along with 250 bottle stores 
and beerhalls, 170 shops, 25 clinics, eight banks, about a dozen 
libraries, and' a score of post-offices, as well as smaller numbers of 
hotels, cinemas, clinics, churches, community halls, magistrates' 
courts, and petrol filling stations. The number of police and other 
vehicles burnt ran to several hundred, which the Public Utility 
Transport Corporation (Putco) which operates township bus services, 
also suffered heavy losses. One-third of its Reef fleet of 926 vehicles 
was attacked . . . Commercial vehicles belonging to white businesses 
were another target of attack ... Numbers of black-owned shops in the 
township were also attacked although the pror0rtion was small . . . 
Schools were one of the main targets of attack.4 
One girl who was involved in the uprisings explained when they attacked non-
government establishments, such as people's shops and homes, they only targeted 
people who were unsympathetic to the students.47 The school boycott continued off 
and on until 1978, and many students never returned to school at all. As news of the 
police action in Soweto reached other parts of the country, the uprisings spread. 
Throughout the next two years, unrest continued intermittently in most of the major 
cities of the country. Some of the rural areas and smaller towns also joined in the 
uprisings. 
The uprisings demonstrated many new elements when compared to past 
periods of unrest. The first and foremost was the age of the participants. In the past, 
protest and resistance rested largely in the hands of adults, but this period belonged to 
the youth. Determining the exact ages of participants is very difficult, but John Kane-
Berman suggested: 
As far as the ages of participants in demonstrations are concerned, it is 
possible to get only a rough picture, based on press reports giving age 
breakdowns of people killed, admitted to hospital, or brought before 
the courts. Of 1200 people in both urban and rural areas whose ages 
were obtained in this way in 1976, it emerges that 44 percent were 13-
16 years old, 49 per cent were 17-23 years old, and seven per cent 
46 Kane-Berman, 19-21. 











older than 24 ... In the Cape Peninsula, half of the 97 people killed (92 
of them by the police) were aged between 11 and 20 ... Many very 
young children took part in demonstrations, and several were shot 
dead. The [South African] Institute [of Race Relations] identified 
twelve children below the age of eleven who died.48 
The ferocity and violence of the uprising were also unseen before this time. The 
might of the police force did not cow the youth as'it had their predecessors. An article 
in the Financial Mail from the time wrote: "A new generation has now grown up. 
Unlike many of their parents, who have developed an attitude of fatalistic resignation 
to second-class citizenship, these younger men and women are impatient, radical, 
militant, brave and proud.,,49 As time went on, they adapted to the conditions by 
bringing water and wet rags to the demonstrations to fight the tear gas of the police, 
and using dustbin lids as shields from the police bullets. They innovated weapons 
from everyday materials, using petrol bombs, stones, and some brand new inventions 
like tennis ball bombs: "produced by injecting petrol under pressure into a tennis ball 
using a syringe, then dipping the tennis ball into petrol and balancing it on a ledge or 
on the floor of the building to be burnt and lighting it. The pressure inside the ball as 
it burnt sent their bomb rocketing around bouncing off the walls, and despite the small 
size often produced better results, according to one of our informants, than the usual 
bottle-encased petrol bomb.,,5o Tires were also filled with petrol, set alight, and rolled 
downhill towards the police. 51 Many student groups developed very clear and 
effective operating techniques. One man who helped the students organise in Cape 
Town explained their strategy: 
48 Kane-Berman, 7. 
49 Quoted in Kane-Berman, 106. 
50 Brooks and Brickhill, 153. 










We always said that any attack had to have a brief duration, 10 
minutes, 15 minutes, nothing more than that. So one of the places that 
we targeted was this J abulani sorghum beer facility, and so we just 
came in there, smashed furniture, equipment, and everything around, 
right? And in ten minutes, there had been so much damage done, and 
the place was set on fire, and we disappeared. And nobody knew who 
had been at the place, who had wrecked so much havoc and damage on 
the premises and so on. And so, we'd move from that to the next place, 
it would be for example, the admin offices in Langa, just in and out, 
five minutes, and by the time the security forces arrived, we'll be 
resting somewhere. And what we did is, we had many places, where 
the Langa Stadium is, behind it, where we had organized the Molotov 
cocktails, we had put in petrol, and put in all this stuff, and we had dug 
holes and put the stuff in, because we did not want to look around, 
where do you find petrol now, where do you find the bottles, where do 
you find this, that, and the other. So everything was ready there. And 
when the time came for the mission, we'd just rush in and grab the 
stuff, and that would always be replenished from time to time. So, 
that's how organized we were in general. And so this group 
specialized in these ambush tactics and so on. 52 
However one looked at it, the uprisings marked a dramatic change in the political 
situation in South Africa. 
The fearlessness and militancy of the youth in the face of such brutal 
repression had many reasons. It could be put down to the excitement of youth or the 
horrible conditions of the townships among other things. However, one of the main 
reasons was the fact that so many of these young people had grown up in a time of 
defeat. Their parents and leaders had been jailed or terrorised into acquiescence, and 
in their memories, their elders seemed to have given up, sold out, and fallen into 
acceptance of their lot as black people in South Africa. Many of them looked on their 
elders scornfully, and had sworn that they would not give up as easily as their parents 
had. A newspaper article from the day before the shooting related: "Many children 
have lost respect for their elders. They see us as people whose dignity and pride has 
S2 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Temba Nolutshungu, 1 August 2001, Cape Town, for the SADET 











been hurt and who have seemingly lost the will to resist injustice."s3 This observation 
was an astute one. One girl later explained: 
Our parents are prepared to suffer under the white man's rule.' They 
have been living for years under these laws and they have become 
immune to them. They agree to them whether they are right or wrong. 
They refuse to co-operate with the new generation when they plead 
with them for co-operation .... Our parents lack unity and believe in 
the ethnic group laws that the white man is imposing on us. They 
despise each other and call one another names that are degrading. The 
future generation has no more confidence in them any more because 
they have not objected to the unfavourable laws, thus the yoke 
automatically falls on the future generation. 54 
Some young people saw this apathy and capitulation to the system and decided the 
mantle of fighting apartheid lay on their shoulders. Bricks and Brookhill defended the 
parents' attitude: 
The imposition of Bantu Education was bitterly resisted. But this 
resistance was largely unknown to the school children of 1976, many 
of whom believed that their parents had quietly capitulated to the 
government's will. Yet the parents would not have responded so 
readily and positively as, in the main, they did to the school students' 
struggles in 1976 if they had not lived through similar battles in their 
own day. 55 
In their own way, many of the youth recognised that the elders were not all against 
them. The same authors noted: 
The rejection by black youth of the moral authority of the older 
generations. . .does not extend to a political repudiation of previous 
generations. On the contrary, with the exception of a few pretentious 
remarks, the spokesmen of the school student movement have by and 
large referred to the imprisoned leaders on Robben Island and others in 
exile with respect, and have indicated that they felt they owed much to 
their predecessors in the struggle. 56 
S3 The World, 15 June 1976, ''Need for cool heads over language row," from Ndlovu, 33. 
S4 Kane-Berman, 125-6. 
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Whatever their opinions on the subject, the generation gap was real, and caused 
tensions between the adults and students in the townships. 
Some were discouraged by their elders from participating in politics. This was 
not just their parents' own fear, but their fear for their young children and knowledge 
that with their children's participation they could find themselves childless. One man 
remembers his family's attitude towards politics. His father had been arrested and 
sent to Robben Island, and they used to tell him: "You see, you'll end up in prison. 
You'll follow your f~ther, that's what you're going to do.,,57 Another recalls his 
mother getting upset if he sang 'Nkosi Sike1el' iAfrika' (the African national anthem, 
often used as a protest song), as his mother said it would get him in trouble. 58 But for 
all the discouragement offered to them, the students refused to be swayed. One girl 
remembered that her father died on June 16, and she was expected to stay at home for 
the funeral and for mourning. She however, was caught up in the events and refused 
to do so. She remembers arriving home around 12:30 at night, and being confronted 
by her mother: 
I was so dirty, I was filthy, my white shirt was black. And my mom 
asked, called me in the bedroom, and she says to me, 'my child, can 
you stop what you're doing for a minute? Especially for now until we 
bury your father? From there you can continue.' And I said, 'Okay 
mom, I do understand what you're saying, but can't you allow me to 
continue now? Because I think my dad knows exactly, he died 
knowing what was happening already, that children cannot stand it. If 
you parents could not take it up any longer, or you couldn't finish your 
business, we are going to finish this business for you.' And my mom 
started looking at me, and says to me, "But you'll die.' And I say, 
"Okay if I die, the military will have died already. Can you see how 
do I look? Then the military will have died. They won't be the only 
one and I won't be the only one who's died, so many, and they're still 
going to kill us.' And my mom was looking at me, she never cried, she 
never said anything. 59 
57 Bernstein, Interview with Mongezi Stofile. 
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As the uprisings continued, and as the students began to organise larger scale protests, 
stay-aways, and boycotts, it became common for the children to instruct their parents. 
One man who was active in Cape Town during the uprisings remembers: "We tried to 
politicise people, our parents, to accept the struggle. It was really bad for them, 
because of the disruption, the transport disruption. They had to work and they had to 
also understand our struggle.,,60 Kane-Berman wrote: "One story had it that during 
one of the stay-aways a child had said to her father: 'Daddy, we are going to burn the 
beerhalls because we want you to stay quietly at home today. You mustn't go and get 
drunk. ",61 Throughout this period, the traditional roles of parents and children were 
often teversed, as the youth took the initiative to further the struggle and the parents 
often found themselves lagging behind. The generation that emerged from these 
events were more assertive, independent, and self-motivated than any that had come 
before. They would provide a rich recruiting pool for MK and APLA to draw from. 
Being a part of all of this caused many people to find politics. One man, who 
was 14 at the time of the uprisings recalled: 
Like any l4-year old, we were naive but the situation forced us to 
mature much faster than we would have, facing bullets everyday of 
your life, teargas about all the time. I remember we user d] to joke that 
if we have not smelled or seen teargas for a week, something was 
wrong- breathing clean air for two days. Things like that made one 
mature very quickly. We started reading books, we got politicised 
almost overnight and I think because of that, students played an 
invaluable role. 62 
Police actions against the students also played a significant role in politicising the 
youth. Hirson relates one instance in which: "Pupils of a school that had been 
60 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Lt. Moses Mrubata,18 November 1998, Cape Town. 
61 Kane-Berman, 19. 











undecided joined the demonstrators after they witnessed the police in action.,,63 One 
man remembered his initial reluctance to get involved, 
I was part of a group of about 10 who refused to take part in the 
protests. We felt that our education was important and we really had 
quite a rough deal ... And we were sitting in our classroom, minding 
our own business, doing our work, while all the kids were outside 
protesting ... And at some point the door of our classroom was kicked 
open and there was a big policeman standing there. And he just came 
into our classroom and he just beat all of us. And from that moment I 
mean we decided if you can't beat them, you'd better join them. And 
so we went and we joined the protest. So in some ways I have to thank 
that policeman for beating us up, because he really, he opened my eyes 
and I think it's because of him that I then developed an interest in 
struggle and so on.64 
Many of the young people who would go on to join MK and APLA pointed to the 
uprisings as the point at which they became involved in politics. 
It wasn't only school children who were affected by the situation. Some 
others found politics from the uprisings as well. One young woman, who was a 
university student at the University of Fort Hare at the time, returned home for the 
June holidays and became emotionally involved in the events. She found that people 
she knew had been shot, and some of them had died. Though she hadn't been 
involved in politics before then, it was enough to involve her deeply.65 Another man 
who was working at the time recalled seeing the cowardice of the police attacking the 
students, and seeing a student he knew shot in the back by the police. He notes that 
this is what got him involved in politics.66 A third man, in his statement to the court 
when being tried for terrorism explained how he had taken no interest in politics until 
the uprisings: 
63 Hirson, 228. 
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As I saw the situation with my own eyes, the police attacked, shot, 
killed, wounded and seriously injured many scores of young black 
people, mainly school children who were involved in nothing more 
than peaceful protests . . . After the children were dealt with by the 
police in this brutal fashion, there was a wave of bitterness and hatred 
which spread through Soweto like wildfire . . . I became more and 
more depressed and I decided that the best way out was to ask for a 
transfer to a place outside Johannesburg ... I tried to take the easy way 
out, that was to get a transfer but it did not work. .. In Soweto it was 
like living in a prison which was a battleground. It was relief to get 
away from it during the day, to go to work, and it was hell to go back 
there at night. The last straw happened on 24 October 1976. I 
attended a mass funeral for a young black man who had died whilst in 
detention by the security police. His name was Jacob Mashobane. 
Hundreds had gathered around the graveside where his coffin had been 
laid and even as the soil was filling it up, amidst the singing of a hymn, 
several cars drove up,.the vigilantes of 'law and order' again, I have no 
doubt acting under instructions from their 'bosses', alighted from these 
cars and triggers were pulled. People scattered, rimning for dear life 
whilst others were brought down lifeless, some dead, some wounded. 
Those who managed to scale the cemetery fence were gunned down by 
a contingent· that had stationed itself outside the cemetery. When the 
crowd had scattered, myself and a few remaining ones were forced at 
gunpoint to carry the dead and injured into carts and vans nearby . . . 
After this funeral I went to work on the Monday. I left work that 
morning and never returned. I decided to commit myself fully to the 
cause of the black people.67 
However they came across it, whether they were a part of the original demonstration 
in Soweto, joined in later in another place, or simply witnessed the events, the 
uprisings led many people into the political arena, and many later found themselves 
joining MK or APLA to continue the struggle that escalated from that day in June 
1976. 
The Generation of the 1980s 
The people who joined MK and APLA in the 1980s were largely influenced 
by the same things as the Soweto generation. Their lives often led them to similar 
conclusions as their predecessors. Many of those who left in the 80s were of the same 











generation and had been jailed for their activities, then upon their releases, simply 
picked up where they had left off, jumping back into the liberation struggle. 
However, there were a few differences in those who were coming of age in the 1980s, 
and their political development also differed. The early 1980s saw a great 
proliferation of community organisations, and the rise of the United Democratic Front 
(UDF), which pulled these together to unite them in the fight against the system. 
Many of the members of the UDF and its aligned organisations later joined MK 
particularly. Other Pan-Africanist and Black Consciousness oriented organisations 
provided a ripe pool of recruits for APLA. In 1984 another spate of unrest 
encompassed the whole country and brought new elements into the fight. While the 
Soweto uprisings were comprised mostly of students and young radicals, the township 
revolts of the 19808 encompassed an extensive cross section of society. The locally 
based concerns such as rent increases and corrupt local officials brought in people of 
all ages and both genders to the struggle. While in the past the state could blame 
violence and resistance on a small group of radicals, agitators, and activists, it became 
clear this time that the majority of the popUlation was participating in the struggle. 
The local issues that brought such diverse people to the struggle soon gave way to 
more political demands, as people came to believe that there would never be solutions 
to the local problems without a change in government to majority rule and universal 
suffrage. Youth and student organisations were joined in the fight by women's 
groups, sports clubs, community and civic groups, labour unions, and church 
associations. 
Additionally, the creation of the UDF, which united organisations from all 
over the country, served as a co-ordinator and infonnation service to unite local 











Tricameral Parliament, the UDF successfully campaigned to get people to boycott the 
elections, which had a minimal voter turnout, indicating very little support for the 
parliament that was elected. The UDF was unique in that it united anti-apartheid 
groups from all regions, backgrounds, and ideologies to work towards a common 
goal, blurring differences to create a "United Front" against Apartheid. As it was 
constructed of many different organisations, it was by nature difficult for the 
government effectively to ban the UDF as a whole. Even when the renewed state of 
emergency led to the banning and detention of most of the UDF leadership, it had by 
that time organised the townships down to street committees, which allowed them to 
operate with a minimum of formal leadership and supplied many lesser known leaders 
to work in their places. While the degree of organisation varied amongst different 
areas, there were some, such as the Karoo, which were organised to such a degree that 
the Cradock Residents' Association (CRADORA) could claim: "If they decided at 
four in the afternoon to call a meeting for six that evening, by five everyone had heard 
about it through street committees, and by six the entire population of the township 
was assembled.,,68 This impressive degree of organisation distinguished these revolts 
from struggles following the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 and the Soweto massacre 
of 1976. At the launch of the UDF, the Reverend Allan Boesak talked of the idea of 
all, here, and now: "three little words, words that express so eloquently our 
seriousness in this struggle . . . We want all our rights, we want them here, and we 
want them now.,,69 With the unification of so many diverse groups in the fight against 
Apartheid, it became possible to co-ordinate efforts in a manner that could make a 
massive impact on the state. With the co-operation of trade unions, women's 
68 Lodge, Tom & Nasson, Bill, (1991). All, Here, and Now: Black Politics in South Africa in the 
1980s, South Africa: Ford Foundation, 74. 











organisations, student groups, and churches, potentially isolated incidents grew into 
huge events. Paulus Zulu explains in Resistance in the Townships: "What starts as 
localised responses such as a protest against an increase in transport fares may 
develop into a labour strike, and, finally, incorporate a school or consumer boycott. ,,70 
By bringing together people across race, class, age and gender lines, a mass 
movement was created unlike any ever seen in South Africa. 
The Pan-Africanist and Black Consciousness oriented organisations also drew 
large numbers to them in the 1980s, many of whom went onto join APLA. The black 
consciousness oriented Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) was launched in 
1978, followed soon after by Azanian Youth Unity (AZANYU) in 1981, and Azanian 
Student Movement (AZASM) in 1983. The connection between the PAC and these 
organisations can be seen in the many times articles on AZANYU, AZAPO, and 
black consciousness were found in PAC publications.71 The Pan Africanist Students 
Organisation (PASO) was only formed in 1989, and many APLA members came 
from their membersbip. They had a much more direct link to the PAC, who often 
gave financial assistance to PASO. 72 In looking at the questionnaires filled out by 
APLA recruits, AZANYU and PASO are by far the most common organisations that 
people had come through, with AZAPO and AZASM also quite high in numbers. 73 
Many of the people who joined MK and APLA in this period came from these 
diverse organisations. One woman remembered: "I [was] most inspired by [the] 
women's movement. Like that time it was Women's Front and the UWO. They had 
70 Meer, Fatima (Ed). (1989) Resistance in the Townships, Durban: Madiba Publications, 13. 
71 See for example: Mthimunye, Dan. (1993). Azanian National Youth Unity (AZANYU). InAzania 
News, Vol 19, No.7. 
72 PAC ftnancial reports, 1991. 











a serious impact on me because 1 used to admire the women and see that they're doing 
a good job ... They're the ones who made me politically aware more than my 
family's problems.,,74 Another man noted: "I was still at High School, Fezeka High 
School. 1 was involved with COSAS [Congress of South African Students]. And it 
was immediately after the fonnation of the Cape Youth Congress, CAYCO.,,75 And a 
third woman was involved in several organisations at the time: 
And after I've been active around '83, when we started to fonn the 
youth, Mamelodi organisation, I was in the ad-hoc committee of 
Mamelodi Youth and I was in the executive when it was launched ... 
But I felt that there's something lacking. Youth can't go alone ... We 
discussed upon the fonning of a women's organisation and I met with 
other leaders ... And they said its necessary and then we fonned [a] 
women's group in my area and I was very active.76 
Many others were involved in discussion groups that found popularity in this period, 
providing banned materials and exchanging ideas about them. These organisations 
brought the problems of the country down to the size of local and immediate 
problems, which attracted many members. They then focused their local resistance on 
a more national level. Many came to understand more about the state of the country, 
and were politicised in this way. This generation also came to politics in the post-
Soweto uprisings period, and the shadow of that time followed them in whatever they 
did. Though some had not lived through this period, they still found strength and 
inspiration from those who had, and by learning of it, learned of the struggle to 
change the country. 
74 Interview with Booi. 
7S Interview with Andeci Nguneni, Interviewer unknown, no date. 











The Role of the Liberation Movements 
Throughout this period from the Soweto uprisings to the township revolts of 
the mid-1980s to the eventual unbanning of the liberation movements and move 
towards negotiations in 1990, the ANC and PAC were present inside the country to 
different degrees. At some points they were able to guide resistance inside the 
country, while at others they were left mainly to release pamphlets and statements 
supporting those working inside. Their role inside the country during this period is 
difficult to characterise accurately. At some points they were little known and had 
- -
little effect, while at others, flags, t-shirts, and posters supporting the ANC and PAC 
could be found in many areas. Liberation movement members often worked through 
other organisations as well, making it very difficult to quantify their efforts within 
South Africa. Operations in the country by MK. and APLA units will be dealt with in 
a later chapter, but this section explores the degree to which the youth who would go 
on to join the armed wings had prior contact or knowledge of the liberation 
movements, and how some of them were influenced by the ANC and PAC and their 
members. 
One very contentious issue is the degree to which the liberation organisations 
were involved in the 1976 uprisings. While it seems clear that they were taken by 
surprise by the events that sparked the uprisings, throughout the years many have 
claimed otherwise. Hopkins and Grange noted this trend: "The most controversial 
claimant is the ANC, which recently revealed that the exiled leadership had actively 
participated in the planning and execution of the event. All evidence suggests the 
opposite.,,77 While they do allow that some members of the ANC underground did 
have a measure of influence over the students, particularly Winnie Mandela, they 











purport that this overall claim is wholly unbelievable.78 One author who was involved 
in the uprisings finds the claims come up often at commemorative events: "These 
movements tell us endless stories about their underground preparations and how they 
laid the ground for the students through their internal and external cells, preparing 
them for that fateful day, 16 June 1976. The main protagonists in this regard were the 
then unbanned Black Consciousness Movement, AZAPO, the banned PAC and the 
ANC.,,79 Despite claims of responsibility, the outbreak of rebellion was unforeseen. 
One author noted that the ANC doubted the usefulness of the student protests: 
"Congress tacticians were particularly critical of the student focus on black school 
curricula instead of grievances that would attract a broader constituency for revolt."so 
The claims of the liberation movements of their orchestration of the uprisings still 
chafe the students that were active in the rebellion. At a commemoration of the 25th 
anniversary of the 1976 uprisings in Gugulethu, Cape Town, a misprint on one of the 
displays turned a small section on the ANC's participation in the events into a huge 
title for that panel. Two people who had been active in the uprisings came close to 
walking out, and one withdrew from speaking at the event, as they thought that the 
exhibit was meant to claim the event for the ANC and exaggerate their participation 
and influence.81 The students who participated in the uprisings are almost all of the 
opinion that they acted without any influence. One remarked: "I do not remember 
any liberation movement ... contributing to our daily meetings and discussions. In 
78 Hopkins and Grange, 84. 
79 Ndlovu, 50-51. 
80 Davis, Stephen M. (1987). Apartheid's Rebels: Inside South Africa's Hidden War, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 31. 
81 The author was one of the organisers of the event, and had to convince the attendees that it was 











short, as students we faced our destiny and problems."s2 One man who participated in 
the uprisings put it quite well: "We knew some ANC and PAC people, but we didn't 
get the impression that they were as militant as we were."S3 In 2006, however, with 
the 30th anniversary of the Soweto Uprisings, several documentaries aired that 
focused on the story of then Soweto SSRC president at the time, Tsietsi Mashinini, 
and on the independence of the students in the uprisings, signifying a change in the 
history ofthat period. 
With the devastating setback to both the ANC's and the PAC's underground 
organisation with South Africa in the early 1960s, and the brutal repression that 
followed, by the 1970s both organisations were largely unseen within the country. 
The early 1970s saw some resurrection of the liberation movement inside South 
Africa, and some people joined and participated in their activities, largely in the field 
of propaganda and recruitment. But by and large, the youth involved in the uprisings 
had far more knowledge of the Black Consci usness organisations than of the national 
liberation movements, and some had no knowledge of any organisations at all. Many 
had no contact with or knowledge of the ANC or PAC, or simply knew that they 
existed while not knowing what they stood for or their history. One man who left the 
country in 1975 knew of the ANC, but didn't know where to find them: "Because I 
had seen in Drum [magazine] of that year, Oliver Tambo together with Samora 
Machel and then I concluded that the ANC should be in Mozambique." He asked the 
Swazi authorities to put him in touch with FRELIMO, who then passed him on to the 
82 Ndlovu, 7. 











ANC authorities in Swaziland.84 Another youth who was 17 at the time of the 
uprisings explained: 
We did not know then what the liberation movements were standing 
for. We only knew that there was an organisation called the PAC, and 
there was also an organisation called the ANC. The president's house 
in Orlando West was just near to our school; we knew that the house 
belonged to Mr. Mande1a. We had not seen him in the newspapers or 
anywhere, we only knew that he was arrested and tried for treason and 
stuff like that. We did not exactly know the history of the ANC or the 
PAC, we just knew that these organisations were somewhere in 
Zambia and we did not know what they were doing there. 85 
Another man remembered that his idea of the liberation movements at this time was 
very faint. He would sometimes listen to 'Radio Freedom', the ANC's radio station, 
but since the authorities often interfered with the signals, he only caught bits and 
pieces of the broadcasts. He knew that there was a call to arms, but that's all.86 
Because of this lack of knowledge, many of the students who would go on to leave 
the country only learned about and got in contact with the liberation movements when 
they found themselves in exile. 
Others already had ANC and PAC contacts inside the country. Some of the 
activists who had been arrested in the early 1960s were released in the early and mid-
1970s, and though they usually found themselves banned, they often passed on their 
political ideas to the new generation. One young man remembered that during his 
holidays at home in Cala in the Eastern Cape, a leader in the ANC, a man named 
Ezra, got him involved in the organisation.87 Another traced his politicisation to: 
My contact, accidentally of course, with a old, one old man who was 
an ANC member, he, he had already served his 12 years in Robben 
84 Bernstein, H. Interview with William Mbalosi, no date. 
85 Verbatim statement of Paul Ndaba- December 1995, in Ndlovu, 19. 
86 von den Steinen, Interview with Makwetla. 











Island in the sixties and also he, his banning order and house arrest. 
But he was selling veg and fruits, you know, fruit and vegetables so I 
happened to meet him at his stand when I go to school, to talk to him, 
talk to me, he, he will read the paper, the English paper to me, about 
Zimbabwe, what was happening all those time. So those were my 
formative years of, you know, political consciousness in a really ... 
d· 88 rrect. .. way. 
Another recalls living next door to a family with two brothers in exile: 
One was with the PAC. I think he died somewhere in exile some time 
ago. The other one was in the ANC ... This was then obviously a 
political family . . . I became very close to the children by the way. 
And through their father's connections and their uncle's connections 
one then had an opportunity of getting a chance of reading banned 
literature. We would sometimes get [an] elementary kind of political 
education from the uncle himself. 8~ 
In these ways, the older generation guided many young people in their discovery of 
politics. 
Some of the youth from this period also fOll:nd themselves recruited into the 
ANC and PAC underground. One was approached by a stranger with whom he 
organised a meeting: 
He said to me, 'look, I've, look I've just a few instructions for you, 
I've been sent to you, your name' ... told me my name, where do I 
live, what I'm doing, you know, that I'm in the SRC, I tried to ask him, 
'how did you know?' He said, 'Look man, I have to tell you so that 
you'll believe me, well ... There are students who left earlier who are 
in, they were at university, these ones in Swaziland, joined the ANC, 
done their trainings, were sent back, so it's them who recommended 
me and then who gave them all the details. Well he said, 'no, what 
you'll have to do, you'll have to open up a cell of the ANC, and in that 
cell there's going to be also a, an MK. cell that will be only solely 
dealing with military matters. Your duty and your task will be to 
recruit, especially focusing on youth and students, eh, people for 
military trainin~.' So one agreed, one was excited, meeting the ANC, 
all those things. 0 
88 von den Steinen, Interview with Kalako. 
89 Interview with Lizo Ngqungwana. Interviewer unknown, no date. 












Another recalled his recruitment, by an older man in the ANC, and he was told to 
form a core of ANC people within his medical school. They would deal with 
propaganda, distributing pamphlets and such, and also provided some back up for MK 
units inside the country.91 One man who started out non-aligned to any organisation 
became a part of the PAC during the uprisings: 
So I think from the students side, from my side, it was finished now, I 
was working for the party now, for the PAC. I was going to be a target 
now, I had to work underground because my mission now I was 
working to recruit guys from Cape Town to Johannesburg. From 
Jo'burg some other guys would take them to leave the country. It was 
not easy from Cape Town to just go straight. In Cape Town I must 
have to recruit some few guys. Then I must have to contact with the 
guy on the other side. That there's another group coming to cross.92 
Sometimes it started much earlier and in more subtle ways. One man recalled: 
Then you grow up and see the old guys then they send you somewhere 
you see because we were young and the police were, they didn't search 
us or they just leave us to pass through them but we are carrying some 
dangerous things, you see? But the older guys Were in danger, that's 
why they had to send us to deliver the stuff, you see, like doing petrol 
bombs, making scorpions, the guns that we make ourselves, scorpions 
and all the stuff you see? Then as I grew up through my mind now 
was in war already. 93 
Through these methods, many were recruited for and working with the ANC and PAC 
long before they went into exile or joined the armed wings inside the country. 
In the 1980s, the mood changed. As the UDF became more prominent, the 
message and political views of the ANC spread. Although it's difficult to estimate the 
interaction between the two, it is clear that many of the main principles were the 
same. Funerals, rallies, and other events saw ANC flags flying high and people were 
91 Kodesh, Interview with Ntsaluba. 
92 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Nicholas Msizi, 2 August 2001, Langa, Cape Town, for SADET 
Oral History Project. 












generally more aware of the organisation and what it stood for. Many more of those 
who left in the 1980s had been involved in the underground before leaving the 
country than their Soweto generation counterparts. Some had been involved in the 
1970s, served prison terms, and upon their release, continued their activities. Many 
were involved in study groups reading banned literature or listening to the Radio 
Freedom broadcasts. One recalled: "What I can say is that my early consciousness 
started in 1983- in 83 I mean ... high school. I was doing Standard 8 at the time is 
when I was first exposed to some books, I mean history, I was doing history. So for 
the first time I came across the word ANC and I used to hear about the ANC on the 
radio and in the news see such things.,,94 Another explained: 
[It was early 1981] that I developed more interest in the ANC politics. 
When I got the banned literature like Sechaba and the African 
Communist. So I started to read widely about the ANC politics, its 
policies and its strategies and what the Freedom Charter and we used 
to get- I remember receiving a cassette from my friends- the January 
8th statement of President Oliver Tambo which inspired me a lot. I 
should think that is basically some of those things that gave me an 
insight into what the politics of the ANC were all about.95 
The PAC enjoyed a rise in publicity as well, particularly through the black 
consciousness and pan-africanist student organisations. Their journals, Azania 
Combat, and Azania News, which had in recent years ceased production, started to be 
published again in 1986 and were widely distributed, and high profile attacks by 
APLA received large amounts of pUblicity. Also at the time of the township revolts in 
the mid-1980s, both MK and APLA attacks multiplied greatly. MK jumped from a 
high of 56 a year before 1985 up to 136 in 1985 and rose as high as 281 in 198996; 
94 Interview with Mjoli. 
9S Interview with Tyikwe. 
96 Lodge, Tom. Guerrilla Warfare and Exile Diplomacy: The African National Congress and the Pan 












while APLA attacks occurred for the first time in decades in 1986, and doubled 
practically overnight in 1987, when they launched a new practice of "grenade 
warfare.,,97 These attacks also inspired the youth and led them towards the ANC and 
PAC. In the early 1990s, the PAC and APLA attracted large numbers of people due 
to their stance against negotiations, and their status of being the only organisation still 
pursuing an armed struggle. In whatever way they found politics, eventually many of 
the youth from these periods found themselves motivated to join the armed struggle. 
97 Dimpho, Muriel. (1989). APLA's grenade warfare baffles Pretoria as 74 attacks are acknowledged. 












Leaving South Africa 
Please put a gun 
In this itching hand 
For I almost tasted victory 
When the enemy dazed ... 
But wordspears and stones 
Cannot pierce 
The heart of our pain 
Somebody please place weapons 
In these palms that just toyed with rattles 
While lullabyes were hummed 
For I too have heard songs 
Rise from Angolan wars won 
But their refrain 
Will not drown 
Some echoes from the homefront battle-field 
With gun in hand 
I could feel the fire of joy 
For I would be one with many 
Whose tears I must drain 
Those tearing screams 
From disenbowelled bodies 
Must be hushed forever 
Please let me bear its weight 
On my growing shoulders 
For although I'm only a cub 
I have worn the armour of man 
Knowing the deeds of years 
That were planted 
Have fertilized our land 
With new dawn's energy 
I must strengthen my sinews 
For I have seen creatures stampede 
And build icebergs on Liberty's path 
But volcanic tides will charge 
Making love to our own ploufts 
Which must furrow for life 
1 Mabuza, Lindiwe. Soweto Wishes. In Molefe, Sono. (ed). (no date). Malibongwe- ANC Women: 












The decision to leave South Africa and go into exile was difficult for those 
who made it. Choosing to leave behind everything and everyone they knew and go 
into unfamiliar places, uncertain circumstances, and be surrounded by unknown 
people was by no means easy. They left behind fathers and mothers, brothers and 
sisters, aunts, uncles, cousins and grandparents, even spouses and children, as well as 
friends. Some left school before finishing, and others left behind jobs that they and 
their families needed for survival. Many had never left their places of birth and would 
find themselves travelling all over the world. Their destinations were unknown. 
Their expectations rested on rumours or guesswork. And above all, they didn't know 
when or if they would ever return. Despite all of this, many chose to leave, and 
carried out their decisions with excitement, anticipation, and courage. A few would 
regret the decision they had made, while most would not change their path if they had 
it to do all over again. 
Reasons for Leaving 
Every person's situation differed from every other's. However, many had 
similar experiences simply from living in the same places and going through the same 
set of events. The choice to leave the country always involved a myriad of factors, 
but most of those who left could point to one or two issues that pushed them towards 
the decision that they made; 
One of the most common reasons for going into exile involved problems with 
the police within South Africa. During the Soweto uprisings, police would often 
round up the leaders of key student organisations, or even just those who were 











detention, and it was common for innocent bystanders to find themselves pulled into 
the police stations as well. Once the police had people in custody, their main goal 
was to find out who else was involved, often through both psychological and physical 
torture. Many of the young people who were involved in the uprisings and eventually 
left the country spent some period of time in police cells under arrest or detention. 
One woman recalled this happening even before the uprisings began: 
We were continuously harassed, myself and my brother by the police, 
picked up, detained time and again, released, picked up, detained 
without being charged and then I only managed to go up to my second 
year at school because its supposed to be for three years, but I only 
managed to do my second year when I was detained again for my 
students activities and I was detained for six months in solitary 
confinement, that was in 1975.2 
During this period she suffered a miscarriage and has health problems to this day due 
to the treatment she received at the hands of the security police.3 Once the uprisings 
took off, this tendency of the police simply became more common. Another woman 
recalled the situation at the time: "W ~ were being shot at, students were dying, others 
in prison unnecessarily.,,4 One man recalled: 
Having really you know made a decision that it is far better to join the 
liberation struggle, rather than be the victim because at that stage you 
can imagine from June 16th until that time there were a lot of arrests, a 
lot of people were killed, there was no certainty, there was no 
education, then you know one at that stage also had a very simple view 
of the struggle. That if we joined the liberation struggle in big 
numbers, surely the state which the:(l was exclusively a white state, 
then that numbers could prevail over a limited force. So this is how I 
joined.s 
2 Bernstein, H. Interview with Gloria Meek, no date. 
3 Bernstein, Interview with Meek. 
4 Bernstein, H. Interview with Caesarine Gwanamakwu, no date. 












For those who had been through periods of detention or prison, no illusions remained 
about what their fate would be if they were caught again, and many were more 
inclined to leave South Africa than to remain and find themselves back in police 
custody. 
Those who did not suffer detention nevertheless suffered the constant threat of 
being caught. Many could not even sleep at home, and whenever the police picked up 
their friends, they held their breath, waiting for their names to come up under the 
harsh interrogations. One woman explained: 
Already before 1 left 1 had spent five months, just sleeping anywhere, 
including in cars in the street. Never going home. And the police were 
. . . maybe its OK to say they were very efficient because they were 
raiding not only my home, but my other relatives .... And my mother 
was taken in for about 12 hours and 1 thought of all the horrible things 
that have been happening in prison, so when she· was released 1 
decided no, 1 should gO.6 
Another added: "Those who have been arrested, they were used to show the police 
houses, where we live and so on and it is out of that that a month later, after spending 
some days not sleeping at home, sleeping with relatives or there and there that way, 
we finally decided that we should go OUt.,,7 Many other people coming from this time 
period have similar memories of police harassment of themselves and their families 
and they often faced the choice of leaving or ending up in detention or prison. One 
explained: "I didn't want to become a [system] vegetable, what we used to call some 
of these people who are detained and tortured all the time, up to a point when you are 
totally useless."g Often people left because they wanted to save their families from 
harassment due to their activities. One man explained: "I had to secure myself and 
6 Bernstein, H. Interview with Ribbon Mosholi, no date. 
7 Bernstein, H. Interview with Michael Meli, no date. 











the rest of my family, cause at one stage they had to assault my father, for the sake of 
me, so that's what I didn't like. So for me to secure my family I had to leave the 
country.,,9 While many people's families continued to be harassed after they left the 
country, the idea of trying to protect them spurred many into exile. 
Above and beyond those who feared getting pulled in for activities they may 
or may not have been involved in was the situation of those who had been arrested 
and actually charged for their alleged activities. Some had been arrested for activities 
during the uprisings, and others had already been involved with the underground 
organisations inside and were caught for more serious offences. One man named 
Ayanda Ntsaluba worked for the underground at the time, and some of the people he 
worked with began to be pulled in by the police. He remembered that they brought 
one old man who had been working with him to identify him. He was very old, a 
peasant, and had never been to school. It was obvious that he had been beaten 
severely. The police took the old man to identify Ntsaluba, and the old man looked at 
him for about five minutes. The police thought they had him. Then the old man said: 
''No, even in my wildest dream I've never seen this man." Ntsaluba knew that the old 
man would be really punished when he got back to the police station, and knew that if 
he were to break, he would betray the old man's bravery, so he had to get out and 
continue this struggle. He ended up leaving, and told the people who were remaining 
behind to give him enough time to get away, and then blame everything on him. As a 
result, many of the people who were being held by the security police were released.10 
Many people left the country while on bail, as they knew the consequences of staying 
would involve long sentences in prison, or a 'forced vacation' on Robben Island. One 
9 von den Steinen, L. Interview with ex-MK soldier who wishes to remain anonymous, 19 August 
2004, Simonstown Naval Base. 











noted: "It was only when they arrested me [for student activities] that they became 
aware that I'm working for the underground structure ... And then we got a RISOO 
bail with all the restrictions of reporting daily to the police stations and all those sorts 
of things. But fortunately when we were out of prison we arranged to leave the 
country."u Others who were working in the underground saw their comrades get 
arrested, and managed to escape the net. In the eighties, things became even more 
dangerous for those involved. With occasional "disappearances" of activists, often 
due to kidnappings or assassinations, some faced the choice of leaving or being killed. 
One woman remembers, "1 was told by some reliable sources that there's a plot to 
hijack me or to kidnap me . . . to kidnap me and assassinate me and that one was 
highly possible. One, is that 1 was really problematic in prison, 1 used to give them 
hell, and two, 1 was very active in the township.,,12 For people in this situation, as 
painful as the choice to leave could be, the choice to stay could easily see them 
consigned to prison indefinitely or even assassinated. 
Others who were involved did not have such strong outside forces pushing 
them to leave the country. However, they decided to do so all the same. Many were 
simply fed up with the situation inside the country. One man explained that his 
neighbour and a man at work had been shot by the police in separate incidents, and 
that at a certain point in the uprisings, the police would just drive around and shoot 
people. Bit by bit he started to feel that the situation was a mess, that there was no 
hope, and he couldn't find a reason to stay in South Africa. 13 Others had situations 
that pushed them over the edge. One girl's brother was shot and paralysed, which 
11 Bernstein, H. Interview with Zola Tyikwe, no date. 
12 Bernstein, Interview with Gwanamakuru. 











really was the last straw for her. She explained: "This anger was building up, not 
because of my brother, but by going to funerals, attending all these funerals. J a. But 
what really made me go out was because of my brother and that's when I started 
telling myself that I must go and train and come back.,,14 Another man recalled: 
"Something that makes me to go to get military training is that the[re] are many 
comrades who died in front of my eyes, most are my best friends ... Because I was 
very angry about the situation inside the country ... I wanted to carry a gun and fight 
with somebody is myenemy.,,15 The pain of staying at home and watching friends, 
neighbours, and relatives being shot and sometimes killed, or thrown into detention or 
prison, was often too much for some people. These things gave them the motivation 
to leave the country, partly to escape the situation and partly to do something to 
change it. 
Yet others, particularly those involved in the Soweto uprisings, just wanted to 
leave the country to obtain military training. One man explained that it was very 
fashionable to leave in the immediate aftermath of the uprisings. He was very excited 
to think about leaving to become a terrorist. He didn't even want to become a 
guerrilla soldier, just a "terrorist.,,16 Another had a slightly more developed idea of 
his intentions and motivations: 
The point of my departure was basically on the fact that for long years, 
our people were struggling through peaceful forms of struggle and this 
did not bring about the change which our people needed, which is 
freedom. And our people were daily killed, they were not defended. 
So I wanted to be also a member who will defend our people, arms in 
hand for the attainment of freedom. So I wanted to go and join the 
14 Bernstein, H. Interview with Joyce Stofile, no date. 
1S Autobiography of Patrick Tseko Mokoakoa, 11 February 1991, on his application to join APLA,. 











- ------- - ._---
people's army and fight for our people's freedom. If need be I can lay 
my life for the freedom of our people. 17 
Whatever the political understanding, the desire to leave the country, learn to shoot, 
and come back to liberate the people was a strong one, and caused many youths to 
make their way to exile. 
In the 1980s, the politics around leaving changed. People often found 
themselves discussing whether to leave the country, and whether the struggle existed 
outside in exile, or inside. One woman recalled: 
There had been a lot of discussion about the question of leaving the 
country. There was a hot debate as to how was it for the comrades to 
leave the country. Well some comrades felt that it's not necessary to 
leave the country because the site of the struggle is here inside the 
country. If one leaves the country one is looked at as deserting or 
running away from the actual struggle which was inside the country. IS 
Another man recalled a meeting where one person was arguing strongly against 
leaving the country: "I think his argument then was that the cornerstone of the 
struggle is inside the country and [there is] no reason in fact for leaving the country. 
But then of course that was interpreted by some of us then as cowardice on the part of 
those who were saying they were not keen to leave etc., etc., and [we] went our 
separate ways there.,,19 During this period, the general guideline was that once a 
person got to the point where he had no room to move inside the country, usually due 
to police pressure, then it was okay to go outside to train, as he couldn't contribute 
anything by staying inside. One man recalled his reasoning: 
The special branch were starting to harass me, us students, especially 
those of us who were in active positions were arrested, put in 
detention, interrogation. But during the year after the '85 the national 
emergency, declared by PW Botha in 1985, I was then again locked up 
17 Bernstein, H. Interview with Zebulon Xulu, no date. 
18 Interview with Mtombeli Tengimfene. Interviewer unknown, no date. 











for a long time. Thereafter I was then infonned that I had to run away 
because I can see for myself that now the special branch is after my 
soul?o 
As MK and APLA had both developed programmes to train people inside South 
Africa, the need to leave solely to get training waned in the later 1980s. 
Leaving the country was also seen as a way to motivate others to take up the 
struggle, particularly if the person leaving was a leader in the community. With the 
uprisings in the mid-1980s bringing so much more of the community into the struggle, 
rather than simply relying on the youth, older people started to change their minds 
about their roles in the fight. One woman explained: 
You know what really inspired me in the question of MK is that 
women inside the country were so angry about ... or tired ... sick and 
tired of the soldiers in the township, occupying the township, that they 
used to say, 'Caesarine, you know some of our brothers and kids went 
away in 76, they are not coming back. We are expecting them to come 
and kill these people, just have a look they are occupying the township. 
Now we want to go ... and I'm talking about grownups in [their] 
fifties, in [their] sixties, now want to go and join this MK. To go and 
fetch arms and fire these people as their mothers because it seems to 
me that they are not really serious, they are not prepared to come back 
and as their leader inside the country, you know that thing is sort, you 
must be exemplary, that's why I decided ... I find that its necessary to 
be exemplary to people who are having confidence in you inside the 
country and all that, to go for MK and if its needs be, if the leadership 
feels that you can go back inside the country, go back and be 
exemplary, you know. Because mothers really are prepared to go for 
MK and come back and fight because they couldn't stand how kids 
were harassed, tortured and all that in front of them by this SADP in 
the townshipS.21 
This kind of community leadership led to more diverse groups of people 
joining the armed struggle. 
20 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Lt. Comm. Mbulelo Mnyaka, 19 August 2004, Militaxy Police 
Headquarters, Simonstown. 












Taking Leave of Home 
Whatever the reasons for leaving home, the act itself was difficult. Most of 
the people who left home didn't tell anyone they were going. This was for many 
reasons, one being the fact that one's family could possibly talk him out of his 
resolve, and the act of going through goodbyes could also have this effect. One 
woman explained her choice of remaining silent: "I knew that if I tell ... especially my 
mother, her tears would make me not to proceed with my decision, you see, so I just 
had to make that straight, just to go without telling them,,22 An even more important 
reason was the security risk of telling people they were leaving, which could lead to 
their capture and arrest by the police, as well as the harassment of those who were left 
behind by the security police. It was generally better for them be able to say: "I don't 
know anything," and mean it, than to leave them with important information about 
routes out of the country. Those who went through pipelines organised by the 
underground movements inside the country were particularly warned not to mention 
their flight to anyone. 
Regardless of the reasoning behind the decision to leave, the majority of those 
who left did so without telling their families. One woman remembered the thought 
process she went through before deciding to leave: 
Well, I'm from a big family and not only a big family but a closely knit 
family which had never before experienced any disappearances or any 
loss [of] any member ... of the family. So I was the first to leave. So 
that in itself was quite a problem. And there were lots of things that 
one thought about: whether I would be in a position to make it on my 
own without the support of my family, how will my family feel, how 
would my mother feel, due to my absence, how much will this 
influence ... any sort of disintegration of the family?23 
22 Bernstein, H. Interview with Elizabeth Matsemba, no date. 










Another man who left during this period eloquently described how it felt to leave. He 
explained that it was the most painful thing ever to have happened in his life. He had 
a strong emotional attachment to his family. Leaving was like going through death 
and being aware of it, choosing to do it. He couldn't tell them that he was leaving, 
but knew he might never see them again, and was not sure if he would come back 
alive. Even upon his return, he could never regain the attachment to his family. For 
instance, when someone dies, he doesn't react like he should, since he had already 
resigned himself to leaving them forever so many years before.24 Letlapa Mphahlele 
movingly described his feelings on leaving home: 
I took the money, went to town that day and bought a bag, a shirt, and 
toiletries. I returned home late at night and hid the new stuff in the 
toilet outside. In the morning, I asked Mother if I could see Mmatlou, 
my month old sister. I couldn't tell Mother that this would be my 
farewell peek at her. The baby was fast asleep, and I patted her soft 
cheeks and tried to open her eyelids. Mmatlou jerked away, and I 
wondered if she would ever get to know me. I said goodbye to 
Mother, who believed I was on my way to Dr. Machupe Mphahlele at 
Groothoek Hospital. "0 sepele gabotse- go well," Mother said, and 
put her head back on the pillow. The chairs, pots, doors, windows, 
floor and the sleepy figures of my sisters and brothers seemed to 
scream at me, trying to hold me back. Outside I cast a last glance at 
the morula tree. It was deep in thought, meditating on the troubles that 
lay ahead of me. The breeze caressed its nude branches and whispered 
questions about my reckless decision. In the dawn Manaleng seemed 
united in its disapproval of my departure for foreign lands.25 
These emotional issues surrounding leaving home afflicted many of the people when 
they had made the decision to leave. 
A few were actually eager to leave their families and homes behind, 
particularly when their family situation was not a happy one. One young woman, 
24 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Tbabang Makwetla, 23 September and 12 October 1998, Cape 
Town. 













who had a different father than her other siblings and was treated badly as a result 
explained her feelings upon deciding to leave: 
So for my age 1 just told myself, no man, if 1 go its fine. Because its 
better ... than to be at home. Because there are many stories, 1 must 
be beaten, I've done this, I've done that, nothing that is right I'm 
always doing. So 1 told myself that nobody needs me in my family. 
So even if I'm gone, who cares? It was my assumption then. So 1 just 
wrote a letter to tell them that, 'well I'm leaving, here are your clothes, 
here is your everything. 1 didn't leave with anything that belongs to 
you. 1 just leave with myself, which 1 think that its not important to 
anybody, because you don't like me, I'm not part of you, so it's fine. 
Maybe where I'm going, people wi11like me. And if they don't, it's 
okay.,26 
While it was still difficult to leave home, weaker family ties took some of the 
pain away from the decision. 
A very few were lucky enough to be able to say their goodbyes before leaving. 
One of these noted: 
I'm one of those few people who were fortunate that 1 was very close 
to my mother. 1 could confide in her a lot so 1 asked permission in fact 
first from her . . . [I asked] whether she would like to see me as a 
mental wreck from John Vorster Square or should 1 go into exile and 
continue where Nelson Mandela and others left off, and she said, 
farewell, go well my son?7 
Another man, when he filled out his application to join APLA, answered the question 
of whether he had left the country legally or illegally with: "Legally from my parents 
but illegally from the Bop[uthatswana] government since 1 saw no necessity of getting 
permission from them.,,28 Many would confide in someone other than their parents, 
leaving word with an uncle or sibling so that once they were gone, the family could be 
26 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Weziwe Ncame, 9 September 1998, University of the Western 
Cape. 
27 Bernstein, H. Interview with William Mbalosi, no date. 











told what had happened to them. Even with pennission and closure, it was still a 
terrible trial for most to have to leave behind everyone and everything they knew. 
Taking leave of home without saying goodbye was often harder on those who 
were left behind than on those who left. Particularly during periods of unrest in the 
townships disappearances were common. When a child disappeared, there was a 
horrible process of going from hospital to hospital, police station to police station, 
looking for them and hoping to find them alive. If a child was never found" many 
parents believed that he had been killed in the fighting between the township people 
and the police. Many didn't know their children were alive until as long as fifteen 
years later, and some who died while their children were still in exile never knew at 
all. One woman said: 
My mother was so worried, she had been preparing for a funeral for a 
cousin, and when she came home at night, she was expecting me to 
open the door, but instead found herself knocking and knocking 
because all the kids were asleep. Those days it was terrible because if 
you don't see your child, you suspect that he might be killed, 
particularly because I was involved with the uprising.29 
A few managed to drop a message to their families soon after they left just so they 
wouldn't worry them, leaving a note with a sister or brother, dropping a letter in the 
post the day they left, or sending a letter from exile when first arriving there. 
However, once a part of MK or APLA, contact with families was usually not allowed 
because it could cause serious security problems as well as putting the people at home 
at risk from the security forces. If someone died while in exile, their family inside 
South Africa would receive a telegram from the organisation to which they belonged. 
Often this would be the first and last word that they heard of their child since they had 











left the country, and they rarely received details to explain the death, which left them 
with many unanswered questions. 
Leaving 
The process of leaving differed according to many circumstances. Some 
people left legally or semi-legally, crossing through the border posts into other 
countries. Others utilised the so-called "Green border", when they climbed over 
border fences and swam rivers, to enter neighbouring countries illegally. Some went 
with the help of underground organisations or people who knew routes out, and others 
went on their own initiative, and found their own ways. Most went through Lesotho, 
Botswana, or Swaziland, though a few went through Namibia, and some travelled on 
airplanes to countries further abroad. When Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, 
another route opened, and in the mid- to late- 1980s, more and more people headed 
towards their borders. 
Those who left through recognised border posts did so in a number of ways. 
Some had travel documents through their work that allowed them to go into other 
countries. One explained what he did: "At that time I was working for Anglo-
American Corporation as a switchboard operator and I used their offices to get the 
travel document and also get permission now and then to go to Swaziland for a week 
and so I had the pasS.,,30 Instead of returning when his week was up, he simply went 
into exile. Others had passports from the independent homelands, which allowed 
them to travel. Many of these had problems at the border, but made up stories to get 
them through. One woman who was jumping bail had previously been caught by 
police at the same border with banned materials. She explained how she got through: 











So when I left South Africa, at the border the guy ... the policeman at 
the border, its one of the people that had arrested me, and I recognised 
him, he recognised me. So he took my passport, went to an office and 
started making phone calls and he came back and asked me, when am I 
coming back? It was around Easter time, so I said, well I'm just going 
for the Easter holidays and I'll be back. So I had ... I only had a 
small, sort of an overnight bag, so that's all I could carry, not to arouse 
any suspicions.31 
Another man, who was travelling on a Transkei passport straight to Lusaka, Zambia 
also provided a cover story, 
You had to state the reason why I mean what are you going to do there 
you see. And I mean the situation of Lusaka, I mean everybody knew 
then that when you go to Lusaka, maybe you're going to the ANe. No 
we had to lie, to say no, I'm a member of ... I'm going to the meeting 
of the International Labour Organisation .. .I had some files with me to 
carry I mean . . . for the security to see that no this person is going on 
business of some sort. And they asked me when you are going to be 
back and I said 3 days you see. And I took a return ticket. 32 
In fact, the independence of the homelands or bantustans, which was one of the 
achievements of which the apartheid government was most proud, provided many 
black South Africans with the opportunity to get official documentation through 
illegal channels, giving false names, dates of birth, and the like. This was helpful for 
getting people out of the country as well as for bringing them back in later. 
Particularly in the mid- to late- eighties, people remember getting Transkei passports 
to leave the country, often through Lesotho, a close neighbour. One woman explained 
the process: 
We have to organise some passports to Lesotho, and the only way that 
we can organise passport in Transkei is, is to try to stay there for some 
days and learn the language because what is happening, all of us are 
speaking Xhosa, but it's not the same, because you are coming from 
urban areas where the language is not the same. So we have to learn 
the language of Transkei and all that, which is not so much different, 
but its . . . a dialect more than a language. And also when you are 
going to take your passports, during the processes, there are some 
procedures that you must know who is your chief, where do you stay 
31 Bernstein, H. Interview with Katleho Maloi, no date. 
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and all those things, so we have to learn those things. And the only 
thing that we find, it was, those people were corrupt. And since we're 
female, so it was easy to get those passports, if we can just try and 
manoeuvre our way out. We've done that and then we got the 
passports after a month, staying there. 33 
Leaving through legitimate means made the journey safer, and those who were able to 
take advantage of their passports escaped some of the perils of fleeing the country. 
However, even with the legitimate documents and a cover story, leaving the country 
could be stressful and scary for many of those who crossed. One man took a train to 
Botswana, and had a run in with security police while on the train. He remembered 
his own response to the border check: 
With valid doc~ents in my pocket, I feared no one. When the train 
stopped at the Ramatlabama border post in the afternoon, I was 
relaxed. We alighted and took our passports to the immigration office. 
After a while, an immigration officer asked us to keep quiet as he 
called out our names and handed back the passports. A Kilimanjaro of 
passports was reduced to an anthill. Then they were reduced to about 
ten ... five ... still my name wasn't called. About ten of us were 
straining our ears for our names as if it were the Day of Judgement. 
The image of the two bad-tempered men in the train flashed through 
my mind. The twin devils must have alerted the immigration 
authorities that I was coming. When the passports on the table came 
down to two my anxiety turned into fear and panic. Finally my name 
was called. I took the passport and got back into the train. 34 
The security police were always on the look out for people leaving the country, trying 
to weed out the ones who might be leaving to join the liberation movements, and even 
with legal documents, people face detention or arrest. 
Many others crossed into neighbouring countries illegally, generally finding 
their way to within a short distance of the border and then climbing the fences or 
crossing a river a couple of kilometres away from the border post, a method referred 
to as crossing the 'Green Border,' through the bush. Many people worked for the 
33 von den Steinen, Interview with Ncame. 










movements underground, and developed well established routes out of the country, 
taking regular trips to help people cross the borders. One man involved in the ANC 
underground recruiting people to leave South Africa for military training and 
organising their passage out from the Eastern Cape in 1976 and 1977 explained the 
process: 
We had our sister cell then in Jo'burg. So what we were doing, we'd 
recruit people, prepare them, take them from here through train to 
Jo'burg, eh, because we used mostly trains, not cars, at that time ... 
avoiding roadblocks. So when they arrived at Park Station in Jo'burg, 
the courier that side would be waiting for them, we'll just give them 
the Eastern Province Herald, and they will meet there on the other side, 
somebody will be standing, we won't describe what he's wearing ... 
just whether one has a cap, this colour ... you'll see him ... with a 
Star newspaper . . . and the person will see them when they got out, 
they will go out and for instance and gather in a certain platform 
number, platform number so and so, with their newspapers and then he 
will come, he will see them, because eh, also he will be briefed that 
side, and pick them up. Then from Jo'burg to Swaziland.,,3s 
He estimated, "We used to send more than three or four trips a week; trips of ten, 
fifteen, five, three, to Johannesburg.,,36 When asked about recruiting, he explained: 
"It was easy, you know, at that time because there were all these, the youth was very 
militant and students and most of the students and youth were running away from 
police, police harassing them. So people, everybody was looking for that, where do 
you join the ANC and what.',37 One man who was trying to find passage out at that 
time remembered: ''Now I left PE [Port Elizabeth] at a time when an underground 
structure of the ANC was basically taking people out of the country ... and there was 
a long queue in fact because there was quite an effective underground.,,38 Many 
35 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Lerumo Kalako, 10 June 1998, Cape Town. 
36 Interview with Lerumo Kalako, Interviewer unknown, no date. 
37 von den Steinen, Interview with Kalako. 
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people travelled through this underground, the cell in Johannesburg, or other 
organised methods. Party loyalties were often set aside when leaving the countries. 
ANC people with PAC contacts could utilise that organisation's mechanism for 
getting people across the borders, and vice versa. One man explained: 
When we got our final briefing, that I mean this is a PAC journey, by 
then, I said no, I'm pulling out. I wasn't aware that this was a PAC 
journey. Maybe there were better minds in fact that had convinced me 
that look, we are going with this trip, but when we reached Swaziland 
because this was the place that we had aimed for, when we reach 
Swaziland we then look for the ANC there. 39 
Another man, with ties to the ANC, who was running a route out of the country 
recalled his own approach: 
Some I knew, some I didn't. They were sending guys to me ... All 
sorts of people. I did not discriminate. I had made my mind up after 
Robben Island I had seen what was happening and I said "To hell, this 
backstabbing among political parties, it's delaying our struggle." And I 
made my own resolution that I'm going to serve anybody who wants to 
advance the struggle. Later on you can grab your niceties and brag you 
belong to this group. And I knew that when they left the country they 
are either going to get into the hands of the ANC, PAC or [BCM]. It's 
their choice and has nothing o do with me, but I had to help them.40 
This allowed many people to leave the country even if they didn't know the right 
people in their own party structures inside South Africa. 
On these trips, generally transport would be arranged from whichever city they 
were in to the border of a neighbouring country. Then upon arrival within a short 
distance of the border, they would get out, go through the bush, jump the fence 
between the borders a good distance away from the border post, and arrive in the 
neighbouring country. Often the person who had taken them to the border would 
drive through the border post on their own with legitimate documents, and then pick 
the group up on the other side and take them to the place they were to stay. These 
39 Interview with Mxolisi Petane, Interviewer Unknown, no date. 












trips were largely undertaken at night, leaving late at night and arriving in the next 
country very early in the morning. One girl who went out with the underground 
recalled some of the details: 
We left from Fort Beaufort to Queenstown. We left with a man that 
we don't know, I don't know even today, I'm still asking myself I 
wonder where is he and who was he. Because we didn't talk with him, 
the only thing that they said, they said we must take a bus from Fort 
Beaufort to Queenstown, and then when we arrive in Queenstown 
we're going to meet a man near, near the buses to Transkei, so we must 
not talk with this man, the only thing we can ask, 'How much is a bus 
to Transkei?' Then we just get in the bus, and then, when the, the bus 
driver will ask us about the, the fees for the bus, we tell him that we are 
waiting for somebody. And then he will know that its us because he 
was just moving up and down the bus to check for us and then that's 
the only thing that he'll know and then he's going to pay for us ... 
When we arrived in Transkei, I think we arrived late round about one 
o'clock. And then he just took us in another house, talked with the 
people of the house and then he left. So we didn't even see him and 
we don't know who is he.41 
They then obtained Transkei passports and were driven straight to Lesotho. Another 
woman remembered her trip into exile: 
The arrangement was that the combi will come at 11, 12 at night when 
people were sleeping. We weren't to tell anyone, bring very little, 
maybe a change of clothes, but no suitcases. Some didn't even get to 
bring that. I prepared the whole day, hid my things outside all day, so 
when the time comes, I can sneak out, take what I hid and go to the 
combi. They came at twelve midnight . . . I got in the combi, and 
knew some of the people there from the youth club. They drove us 
next to the Swazi border, and then we skipped, crossed the fence 
illegally. The driver had a passport, he was going to pass legally. He 
dropped us in the woods. We walked about 20 kilometres. And then 
we crossed, and were supposed to meet him on the other side. We 
delayed because of police patrols, and they must have seen us because 
they shot a warning, but we were determined to go forward, not 
backwards. Then the second shot was not a warning, so we crawled 
towards the border, determined not to go back. There were fourteen of 
us, two girls and the rest were boys. We managed but it took us long.42 
41 von den Steinen, Interview with Ncame. 











Swaziland and Botswana were the most common destinations for most of the people 
from the Johannesburg and Transvaal areas, with Lesotho being more popular with 
those from the Cape and Natal, but many crossed according to the plans they could 
make, rather than by which was the closest border. 
Those who went through Swaziland had a double crossing to make due to 
agreements between the government of Mozambique and Swaziland, which forced the 
recruits to cross illegally into Swaziland, travel to the Mozambiquean border, and then 
cross illegally there again. The same woman who told of her crossing above 
continued her story, 
After a month, we moved from Swaziland to Maputo. It was the same 
procedure of crossing illegally. Duma took us across, he was so strict 
... I was so scared of walking in the dark at night, and I fell over, the 
fear of walking at night, and there were small rocks, you know, when 
you don't know the route, and you're just going behind, you know, and 
I fell over, and when I fell over I started laughing. He came back, 
shouting at me. 'Do you know that you're not supposed to laugh? 
Ntombi [isiZulu for girl]? Hmmm?' He had a very deep Zulu accent, 
'Hmm? You're not supposed to laugh. You know? You know that if 
you laugh, you're going to expose ourselves. Hmm? You must keep 
quiet. Quiet, quiet, keep quiet, do you understand?' I said yes. And 
it's dark, and we're walking, walking, and the way we're walking, it's 
like we're tiptoeing. And it's struggling, you know, it's a long 
journey, and we're tiptoeing.43 
The trips between the cities and the borders were often a very dangerous part 
of the journeys, particularly when police roadblocks were up on the main roads. 
Transporting groups of people from their homes to the border could easily attract 
attention. People would invent cover stories, passing themselves off as church 
groups, football teams, bands, and the like. One man recalled: "We were 12 in our 
group, with one lady. Through Johannesburg, Soweto, where we changed the combi 
we were travelling under cover of a jazz group called Skief, Cape Town jazz group 











called Skief.,,44 One girl who left with a group of other girls recalled that they dressed 
up in head-scarves and jackets, so that if they were stopped, they would all look like 
old ladies and say they were going to a funera1.45 Another group of girls dressed up as 
Zionist church women to avoid the police.46 A group of boys who crossed into 
Botswana left their 'fancy township clothes' behind and dressed in old clothing in 
order to escape people's attention.47 There were as many methods of crossing as there 
were groups that went across. 
Many people did not have the assistance of the underground movements to 
help them plan their journeys and get across the border. They often left with very 
little information and following very general tips. One woman went with a few 
friends to jump the fence into Botswana at night: 
Of course it was frightening because there were some searchlights and 
the cars which were moving. But we managed to do it ... [after we 
crossed], it was a long way. We were given the direction that if we go 
straight, we will come across Gaborone, but that was . . . it was not as 
they said. So we walked a long way until we came across the farm 
houses, you know the houses near the border. And then we got there 
and we talked to the people, we told them that we are South Africans. 
Then we lied, we told them that we came to Botswana to attend school 
there ., . Then we had to report to the local chief. After that we 
proceeded to the police station until they made contact for us with the 
ANe people.48 
Another woman went all by herself, 
A friend of mine drove me to Mafikeng and I spent the night in 
Mafikeng and [at] four o'clock in the morning I crossed through 
Pietsane. You know the border is very wide and that time, they didn't 
have the manpower to man every inch of the way and where I crossed, 
the border is very liberal because you find the Botswana people were 
44 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Bandile "Blacks" Joyi, 21 November 2002, Cape Town. 
45 Kodesh, W. Interview with Jumaimah Modiakgotla, 8 April 1993. 
46 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Tsidi Mhlambo, 12 February 1999, Yeoville, Johannesburg. 
47 Bernstein, H. Interview with Michael Meli, no date. 











crossing, you know people were crossing back and forth, they did their 
shopping on our side and went back. So that's where I crossed. The 
river was not very deep, although it had rained the night before and the 
current was a bit strong. I was very scared. I was by myself . . . I 
didn't know where I was going. I was very frightened. And when I 
got to the other side, I wasn't even sure that I was already on the other 
side. But then after walking for something like five hours, I saw a 
building with the Botswana flag and that was a relief.49 
Whether on their own, with the help of the liberation movements, or through the 
assistance of the people of the neighbouring countries, the young recruits managed to 
get out of South Africa and found themselves in exile. 
Arrival in exile 
Arriving in exile was an exciting time for all who had left. Many experienced 
a wave of relief just finally to be outside of South Africa, where they had endured so 
much for so long. Indres Naidoo recalls arriving in Mozambique early one morning: 
"It was like for the first time in my life I was breathing. I'm free, I'm free, I'm 
free.,,50 One woman found herself staying in an ANC safe house, and said: "Well, it 
was a sense of relief that now for the first time we could talk openly about the ANe 
we worshipped so much.,,51 One man recalled that his impression of freedom came 
through libraries. Once he got to Botswana, he had the first chance in his life to study 
the documents of the liberation organisations, and through his readings of Sobukwe's 
speeches, he came to find the PAC as his natural home. 52 Another man had a bit more 
reserved reaction at his reception by the Basotho people: "It was very difficult. I felt 
both happy and helpless in the sense of being in hands of people I've never known, 
49 Bernstein, H. Interview with Ribbon Mosholi, no date. 
50 Bernstein, H. Interview with Indres Naidoo, no date. 
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and my life depends on them, but also hopeful in the sense that there is support for 
what you are doing, they are not even South African, but are helping the struggle 
anyway.,,53 Overall, the recruits who found themselves in ANC and PAC hands upon 
arrival in exile found the atmosphere welcoming. One noted: "The manner in which 
we were received made one to feel good, it was a warm reception in a comradely 
manner. The older generation receiving us were excited about the young generation 
coming to help in the struggle.,,54 A PAC man remembered his reception in 
Swaziland, "The reception was good in the sense that again, being received by what 
one can call experienced members or stalwarts of the organisation where one was now 
really pumped to appreciate and understand that this was the correct decision." A 
good reception in exile made them feel comfortable with their decision to leave and 
eager to continue on their journey. 
Not everyone was so happy to be outside though. One woman recalled: "I'm 
now in exile, the guys are telling us, now you're in exile, you can't go back because 
you know what will happen. I was beginning to regret leaving my mother.,,55 
Another recruit remembers that it was a very traumatic period of his life, he was 
wanted by the police, his friends had been arrested, he left South Africa, he was very 
emotional, but managed to keep the emotions in check. Only at night would he toss 
and turn with nightmares and wake up often.56 One young girl of 16 was happy to be 
out, but desperately missed home. This was the same woman who was so happy to 
get out of a bad family situation explained above. She related: 
53 Kodesh, Interview with Binda. 
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------------- ---- ----------- -- --- -- --
When I was in Lesotho I used to phone home and the only thing that I 
will say is 'hello'. And that is all. And I would just enjoy listening, 
different voices of people who are asking, 'Who is this person who is 
always phoning here and not ... she's done it again, just put that 
phone ... ' And everybody is, you know, mumbling and talking and 
then I'll put it down and then the following day I'll do, I think I've 
done, I stayed in Lesotho for three months and that I've done that for 
three months. And they couldn't discover, sometimes I couldn't even 
say hello, just wait for another person to say, 'hello' then I just keep 
quiet and hold the phone, 'HELLO, who are you? Why are you doing 
this?' and then the other one they'd ask from the kitchen, 'Who is that 
one?' Then they'll say, 'No, we don't know,' I used to enjoy that. 
Because I would just think, if I could tell them, maybe they can come 
and fetch me and I don't want that, because I've taken my own 
decision, I don't want to go home. 57 
Another man recalled his doubts upon his arrival in Botswana: 
It was cold as my mind rewound the cassette of my life. Where did 
Mother think I was? She was expecting me back home that same day. 
How would she cope with my absence? I had told the immigration 
officer that I would be in Botswana for seven days. This was only my 
first. So I still had a chance to go back home to Mother. No, never. I 
had cut my moorings. I slept fitfully that night. 58 
Everyone had different reactions upon arriving in exile, but excitement of what would 
come next predominated. 
The Process 
Upon arrival in a neighbouring country, there was a defined process for the 
newly exiled to go through. Some went completely through the underground and 
skipped this process, but this was the exception rather than the rule. Upon reaching 
the neighbouring country, whether Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique or Botswana, 
one generally would go to the police station, or a government department, and tell 
them who he was, where he had come from, and that he wanted political asylum. 
Many who were wanted at home gave false names due to the high level of co-
57 von den Steinen, Interview with Ncame. 











operation between some police forces and the security police in South Africa, 
particularly with the Swazi police. One woman recalled: 
One of the things that they told us that firstly we have to change our 
names . . . 1 mean having so many years with your only name, it 
wouldn't have been a very easy decision to just after change your name 
. . . but it was the necessity for our survival because there was the fear 
the Lesotho Police or security branch were having some dealings with 
the South African security. So when we were going to the police 
station to go and declare as refugees, we were having now this problem 
of getting ourselves new names. 59 
Others would apply straight to the United Nations for refugee status. Once one had 
applied to get asylum as a refugee, he was asked ifhe wanted to be put in contact with 
the ANC or the PAC, and occasionally other organisations. He would choose which 
one, and then be put into their hands and would leave to go to Zambia or Tanzania, or 
occasionally straight to Angola. People who had already been involved in one 
organisation or the other would choose according to their membership. But many did 
not have an affiliation to or knowledge of any organisations, and had to learn about 
them and select one. One recruit recalled the routine she went through in Botswana: 
"I went [to the] police station and 1 went through the process. You know, you have to 
fill in forms, then declare yourself a refugee and they were very nice. Then they 
showed me where to get the bus to go to Lobatse. And in Lobatse 1 got a bus to 
Gaborone, and Gaborone, well, there were many South Africans there and some of 
my friends too were there.,,6o Others had to spend time in the police stations. 
Another recruit who went through Botswana recalled that he was taken to the police 
station with his group and locked up. The floors were shining, very smooth and clean. 
It was very boring, and the food was bad. They didn't treat them like criminals, 
though, they let them go to the shop and get what they needed, but they slept in the 
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prison, and there was no point in running away. Some PAC and AZAPO people came 
around, but since they knew they wanted to join the ANC, they just stayed until the 
ANC representative came and organised for them to leave to Zambia.61 Once through 
the process of choosing an organisation and registering as a refugee, many of the 
people who went through Botswana were housed at a refugee camp in Dukwe, in 
sections dedicated to their particular organisation. Another man remembered going 
through Swaziland: 
I stayed almost ten months in Swaziland, But first we contacted the 
police . . . So we stayed in a police station, they went through our 
stories, our personal stories, background and what we wanted in 
Swaziland. Well, they even told us there are two political movements, 
which one are you to join? Well, me and my friends . . . well we 
cannot just come and say we want the ANC or PAC, we don't know 
about these things. But first what we want, we want refugee status 
then later we want to pursue our studies . . . In the end I went to a 
camp, a refugee camp ... we met all sorts of South Africans ... There 
were those who were for the PAC, those who were for ANC, so in the 
process we sat and listened and started finding out what is going on 
outside. Well ultimately I came to be more attracted to the ANC.62 
The situation in Swaziland at the police stations was similar to that in Botswana. One 
man recalled: 
We were accommodated in the cells, at that stage we were about 15 to 
20 people per room, but we were not literally locked up, but there was 
some semblance of control because at a particular time of the day you 
needed to be back and at night they'd lock. But during the day you 
could travel, go to the capital city or any of the small towns. And then 
you were required also that if you were not going to come back, you 
should then inform the committee that was running that centre that 
you're not going to come back and where, if they wanted to meet you, 
you will be.63 
Another man who was a member of the PAC recalled: "They asked what organisation 
do you belong to, and we said PAC. So they said, no phone the PAC official now, 
61 Kodesh, W. Interview with Meshack Mochele, 15 December 1992. 
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they phone this guy, this guy came. Then he welcome us, welcome gentlemen, shake 
our hands, who are you, then he took us to Gaborone.,,64 If someone didn't know 
what organisation he wanted to join, sometimes the choice was purely based on luck. 
If he was received by someone who was partial to one organisation, he would be 
influenced to join that organisation. One man related the pressure from a policeman 
in Botswana: 
"Which one would you like to join?" "I don't know them. You can 
help me by calling their representatives to come and explain their 
organisations' policies to me." "That's impossible," he said with an air 
of finality. "I can call the ANC people because I know where they stay. 
They are here in Gaborone. But it'd take us three days to reach PAC 
people. I would need a special car because they are in the Kalahari 
Desert. It would take us another three days to come back. And then 
there's a student organisation, but they are not serious people.,,6s 
That man held out to learn the different organisations, and later heard a rumour that 
this particular policeman received payment to channel recruits to the ANC. Another 
man who went through Swaziland remembered a policeman who was sympathetic 
towards the PAC encouraged him to join that organisation.66 Influences from other 
people who had loyalties to the ANC or PAC could lead someone to a particular 
organisation. The presence of a representative of one organisation when another was 
absent could also swing the decision. The fact that people often could not leave the 
jail until they picked an organisation also led people to choose quickly and without all 
the information they needed to make an informed choice. 
The process in Lesotho resembled that in Swaziland and Botswana. One 
woman and her friend went to the police station and declared themselves as refugees 
under false names. They noticed: "The first thing that struck us, the police, the 
64 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Lt. Mmfanelo "Zola" Bongco, 19 August 2004, Simonstown 
Naval Base. 
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manner of the police there was not so different from the police that we were used to 
here in South Africa. The way they were harassing us, pushing us around, asking a 
lot of funny and stupid questions . . . That was a great disappointment to us because 
we thought that in Lesotho, having been free for such a long time [they were] sure to 
be observing some standards that we were not used to here in South Africa.,,67 The 
authorities later took them to a refugee camp outside of Maseru. Eventually the 
majority of the newly exiled South Africans would find themselves in the hands of the 
ANC or the PAC. 
Once with the organisations, there was also a procedure. With the ANC, this 
consisted of writing an autobiography and choosing whether one wanted to go to 
school or join MK. The ANC described the process to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, 
On arrival, the recruits were welcomed by the official in charge and 
advised of the rules that would govern their stay in the reception area 
or centre by the person in charge ... Recruits had to supply detailed 
infonnation on their family and educational history, their reasons for 
wanting to join the Movement, and details on the political activities in 
which s/he had been involved. Biographies also served as skills audits, 
and as a means of gathering valuable infonnation of various kinds.68 
These biographies were used to get an idea of each new recruit, as well as to weed out 
security agents sent by the South Africa Police to infiltrate the ANC. They also 
served as a method of obtaining infonnation about the situation inside South Africa 
and about people there who were suspected to be infonners. One recruit recalls that 
he had to go through these basic interviews, to give them his life story, and to tell 
67 Interview with Tengimfene. 
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them who he thought were informers at home.69 A comrade who was working for the 
security department in Mozambique explained, 
It was my basic task to interview people who were coming from home 
and . . . to interview them, to go through their biographies, to assist 
them in first and foremost in writing out their biographies and secondly 
to determine as their credibility . . . working very hard too to try and 
sift from that group ... the people whose stories were not credible with 
a lot of loopholes and stories that were clear that they were actually 
made false stories so that we can be infiltrated by the enemy. 70 
Most recruits passed through this with no problems. 
The other main question they were asked was whether they wanted to go to 
school or join the armed struggle. Many did choose the school option and were sent 
to study allover the world. Others had their hearts set on the military. Sometimes the 
people asking the questions would try to influence the recruits in their decisions. 
When they saw people who were very young, or well educated, or often if they were 
young girls, they would encourage them to go to school. One recruit remembered: 
"After three weeks under the ANC wing we were given a choice of education or 
military training. In spite of many attempts to dissuade me from taking the [latter] 
option, I went to the camps because I had a lot of anger in me and I wanted to do 
military training.,,71 Another recruit recalled her interview in Mozambique, where she 
received the school or MK question: "We said we wanted to go to MK. He said you 
are too young to go fight and we became very hysterical because that's what we came 
for. If we wanted to study we could do that in South Africa. We discussed, and the 
69 von den Steinen, Interview with Mrubata. 
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next day they asked us again and we said no we want to go to MK." 72 Indres Naidoo 
indicated why they sometimes discouraged people from joining MK with a story, 
I'll give you the case of point of three young 'so-called coloured' boys 
that came from the Cape. They were very, very young. And in fact it 
was heart breaking to see them going into military when they should 
really be in school. And I spoke to them. And I said to them, 'Listen 
chaps, you chaps should rather go to school than going into the 
military.' And they said, 'No, we have come here to get necessary 
training and to go back into the country.' ... And of course all three 
went into training and the three returned into the country and two 
[were] killed and ... one was captured.73 
All were not so keen to go straight to the military. One woman remembered the peer 
pressure that put her in that position: "We were asked whether we still intend to go for 
military training or to go to school. I was almost the last one they interviewed and the 
group said we're still going for military training, and I felt that if I said I wanted to go 
to school then, it would be a betrayal.,,74 Not all were encouraged to go to school, 
either. One recruit remembered that he wanted to go to school, but due to the fact that 
he had done some work in the early 1960s for the ANC, working with sabotage, they 
thought he should really use his experience to join the military. Eventually he 
relented, convincing himself that it was better to do that and pay his own way, then to 
go to school and feel indebted to the movement forever. 75 Finally, the recruits were 
given 'pseudo-names', or 'bush-names', for security purposes, so they wouldn't be 
recognised. 
The PAC process was largely similar. Recruits filled out a form detailing their 
personal family and health details, then their education, work, and political 
72 Interview with Mavuso. 
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background. They wrote or dictated their autobiographies, for the same purposes as 
in MK. However, the choice of school or the military was not as often given in the 
PAC. They took the stance that the organisation must decide where to place its 
people. The PAC often favoured channelling people into APLA and only a few 
people got scholarships to study. When first joining the PAC in Botswana, one man 
explained what he was told when he asked to apply to APLA: "Comrade, you can 
apply in writing for membership of the PAC but not for membership of APLA. Once 
you're in the PAC, the organisation will decide where to deploy you, taking your gifts 
and talents into account.,,76 Another man who later left the PAC to join the ANC 
claimed that he wanted to study, but was forced to go for military training by the 
leadership. One could still state a preference however, and on the forms for 
registering with the PAC one section was titled: "Special areas of interest for 
deployment (What kind of work military/ academic)" 77 
The competition between the ANC and PAC for recruits was heated. Often 
people who didn't have a good knowledge of the policies and ideologies of the 
different organisations were told negative things about the rival organisations to get 
them to join the other one. Most often though, people were given information on the 
different organisations and allowed to make up their own minds. The PAC archives 
at the University of Fort Hare contain a huge number of applications for membership 
that show what attracted people to that organisation. In the applications, the large 
majority of people who joined the PAC were attracted by the organisation's stance on 
the land issue, which asserted that the land of South Africa had been stolen by the 
white people, and must be reclaimed by the Africans. One man articulated his reasons 
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for joining the PAC: "I have joined PAC and APLA because as far as 1 am concerned 
this is the only organisation that secures African's interest particularly on the land 
issue and rebuilding of dignity of the Africans.,,7S Other recruits saw the PAC as 
more militant than the ANC, and that attracted them to the organisation. One man 
noted: "APLA soldiers do not aim to destroy buildings of which after liberation we 
would have to re-build, instead their task is to kill Security Police and installations 
and South African Defence Force the army that kills unarmed innocent masses.,,79 
And while the PAC officially had a non-racial focus, it was often seen as a purely 
black organisation, as opposed to the ANC who had many prominent white members. 
One man stated on his application: "The ANC was not an answer because of the 
whites within it."sO Often the same things that attracted some people to the PAC 
made others commit to the ANC. One woman who joined MK explained: "I don't 
know what made me not to be in favour of the PAC. Mostly it was because of maybe 
the way they were too militant and the slogans which they were passing around and so 
forth. 1 mean this thing that South Africa belongs only to Africans, etc."Sl For 
whatever reasons, when people arrived in exile, they went through the process and 
joined the ANC or PAC. Then they looked forward expectantly to what would come 
next. 
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The Conditions Outside 
Most of the recruits who left South Africa had never been outside the country 
before. They went through several countries, and experienced many different places 
and situations. Some spent considerable time in certain places and came out with 
insightful impressions of the places they had been. 
Many of the recruits had never been on an airplane before, which was often a 
daunting experience. One comrade recalled: "On the plane from Botswana, we 
starved ourselves until we got to Lusaka . . . we thought we had to pay for the 
aeroplane food and drink."s2 Another was terrified to be flying: "It was my first time 
in a plane, I couldn't eat, I was horrified."s3 And a third was not so sure of the 
quality of the aeroplane: "It was my first plane, and it was a very shaky old plane. It 
was a very scary experience."S4 The first experience with black African pilots thrilled 
many. One man recalled: 
We boarded a ten-seater flight to Zambia. It was our very first 
experience of flying and we were amazed to see a black pilot. There 
were none in South Africa. In fact we had never even seen a photo of 
one in a magazine or book before. At that point it hit me- we were no 
longer in South Africa. This was my first real taste of freedom. 85 
Many recruits went through Lesotho and had a chance to see a bit of the 
capital city area. One recalled, 
Well first and foremost . . . I had a problem, language problem in 
Lesotho. But I managed to get myself to the capital, Maseru [from the 
place she was staying] ... I had no problems with the government, in 
fact, many Lesotho locals were very, very sympathetic to our cause 
and very helpful because I had some Lesotho friends. They regarded 
me as a sister. And the people were very sympathetic because it was 
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immediately after the Maseru massacre ... So the Lesotho locals were 
very bitter about the South African government so that's why they 
were so warm towards us.86 
Another didn't feel so far from home in Lesotho: "Lesotho is like South Africa, so we 
didn't even feel that you are in exile, because the weather was the same, and it was 
during December, you know, singers like Hugh Masekela and all, there were many 
shows and everything, so you didn't feel like you were really in exile.,,87 One woman 
spent a long time in a refugee camp there, waiting for enough people to gather for 
them to go on to Tanzania. She said that they stayed there in two big dormitories, one 
occupied by the younger boys, and the other filled with more matured comrades. Life 
there was monotonous and boring. They had enough food, though it wasn't always 
nice, and without anything to do, they would just wander about town endlessly. 
Eventually they managed to work out a programme for the camp, with language 
lessons to learn Sesotho, some political lessons led by some of the mature comrades, 
and some sports as well. 88 
Botswana also inspired some new ideas. One man who spent time there found 
things very different from home, with very different cultural norms. He was surprised 
to see women, mothers, riding a bike, which he had never seen at home in Cape 
Town. He found that in Botswana, mothers were often the heads of households. He 
also found himself sitting next to white people in bars, and it was a very strange 
situation for him. The living conditions at his ANC residence also surprised him. 
There were women there, but everyone was expected to cook. They would help him 
out, give him directions and such, but when his cooking day arrived, he was the one 
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who had to do it all. This was a big change for a man who had only fried an egg ever 
before. He also had to keep himself and his clothes looking spotless and well pressed, 
when before he had always just let his sisters do that sort of thing for him. His time in 
Bots~ana taught him many new skills and changed many of his ideas. 89 
Another woman remembered her time spent in Zambia. Unlike the 
neighbouring countries, Zambia really felt like somewhere far from home to her. She 
said: "What struck me most was the . . . soldiers guarding the airport there. They 
were too dark, too dark, I mean one could see that these are not South Africans." She 
went to a residence there, and they established a daily routine. They would do some 
gardening in the mornings, before it got too hot, then work at indoor chores like 
washing clothes. They would tell stories and play games, and spent a lot of time in 
the library there reading books they could not get access to in South Africa. They 
played sports like softball, soccer, volleyball, and table tennis. Then after supper they 
would have news and political discussions, followed by a period called 'jazz hour', 
which was filled with singing and listening to the radio. Though it was fun at first, it 
quickly became boring. They were not allowed to leave the residence, and they 
longed to mingle with the locals. Eventually they found themselves lying around, 
sleeping a lot, pretending to be sick just to get to go to the clinic and meet some local 
people. They even tried to brew some home-made beer. Finally, they were able to 
leave to go for military training after two months at the residence there. 90 
Tanzania was one of the hubs of transit for the recruits on their way to 
training. There they found a completely different place from what they knew and 
from what they had imagined. Every recruit who went through Tanzania commented 
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first on the heat. One expressed: "We arrived in Tanzania, and it was hot. We were 
surprised, we thought maybe it was the heat of the engines, but we got to the airport 
and it was still just as hot ... It was so hot we couldn't do anything, walked around 
half naked, sweating all the time ... moving out at night, to get out and take a walk or 
something.,,91 Many who were used to Johannesburg were shocked at the differences 
between there and Dar es Salaam. One woman remembered: 
When we first landed in Tanzania, we were very excited because we 
hear the radio talking about Dar es Salaam, we thought it was like New 
York City. So when we arrived, it was in the evening and we saw just 
a humid place, very dull. Some medical officers fetched us at the 
airport. We asked them, 'Are we there or are we still proceeding to 
Tanzania?' They said, 'Welcome to Tanzania,' and we were 
astonished because the way it looked was not what we thought. We 
expected like Jo'burg or America, but the place was so tiny, people 
wearing dark things covering their faces ... 92 
Another recalled her reaction upon arriving in Tanzania: 
Now immediately we arrived in Tanzania, oh, things have changed, 
really. We see the place, the town, oh my, the place is dirty, you know 
the buildings, there, there's no paint, there's nothing. You can see that, 
no, there's poverty here. And then we, we stayed for three to six 
months and then there was a problem of morale, we were attacked by 
malaria. It, it was another misery.93 
One recruit recalled his arrival at the Dar es Salaam airport: 
A rat ran across the floor, we said, 'Hey, this is really Africa now.' 
We went out of the airport, it was still very hot, there were 
cockroaches on the road, big ones we weren't used to. We were driven 
with cars into a flat there in Dar with a few guys, maybe 10 or so. We 
stayed there, eating meat, food, there were no shortages. 94 
As they got to know the place, some began to like it better. One recruit said, "We 
managed to get around Dar es Salaam, went to the market, met local people, had the 
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local women plait us. Tanzania was nice, people were very friendly. It was my first 
experience to hear the Muslims praying.,,95 Another recalled: "There was no 
difficulty with the language especially us who were staying in town. A number of 
people were in a position to speak English even if not fluent English but once you 
speak English they are in a position to follow, what exactly it is that you want to say . 
. . One also picked up some Swahili words.,,96 He also compared South Africa and 
Tanzania and decided: 
There was a vast difference between the two . . . We were from a 
highly developed country when it comes to economy and the 
infrastructure. Then we had to adjust to a country that is a little bit less 
developed . . . But what was also noticeable was the political 
development. They were more politically developed ... So that you 
couldn't realise any tension amongst the people of different colours ... 
With us it still had those . . . whereby you tend to be surprised 
sometimes in a place you see just whites mixing easily with blacks. 
And theoretically this is what we hoped for. But at times when you see 
it happening practically it is not so easy to accept it.97 
Some of the recruits stayed in camps outside of Dar es Salaam. There they had a 
routine of classes, cleaning, taking care of the camp, cooking, and the like, and some 
physical training and political education to begin to get them in shape for the real 
training camps. Others were put up in town at hotels or party residences. Eventually, 
from wherever they were staying, they advanced to take up the task for which they 
had left South Africa: military training. 
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Come friends to the forest of feast 
feast of knowledge of bow and arrow 
feast of whispers of spear on flight 
the bush beckons all to the bush school1 
The late 1960s and early 1970s were difficult times for the liberation movements in 
exile. Plagued with leadership problems, stagnancy, competition for resources and 
support, and an absence of influence inside South Africa, the ANC and PAC were 
poorly situated to launch a revolution. When the Soweto uprisings erupted inside 
South Africa in 1976 the organisations faced both a huge opportunity and a great 
challenge. Thousands of young, militant South Africans fled into exile, seeking 
military training and expecting to return home quickly to fight against the apartheid 
regune. 
The African National Congress held a consultative conference in Morogoro, 
Tanzania in 1969. Among other issues discussed, they agreed to open membership to 
all races during the conference. They debated this decision at length, and a group of 
prominent members who opposed the decision divided the party. The ANC expelled 
this "gang of eight", as they were known, in October of 1975, and the issue appeared 
closed. The gang of eight launched a rival organisation, which drew little support and 
soon faded into obscurity. 
The 1974 Portuguese coup that led to the independence of 
Mozambique and Angola in 1975 provided the ANC with an excellent opportunity. 
Their close relationship with the Movimento Popular de Liberta~ao de Angola 
1 From Matlou, Rebecca. (1980). A Soldier at War (To the Year of the Spear). In Feinberg, Barry. (Ed). 
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(MPLA), Angola's new ruling party, allowed them to establish training and transit 
camps for their recruits in Angola, and gave them the ability to absorb the thousands 
of young South Africans who began to join them from the following year. One source 
noted a large wave of people leaving the country in the wake of the Soweto uprisings, 
trailing off to approximately 250 people per month by 1978, and an overall boost of 
ANC numbers from 1 000 to 9 000. The ANC won the lion's share of the new blood, 
with about two thirds of the recruits going into their organisation. 2 In the immediate 
aftermath of the uprisings, the average age of MK operatives tried by the state 
dropped from 35 to 28.3 While unprepared for the influx of new recruits, the 
settlement of their leadership disputes and the establishment of camps in Angola put 
them in an excellent position when the Soweto generation started to flee into exile to 
join the armed struggle. 
From the Soweto uprisings until the regional peace m~asures which led to the 
closure of ANC camps in Angola in 1989, the vast majority of South Africans who 
went into exile to join Umkhonto we Sizwe did at least their initial training at one of 
the many MK camps in Angola. While a few trained elsewhere, and many went on to 
further training allover the world, this basic training in Angola was something of a 
universal experience for the MK soldiers from the Soweto generation and later 
groups. The training was strenuous, and the conditions often difficult. Whatever 
period they were in Angola, and however long their stay, their time in the training 
camps remains vivid in their memories. 
2 Davis, Stephen M. (1987). Apartheid's Rebels: Inside South Africa's Hidden War, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 57. 











June 16 Detachments & Post-Soweto Recruits 
The students and their sympathisers who left South Africa to join MK in the 
immediate aftennath of the Soweto uprisings found their way to exile in many 
different ways. Eventually most ended up in Angola at a transit camp just outside 
Luanda called Engineering Camp. From June until December, these soldiers-to-be 
collected in this camp until they were finally sent on to their basic training. 
Nobody who comes into a brand new situation is really prepared for it, but it is 
hard not to imagine what awaits and what conditions will be like. This was true for 
the South Africans who went into exile to join MK. The first group to leave the 
country after the uprisings and go to the training camps in Angola entered a situation 
for which they could not possibly prepare. They were the pioneers and the first to be 
trained in the camps there, so even the soldiers who had already trained in other 
places could not prepare them for what lay ahead. 
One of the first things many of the ex-MK soldiers recalled about Angola and 
Engineering Camp would become one of the main concerns of their time there. 
Angola is in a malaria zone, and many soldiers fell prey to this disease during their 
training. One method of combating this was the use of mosquito nets, and to those 
who had no experience with these, it was very strange to arrive in Angola and inspect 
their sleeping arrangements. One man who came to Angola at this time remembered 
his first impressions: 
Somebody said you'll find a bed, an empty bed there. So I'm going up 
there. On the floor, I saw a string of beds, with some nets and so on. I 
said, 'What's this thing?' I look around, I've never seen such a bed 
with a net. People are inside as if they are dead, or critically ill. Then 
I said- well there's an empty one. I look at this, there's sticks, four 
sticks two in front, two in back. I said, 'Oh gosh, I've had it' I just 
took them, pushed them aside . . . got into the bed . . . I thought I was 
going to sleep and I sleep. Something came . . . zzzzzzing! . . . 
Dddddddding! ... Wwwwwwong! All these things. I said, 'What's 











there's net, but we never take them seriously ... I never slept man, it 
was war, man it was war ... I went down, stayed in the veranda until 
the moming- I couldn't sleep because of the mosquitoes and there were 
guys next to me, just snoring. And then I mentioned it to some 
comrades and they laughed and said: 'We did the same thing too' .4 
Many other soldiers remembered having the same reaction. One noted: "You 
remember soldiers sleep at halls. You'd find people, about 80 people that are sleeping 
here, there is 40 beds this side and that side. And every bed has a mosquito net. 
When you enter there, take your mind to the hospital."s This is just one of the many 
strange circumstances these new soldiers had to get used to in a hurry. 
Once they got over their initial reactions, life in Engineering Camp became 
largely a game of waiting to go for training. For students who had left the country 
intending to spend a few weeks or months learning how to shoot, then heading 
straight back to South Africa with a gun to liberate their country, this often came as an 
unpleasant experience. Mxolisi Petane remembered the camp as: "A place where 
soldiers were beginning to be ... I don't want to say disillusioned or frustrated. They 
wanted to go to train.,,6 In the meantime however many activities occupied their time. 
In addition to their comrades from home, they met Angolans from For~as Armadas 
Populares de Liberta~ao de Angola (F APLA), Zimbabweans from the Zimbabwe 
African Peoples Union (ZAPU), Namibians from the South West African Peoples 
Organisation (SW APO), and even Cubans who were assisting the Angolans, and 
would soon become instructors for MK as well. Many thrilled to see trained soldiers 
belonging to black armies that were also involved in liberating their own countries. 
While exciting to interact with the different groups, it was also difficult at times due 
4 Kodesh, W. Interview with Sipho Binda (Mandla Jwara), 24 March 1993. 
S Interview with Mxolisi Petane, Interviewer unknown, no date. 











to the cultural and linguistic mix. In countries near to South Africa which were the 
first stops in exile, one might find Sesotho, Setwana, Siswati, or English being 
spoken, which didn't seem so different from South Africa. Once they had reached 
Angola, they found that the Angolans spoke Portuguese and the Cuban soldiers spoke 
Spanish. But as one MK soldier noted: "[We had] difficulty with language, but it is 
typical of South Africans I think we catch on fast. Already some comrades speaking 
Espanola, Portuguese, teach us few words, how to greet, water, money, I love you, so 
Relations sometimes deteriorated, however. F APLA also shared the camp, 
and the war against Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) 
had exhausted many of their supplies, especially food. Many of the F APLA soldiers 
often found themselves lacking, and noticed that the South Africans at the other end 
of the camp had ample supplies. One soldier related: "One Angolan guy burst into 
our room, holding a grenade, without a pin, which we didn't know, and another guy 
pushing him, pulling him. We found ou  later this guy wanted to bomb us since they 
didn't have food and so on and we were almost like civilians, had what we needed."s 
Other soldiers had similar memories of conflicts with F APLA soldiers over food. 
Activities varied, and no full training programme operated there, though they 
did not remain idle. One soldier recalled that they would while away the time playing 
soccer, doing obstacle courses, and doing light training. 9 Another remembered that 
they also would go to the cinema some evenings in town, and to the beach on 
7 Kodesh, Interview with Sipho Binda. 
8 Kodesh, W. Interview with Meshack Mochele, 15 December 1992. 












Saturday or Sunday.l0 A female soldier fondly described the trips to the beach and a 
different side to the cultural exchanges. The women waiting to begin training lived in 
a house in town with the leaders, but would join the men from the camp in their 
excursions. She remembered that she and her female comrades met some of the 
Cuban forces at the beach, and noted that: "They liked women, they would sing, play 
the guitar, try to teach us to swim ... " and they eventually got into trouble once a 
couple of the Cuban guys tracked one of the girls back to their residence. 11 Despite 
some good times, however, the overwhelming urge was to go and train so they could 
return to fight. 
Their chance finally came near the end of 1976. The recruits piled into buses 
holding about 100 people each and with Cuban escorts in case of UNIT A ambushes. 
They spent almost a whole day driving to the camp, which lay far to the south of the 
capital city, Luanda. Wben driving south, it really became apparent to some that they 
were travelling through. a war tom country. One man remembered seeing what he 
called, 'road scars,' like signs with gunshot holes and overturned truCkS.12 Another 
woman recalled Angola as terrible because of the war, and remembered going over a 
bridge made out of planks, and that now when she looks back, she finds the 
experience scary, though at the time she was too excited about getting training to 
worry too much. 13 One soldier found the drive exciting, and recalled a stop near a 
pineapple farm for a rest and some fruit, and then another stop at a restaurant to eat 
some more along the way.14 Finally the excited recruits arrived at the camp they 
10 Kodesh, W. Interview with Abraham Lentsoane (Titi Motsenang), 5 April 1993. 
11 von den Steinen, Interview with Tsidi Mhlambo, 12 February 1999, Yeoville, Johannesburg. 
12 Kodesh, Interview with Mochele. 
13 Kodesh, W. Interview with Thoko Thedorah Mavuso (Zukiswa Mindala), 7 April 1993. 











would be training at, just outside of Benguela. They were very surprised to find a 
large empty, dirty space. A female soldier remembered arriving there to find no 
water, no houses, just a wide open space that was very dry like a desert. She had 
expected the camp to be like a school or something, with dormitories and all, and 
found only one house, where the Cubans guarding the place lived. She said that her 
dreams were just shattered. After 15-17 hours of driving, she hoped that perhaps they 
were still in transit, until one of the leaders came and said: "Welcome to our new 
camp.,,15 The women were given one room in the house that was there, for all of 
them.16 A female soldier noted that the room was small, and they slept like sardines, 
so that when one turned over, all of them had to do the same.17 Eventually they got 
the camp organised for the next group of trainees, and managed at the same time to do 
their six months training. Many moved on to Nova Catengue, not far from the 
Benguela camp, to help set that up as well, and it became the main training camp until 
its destruction in 1979 at the hands of the South African forces. The recruits of the 
next several years benefited from their efforts. 
Post- Soweto generation recruits 
Later recruits had better access to information about the camps. Some who 
were active in underground structures before they left the country, or who spent time 
in prison, were able to get information from trained MK soldiers who were working 
inside South Africa, or who had been caught and now shared a prison cell with them. 
IS Kodesh, Interview with Mavuso. 
16 10 by one count, 11 by another. 











Others would meet up with people they knew in exile, and exchange news of home 
for details of the camps, as one woman related: 
Well the comrade I had left the country with had left me in Lusaka so I 
found him there so as he was the only person I could rely on, I took 
him aside, asked how life was there and such things. So he gave me a 
lot of information as to how should I behave . . . And in the process I 
also met comrades whom I'd been with in some schools here in South 
Africa who were already trained. So they also received me with a lot 
of enthusiasm. First question they asked was how was the situation 
back home, where who, where was who, what was who, so and so 
doing and all such things. And in return I also asked them about how 
military training is. So general[ly] there were lot of stories that we 
were being told. Well basically depending on who you- one met. 
Some of the stories were frightening, some were encouraging. But at 
the end we ended up being confused and just decided we're going 
forward. We'll just see what was in store for us. 18 
Some still arrived with no idea of where they were heading, and their reactions to the 
situations they found themselves in depended on their own perceptions of how things 
would be. One was surprised at how bad things were, having expected better: 
As we used to see armies here inside the country living in barracks 
with conditions relatively looking good. When we arrived in the 
camps first it was a bit of a surprise for most of us. That those were 
real bushes and that people were living in dwellings built underground. 
But with all that what also surprised us was the amount of work that 
has been done by the comrades that were there before us who were 
able to build those areas and make them homes. For example, one was 
not aware that those dwellings are cemented. That in those dwellings 
there are beds for all of us. Well dressed beds with blankets, c1ean. 19 
Another expected far worse than what she found: 
For me, I didn't find [the conditions] very hard, but for any person they 
were hard. Because I was imagining something that was worse than 
that. For instance, I was imagining that we are going to sleep in the 
hammock ... and then we're going to eat the roots of the plants ... So 
when I found tents and . . . I was sure of the three meals . . . I was 
satisfied because I was imagining something worse than that. 20 
18 Interview with Mtombeli Tengimfene. Interviewer unknown, no date. 
19 Interview with Zola Tyikwe, Interviewer unknown, no date. 











Some were just amazed to find themselves in these situations and couldn't have 
imagined what awaited them. One recruit remembered going to train in Quibaxe, east 
of Luanda, driving through the jungle on a tar road that eventually disappeared into 
rough dirt roads. It was a very eerie atmosphere, and the journey was broken by a cry 
of "Inyoka!" He looked up only to find a real live snake hanging from the tree on the 
side of the road.21 Whatever the circumstances, arriving at the camps was quite an 
experience for all, and most would remember this too for the rest of their lives. 
Training in the Angolan Camps 
Throughout the period covered in this study, the training programme largely 
stayed the same in all of the big training camps. Some differences developed as time 
went on, but the basic daily routine and the courses provided remained similar. Upon 
arrival at the training camps, the training staff divided the trainees into sections of 
about 10 people, then three sections combined to create a platoon, then three platoons 
made up a company, which would have around 100 people in it. The main training 
camps for the basic training had about 500 trainees doing the course at a time, and the 
course lasted about six months. Each section, platoon, company, and camp had a 
commander and a commissar. The commander was the person in charge, and the 
commissar was there as a person to guide people politically, and to sort out the 
problems that people encountered. The camp commanders and commissars were 
trained soldiers, while often the section, platoon, and company commanders and 
commissars were promising recruits singled out early on. Soldiers often referred to 
the commander and commissar as their "father and mother," respectively. One soldier 
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who remembered his introduction to this system remarked that the commander was 
younger than he was, and slight, and wondered how he could be a commander when 
he imagined they should be big and tough. Then they told him about the commissar. 
He wanted to know, "what's that?" They replied, "Well, he teaches politics." He 
said, "Politics? We don't need that, we just need orders." They explained, "But you 
can go to the commissar if you have problems with the commander or the other 
soldiers, he's like your mother, you can go to him with your problems.,,22 Companies 
often trained together, and the different companies would. rotate among the classes. In 
addition to about 500 trainees at a time, the camps also housed the staff needed to run 
the camp. Howard Barrell, who has written much about MK, estimates that in the 
main camps: "There would be about 25 instructors covering the various subjects in 
the training programme; the camp administration would comprise the commander and 
about 10 others charged with portfolios like the political commissariat, ordinance, 
logistics, communications, personnel and instruction.23 
The trainees woke up between 4:30 and 5:30 in the morning, depending on the 
camp where they were training. The first half hour to hour of the day would be spent 
doing morning exercise, which usually consisted of taking a long run, sometimes up 
to 6 or 7 kilometres. After the morning exercise the trainees had a short time to wash, 
then they went to breakfast, for which they often had very little time to eat. One 
soldier remembers getting 3 minutes for breakfast, others about ten. 
Then the trainees assembled, listened to announcements, and heard the news. 
There were particular soldiers selected to listen to the news every night on the radio, 
and also receive news from the Department of Information and Propaganda, which 
22 Kodesh, Interview with Binda. 











they compiled and shared with the camp. This was the main way for the people living 
in the camps to stay in touch with the situation in the world and in South Africa. 
After this, it was usually around 6 or 7am, and they went to classes until about 12 or 
1 pm. They broke for lunch, and after lunch, there would be more classes, work to do 
around the camp, marches to go on, or extra studies or practices for cultural groups. 
They had dinner at night, and some time to relax, take extra classes, or hold practices 
for cultural groups. Classes consisted of fireanns, engineering (sabotage, bombs, and 
the like), Military and Combat Work (MCW; the art of underground and guerrilla 
warfare, based on a system developed by the Soviets), politics, topography, first aid, 
physical training, tactics, and artillery. Then lights out came around 10pm. This 
routine went on from Monday through Friday, but Saturday and Sunday were less 
structured days, with sports, cultural events, extra classes, and a bit of time for 
relaxation.24 
Later groups of recruits found the routine changed, particularly during periods 
of heavy UNITA activity in the areas of their camps and South African bombing raids 
across the Namibian border. In these cases, the trainees spent most of their time 
outside of the camps in the bush, sleeping, training, and holding classes there, and 
only returned to the camps for a bit of sleep, food, and assemblies. In addition to this 
routine were special alann drills, as Jack Simons described in his diary: "A mini 
alann last night and a bigger more protracted one this morning starting at 4 a.m. 
Operation entailed evacuation of camp and taking cover some 100s of metres away." 
And the next day: "Another "alert"- breakfast at 5:30, long trek along river bed, 
scrambling up ravine to reach culvert from the back. Return at 1 0 a.m. Rest of 












morning recuperation!,,25 The camps during this period of the late seventies and early 
eighties often had extensive systems of trenches and dugouts for defence against air 
attacks, as well as underground bunker systems to keep the camp invisible from the 
au. 
The politics classes constituted one of the main focuses of the training 
programme, with several class periods each day set aside for this. Political education 
focused on several different aspects, some covering the history of South Africa, the 
ANC, the SACP, and MK. Others would study revolutions around the world, such as 
those in Vietnam, Russia, and Cuba. Also covered in detail were the theories 
surrounding Marxism and Leninism, as well as political economy and scientific 
socialism?6 MK focused largely on providing its soldiers with a clear political 
understanding of the history of their own struggle as well as other peoples' struggles, 
and taught them the circumstances surrounding their own conditions in the present. 
Since policy usually precluded the quick few months of training and 
immediate return to South Africa with an AK-47, as so many of the youth fleeing the 
country expected, it was imperative to get them to look at the bigger picture. They 
studied issues like friendly and hostile countries surrounding their borders, 
international and regional influences, and the military might of South Africa. To keep 
their morale high when it felt like they would never return to South Africa to fight, 
they were reminded that many people had already been in exile for 15 years or so 
before they arrived there, and that the liberation of South Africa would not happen 
overnight. One soldier explained his ideas at the beginning of his training and the 
positive effects the political classes at Engineering camp gave him. He said that it 
2S Sparg, Marion, Jenny Schreiner and Gwen Ansell, (Eds). Comrade Jack: The Political Lectures and 
Diary of Jack Simons, Novo Catengue, Johannesburg: STE Publishers, 109-110. 











was painful to unlearn all the wrong impressions about being a soldier, about the 
ANC, about the revolution. The instructors impressed upon the recruits the necessity 
of training and politicisation, but in the beginning he thought it a waste of time. He 
would rather just be given a weapon and then go stand at Johannesburg's Park Station 
and start shooting. In time he began to understand the point of politics and its use in 
rallying the people inside South Africa to their cause. He learned about the situations 
in neighbouring countries and the problems with infiltrating soldiers across their 
borders. Eventually his revolutionary zeal gave way to a more informed patience and 
the training at the transit camp helped him accept the situation.27 This political 
training helped keep the soldiers' morale up even in the most discouraging times, and 
helped them develop the patience to wait for the time to go home. One soldier 
remarked: 
There were some times when we used ... not to get the normal food 
which we were supposed to get but in any case, we used to get three 
meals a day and we understood that we are people who are dependent 
upon the solidarity and also the commissars at the camp, they stressed 
the need for understanding a situation, because in exile and mostly in 
the camps, one lives under an abnormal life, but since one knows what 
one had brought him or her to Angola, then one accepts everything 
which will bring our people's freedom nearer?8 
This political education was of uppermost importance, as the ANC believed it vital to 
know your enemy and his capabilities, and to be well enough instructed in these 
things to be able to educate those inside the country, were one deployed there. 
Physical activities were quite strenuous, consisting of long runs, practice 
marches, obstacle courses, and basic exercises to keep people fit. Often these 
exercises would come just after lunch, when the trainees had just eaten, and might 
also be tired from the morning classes and from guard duty during the night. This 
27 Kodesh, Interview with Binda. 











course was sometimes known as "physico." One man described what they did in his 
camp for this period: 
Aish, you'll be grilled, you'll be, when you arrive in the field, you'll 
see a number of instructors. Oh, you start running around, when you 
are running, you are ducking. Or sometimes they used to say you must 
talk, talking, chatting to each other. We at first didn't know why they 
are doing this. And then when you, as you run more rounds and more 
rounds, talking dies down, you're no longer talking. And then even 
ducking. So, there will be station, one for, you know, push-ups, one 
for stomach exercise, one for this exercise ... You run, you start from 
that, do ten push-ups, move, you run to the other one, you don't just go 
there walking. Do stretches, you run, do stomachs . . . you sweat, you 
sweat, you sweat, by the time you finish, you are dead. 29 
Sometimes the "physico" would require the trainees to drag themselves across the 
hard ground on their elbows, getting back to camp with scratches and cuts if the 
weather were dry, or covered in mud if it happened to be raining. Some camps had a 
special long march, staying overnight in the bush, at the end of the basic training 
course. One female comrade recalled this march and noted that the day before the 
march a doctor would check everyone out to make sure they were fit and many people 
would suddenly feign sickness to escape it. Only she and one other female soldier 
participated with their male comrades. The trainees were told that the rivers were 
poisoned for the march, so they could only drink from their canteens, and there was a 
mock attack on the trainees at night from the instructors. On the way back, they ran 
out of water, and those who couldn't make it had to be carried back. She wanted to 
give up on the way back, but determined to finish, and having recently fallen in love 
with her future husband, who was in her platoon, she used that feeling as a way to 
make it through30. By the time the trainees finished their course, they had acquired 
excellent physical shape. 
29 von den Steinen, Interview with Lemmo Kalako, 10 June 1998, Cape Town. 











One of the most exciting parts of the training for most recruits was the 
firearms training. Most of the youths who left South Africa during this period really 
ached to get their hands on a gun and learn how to shoot it, and their first chance to do 
this came as a great thrill. Their first sightings of trained and armed comrades were 
always memorable, and they could not wait to follow in the footsteps of those who 
had come before them. Upon arriving in Mozambique on the way to exile, many 
recruits were excited and amazed to see an army made up of black men and even 
women, looking sharp in their uniforms and carrying guns. Another had the same 
response upon arriving at Engineering Camp outside Luanda: "Our main interest was 
to see the weapons, to learn how does it work? Our eyes were always on the soldiers, 
looking at the weapons, thinking, 'we're going to use that thing, to learn to use that 
thing' ... These young chaps, some very young, even 12, 14, Angolans, with 
weapons hanging there, we would always try to call them to talk to them.,,3l 
Eventually they got their chance. Sometimes they would start out dry firing 
the guns or using rubber bullets for practice, and their first attempts with live bullets 
were thrilling and occasionally humorous. One woman remembered: "When you 
shoot an AK, the cartridges come out the back of the gun, over your shoulder. There 
was one guy training with us who started shooting, felt the cartridges hitting him in 
the back, and got scared because he thought he was shooting himself by some 
mistake.,,32 Another remembers the start of firearm training: 
The first time I used a weapon in Benguela, I was very excited. We 
were taught how to assemble and disassemble, learning to do it in 
minutes, calculating the time. It was very exciting. Then we learned 
how to shoot a target, doing something practical, and they taught us 
how to use a grenade. I was a little nervous the first time, but as time 
went on, I felt confident. We were told how to detonate explosives. It 
31 Kodesh, Interview with Mochele. 
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was very exciting to see myself carrying a gun, aiming, shooting, doing 
the practical things. 33 
Learning to shoot really brought home to the trainees exactly why they were there and 
what they were accomplishing. 
Life in the Camps 
Some got their shooting lessons early and quickly, as the presence of UNIT A 
in the area of many training camps made guarding the camps a necessity. In the first 
groups of trainees the trained instructors from the earlier generations would do the 
guard duties, but as security became more important or in the smaller camps, the 
trainees would be given the rudiments of shooting and a rifle and a couple would be 
sent straight to guard duty upon arrival. Guard duty was done in shifts of two hours, 
often during the middle of the night while everyone else was sleeping. One recruit 
explained what this was like: 
It was difficult to get in the routine, especially the question of to guard 
during the night. It was very frustrating, you know, to stay two hours 
alone, you know, so you just find yourself thinking, you know, 
homesick and thinking about home and thinking about other things, 
because you just tell yourself that you can't sleep because .there are 
hyenas around, so there was . .. this thing that, I don't know whether 
it was true, that when we sleep, the hyena maybe will come and you 
know, attack you, because the hyenas see you, I don't know where 
because it's dark, he knows that there's somebody there and when you 
are sleeping he can hear that you are sleeping and the hyena can come 
immediately. So there was those fears so you are afraid to sleep and 
all that, and you just feel that, you know, when you are guarding you 
are having a responsibility of the camp, if the enemy can come and 
attack, they are going to kill you too, or you are going to account 
during the process.34 
33 Kodesh, Interview with Mavuso. 












The already exhausting training programme, when combined with the need to 
wake up for two hours on guard duty, made many trainees fall asleep the moment 
their heads hit their pillows, if not during classes. One instructor who organised 
literacy classes, since some of the soldiers were illiterate or having problems with 
English, found herself teaching outside of normal class hours, and having exhausted 
pupils, as well as being tired herself. She related: 
Another problem was that, I mean once one is a trainee there's a lot of 
physical activity going on ... A comrade is always tired ... I mean I 
remember some of the days whereby after a night's duty I will teach 
and teach and then find that half of the class is asleep. I just ask the 
comrades, comrades, okay, I can see that everybody is tired so let's 
sleep. Then the whole class including the tutor will sleep. Well we 
used to post a sentry now who will watch for us when one of the 
seniors come. So when the seniors come I will wake up again and start 
teaching.35 
Another recruit who went to a smaller training camp recalled the same problem: "We 
had makeshift classes, bench formations on high benches, and if you fall asleep, you 
falloff. It was hard to stay awake in class, particularly if you had late guard duties.,,36 
Women made up only about 2% of the trainees in the early intakes of the 
Soweto generation, but by the 1980s their presence rose to 20%. They undertook the 
same training programme as the men, and their leaders expected them to perform 
equally. One woman recalled, 
Men think that women cannot do what are called difficult tasks. For 
instance, when the time came for us [to] go to the shooting range for 
the first time, you know they would be very protective. 'Oh, this gun 
is too heavy, you can't use that,' and so on. And when you beat them 
at the shooting range, you know its like, 'What is happening, can you 
give us ... how do you do it?' Because they think in order to shoot 
straight, you must be very strong, because the gun is heavy and the 
recoil is very hard, it can break your shoulder if you are not very 
careful and especially when it comes to pistol training. Because the 
rifle is much easier than the pistol. The pistol is very heavy and you 
3S Interview with Tengimfene. Interviewer unknown, no date. 
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have to hold it on one hand very steady and I learnt that the trick is not 
to aim too long. Because when you aim too long, then the hand starts 
quivering and by the time you pull the trigger, you are off the target 
completely. So the best thing is to aim very briefly and pull and that 
does it. Now people tend to want to make sure that the target is within 
the sights and it doesn't take long to know that the sights are correct. 
And other than that, I didn't find so much discrimination.37 
Many of the men took the successes of the women as blows to their own manhood, 
and reacted by making fun of the women. One woman related: "Some of the men will 
tease us you know, especially when we're doing tactics, running, and especially if, let 
say if you, if 1 run faster than one of them, the males, they'll start passing funny 
remarks, 'no no no no, you can't beat me you're a woman' ... They used to say such 
things, and it just would discourage you ... I was voted best combatant two or three 
times in my detachment.,,38 Sometimes the women surpassed the men at the training, 
which many of the male comrades did not appreciate. The small number of women in 
the camps sometimes created problems, and relationships between cadres or between 
trainees and instructors were common. The women were in great demand as partners, 
and with so few, the majority of men were going to have to do without. Affairs often 
occurred, and brought with them a wide variety of problems. The young girls training 
in the camp largely found themselves conducting relationships with the leaders and 
instructors. This caused a lot of friction between them and their fellow trainees. One 
MK member remembered: 
They were women of substance who expected no pity and took part in 
exactly the same activities as male soldiers. I applaud them for their 
amazing courage and determination. Inevitably, women soldiers were 
subjected to amorous proposals from time to time but generally 
behaved themselves in a manner befitting the army. Rejected suitors 
occasionally spread malicious rumours about females who refused 
their advances but the women were undeterred by the gossip . . . 
Demand exceeded supply, there were far fewer female than male 
37 Bernstein, H. Interview with Ribbon Mosholi, no date. 











soldiers so they were regarded as valuable assets. Those who did have 
love affairs conducted them discreetly, respecting the feelings of those 
outside a re1ationship.39 
Some MK women reported or experienced harassment and even rape at the hands of 
their comrades, but most completed training without mishap and became fully-fledged 
members ofMK. 
Late night guard duty constituted only one of the hardships the trainees 
encountered at their camps in Angola. The most universal complaint, mentioned by 
almost all of the ex-soldiers interviewed, was about the food. The comrades rarely 
complained about the amount of food they received, which was adequate for their 
survival. One recruit, in fact, was amazed at how often he was fed: 
You come to a place that is better than your own home ... when I'm 
saying this, better in the sense that look we are not used to three meals 
... if you have eaten in the morning you'd see when you come back. 
But you come to a place that insist that there's three meals a day. Full 
meals.40 
However sometimes the camps in Angola experienced severe shortages. Usually this 
did not involve people foregoing meals, though occasionally this was the case. More 
often they would simply find themselves facing a monotonous menu while they 
waited for supplies to arrive. Sometimes this would be pap, or rice and beans, or tea 
and bread for three meals a day for a week or so. Otherwise, depending on donations 
and supplies from foreign countries, they often found themselves with large stocks of 
something they despised, such as powdered eggs, which all who mentioned them 
hated. Nor did they appreciate the yellow mealie meal that prevailed in Angola. 
They would occasionally find worm-filled beans for their nourishment, which had 
simply to be choked down, as weeding all the worms out left hardly anything, and 
39 Matakata, Jama. (2004). Hills o/Hope, Pietermaritzburg: Nutrend Productions, 36. 
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consumed too much time. Otherwise, meals usually consisted of rice, pap, or bread, 
with tinned meats and tea or cocoa. Occasionally fresh meat would be obtained 
through hunting expeditions, though this wasn't usually the case, since fairness 
required enough meat to share with all 500 trainees and the staff members. Fruit was 
sometimes plentiful in the camps that were situated on old plantations, with lots of 
bananas, mangoes, and pineapples to enjoy. But the day to day food supplies tended 
to be monotonous, especially in times of shortage, and this is what the soldiers 
remembered even after all these years. 
Sickness also debilitated the camps. Some camps did have their own doctor, 
or 'medico,' in residence, but often only a regional doctor would do rounds of the 
different camps for check-ups and complaints. Emergency cases had to be driven to 
the nearest town with a hospital, or even all the way to Luanda Occasionally, people 
died from their illnesses without ever returning to South Africa. The morale of the 
remaining soldiers suffered as a result of these deaths. Malaria brought the biggest 
problem to the camps, and the mosquito nets mentioned above were definitely 
necessary, as well as the anti-malarial pills offered in some of the camps. Jack 
Simons, in his diary kept while in the camps in Angola as a political instructor in 
1979, wrote: "Feb. 8, Thursday ... Am told that +/- 120 cases of malaria- nearly half 
our population." and then later, on Feb. 14: "I think malaria has shaken me badly-
morale, drive, interest in work, the lot. Certainly took the glamour (such as there was) 
out of Novo [Catengue] ... 1 dislike crawling under mosquito net, and dislike even 
more being bitten!,,41 A large proportion of the trainees caught malaria at least once, 
and many went through it several times. One such person was an instructor at 










Benguela who caught it many times and eventually shot himself, citing his constant 
attacks of malaria as one of the reasons for his suicide.42 
Suicides also occurred for other reasons, and this was not the only case of a 
soldier who decided to end his life. Anything from boredom with years in the camps 
without sight of returning home, failed love affairs, and fear of getting punished for 
indiscipline, to basic homesickness could trigger this dire reaction in both untrained 
and trained MK. soldiers. One soldier remembers three suicides during her years in 
the camps, one due to a failed love affair, in which the man shot both his lover and 
himself, and then two others at nearly the same time that another soldier died of 
typhoid fever. 43 These sorts of events were tragic in themselves, and even more so 
under the circumstances in which they occurred. The soldiers who left everything 
behind often found themselves wondering about the purpose of it all, and if their 
fellow soldiers had died in vain, as so many of them spent many years in the camps in 
Angola, doing further or specialised training, or working on training the new recruits, 
when the struggle in South Africa didn't seem to be advancing noticeably. The 
morale of the camps dipped lowest during periods such as these. 
One issue of supply for the camps that became incredibly contentious was 
something that seems like a natural ingredient for any group of soldiers: cigarettes. 
Towards the mid-1980s, reports started to emerge and gain credence worldwide about 
the dangers of cigarette smoking. However, as anyone addicted to nicotine is sure to 
note, all the lectures in the world can't keep people from wanting another cigarette, 
especially when it is one of the rare pleasures of a difficult existence. The rations for 
the MK soldiers were set at 2 packs a week per comrade, which were easy enough to 
42 von den Steinen, Interview with Mhlambo. 












obtain until these newly accepted reports created problems. Many of the countries 
sending supplies to the ANC, largely European and particularly Scandinavian 
countries, always had a policy of sending only supplies that were necessary for the 
survival of ANC members in exile, of which a large number were MK soldiers. They 
always refused to help with any sorts of weapons of war, which generally came from 
the Eastern Bloc countries. With the advent of the anti-smoking movements around 
the world, many of these same countries also began to have problems of conscience 
with supplying something potentially lethal to the soldiers. One memo from this 
period explained the side of the anti-smokers and the lack of supplies, saying: "Our 
own Comrades in the medical field in Europe, some of them professors, have told me 
personally that smoking is even worse than publicly alleged ... Therefore forcing our 
donors to supply cigarettes, is like asking them for food, clothing, transport, 
medicines-'& a little bit of poison as well please.",44 Another memo which 
accepted these problems but dealt with the reality of addiction asserted, "Cigarettes 
burning issue: We ask for these but no response. In all countries campaigning agst. 
smoking, gives all sorts of diseases. So they do not want to give cigarettes. But not 
fair to withhold cigarettes. We will give some cigarettes but commissars must 
educate agst. smoking.,,45 This problem caused major concerns for logistics officers 
and diplomats, as well as the smokers themselves. 
Life in the camps was not all so terrible, however, and weekends were often 
the best time of all, a time of rest and relaxation, fun and games. Soccer teams were 
often organised, giving themselves names like 'Mandela Eleven' and 'Sisulu United', 
or the "Bolsheviks' and the 'Spears' and games usually occurred on Saturdays. 
44 Memo, date and author unknown, from ANC Lusaka collection. 
45 Memo, date and author unknown (but mentions mutiny in 1984, so must be around mid-1980s), 










Volleyball games and swimming where possible were also popular. Requisition 
orders from the camps and requests sent to countries sending supplies to the ANC 
often asked for sporting equipment, one requesting jerseys, shorts, socks and boots for 
four rugby teams and 12 soccer teams, 20 rugby balls, equipment for softball, 
baseball, cricket, hockey, table tennis, and volleyball, track suits, canvas shoes, dumb-
bells, skipping ropes, weights for weight lifting, books on sport, and karate and judo 
suits.46 Indoor board games also became popular for leisure time, and again the 
requisition orders reveal the games played. One listed: "10 sets Scrabble, 10 sets 
Monopoly, 10 sets Chess, 10 sets Draughts, 10 sets Chinese Checkers, 10 sets Playing 
cards, 10 sets Playing cards (2), 10 boxes Table Tennis balls, 6 Table bats.'.47 
Despite the irony of socialist-oriented soldiers playing Monopoly, the games proved 
popular among the cadres. Weekends also brought enjoyment of cultural aCtivities as 
well as films and radio. One MK veteran remembered: 
There's many cultural groups on camps. There were the Zulu dance 
group, the Xhosa dance group, there was the Sotho dance and many 
other traditional dance- South African dances. There was also the ... 
choir. There was the small quartets, there was drama, many other- so 
we'll be divided amongst- so I decided to join the Zulu dance ... 
because I didn't want to do something that I knew like singing. I 
wanted to learn something new. So I joined the Zulu dance. So on 
certain days we'd go on certain evenings to recreational hall, call it the 
stage whereby each of those groups now will perform. Used to be 
wonderful night. Sometimes we'll ~o and watch films. Most of the 
films we watched were Soviet films.4 
Also popular was listening to music and singing. One woman recalled: 
"Saturday nights, we would gather around the fire and start singing, before the curfew 
46 Requisition list, date and origin unknown, from the ANC Lusaka collection in the Mayibuye Centre 
archives. 
47 Requisition list, date and origin unknown, from the ANC Lusaka collection in the Mayibuye Centre 
archives. 











comes, we would sing after listening to the news, or if we were not singing, we just sit 
and tune VOA [Voice of America], a jazz station and just talk about home and 
everything.,,49 Music also emerged as a popular activity. Jazz and traditional African 
music particularly dominated as the favourite types. Musical instruments frequently 
appeared in the requisition orders, and the ANC created the Amandla Cultural 
Ensemble, which included several MK soldiers, and travelled the world performing 
and spreading awareness of the ANC and its struggle. 
Holidays also brought a time for suspension of the training schedule and the 
opportunity for a good time, with dancing, music, dramatic performances, and often 
feasts with food not usually available to the soldiers and occasionally with beer for 
each person. Jack Simons wrote in his diary: 
Feb. 24, Saturday: Yesterday's commemoration of Red Army Day 
went off well, with a display of relevant Soviet literature, introduced 
effectively by members of ex-Moscow "special" platoon- a baseball 
match . . . and a football match between the "champion" Dynamoes 
and a "picked team." At night a culture evening- speeches by Cuban 
Commissar and Camp Commander (very good), followed by concert 
(highlight a drama, centred as usual around a shebeen, the most vividly 
remembered social aspect of Soweto life- coupled with crime. B/stan 
removals and resistance the political element a relatively new note in 
"Shebeen" acts). 50 
The weekends also brought great homesickness for many of the soldiers. During the 
week, the training programme took up so much time that they were often too 
exhausted to think of home, but on the weekends, with more leisure time and 
activities like sports, singing, cultural dancing, and music that they had enjoyed in 
South Africa, thoughts often turned towards home. Memories of Friday night 'jols' in 
Soweto, Saturday afternoon soccer games in Cape Town, or Sundays spent with 
49 Bernstein, Interview with Mosholi. 











friends and family would often tum the soldiers introspective and they would long for 
home. 
One of the overwhelming responses from ex -soldiers who have been 
interviewed by many different interviewers about life in the camps is the spirit of 
camaraderie that existed there. The soldiers who joined MK came from allover 
South Africa, from Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth, smaller cities 
and towns around the country, and even from the rural areas. They came from 
different class backgrounds and family experiences, and they were black, coloured, 
Indian, and white. They left a country where the greatest problems included race and 
class, and arrived in exile to find a situation filled with people from the same place 
but without these problems. This is not to say it was utopian: reports still described 
some favouritism according to ethnicity or nepotism, though this was largely 
attributed to the leadership. But overall, many of the soldiers had fond memories of 
the interaction between themselves and others. One man asserted that: "The camp 
made us feel like South Africans and not white or black or even Capetonians."Sl 
Another ex-MK soldier added: "Here we were from quite different schools ... from 
different parts of society, and we just communicated ... there was no question, you 
are from a higher class, you are from where, you are from the rural area."S2 And a 
white comrade who did basic training in the camps eloquently expressed: "I've 
discovered my South Africanist, if I can call it that, outside. Of course, I missed . . . 
family, friends that I had there and the place itself. But ... I didn't feel home as a 
51 Interview with Thamsanqa Ngwevela, Interviewer unknown, no date. 












white South African in a country whose politics I hated. And its only coming out that 
I was able to ... find a South Africa that I do really love."s3 
This camaraderie and spirit of togetherness, especially when combined with 
the political training, made it much easier to overcome the problems encountered in 
the camps. One soldier asserted: "Well, life in the camps, one cannot say it's not 
difficult. It is difficult. But there is that spirit which makes you to carry on."S4 And a 
female comrade noted that: "It wasn't hard because at that time we were willing to do 
it. Its only now that we realise that what we were doing there was hard."ss This sense 
of purpose, as well as the spirit that existed among the comrades, made life in the 
camps bearable even during tough times. 
The leadership was also instrumental in morale, visiting the camps on 
occasion, particularly for holidays and graduations of basic training groups, giving 
speeches and visiting with the trainees. But their biggest impact, if people's 
memories can measure this, was the way they interacted with the soldiers, by putting 
their policies and rhetoric into action. One ex-soldier remembered a visit by Oliver 
Tambo to the camp: "The president comes. He's around here. We queue in the same 
queue we are going to get our food. This impresses US."S6 Another remembers a day 
at Engineering Camp soon after he arrived in Angola and they were queuing for food: 
There was a white guy in our queue, you know? Uh, he was standing 
there, then some, I think those who knew him said- 'do you know who 
this person is?' They said, 'that's Joe Slovo'. 'Joe Slovo? No man, 
not this one, man' ... we expected Joe Slovo to look like a cowboy, 
you know? <laughs>' And how can he be so modest in the queue? 
With us you know? He must go in front, man, he's the leader' and so 
53 Bernstein, H. Interview with Barry Guilder, no date. 
54 Bernstein, H. Interview with Michael Meli, no date. 
55 Bernstein, H. Interview with Joyce Stoffie, no date. 











on. No, he was queuin~ there. 'Why does he look so clean, you 
know? He's a terrorist? ,5 
Having the top leaders in the queue waiting their turn for food like regular trainees 
gave much more than lip service to the ANC's ideas of equality. 
Conditions in the Angolan Camps in the Early 1980s 
The soldiers who had left South Africa in the wake of the Soweto uprisings 
found the camps in Angola exciting during their first few years there. Their 
instructors, largely Cubans and Soviets with high levels of training themselves, 
provided interesting and well thought out training programmes. The camps had some 
problems with supplies, but the overwhelming urge to train and return to South Africa 
and the zeal and enthusiasm with which the recruits approached their training often 
reduced these problems to mere inconveniences in their minds. The new and very 
exciting training encouraged them to dream of their imminent return to South Africa. 
As these young soldiers completed their initial training, many attended 
advanced training programmes, both in Angola and abroad, often in Soviet bloc 
countries, Cuba, or in various independent African countries. A few returned to South 
Africa as trained MK soldiers, but only a small minority. Upon completing their 
further training, many returned to Angola, and spent their time there doing more 
training, working in support capacities for the organisation there, or instructing the 
new recruits who continued to trickle into the camps in Angola. As more and more 
time passed, the enthusiasm and sense of immediate return to South Africa turned into 
a more jaded attitude in many of MK's now trained soldiers. By the early 1980s, 
some of the people living in the camps in Angola had already spent more than five 
years outside of South Africa, and didn't see much action of any worth going on 












inside the country. Demoralisation and depression set in for many of them, as well as 
boredom and stagnation. Problems which seemed small and inconsequential when 
they first arrived now grew to be significant and inescapable. This change of attitude 
in many of the soldiers living in Angola became a serious obstacle for the 
organisation. 
The conditions in the Angolan camps in the early 1980s were not ideal in the 
best of times. The conditions combined with the general feeling of demoralisation on 
the parts of the troops could only make things worse. Lines of supply, for example, 
became a common problem during this period. Food, clothing and medicine, though 
sometimes found in great quantities in storage facilities in Luanda, didn't reach the 
camps, particularly the furthest outlying ones. Food was a very hot issue, and many 
registered complaints aboutit. While food had always been a problem in the camps in 
the earlier days, comrades readily accepted the conditions, as they still had the 
revolutionary zeal that let them justify the problems and accept them as their lot. As 
time went on, however, complaints became more frequent and the issue commonly 
arose in the camps. 
Fresh meat and vegetables became very scarce in the early 1980s. When 
Wol:fie Kodesh visited the "Moscow" camp in Angola in 1984, he learned that they 
had had fresh meat only once in the last month, eggs once in 2 or 3 weeks, and no 
fresh vegetables at all. They further told him: "[the] office stopped us getting fresh 
meat because they said there was no money. This was stopped for two years. ,,58 
Often the supplies never reached the camps from Luanda or were even unavailable in 
Luanda. A solution existed, however: many of the local towns or villages in the 
vicinities of the camps had fresh meat and vegetables, and some people in the camps 











bartered with the villagers with surplus clothing or foodstuffs in order to get preferred 
food. Unfortunately, the leadership discouraged this practice, and people who 
bartered for goods with these surplus products could be harshly disciplined for their 
actions. In his notebook on projects in Angola from 1984, Kodesh suggests that 
bartering be allowed, supplied, and controlled, and seen as a viable alternative for 
getting fresh food to the camps. 59 But his report came too late to stop the issue from 
exploding. 
Medicine and medical treatment also emerged as serious problems. In many 
camps, rampant malaria received but minimal treatment. The leadership had to find a 
way to deal with the problem, and one report submitted for the National Consultative 
Conference in 1985 pointed out: 
1- In our camps there is little transport or at times no transport at all 
for the Medical department. 
2- Trainees are nonnally going to camps for training without Medical 
check-up at all. 
3- Malaria cases are kept in our Medical points for a long time even 
though the medical officer sees that the patient gets worse without 
being taken to the hospital in Luanda 
4- No proper food or diet for our Malaria cases in the West.60 
The lack of proper medical care escalated into more than just an inconvenience. 
Many people in the camps came down with malaria, and some had to watch their 
fellow comrades suffer through the illness, or even to die from it for lack of proper 
medical care. At times like these feelings of futility would set in among the cadres, 
who would wonder why this comrade of theirs could just die in exile, never having 
the chance to set foot in South Africa again. Some thought that deaths like this were 
senseless and should have been prevented with a more aggressive policy about 
deploying people back into South Africa. 
59 Kodesh, Wolfie, Moscow 6/12/84, from notebook on projects in Angola. 











Transport also developed into a substantial problem in the early 1980s, and 
often exacerbated other problems. Without proper transport, it became even more 
difficult to get food, medicine, and medical officers to and from the camps. Kodesh's 
notebook pointed out that adequate transport would consist of one truck and one 
Landrover for each camp: a modest goal. However, he found that one camp had one 
Landrover and no truck, and yet another had no working transport, and had to borrow 
a truck from another camp, which could not easily spare it.61 More transport would 
also have allowed periodic trips to Luanda to break the boredom of the routines in the 
camps. 
Pure boredom and stagnation mushroomed into one of the biggest problems of 
the camps. One soldier noted: "on a typical day in the camps, a cadre would be 
awaken[ ed] at 5 am. He would drag himself from his sleeping bag to face another day 
of boring. routine, in the company of the same faces, thousands of miles from 
home.,,62 Another soldier explained that some of the least disciplined people in the 
camp, who were always complaining and hating life there, performed admirably once 
they were sent back to South Africa, but just couldn't tolerate the waiting and the 
boredom of the camps.63 Often the training material in the classes did not change, 
even if they had been in the camps for years and had gone through several courses. 
One man related his response to the repetitive material: 
If you are going to teach me that the ANC was formed in 1912 for 6 
years, that thing is not going to change. You taught me that when I 
came here, I've done my training, you taught me that, the ANC was 
formed in Bloemfontein in 1912. Even 1980 I must still study that, 
61 Kodesh, W olfie, notebook on projects in Angola. 
62 Twala, Mwezi, and Bernard, Ed. (1994). Mbokodo Inside MK.: Mwezi Twala- A Soldier's Story, 
Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers.44. 












come on ... Let him come to us and ask us what we are interested to 
know. We can study the history of Vietnam, Cuba, a number of 
countries. See we ever advocated for academic classes. But this up 
and down that we are doing it's bringing no deVelopment. Rather than 
studying the history of the ANC every day for 3 years.64 
Even beyond simple repetition, other problems plagued the training programme. In 
the first few years of the camps in Angola, highly trained instructors, Cubans, 
Russians, and South Africans who had been in exile for many years would lead the 
classes. Later, as more and more trainees finished their initial training and went on to 
advanced training, they began to return to the camps as instructors. But many of them 
simply regurgitated the infonnation that had been taught to them. One woman 
remembered: 
The instructors were comrades who had been trained in Europe, 
especially in the Soviet Union, and the tendency was just to regurgitate 
infonnation they had learned earlier. And it created a lot of problems 
because when comrades start asking questions, especially sensitive 
things like explosives, you know, 'why do you mix this proportion of 
this acid? Why not the other acid?' and so on, and comrades used to 
get stuck. 65 
When this repetition and lack of dynamic teaching style was combined with the long 
length of time many soldiers found themselves spending in Angola, the effect became 
devastating. 
Beyond the basic boredom, the supplies of recreational materials broke down 
during this period. Libraries lacked books, games and sports equipment were 
insufficient, and film and video equipment was often inoperable. They were not even 
allowed a day or so to take a trip to Luanda for the cinema or the beach. One soldier 
remembered them complaining about this: 
There were times we say, 'hey comrades, we are tired now, we are too 
much in this bush ... Take us for a trip to Luanda, we must go and see 
64 Kodesh, Interview with Lentsoane. 











the beach, go to the cinema and come back. ' [The] answer that was 
given was, 'comrades this is a revolution and that is not possible.' And 
... a person who's telling you that 'this is the revolution', he goes to 
Luanda ... and once he reaches Luanda, he goes to the beach, he goes 
to the cinema. He comes and join in the camp ... Now lou're asking 
for that chance, they say its a revolution, its not possible.6 
This boredom and despair of ever seeing home again took a devastating toll on the 
soldiers living in Angola. When bad lines of supply and inadequate food and medical 
care exacerbated these feelings, the likelihood of rebellion increased steadily. These 
conditions, when combined with other problems, led directly to a mutiny in the 
Angolan camps in 1983, which is discussed in Chapter Five. 
In the end, all the training and hardships led to one goal: return to South Africa 
to attack the apartheid regime. Some people never had that opportunity. They 
remained in exile as instructors, students, or party functionaries. Some despaired of 
ever getting home again or of winning the struggle, and created new lives outside 
South Africa. And some got the chance to operate in the front line states and even 
inside South Africa, finally putting their training to use. 











Chapter 4: The Azanian People's Liberation Army in Exile 
New Way 
New way oflife without fear of death 
Is the only way to freedom 
Others must die for others to live 
You must go with me comrade, for the road is long ... 
Thorny ... and tortuous. 
My dear brother and comrade, I need your help in this long way 
Fear not the enemy ... for the people are with you 
Comrade, take my hand ... for us the road is long 
Comrade, take your gun. 
Introduction 
I know we have neither place to sleep, nor food to eat 
We have no coats and no blankets to cover our now 
Shivering bodies; the enemy has them galore! 
Let us go comrade; they belong to us! 
Victory is tomorrow! 1 
The Pan Africanist Congress also faced leadership problems, stagnancy, 
competition for resources and support, and an absence of influence inside South 
Africa in the years before the Soweto Uprisings. However, unlike the ANC, the 
PAC's leadership problems had not been resolved when the rush of recruits headed 
their way. The ongoing crisis spilled over into the next generation and crippled the 
organisation for years. It is discussed in detail in chapter five. While the PAC did not 
have the opportunity to establish training camps in one region, or to create a common 
programme for all of its recruits, it did have the support of many sympathetic nations 
that offered training for its wave of recruits. One source estimated that the PAC 
actively recruited about 130 people between September 1975 and January 1977, 
though many others found their way to the organisation without the assistance of PAC 
members.2 The one-third of the Soweto generation that fled South Africa and did not 
I Johnson, Raymond. (1977). New Way. In Azania News, January-June, PAC of Azania, 38. 
2 Davis, Stephen M. (1987). Apartheid's Rebels: Inside South Africa's Hidden War, New Haven: Yale 











join the ANC mostly ended up with the PAC or just took their chances as unaligned. 3 
This crop of new members spread to the far comers of the world and returned to 
Tanzania with varied skills and experiences. All hoped that they would be quickly 
trained, then infiltrated back into South Africa to take on the apartheid system, but 
few got the opportunity. 
Foreign Training 
For the Pan Africanist Congress, when the wave of recruits came out of South 
Africa from 1976, no central camps for training APLA cadres yet existed. Recruits to 
APLA would stay for a time in Dar es Salaam, then be chosen to do training in one of 
a number of sympathetic countries. For this reason, the APLA soldiers' training 
experiences are far more varied and divergent than those who joined MK. The PAC 
concentrated efforts on developing relationships with like::-minded countries and 
obtaining training for their soldiers. Several African countries supported the PAC and 
provided training for the APLA recruits, including Libya, Ghana, Guinea, Uganda, 
Nigeria, Egypt and Sudan. Further abroad, trainees took courses in Lebanon, Syria, 
Yugoslavia, China, and Kampuchea, present day Cambodia. A man who had been in 
exile since the early 1960s recalled the process of sending the new recruits to training: 
Sometimes you would send a group of cadres, a group of trainees ... a 
group of two hundred, hundred and fifty to a country like Egypt, or a 
country like Ghana, or Guinea, these groups, but those were not cadres, 
. they were just there for training, from there they would come back to 
Tanzania.4 
One writer explained the sequence of events: 
3 Davis, 57. 
4 Interview with Mfanasekhaya Gqobose, Interviewer unknown, 18 August 2001, New Brighton. From 











[One group] joined the PAC in December 1976, and was part of the 
first group of 25 PAC members sent to China for military training. 
The second group was sent to China in June in 1977, while others left 
for Cambodia, Uganda and Libya. The groups sent to China were 
given training in intelligence, counter-intelligence and infantry. The 
reason for this kind of training was to prepare the first fifty cadres for 
their return to South Africa to create what was called military pockets 
in preparation of the eventual arrival of other units that specialized in 
conventional and guerrilla combat. 5 
He went on to relate the story of a man who left South Africa just before the Soweto 
Uprisings, and who detail~ the different groups that went for training during that 
period: 
Moerane recalls that four distinct groups of new recruits into APLA 
were sent to different countries for military training. Firstly, when his 
group arrived in Uganda it joined with cadres of the Basotholand 
Congress People's Party (BCPP) and were sent for training in Libya. 
This group of cadres was soon joined in Libya by another group of 
APLA recruits. Their training included infantry, espionage and 
weapons handling and this group left Libya after nine months. 
Another group of 9 cadres was sent from Libya to Syria to undergo 
commando training. The third group arrived in Tanzania late in early 
1977 and was sent for military training to China. The fourth group that 
had most of the products of the 1976 Student Uprising were sent to 
Kampuchea for military training and that is were they got lost for some 
time. 6 
Some few soldiers in the Soweto Generation were trained in Tanzania, particularly at 
the ltumbi camp in the Mbeya district, though training in the PAC camps in Tanzania 
became more established and common in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Examination of the questionnaires filled in by many APLA soldiers reveals 
some training specialties in different countries. Libya often appeared as a place for 
basic training in infantry, particularly during the mid to late 1970s. Guinea provided 
basic infantry training, and also specialisations in anti-aircraft measures and counter 
S Ka Plaatjie, Thami. Poqo and the Azanian People's Liberation Army, draft chapter for The Road to 
Democracy in South Africa, Volume 2, 1970-1980 by the South African Democracy Education Trust. 
(Draft chapter given to the author by Ka Plaatjie, and this section did not appear in the fmal articles 
published.) 











intelligence. Uganda provided a commander's course to some APLA trainees, as well 
as basic infantry and mines training.7 Nigeria maintained a special relationship with 
the PAC, offering both an Officer's course and Air Force training. A group of 22 
APLA trainees went there in 1977 for the vitally important air force training. Given 
the strong enemy air force the training offered an excellent opportunity, as it would 
not only give them the knowledge needed to fly aircraft, but would also allow for 
strategic sabotage of South Africa's Air Force equipment and perhaps even capture of 
enemy planes. 8 Other countries provided courses in infantry, guerrilla warfare, 
commando training, intelligence and security, and other specialties. 
When APLA recruits first arrived in Tanzania, they lived in and around Dar es 
Salaam because the Tanzanian government had a policy that untrained cadres were 
not allowed to stay in the PAC's military camps.9 Their time in Dar often involved 
learning about politics and the history of the PAC. One man recalled: 
In Tanzania, at that time our main duty was to attend political classes. 
That was the main thing. It was what we discovered was that the PAC 
emphasised the need that all members must be politically matured. 
And the PAC has as a principle that before they give you a gun, you 
should have been politically educated. Then they feel they can then 
entrust the weapon to such a person. Because they fear that if you are 
not politically matured, or developed, you could easily miss the 
objective, either to use the weapon in places or against specific targets 
that would end up embarrassing the organisation, or against other 
members. lo 
Another man remembered his time in Tanzania, waiting to go for training: "In 
Tanzania, that's where we met other comrades ... who were very instrumental in our 
growing as future commanders of APLA. They taught us politics, deep politics. 
7 APLA questionnaires. 
8 von den Steinen, L. Interviews with Vusi Make, 15 August 2005, Centurion, and Brig. Gen. Barney 
Hlatswayo, 16 August 2005, Pretoria. 
9 von den Steinen, Interview with lliatswayo. 











African Nationalism, Pan-Africanism, Marxism, Leninism, that's how we got it. 11 
Often the waiting was difficult. People were selected to go for specific training 
programmes, and there was no telling when one would be called. Some went for 
training quickly, while others stayed in Dar es Salaam for long periods. Excitement 
about going to receive training often mixed with frustration at not getting there fast 
enough. One APLA soldier explained, "At first, I must be honest with you, I was not 
really happy, you know, if some of your close friends are departing and you are 
remaining behind, it was not a nice feeling. But one had the hope that surely my turn 
will come. And if that turn comes, then one must appreciate and grip the opportunity 
as it comes.,,12 Eventually the recruits got their orders, and went to the far corners of 
the world where they received their initial training. 
Each place had very different circumstances, living conditions, language and 
cultural issues, and training programmes. People's specific stories about their own 
experiences in various countries add to the history of APLA and provide a glimpse of 
the training the soldiers received. Barney Hlatswayo, who became the Chief of Staff 
of APLA in later years, remembered his original three month training in China in 
1978. Their training started with a political and cultural component: 
When we went to China the first three weeks to a month was used as 
part of the political training, because we were visiting all the historical 
sites, where we were given lectures on the Chinese revolution and the 
work of the communist party, which was part of the curriculum. 
Where you'd practically visit the site, understand and see for yourself 
the site, and be addressed by people who took part in the struggle. 
Then the whole tour ended up in Southern China in the province of 
Guangzhou, where the military training then started. 13 
11 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Blacks Joyi, 21 November 2002, Cape Town. 
12 von den Steinen, Interview with Hlatswayo. 











After initial introduction to China and lessons about Chinese history, they went to a 
training camp and began the practical training: 
The training programme mainly it involved tactics, it involved the 
methods of how to organise politically and methods of how to establish 
a guerrilla army. Light weapons manufactured in the East, and light to 
medium weapons manufactured in the West because of the concept 
that the bulk of your weapons surely will not come from outside, per 
their own experience. Yes, whatever you organise from outside should 
assist you to capture more from your enemy. And then we did a phase 
on what they called home-made explosives, how to utilise normal 
chemicals that you can purchase over the counter to manufacture 
explosives. Then plus the whole regimental discipline, the drill, I think 
then that really was more or less the training.14 
His political training during his time in Dar es Salaam while waiting to go abroad for 
training served him well during the training programme in China, and he emerged 
from the course confident in his abilities: 
One really appreciated and maybe due to the political education that 
one had in Dar es Salaam before the training, one had a better 
perspective of the essentials of their revolution and when the 
programme was presented again we had the opportunity to request an 
addition of that or exclusion of that. And that was approved. But all in 
all I think one felt that he was better equipped. after the training than 
before ... It was, one realised that in South Africa there was no chance 
that one could obtain that kind of training, in South Africa the military 
training was exclusively reserved for whites, and I speak under 
correction, but I know even blacks who were part of the system, they 
were not allowed to carry a weapon. So one had that sense of 
appreciation that now I am better equipped, more knowledgeable than 
the rest of our countrymen. IS 
Another man explained the training programme in China: 
When PAC sent cadres to China to training, they were going to train, 
they were going to train not only in handling arms ... we had to learn 
all sorts of things, we had to learn of course even the nature of the 
Chinese revolution, learn about the Chinese revolution, its nature and 
everything, we had learn how to exist ... you had to plant your own 
crops here, your means of sustenance you see, that was also the aspect 
14 von den Steinen, Interview with Hlatswayo. 











of self-reliance, you had to subsist on your own as long as you get the 
ground and tools to do that, and eh . . . in other words you can't get 
supplies to ... struggle, things like food and things like that ... the 
annies would do, but you do it yourself, on your own, you plough and 
get food by your own means. I6 
The Chinese programme thus focused not only on the history and lessons from the 
Chinese revolution, but also on self-reliance as a crucial aspect of guerrilla warfare. 
The training in Guinea provided a good base for the APLA fighters who went 
through that programme. They faced more difficult living conditions than in many 
other places. Letlapa Mphahlele gave a detailed description of the conditions in 
Guinea. Upon arrival, the poverty of the country struck him: 
Conakry looked antiquated, with dilapidated buildings and potholes 
and battered cars in the streets. Poverty hung like a pall over a country 
that had obtained its independence from France in 1958. When the 
French left, they uprooted telephone poles, emptied offices of furniture 
and important project files and stationery, removed windowpanes from 
buildings, took all the money they could lay their hands on, and 
shipped the stuff off to Europe. In their wake they left a poor but 
proud nation. Poverty did not deter Guinea from helping the oppressed 
on the continent and beyond. I7 
Training took place at the Centre National Kwame Nkrumah, just north of Conakry. 
Mphahlele remembered the conditions in the camp: 
The instructors gave each one of us a mosquito net and a pair of new 
yellow sheets . . . We were warned never to experiment with using 
paper in their toilets because the sewerage pipes were very narrow and 
designed to carry waterborne waste and nothing more. In place of 
toilet paper, we had to use water. In the early days we spent hours 
washing our hands with soap and sand and rubbing them against the 
concrete slabs to erase the stubborn smell. We laughed hilariously and 
consoled ourselves that what we were going through was part of the 
training ... We slept on bunk beds. After a short stay in a small 
dormitory, we were moved to a large one called Robert Sobukwe. It 
was one of about ten of its size and was named after the PAC's 
16 Interview with Gqobose, from SADET. 












founding president. Every donnitory or facility in the centre was 
named after a revolutionary of one shade or another . . . Every 
donnitory had its own set of toilets, showers, taps and concrete 
washing. IS 
Another man who trained in Guinea said that life in the training camp was: "Very 
interesting, if you like hard life. I'm one person who is like that. I like suffering. 
Sort of a hobby sometimes, I don't know. But sometimes you don't realise that 
you're suffering because you sometimes get used to it.,,19 Mphahlele explained life 
in the camp: 
The typical day was characterised by waking up early in the morning, 
and washing. Basically showering because the climate there is hot 
throughout and we enjoyed a cold shower. Then preparing for 
breakfast, that was breakfast in name because we used to prepare tea 
with the leaves from wild trees. I mean wild tree leaves and of course 
we used to drink tea with a small piece of French loaf. And from there 
we would wait for instructors, military instructors, depending on who 
was going to be in charge on that particular day, it could be physical 
trainer or military instructor on shooting, etc. But overall the whole 
training was characterised by dis rganisation, we were there only nine 
months, but the course, we ended taking a year, because there was a lot 
of absenteeism on the ins ructors' part. And sometimes instructors 
would be there, but interpreters wouldn't be there. Because they were 
speaking French and the European language that was close to us was 
English so it was difficult when there was no interpreter for any 
instruction to take place. 20 
A command report from Malusi Koli, the APLA commander in Guinea in 1987, 
provided a list of instruction the trainees had received in March of that year: 
1. Compass 
2. Combatant as an observer 
3. Different actions of a soldier in defensive 
4. Diffe[re]nt actions of a soldier in offensive 
5. F.N. R.P.D. Machine gun (Soviet made) 
6. Nuclear weapon 
7. Chemical weapon 
18 Mphahlele, 83~85. 
19 von den Steinen, Interview with Joyi. 











8. General rules of subordination 
9. Transmission for military use (communication) 
10. Combatant as a messenger or as an agent of transmission 
11. Special care for wounded people or soldiers in the battlefield 
12. Day time infantry group in defensive position 
13. Self defence or close combat 
14. Different actions as chief of groups 
15. Transportation of wounded soldiers 
16. Independent exploratory patrol group 
17. Independent security group 
18. Infantry group at the offensive 
19. Rocket launcher R.p.G;221 
The report also explained that the trainees had been issued rifles and given blank 
bullets to shoot. The commander asserted: "In all these activities the group showed 
more interest, and level of participation is greatly encouraging. Carrying rifles at their 
backs seems to have boosted the morale of us all.,,22 Long marches characterized 
training in Guinea. Mphahlele remembered one coming at the end of their 
programme: 
Mont Kakoulima. When the instructors mentioned these two words, I 
was gripped by fear- as they intended. The mountain maintained its 
ancient and majestic posture. It appeared to be looking forward to our 
long-awaited arrival and its revenge for the humiliation we had 
inflicted on it, spraying it with anti-aircraft artillery fire. We were 
going· into guerrilla manoeuvres in the terrain around the mountain; the 
climax would be the toughest of all exercises, a march to the summit. 
Everyone who has been on Mont Kakoulima tells you that you need 
strong bones to carry you to the top. We strengthened our knees with 
tough exercises and were ready when the day dawned. We packed our 
rations of rice and large quantities of dried fish- its stench wriggled our 
noses. During the exercise we slept in our hammocks with wet and 
muddy boots on, ready for any call to action. We constantly moved 
camp, sometimes just when sleep was starting to massage our tired 
bodies. The weakness in this exercise was that we were barred from 
using blank ammunition, which would have made it almost real. The 
ban was in place because of another one of Guinea's endless coup 
alerts [in early 1982].23 
21 Command Report, written by M. Koli, Commander, marked as received by headquarters in Tanzania 
on 16 May 1987. 
22 Command Report, written by M. Koli, Commander, marked as received by headquarters in Tanzania 
on 16 May 1987. 











The commander's report also described a long march as part of the training: 
They introduced a long march on the first week of this month. The 
distance was about 35 kilometres. This march involved going up a 
mountain, through dense bushes, doing manoeuvres, mock attacks and 
jumping obstacles. We were carrying military bags with a capacity of 
25 kg, an hammock and c.K.e. assault rifles. This march takes place 
every Saturday?4 
Another man who trained in Guinea remembered longer training exercises outside of 
the camp, "you go and stay about two weeks in the bush with nothing to eat but what 
you find around, in your surroundings.,,25 Mphahlele remembered the highlight of the 
graduation of his group of trainees, when the president of Guinea came to 
congratulate them, and gave them each a high quality watch with his picture on the 
face?6 Though a difficult life with tough living conditions, the training in Guinea was 
usually of a high quality and the soldiers who emerged gained not only training for 
their struggle, but also self-sufficiency, stamina, and the ability to survive in hostile 
environments. 
Another man who, after a time as a camp commander in Tanzania, led a group 
to train in the Sudan remembered their serious language problems in training: 
I left Tanzania and went to Sudan leading a group of about 30 to go 
and do training in Sudan. We were in Sudan for about six months, and 
there again it was a mixture in the sense that you had people who were 
previously trained and others who were not trained completely. The 
aim there was for those who have trained to assist those who were not 
trained because of the language problem. Because we were told we 
could experience some language difficulties, and it is true. The 
instructor who trained us had basic to almost nothing knowledge in 
English, but we had to find a common way how to communicate. But 
24 Command Report, written by M. Koli, Commander, marked as received by headquarters in Tanzania 
on 16 May 1987. 
25 von den Steinen, Interview with Blacks Joyi. 











still, because of the presence of those that were trained, one could say 
that the training of the whole group was successfuL 27 
He also found the conditions in Sudan a bit disappointing. He expected to find 
independent African countries well developed and superior to South Africa. As he 
had previously trained in China he expected a similar welcome, and was disappointed 
when they were just met by an open truck and transported to the camp, about 50-70 
kilometres north of the capital, Khartoum. The camp comprised several sections, the 
main training centres where recruits are trained and then the adjacent area, where they 
had the special forces or commando camp, then an air wing and the militia camps 
around the area. The programme involved basic training, mainly involving tactics, 
platoon level organisation, the set up of companies, and the like. They also studied 
various types of weapons from pistols to light machine guns, heavy machine guns, 
and mortars. After that finished they had a stint with the special forces, the 
commandos, where they faced endurance training. They first heard they would move 
to the commando camp, then en route to that section on a flat bed truck made for 
transporting tanks, they were told they would remain at their normal camp and 
commute for training and turned back. He recalled being relieved at that decision, as 
the commando trainees had to wake up at one in the morning to start their day, while 
his group only had to awake at three a.m. They would quick march to the commando 
area, which was about 7-10 kilometres away, then train all day until 9 p.m. They 
would then walk back to their camp and immediately fall asleep. The training 
programme focused on individual skills, hand-to-hand combat, and strength building. 
They even learned specific techniques such as how to jump out of a moving car in 











case of ambush. While the already trained cadres found the basic training repetitive, 
the commando training provided an exciting new element.28 
The group of Soweto generation recruits that trained in Kampuchea had an 
exciting tale to tell when they returned to Tanzania. While their training started out 
normally enough, Vietnam invaded the country during their stay and turned their 
training programme into a practical exercise in escaping an invading force. One 
recruit told of his training in Kampuchea: 
I started in China ... in August 1977. We were a group of 23 ... and 
spent six weeks in China on orientation on what to expect from 
Kampuchea because the country had just received independence in 
1975 ... [In Kampuchea] we started with the military training about 
how to make bamboo shoots,. not the modem AK stuff. How to make 
the modem traps and how effective were they. They showed as to we 
should not depend too much on the AK and the other modem 
equivalent. We should always rely on our selves. I should not get 
hungry, I should not think that I am not armed and if I have something 
to sharpen with, cut a branch of the tree and make a trap and by the 
time when we started it was after two months that we started with the 
military training.29 
When Vietnam invaded Kampuchea in 1978 the group of APLA trainees suddenly 
had to put their training to use: 
When we were about to start with the heavy machine like the tanks, 
airplanes and helicopters then the Vietnamese invaded Kampuchea and 
we had to move from the city to the countryside. That was a very good 
experience because all that we were being taught we had to [put] into 
practice, how to evacuate people . . . We marched for eight months 
from Kampuchea going down to Thailand. Whiles going there we 
were intercepted and had to take another direction. 30 
This group definitely got more than they bargained for in their training programme. 
28 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Brigadier General Barney Hlatswayo, 11 January 2007, telephone 
interview supplementary to earlier interview. 
29 Ka Plaatjie, Tbami. Draft chapter. 











All of this movement of cadres and trainees around the world brought with it 
problems of passports, visas, flights, and clearance into and out of various countries. 
Most of the people who left South Africa and went into exile did not have official 
papers. A few had left legally, but most crossed the "green border" jumping fences 
and fording rivers. Others left on Transkei passports, which were not recognised in 
the rest of the world. The United Nations provided many travel documents, and 
agreements with many of the nations who supported the PAC's struggle also helped. 
Guinea was particularly helpful in providing passports for the cadres. One letter 
documenting an offer of passports from Guinea commented: "The Guinea National 
Passport[s] have been of great assistance in this regard.,,31 Sierra Leone also 
furnished the cadres with passports, requesting only their place of birth, date of birth, 
residence, height, and colour of eyes and hair, and would renew the documents 
furnished with the same information.32 The PA  Archives contain offers of and 
requests for flights, spending money, transport, accommodation and many other 
provisions. Offers for training programmes also abound. One letter showed the long 
standing relationship between Guinea and the PAC, with a request for military 
training and round trip flights from Tanzania for 100 cadres.33 Offers of training also 
abounded, from large groups to small specific courses. One letter accepted an 
Ethiopian offer to train and equip 100 freedom fighters from South Africa and 
31 Letter from Joe Mkwanazi, PAC Administrative Secretary to H. E. Foreign Minister Guinea, dated 3 
January 1987. 
32 Letter from Joe Mkwanzai, PAC Adminstrative Secretary to H. E. Foreign Minister Sierra Leone, 
dated 3 January 1987. 












Namibia as an initial group, to be followed by more trainees. 34 Another letter from 
Egypt offered training for three cadres in the security of vital installations at the 
Egyptian Police Academy in Cairo.35 The logistical problems of moving so many 
people around the world for training at times became overwhelming, but generous and 
dedicated help from their allies eased the burden. 
Many documents in the PAC archives at the University of Fort Hare provide 
informative reading on different courses of training for APLA cadres. Though many 
lack dates and locations, they offer insight into some of the special topics studied by 
the trainees. One lesson plan from the Libyan Arab Armed Forces gave great detail 
on the development of a mortar platoon, focusing on the 81 mm mortar. Including the 
principles of using the mortar and its uses, advance set up, attack, position, different 
defensive uses, withdrawal, and change of positions, this lesson provided the guerrilla 
armies with a more powerful supporting weapon in case of engagement with enemy 
forces. 36 One trainee's notes on the operation of weapons included details of 
blowback, recoil, and gas operation of rifles, including advantages and disadvantages 
of each, and diagrams illustrating the working of a rifle.3? Another trainee's notes 
gave detailed explanations of various types of homemade explosives, including 
materials, preparation, and ignition information on many types of explosives, 
including: 
1. Improvised incendiary time mine in a plastic glass 
34 Letter from Johnson Mlambo to H. E. Comrade Mengistu Haile Mariam, Chairman ofW orkers Party 
of Ethiopia, Provo Military Adminitrative Council of Socialist Ethiopia, Commander in Chief of 
Revolutionary Armed Forces, dated 20 July 1987. 
3S Letter from El Sayed El Khouly, Ambassador- Embassy of the Arab Repulic of Egypt, Tanzania to 
the PAC, dated 7 January 1992. 
36 "81 MM Mortar", by the Libyan Arab Armed Forces, 12 October 1978. 











2. The fire cake 
3. The incendiary bottle 
4. Jellified petrol based on soap 
5. Incendiary mixture of sawdust and paraffin 
6. Improvised slow burning cord made out of a piece of rope (five 
different types) 
7. Improvised Thermite for making holes 
8. Improvised napalm made of suet (tallow) 
9. Improvised Napalm based on Polystyrene 
10. General security measure and technical protection when working 
with inflammable materials38 
Training in the creation of improvised explosive- weapons based on easily accessible 
ingredients was vital in the training of guerrilla forces for the South African struggle, 
who often needed to improvise weapons when supplies were low. Another set of 
notes detailed issues of· intelligence, security, and counter intelligence, including 
different types of agents, principles of recruiting, vetting, and approaching possible 
agents, and tasks, risks, and principles of both intelligence and counter intelligence. 39 
Intelligence and counter intelligence were vital matters for the APLA forces, and clear 
training in these matters became a critical part of instruction for the cadres, some of 
who received specialised training in these topics. One training manual from a Junior 
Command and Staff Course on Military Intelligence and Security from a British 
military academy showed not only the high level of training material available for the 
trainees, but also the quality of the intelligence cadres, as the document is marked as 
highly restricted.40 Even a training paper on martial arts principles appears in the 
archives.41 Multiple articles and lesson plans on the theory and practice of guerrilla 
warfare, particularly those focusing on the Chinese methods, were common in their 
38 Notes from unknown trainee, undated. 
39 Notes from unknown trainee, undated. 
40 "Junior Command and Staff Course, Phase 3, Junior Division the Staff College: Military Intelligence 
and Security," dated 1991. 












training. Details of South Africa's defense capabilities were also crucial to the 
training, and various training manuals relating to this also appear. One details major 
arms suppliers related to South African defense, major weapons of South Africa's 
Land Force, Air Force Weapons and South Africa's Force Structure.42 Documents 
about the structure and capabilities of the Zimbabwean Army included education 
plans and lectures and offered insight into a newly formed army in a newly liberated 
African country.43 Whatever and wherever their original and supplemental training 
courses, most APLA cadres returned to various camps in Tanzania after their training. 
Life in the Tanzanian Camps 
The coming together of different training groups once they had completed 
their courses allowed for a great exchange of ideas in the camps in Tanzania. Unlike 
in MK, where all received similar basic training, and only advanced training courses 
brought variety, in APLA the programmes differed. Upon their return to Tanzania, 
cadres would share their training experiences and living conditions in the various 
places, and teach skills specific to their programmes to the people who had not 
learned them. One man who returned from Guinea to do a nine month junior 
commanders' course at one of the PAC camps in Tanzania, remembered: 
After that we went to ltumbi Mbeya in Tanzania ... That's where we 
met our senior comrades who trained us further. Now, in the PAC, or 
in APLA, if someone has attended a military course for training 
somewhere, say China or so, they will come back and meet other 
groups, who are from other countries also. And then those studies will 
be put together and one thing will come out of that in terms of military 
knowledge, military science, and political science and all other 
relevant fields of study. So that's what we used to do.44 
42 "South Africa's Military Capability: Myth or Reality." Undated. 
43 "The Outline and Organisation of the Army," confidential document for the Zimbabwean army, 
undated but post-1980. 











Another man remembered arriving at the Bagamoyo camp in Tanzania in 
1981, where a large influx of recruits had just arrived from Lesotho, and a number of 
groups had returned from training. Two other groups had recently returned to the 
PAC after being expelled during the leadership struggles of the 1970s. The new 
. recruits were excited to hear stories from all the men who had gone for training in 
various places. He explained: 
The group from Nigeria included people . . . who had studied civil 
aviation. The Guinea group told us about the poverty and hunger 
ravaging the West African country. The group from Sudan was noisy. 
They would imitate their Sudanese instructors, who were crazy about 
physical fitness and endurance. The group from Lebanon talked only 
about war. We envied their experience of the war in West Asia ... 
They told us of the incessant barking of gunfire as the Palestinians, 
Lebanese, Syrians, and a wide variety of militia on one side, and the 
Zionist Israelis on the other, were locked in the war for land. Theirs 
had been a tough mixture of theory and practice. The group from 
Mbeya was supposed to be the core of the Azanian People's Liberation 
Army. They were a difficult and rebellious crowd, and refused to 
participate in some of the camp programmes like physical training ... 
The group from Cambodia [Kampuchea], which had had military 
training earlier than the others, had a long story to tell ... The PAC 
group had to learn the Cambodian language before they commenced 
their training. They joined the Cambodian peasants in the fields, and 
tended pigs, goats, and rabbits ... The training was interrupted after a 
year when Vietnam invaded Cambodia . . . The PAC cadres joined 
hundreds of thousands of Cambodians fleeing to Thailand in the north-
west. Vietnamese planes rained bombs on the columns of marchers 
. . . The early days of the march were bearable since there was food. 
As soon as the food supplies ran out, death and disease reigned. They 
refugees turned to a diet of black spiders, frogs and bamboo shoots as 
they marched through the dense forests and monsoon rains . . . Relief 
came only when they crossed the border into Thailand. The PAC men 
remained in the refugee camp for a month before they flew back to 
Tanzania via Pakistan. Most of the members of this group had not 
recovered fully from their Cambodian experience.45 
The first PAC camp had been established in Tanzania in 1964, in the bush in 
Chunya. While the leadership stayed in Dar es Salaam, and often lived in luxurious 











My job as the representative I was the main person to liase with all 
government structures, plus the Tanzanian People's Defence Force, to 
liaise with hospitals in case we had some people who need to be 
admitted, to give support to those that are in hospitals as well as to 
organise emergency or other essential supports that is needed for the 
camp. But my office had a budget of about 100,000 shillings, which 
was a lot then, but in today's standards, it means it is about roughly 
100 US dollars. But in 1979 that was quite a swn.49 
Mphahle1e remembered his arrival at Itumbi: 
We finally reached our new home, the APLA camp in the district of 
Mbeya in southern Tanzania. It was variously called the College, 
Itumbi, Mbeya or the Camp. It was called the College because people 
who were illiterate when they arrived at the place could read and write 
when they left it. Those who were literate when they arrived became 
crude intellectuals, and those who were already intellectuals generally 
kept away from Mbeya. Humans survived in Mbeya but the story was 
different for some animals. No matter how healthy dogs and domestic 
pigs were when they arrived, they would get sick and die within weeks 
... An imposing double-story, red-brick structure we called the 
Carlton Centre was the hive of camp activity. Its ground floor housed 
the camp press, the dispensary and the storeroom. The first floor 
rooms accommodated cadres, and a few tents were pitched near the 
Cadton to alleviate the overcroWding. The parade ground unfurled in 
front of the Carlton. This was also used for volleyball games and 
soccer, even though there was a soccer field just outside the camp. 
The leaders' quarters, on the edge of the forest about 200 metres from 
the Carlton, were called Shanghai. This was where members of the 
central committee stayed when they visited the camp. The camp 
commander and his immediate juniors also lived there ... A few steps 
from the fowl run stood an old tree we called the Historic Tree (I still 
don't know why); under it we held meetings and listened to lessons in 
many disciplines. The benches and tables under the tree were made of 
logs split lengthways . . . Work was allocated according to the 
individual's physique. The strong ones fetched wood from the bush 
and called themselves the commandos; the weaker ones like me 
repaired the road into the camp; and the old and the sickly worked in 
the maize and groundnut fields. . . . We drew water from the nearby 
pool only when the water-pwnping machine had no diesel or its 
propelling belt was worn out. We were not the only users of the pool-
we shared it with an elephant that obviously abused it. He came at 
night, ate and destroyed banana trees, splashed in the pool and left it 
muddy. Early risers often saw him lumbering away. 50 
49 von den Steinen, Interview with Hlatswayo. 











He later moved to Mgagao, and related his first impressions: 
We had arrived at our new camp early in 1983, and it was exceedingly 
cold ... We were not warmly dressed but relished the cold because it 
relieved us from mosquito bites and from the dreaded malaria. 
However we had to face the new terror of the jigger flea. When it bit it 
deposited a worm under the victim's skin. Compared to ltumbi, 
Mgagao was a city. There were six spacious dormitories, a large 
administration complex, a large storeroom, a large kitchen, a shelter 
for firewood, flush toilets and showers. Most of the toilets and 
showers were out of order. Here firewood was a problem because the 
sprawling villages had denuded the area of every dry branch. 51 
The first phase of building the new Ruvu camp in 1978 involved the 
construction of five houses, and three other bUildings. The long term plan aimed to 
accommodate 1000 people, and to build 67 houses, a dining hall, kitchen, common 
room, two classrooms, a store-room, a library and a clinic. 52 Though started as a 
transit camp for the military recruits, Ruvu eventually developed into a more 
encompassing settlement. One man who went into exile in the 1990s remembered his 
trip to the camp, arrival, and the process he experienced: 
Then there was a guy there . . . he told us, no, I am the camp 
commander of that camp you are going to. And he welcomed us, 'you 
are welcome, you will go tomorrow morning, and it's 400 k's from Dar 
es Salaam to get to that place'. So we'll go tomorrow morning with a 
truck, because it's very hot during the day, and we are target, ifmaybe 
an agent's were operating at that time, so it's better to go at night or 
early hours of the morning. So I said OK. So round about two, the 
truck was there, we jump in the truck, it went to the bush. And there 
was no road there, but the driver knew where to turn, which way to go, 
for about 400 kms! We were just turning, turning, and there's nothing, 
no road, nothing. 53 
After a seemingly interminable trip, they made it to the camp: 
51 Mphahlele, 100. 
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So we arrived there, they welcomed us ... and the programme was 
starting, different groups of people doing different things. It was 
interesting, because it goes with the stages. Normally all of you go for 
haircut first. Then from there go to stores, get your uniform, take all 
your clothes. And then you do the paperwork, where you're coming 
from, why you join the army, the PAC, all of that. That's registration, 
maybe half of the day you're doing that. Then that was just the day 
that you learn, what you must do, what you must not do, don't ask 
anything you will be told what to do. Then we started training at this 
base. Ok, it's an ongoing thing, you do it, I think it's nine months. 
But if you are not up to standard, they can say, okay, another three 
months until they are satisfied. Then you are soldiers, then you just 
carry on with the normal programme. And then you specialised in 
something. But we were concentrating more on education and politics, 
not militarism, that side.54 
Most APLA cadres spent some time in the Tanzanian camps during their stay 
in exile. Each camp had its own programme, but the activities were similar. A report 
on the camp in Ruvu explained a typical day for the residents: 
a) 7.00 am.- 8.00 am. BREAKFAST. Usually they have porridge, 
bread if it is there, tea or coffee. 
b) 8.00 am.- 9.00 am. IDEOLOGICAL STUDIES. 
c) 9.00 am. - 12.30 pm. VARIOUS CHORES. Some do gardening 
and some fishing. 
d) 12.30 pm. - 1.30 pm. LUNCH. RicelPap Vegetables and Meat if 
available. 
e) 1.30 pm. -4.00 pm. RESTIRECREATION 
f) 4.00 pm. - 5.00 pm. READING OF CURRENT EVENTS. By 
someone who is responsible for the radio that day, and then follows 
the discussion of current events. 
g) 6.30 pm. -7.30 pm. SUPPER. Usually the same as lunch. 
h) 7.30 pm. - 8.30 pm. CULTURAL HOUR. When they sing and 
practise new songs. 55 
As Ruvu began as a transit camp for cadres waiting to go abroad for training or return 
to South Africa and fight, their schedule was lighter than other camps. Another man 
explained the programme at Itumbi camp. From Monday through Friday people woke 
S4 von den Steinen, Interview with Bongeo. 











up around 5 a.m. to a programme for physical training. This often involved a run of 
15 kilometres or so to the nearest village, then the same distance back. Other times 
they ran another route where they collected firewood, or out to a distant hill and back. 
Upon their return, the cadres would have tea, then assemble for the first parade at 8 
a.m. At the parade they would find out who was ill and needed to be excused from 
work, and who had specific jobs to do around the camp. Some would work in 
administration, others in the sick bay, and still others tended the poultry or vegetable 
garden. At 9 a.m. they would again assemble, and assignments were given out. 
Certain platoons or companies would be sent to work on the road, fetch firewood, or 
work in the kitchen. The collection of firewood was a crucial part of winter work in 
the camp. In the dry season, they would stock up for the rainy season. In the rainy 
season one group stayed on standby in case a truck went out of the camp and got 
stuck. If another vehicle were available, they would get a ride to the mired truck, but 
often they had to walk to the stalled vehicle and dig it out of the mud. Comings and 
goings were common: people would leave the camp to go to school, cadres would 
return from training, and new recruits arrived from South Africa. And of course, 
some people would leave to go back to South Africa and fight. 56 When people 
trained in the camps, chores, rest and relaxation would fall away and be replaced by 
training programmes. Whether training or waiting however, instruction in politics 
remained a vital component of camp life. 
As with MK's camps in Angola, the APLA cadres in Tanzanian camps had 
problems with food. While some camps became relatively self-sufficient, others 
relied solely on donations from allied organisations and countries. Shortages and cut 
backs always effected the soldiers staying in the camps. One report showed the 











problems that arose from depending on support from sympathetic countries and 
organisations. Supply problems led to the following changes in food for the camps: 
• Potatoes have been cut off from the ration 
• That cabbage will be replaced by Mchicha ... 
• Maita has agreed to give the camp two bags of beans in a place 
of meat. 
• Told the meeting that Ruvu will in the near future face some 
food problem since there is a movement of cadres to Ruvu from 
Bagamoyo 
• He also indicated tha~ fruits and vegetables have been 
reduced. 57 
The camps had varied capabilities when it came to supplying their own food. 
Mphahlele described the food situations in both ltumbi and Mgagao. In ltumbi he 
remembered: 
I shared meals with Babes. Food was served to individuals, but people 
grouped to combine and share their meals. A group eating from one 
dish was called a chama, a Swahili name for party. Babes was a 
valuable partner. On meat days, he was not ashamed to queue half an 
hour before the cooks rang the bell for mealtime. The cooks dished out 
the rice, the staple food. We helped ourselves to the meat, with each 
person entitled to one piece. Babes, always the first in the queue 
would fork the two biggest chunks, usually ox knees. Babes had the 
appetite of a bird, especially on Mondays when he nursed a hangover 
from the weekend's booze binge. This suited my giant appetite well.58 
Particularly despised were the beans they often ate at that camp: 
Beans-what the Tanzanians call maharage in Swahili- were part of the 
diet we had to stomach. On lean days we ate beans without oil or fat, 
and when there was a salt crisis in Tanzania, we ate them without salt. 
Those were the tough days of magendo, the black market, when sellers 
hoarded retails goods and sold them exorbitantly on the black market. 
The beans were dark brown and big and tasted as if they had been 
cooked in hellfire by Lucifer. They took at least five hours on the fire 
to cook and gave us heartburn. The beans also caused stirrings and 
rumblings and roarings in our stomachs. Frequently when we were 
57 Planning Committee Meeting, Dar Es Salaam 4 December 1993. 











jogging, a runner would break. off from the formation and unleash a 
salvo of mighty farts amid cries of ''Ngubo!''- blanket! I never got a 
satisfactory explanation of the meaning of the cry. Did it mean, "Get a 
blanket to smother the noises and the smell"? Whoever started it did 
us a service, because the cry of "Ngubo" removed the opprobrium 
from farting, and we felt free to rid our bowels of dangerous gasses.59 
He recalled much better food supplies in Mgagao : 
The garden thrived. We had abnormally large cabbages, beetroots, 
onions and carrots. The vast shamba, the ploughing field, was green 
with maize. We ploughed with a tractor, so our toughest manual work 
was weeding the fields. We called the maize field nguvu kazi- Swahili 
for 'hard work'. We reared a flock of pigs and slaughtered them for 
meat. Yugoslavia also sent us a large quantity of tinned food that 
drastically changed our diet. We shipped bags full of cabbage to Iringa 
town to sell. We were already anticipating a time not far off when we 
would be liberated from handouts from the DAU's Liberation 
Committee.6o 
Johnson Mlambo also explained the progress towards self-sufficiency in the Ruvu 
camp: 
We had for instance gardening where we cultivated some vegetables 
and the like, we had fruit, we had rice, maize, and even com being 
grown. We had also livestock, from poultry to goats, to cattle and 
pigs. It was developing very well where we could see that some of our 
people who have been trained in agriculture went to some of the 
schools in Tanzania, getting the knowledge to run that place 
effectively. 61 
Whether in times of plenty or of scarcity, food remained in the forefronts of the minds 
of the cadres in the camps. 
S9 Mphahlele, 93. 
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Culture, sports and recreation were also a part of camp life. A group of cadres 
who were at Ruvu camp in its early days detailed their needs and wants in regard to 
music, poetry, and literature to the Department of Publicity and Infonnation: 
1) A list of books they require had been submitted to the department, 
but so far they had not managed to get the required books. 
2) They wanted to know whether they would be allowed to submit 
articles/poems to the department, as contributions to the News 
Magazines 
3) An invitation was extended to the staff of the department, of 
Publicity and Infonnation to visit the centre to record some of their 
songs for the radio broadcasts.62 
The Ruvu camp also requested sporting goods and recreational materials. They asked 
specifically for: 
1) Table Tennis Sets (Including Nets, balls, rackets)- 4 
2) Soccer Balls- 12 
3) Boxing Gloves- 12 pairs All Sizes 
4) Dart Boards and Darts- 6 
5) Chess Sets- 12 sets 
6) Checkers- 12 sets 
7) Playing Cards- 40 packs 
8) Skipping Ropes- 5063 
Mphahlele fondly related his time working on the newspaper in Mgagao camp. 
They would compile infonnation from the radio, and report on current events and 
sports. They also organised a number of campaigns, against ignorance, smoking, and 
malingering. He explained their methods and results: 
In the fight against ignorance, we randomly interviewed members, 
from the commander on down, on current events. We published the 
answers verbatim. If they were incorrect, we provided the right 
answers alongside and the person interviewed would be the butt of 
jokes in the camp. I found people in the Publicity Department just as 
ignorant. They complained and asked to be exempted but I refused, 
arguing that no one had the right to be ignorant. Sam was by far the 
62 Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania, "P.A.C. Transit Centre Tanzania." 












keenest follower of current affairs and always scored a hundred 
percent. On parade he encouraged the cadres to read the papers. 
People actually started reading to avoid embarrassment. The Publicity 
Department provided a translator for those who couldn't read English. 
The fight against smoking was not very successful among the smokers, 
but we grabbed and popularised Sam's slogan, "If you don't smoke, 
don't start." Only one cadre successfully kicked the habit as a result of 
our campaign, and we paraded him as a campaign victory. The third 
campaign, against malingering, didn't last long. With the help of the 
medical staff, we singled out the malingerers and they were soon on 
the straight and narrow.64 
Another man explained the importance of culture in a revolutionary army: 
They know their cultural history, knowing who they are. Because you 
must have identity. With culture, you know, we used to come with 
plays, dramas, all those cultural things. Some traditions, why there are 
traditions from our forefathers. So that we are fighting against a 
cultural aggression, you know, which was forced on us. Or imposed 
on us by the Boers.6s . 
He happily recalled the cultural events that took place: 
Singing and dancing, and all that. Every Friday we used to do that. 
And coincidentally, I used to lead many songs, I would sing by myself. 
And I used to dance also, gumboot dance and traditional dance. And I 
used to do poetry also . . . we used to sing traditional songs, which 
would have a message, political message, a heavy one. And we used 
to make sUre that the morale of the soldiers is high. We were in charge 
of that. 66 
As in the MK camps in Angola, sports were always popular activities in the APLA 
camps as well, particularly soccer. The cultural and recreational activities allowed the 
cadres some semblance of life removed from the military and kept them entertained, 
allowing them to take a break from the monotony in the camps once in a while. 
Transport problems crossed political lines and affected the PAC as well. 
Many vehicles lacked parts and maintenance. This scarcity often left camps with no 
64 Mphahlele, p. 104. 
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vehicles, and roads were often badly maintained and washed away in the rain. One 
report touched on this problem: 
Mahindra which was to assist in Ruvu has broken down, spare parts do 
not fit well from one car (MADHINDRA) to another. LAND 
CRUISER TZB 7112 has developed mechanical defects. There is only 
one tractor that is operating. This means that there is no practical 
transport in this centre. 67 
Johnson Mlambo described the problem of building a road to the Ruvu settlement: 
Basic infrastructure was there and the area had earlier been abandoned 
by the sugar farmer because it is a bit of a mushy area and after the 
sugar fanner the prisons department tried to take it over, but because of 
the floods that occasionally impede normal passage of people, you find 
that when it's the rainy seasons, for two months or more people cannot 
... no vehicle can actually reach the camp, so people stop at Kitonga 
village and they have to carry things on their heads, cross over ... You 
build a road, discover that the Norwegians were assisting us in this 
because many governments and countries would not give assistance of 
a capital nature you know, to build infrastructure of that time, building 
a road, they would rather want to help you build houses . .. even that 
we had to because we needed that transit, 14 kilometres, from the main 
road, from Dar es Salaam to ... Morogoro,Iringa, that's going down 
south you know. And there were learnings, aspects of road 
construction ourselves in the process you know. Some of the people 
engaging in development, they cheat you first and they . .. the money 
has gone and they give you a good road, seemingly which is good, but 
when the rains come, they wash it away, then you learn more and 
more, this is the way it should be done, and this way and that way. We 
were making a lot of progress and access during the rainy season was a 
particular problem that we battled with but we had already defeated it 
by the time we left.68 
A United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid delegation 
experienced these problems when they tried to carry out a mission to inspect the camp 
at Ruvu in 1985, and had to turn back long before they reached the camp. Their 
report read: 
67 PAC Planning Committee Meeting, Dar es Salaam, 4 December 1993. 











--------------~---- ---- - ~ --- - ---------
At 3.30 p.m. we left the main road to drive the remaining 15 kIn on an 
untarred road for Kitanga. Very soon our Landrover started to "swim" 
on the road, turned 90° to the left and only stopped just on the edge of 
the road. I saw it already capsized. We nevertheless continued on our 
way half walking, half driving, the car every now and then being swept 
from one side of the street to the other. Our two Tanzanian 
accompanying officials, one from UNDP and the second one from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recommended to us that we should go 
back and leave this road because it would continue like that. Although 
the road had recently been redone for 300 000 US Dollars by the 
Norweigan government it was difficult to pass it during the rainy 
season. Since heavy rainfalls had started some days ago the road had 
become a sole heap of mud. Underneath the layer of sand on the 
surface there was moisty clay. The tyres of our landrover could not 
cope with these conditions69 
The party continued on their way trying to reach the camp: 
After we crossed another car on the road the two Tanzanians again 
made reservations against our continuing our way, since they had 
spoken to the driver of the other car and learnt about the worsening 
situation of the road to come. They repeated that it was hardly worth 
while to make all these efforts for such a camp. We only stopped our 
march when we came to an unsurmountable lake of water. By then we 
had perhaps made half of our way. A villager passing by was asked to 
pass on the message to the PAC camp that the UN delegation could not 
come due to the bad road. We then drove back in our "swimming" 
[Landrover] and reached Dar at about 6.30 p.m .... Our proposals to 
make another attempt to get to Kitonga were not taken up by our 
Tanzanian friends. No other car would be able to pass, and it would 
also be impossible to arrange for a helicopter. We were also told that 
there was no telephone communication.7o 
At times the camps were left with no transport, making it difficult to provide 
necessary services, like transporting cadres and supplies. 
Well trained and politically armed, the APLA soldiers returned to Tanzania 
with one thought in their minds: to return to South Africa and put their training to use 
against the apartheid government. Leadership problems plagued the PAC, and most 
69 UN Special Committee against Apartheid Mission to Angola, Zambia and Tanzania April3rd_17th 
1985. Topic "Women and Children under Apartheid". 
70 UN Special Committee against Apartheid Mission to Angola, Zambia and Tanzania April 3rd _17th 











cadres waited a long time to be given the opportunity. Some never saw deployment in 
the front line states or the homefront. Others found work in administrative capacities, 
solidarity and diplomatic circles, or went for educational courses and learned trades 
and skills. Some remained in the Tanzanian camps until the political settlement 
allowed for the first democratically elected government of South Africa. Some lost 
hope in the struggle and established lives in foreign countries. But the lucky few 





















Chapter 5: Crises of APLA and MK in Exile 
Long is the road to freedom 
Your impatience 
Will not make it shorter comrade 
I know heart 
Is bursting with anger 
Your brain burning 
With the heat of vengeance 
Waiting tortures 
Waiting waiting waiting 




Who is who isn't 
I know your pain 
Many have felt it from time began 
Unpraised burial without lamentations 
Many have trod on this road 
Before you 
Often bloody footprints 
Landmarks 
For you and me 
To follow 
The long uneasy road to freedom 1 
Life in exile involved difficulties on many levels. Despair of ever returning 
home and gaining liberation threatened the minds of many members of the liberation 
organisations. Both the ANC and PAC faced difficult times and distractions from 
their goals. Each organisation faced crises while in exile, and the consequences lasted 
far beyond the immediate circumstances. The PAC experienced a leadership crisis 
that saw them expelled from Zambia, brought divisions within the organisation, 
affected the Soweto generation of recruits, and effectively shut down their efforts at 
waging a revolution for years. The ANC faced mutinies in the Angolan camps that 












destablised their organisation and led to the execution, imprisonment, and 
ostracisation of some of their cadres. 
The APLA leadership crisis 
The Pan Africanist Congress faced a deep crisis in leadership in the years 
before the Soweto uprisings. However, they could not settle things before the rush of 
recruits headed in their direction. A feud between T.M. Ntantala, the Commander of 
APLA, and P. K. LebaUo, Chairman of the Central Committee of the PAC, led to 
repeated conflicts and even outright violence. A basic ideological difference, with 
Ntantala advancing a Chinese oriented strategy regarding guerriUa warfare and 
Leballo taking a stance as a strong Africanist opposed to foreign influence 
purportedly caused the feud. Beyond this basic ideological split, accusations flew 
about tribalism, misappropriation of funds, autocratic behaviour on the part of the 
chairman, and other issues. The leadership squabbles led to the PAC's expulsion 
from Zambia in 1968, which forced the PAC to move its headquarters to Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania. The recruits who came to the PAC in the wake of the Soweto 
uprisings found themselves in the middle of this feud. 
Some APLA recruits managed to stay out of the thick of the problems, while 
others could not. Some received their political training in Dar es Salaam, went off for 
military training, and returned to Tanzania with no apparent ill effects. However 
others were caught up in the chaos. As an 'either with us or against us' tendency 
characterised the South African liberation movements, most testimonies from the time 
about the crisis are written by disillusioned members who were expelled or resigned 
from the PAC. Particularly common are testimonies from cadres who left the PAC 











Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). These people carried a large 
amount of disillusionment and frustration with the PAC and APLA, so their stories 
come with a bias, but they are useful indicators of some of the elements that drove 
recruits away from the PAC's crisis in leadership. One of these men, who left the 
PAC to join the ANC, related his experiences: 
We left for Tanzania in May 1977. We travelled by Mozambican 
airline. We were a group of more than seventy. While we were 
waiting for military training the chairman of the Central Committee of 
the PAC, Potlako Leballo, visited us time and time again. We had 
meetings on Sundays. I realised that things went wrong- we received 
only promises of military training. Eventually a few went for training, 
but this represented only a fraction of the 200 waiting to be trained. I 
also started to see differences between the leaders of the PAC. The 
commander of the army, Ndandala [sic] and the PAC chairman, 
Leballo, were the only persons talking to us. No one was interested to 
fight at all. The situation became critical when a group of 30 trained 
cadres came back from China and were joined by a group trained in 
Libya. They heard they were not going back to fight. Both groups 
were dissatisfied and wanted to see the leadership. They went to Dar 
es Salaam and met Leballo who convinced them he was the only 
person qualified to lead the liberation struggle. But the group under 
Ndandala [sic] was the only group progressing. Themba Maphalala at 
that stage was talking against Leballo and was the only person to do 
this. Subsequently there was a shift against Leballo on the question 
why so little people were military trained. We demanded that Leballo 
must come and explain, but there was no progress.2 
Eventually this man got fed up with the problems in the PAC and left to join the ANC 
in 1979. Another man experienced problems in Tanzania in the 1970s and defected to 
the ANC, then tried to return to the PAC in 1988 in the wake of the MK. mutinies in 
Angola. His tale of his stay in Tanzania illustrated the disorganisation and lack of 
resources for the recruits: 
In September, 1977 we flew out of Swaziland ... We slept in Maputo 
for the night and the next morning we flew to Dar. In Dar es Salaam 
we staying in Kibo II or New York City as it was known to most of us. 
We stayed there till mid 1978 and some of us then left to stay in 
Manzere which was occupied mostly by comrades who were from the 













Cape and who were dubbed by Leballo as "reactionaries". We stayed 
there for some time then the whole group moved to Mwenge. Staying 
Mwenge proved to be tough and really the going was too tough. We 
never used to get rations regularly from the Party. Then by November 
or December, sixteen of us mostly from Soweto decided to leave the 
Party to go and join the A.N.C.3 
In this case, the delay in going for training, contact with disillusioned members, lack 
of resources, and stagnancy caused an entire group of recruits to defect to the ANC. 
A report of a meeting in 1979 highlighted this exodus, noting: "Also entered 
was a report from cadres from the Camp who wished to take up scholarships due to 
adverse conditions at the camp. All these activities have created the impression of 
lack of discipline and authority. Cadres have gone to government offices to tender 
resignations.,,4 While many cadres persevered and remained loyal members of the 
PAC and APLA, others chose to leave the organisation and either join the rival ANC 
or fend for themselves with help from the UNHCR, robbing the PAC of many eager 
and able recruits from the Soweto generation. 
Instances of indiscipline among the APLA soldiers, usually attributed to the 
leadership struggle and Leballo's influence on the recruits, can be found in many 
discussions of the problems of the time. Many sources claim that Leballo worked to 
recruit the newcomers to his side, creating a division between the older soldiers of 
APLA and the new, more militant youth. The large number of these reports came 
from people opposed to Leballo, and again must be approached with caution. In one 
case, one man who was later expelled from the organization purported that in 
November of 1977, PAC members training the new recruits in politics upset Leballo 
by not extolling his virtues to the new cadres. Unable to reassign them, Leballo had 
the young recruits forcibly removed from the residences, and one man was stabbed 
3 PAC application biography, 22 March 1998. 
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during the ensuing struggle. The same report claims that new recruits who were 
unhappy with the situation called a meeting with the Central Committee to air their 
grievances and hear what they had to say, but when the recruits arrived, they: "laid 
siege to" the Party Offices, and again violently attacked the offices the same day. 
Later, a gang of recruits reportedly attacked the residence of the central committee 
members (excluding Leballo), threatened them with violence, and took sensitive 
documents and keys to the offices with them. Later the same day, they took a party 
functionary and others hostage but the intervention of the DAU African Liberation 
Committee rescued them. 5 
The PAC finally held a conference in 1978 to address the crisis. Ka Plaatjie 
noted: "It was used by Leballo, however, to legitimise his control over the army and 
to bring to a logical conclusion his differences with Ntantala.,,6 In the end, the PAC 
expelled Ntantala and about 60 of his supporters. They later went on to establish their 
own group, the Azanian People's Revolutionary Party.7 One cadre, when he returned 
from a traumatic period of training and escape from an invading army in Kampuchea 
to Tanzania in the wake of the conference, found the circumstances demoralising. He 
returned to an organisation in crisis and found this large contingent of the people 
expelled. He lamented: 
[After the training] our morale was very high and when we heard the 
news it was then that one of our comrades Sadlasafta Zakalala got 
disturbed . . . He started to lose his mind a bit talking funny things 
asking this and that and when we arrived in Dar es Salaam after that 
report that was given by Edmin Makoti ... We agreed, that we did not 
5 Ntantala, T. M. (1978). The Crisis in the PAC, 4 April. 
6 Ka Plaatjie, Thami. (2006). The PAC in Exile. In SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa 
Volume 2 [1970-1980}, Pretoria: UNlSA, 744. 
7 Ka Plaatjie, Thami. (1999). Factionalism, Misrepresentation and Power Struggle in the PAC 1966-
1978: A Working Paper, Presented at the South African Historical Association Conference, University 











have to cry over this there were 67 members of the army in the camp. 
Sixty seven. 8 
In the aftennath of the conference, incidents of indiscipline among the new APLA 
cadres supporting Leballo increased. Vusi Make, in a presentation to the OAU 
Liberation Committee in 1979, outlined some of the incidents: 
At that time 40 cadres of the PAC had left the camp to come to Dar es 
Salaam, to terrorize members of the organisation and had held others 
hostage . . . Some members of the High Command have since 
degenerated into a gang of thugs who perpetuate terrorism within the 
ranks of APLA, for example, despite their agreement to abide the 
directives of the Presidential Council and the Central Committee, these 
mem\?ers of the High Command remain in Dar es Salaam, where they 
have forcefully taken over party houses and brought scores of cadres 
from the camp to back up their threats, and physically attacks on party 
officials and cadres at headquarters ... At the camps those members of 
the High Command have set up a terror squad by appointing with 
Leballo's collusion and without the Central Committee knowledge or 
approval, their own camp administration composed of elements from 
the High Command also from the 41 undisciplined cadres, who have· 
been declared prohibited immigrants by the Tanzanian government. 
Under this mal-administration, beatings and assaults have become the 
order of the day in the camp against those cadres who reject the High 
Command's indiscipline and are determined to serve the Azanian 
People's cause under the discipline of the Central Committee of the 
PAC.9 
While indiscipline and violence on this level sounds quite like a mutiny, the 
cadres involved acted on Leballo's orders or in solidarity with his cause, and as the 
chairman of the PAC, he held the authority to command. In the end, the rest of the 
leadership removed Leballo as chairman in 1979, and replaced him with a three 
person committee consisting of David Sibeko, Vusi Make, and Elias Ntloedibe. 
APLA cadres assassinated Sibeko in June 1979, gravely illustrating the persisting 
8 Sgubu Dube, quoted in Ka Plaatjie, Thami. Poqo and the Azanian People's Liberation Anny, draft 
chapter for The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 2, 1970-1980 by the South African 
Democracy Education Trust. (Draft chapter given to the author by Ka Plaatjie, and this section did not 
appear in the final articles published.) 
9 Statement by the Leader of the PAC Delegation, Mr. Vus-Make to the 33rd Ordinary Session of the 











struggle within the organisation. Vusi Make narrowly escaped the attack, and 
security tightened around the leaders. He remembered that the Tanzanian neighbours 
were unimpressed by this, as guards could stop and search anyone passing the leaders' 
residences. 1o Make then took over as the chairman for a short period until John Nyati 
Pokela left South Africa and took over as chairman in 1981. 
On occasion, the circumstances became so extreme that the Tanzanian 
authorities had to intervene. After the attack by the 40 cadres who Tanzania asked to 
have expelled from the country, the host country became very concerned about the 
leadership squabbles, and the lack of progress in the revolution, as one report 
explained: "The Tanzanian Government has since decided to freeze our activities by 
prohibiting entry into Tanzania of any PAC cadre (trained or untrained) until all 
cadres presently in this country have been infiltrated into Azania."u The Tanzanian 
army also stepped in to settle the problems of the ltumbi camp: "The remaining PAC 
leadership lost total control of the forces at ltumbi camp. Eventually the Tanzanian 
Defence Force intervened in 1981, and in the operation to wrest control of the camp, 
four APLA cadres were killed by the Tanzanian Defence Force.,,12 One man 
remembered the event: 
At that stage then there was a crisis within the PAC, which followed 
the assassination of our director of foreign affairs, the late David 
Maphgurnzana Sibeko, who was also our representative at the UN and 
that then threw the whole party and the movement into a crisis. And 
then there was instability because the camp, Chunya, was opposed to 
the leadership, and then the Tanzanians wanted to enforce some 
control. So everybody had to be back into the camp and when we were 
in the camp, then the most unfortunate chapter of our struggle took 
10 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Vusi Make, 15 August 2005, Centurion. 
11 Administrative Report Presented to the Administrative Committee of the Central Committee on April 
30, 1979. By Henry Isaacs, Acting Administrative Secretary. 












place. That was on the 11th of May where the Tanzanian authorities 
when they wanted to enforce their will some of our senior members in 
the camp undermined the call and they were warned that the Tanzanian 
law and the wish would prevail. And those leaders still didn't take 
note or heed or appreciate and then Tanzania had to enforce their will. 
And in that process I think four people were lost, and then eleven were 
injured. And it was immediately after that shooting incident that I was 
then on the squad appointed by the Tanzanians to take charge of the 
camp. 13 
While most, though not all of the Soweto generation recruits to APLA 
encountered the leadership problems, those based in Tanzania commonly encountered 
them. One man of the Soweto generation explained his views of the crisis. He said 
that initially his generation of APLA recruits were quite involved in the feud, were 
very loyal to Leballo and believed in him. It was only later that their views began to 
change. Particularly instrumental in the change were groups of trainees who returned 
to Tanzania from Nigeria, Lebanon, and Guinea. They began to question Leballo's 
role, and the tendency to brand anyone who disagreed with the chairman as a counter-
. revolutionary. They began to talk about the effects of the crisis, and that the PAC 
must not allow itself to be drawn into ill repute in the eyes of the world. Their 
influence helped lead to the stepping down of Leballo.14 The indiscipline and poor 
training of the Tanzania based soldiers had to be addressed in later years, when first 
John Nyati Pokela, then Johnson Mlambo, took over leadership of the PAC, and 
worked to reorient and retrain the soldiers. 
Occasional flareups continued even in the 1980s. After being welcomed back 
into the fold by Pokela, the PAC members expelled by Leballo in 1978 still found 
13 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Barney Hlatswayo, 16 August 2005, Pretoria. 
14 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Brigadier General Barney Hlatswayo, 11 January 2007, telephone 











themselves labelled as dissidents. In his letter of resignation from the party in June of 
1983, one of these members related his experiences in this regard: 
On the morning of 23 March 1983 I was subjected to a gangster-like 
forced raid by a group of party members ... at my house in Temeke 
. . . The next couple of weeks were to see running battles of hide and 
seek in the streets of Dar Es Salaam and the uncalled for and 
subsequently established highly irregular involvement of the 
Tanzanian police who had been invited by the party. Throughout this 
period I have personally not had any official explanation for this kind 
of action taken against me by the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania. 
This deep silence and mystery, so uncharacteristic of this organisation 
as I have know[n] it since 1963 up to 1977, when Lebal[l]o unleashed 
upon some of us cadres whom he had incited [who] deal[t] with us 
accordingly, was an ominous indication to me that once again I had 
become a target to be dealt with accordingly. IS 
Occasional relapses into the problems of the 1970s continued on throughout the 
1980s, though eventually the new leaders returned discipline to the ranks. Despite 
this crisis, the ensuing indiscipline and violence, and the ongoing problems, most of 
the recruits managed to get their military training in various parts of the world, and 
came back ready to pursue the anned struggle. 
In the wake of the infighting, the leadership worked to instill discipline in the 
camps and get the cadres back on track politically. Letters from the Tanzanian 
government pointed out a common problem of trained cadres who were not deployed, 
and not in the camps but rather living in Dar es Salaam with no duties and causing 
problems. I6 A report from 1979 highlighted and addressed this problem and set out 
new rules, including: 
1. All trained, students and other cadres presently residing in Dar es 
Salaam without any particular duty to perform must with 
immediate effect be taken to their respective camps. 
IS Letter from Bunga Glen Mpukane to Joe Mkwanazi, 20 June 1983. 
16 Letter from W. Mwaipyana of the office of the Prime Minister of Tanzania to the Chief 













2. All trained, students and other cadres coming to Tanzania from 
abroad must be taken to the relevant camps upon their arrival. 
They must not be allowed to stay in Dar es Salaam. 17 
At one meeting the leadership debated the best ways forward in rehabilitating the 
cadres: 
The main issue tackled was the militarization of the leadership of 
Bagamoyo. This move was necessitated by the need to instill 
discipline at that centre. However, there were views that this problem 
of discipline is a political problem which needs a political solution, 
some members stated. Another view also prevalent was that we should 
realise that we have to use force to enforce discipline after all methods 
of persuasion have failed. 18 
The PAC also instituted well defined and spelt out codes of conduct. These included 
several documents: a Military Leadership Code of Conduct, one spelling out APLA 
Service Offences, one entitled ''The Discipline of the Battlefield", which required a 
signature from the cadre, Camp Rules and Regulations, and a document spelling out a 
clear code for corporal punishment, when needed. 19 One PAC scholar explained: 
These changes emanated from open engagements between the PAC 
leadership under Vusumzi Make and the general cadreship in 1980. 
The hostilities to the new leadership had subsided and the daunting 
task of rebuilding the PAC was beginning to unite cadres in the camps. 
Their spirits were uplifted when the news of Poke1a's arrival as 
disclosed. He became the new chainnan of the PAC and Commander-
in-Chief of APLA from January 1981. He recruited fresh blood into 
the Task Force of AP LA. 20 
17 PAC Inter-departmental memoradum from the Chief Representative to Directors and Head of 
Departments, Dated 23 February 1983, citing letter of of28 August 1979. 
18 Minutes of Central Committee Meeting, August 22,1982. 
19 Azanian Peoples Liberation Army Service Offenses; Azanian People's Liberation Army Military 
Leadership Code of Conduct; Corporal Punishment (C.P.) In the PAC, as a Disciplinary Measure; 
Mgagao Camp Ru1es and Regulations; Discipline of the Battlefield. 
20 Kondlo, Kwandime Merriman. (2003). In the Twilight of the Azanian Revolution: The Exile History 
of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (South Africa): (1960-1990), thesis submitted in fulfilment of 












When John Nyathi Pokela was released from prison in 1980, the PAC 
leadership called him into exile to take over as the chairman of the organisation in 
January of 1981. With a policy of addressing the problems that caused so much 
trouble for the PAC, he worked to restore unity, develop the homegoing programme, 
and intensify the largely non-existent armed struggle. His efforts bore fruit in later 
years, but his stint as leader of the movement ended prematurely with his death in 
June of 1985. Johnson Mlambo, who left South Africa to join the organisation in 
exile upon his own release from Robben Island in 1983, succeeded Pokela. Mlambo 
built on the foundation started by Pokela, and the succeeding years showed a huge 
upsurge of APLA activity inside South Africa for the fIrst time in decades. Mlambo 
remained chairman when Zephania Mothopeng became president of the PAC, and 
both continued in those positions until Clarence Makwetu took over the presidency in 
1990. The legacy of leadership struggles, which characterised the PAC throughout its 
existence, limited its effectiveness and negatively influenced its supporters. One man 
explained the problems experienced by APLA in the wake ofthese problems: 
So that was the problem through and through, that's why un:Iike the 
MK and the ANC, with the ANC there was that kind of continuity, 
which is very vital to the effective execution of the armed struggle. 
The high command of Joe Modise, Chris Hani, etc. that left the country 
in the early sixties, was the same high command that came back and 
reported to their leaders, their political leaders, Sisulu, Mandela, etc. 
But now with the PAC, the high command that left in 1960, was 
toppled in 1975, the one of 1975 was toppled in 1976, the one of 1976 
was toppled in the eighties, so like people like me they only know the 
PAC in the '80s, because there was that, I don't know if it is proper to 
call it a vacuum of military leadership .... So that I think undermined 
the effectiveness of APLA on the ground. Because we lacked 
continuity and we never blended the youth militancy with the age 
experience, the thing that the ANC did to its advantage?l 











Background to the MK Mutinies 
In the mid-1980s, many of the soldiers in Angola participated to varying 
degrees in mutinies against the leadership, which marked a low point in the ANC's 
struggle. Aside from the dire conditions in the Angola camps discussed in chapter 
three, many other issues contributed to the eventual blow up. Spending years in the 
camps with no reprieve and very little change in the routine sufficed to cause a state 
of extreme boredom. One report to the National Consultative Conference asserted: 
This department [Personnel and Training] should up-date its training 
programme and should sen[ d] comrades to military academy and even 
academic schools. It can only be absurd to keep comrades for 8 yrs in 
the camps without any improvement or advance in both military or 
academic schools?2 
One MK soldier explained to his interviewer that not going back was incredibly 
difficult, and at times he would despair of ever returning to South Africa to fight. He 
would often have just to walk away alone for a bit and come to terms with that.23 One 
man explained to the Stuart Commission, a commission created to inv~stigate the 
causes of the first mutiny: "Our lengthy stay and conditions in exile (i.e. camps) has 
made some of us to lose all sense of human feeling, lose complete touch with 
humanity, we do not have the same resistance." The report went on to say: "The 
commission believes that the conditions in the camps, the total isolation from the 
outside world, the desperation and frustration of not being deployed make it 
practically impossible for cadres to survive (politically, morally and psychologically) 
22 National Consultative Conference 1985: MHQ unit Lusaka, regional preparation document 
23 Pilcher, Rosie. (1998). Occupational Hazards: Observations of Conditions in Umkhonto we Sizwe's 
Angolan Camps, unpublished thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of an honours degree in history at 











in the camps for several years.,,24 The long years in the camps caused increasing 
stress in the lives of the rank and file soldiers. 
To make matters worse, the rank and file soldiers often resented the 
leadership. The rank and file believed that the leaders lived the easy life, not 
suffering deprivations, while they themselves suffered in the camps. Many 
documents written in the aftermath of the mutinies pointed to the inequality in 
circumstances between the average soldiers and those in positions of power. Much of 
this hostility focused on the ANC Chief Representative in Angola's office. 
Comments from the rank and file when interviewed in the aftermath of the mutinies 
included: "No money for camps but new cars bought constantly for Chief Rep's 
office,,,25 "Instead of the Northern Camps and other outlying sectors being given top 
priority, it became blatantly clear that Luanda itself and particularly the Chief Rep's 
residence was the top priority',26 and "House of Chief Rep. should not be a place 
where everything is eaten and not elsewhere.,,27 These inequalities extended beyond 
the leadership in Luanda, however. Another document noted: "Commanders and 
other members of the administration should cease to eat fresh food which other 
comrades can not obtain because this will have wrong interpretation and raise 
misunderstanding among comrades.,,28 The leaders and commanders often failed to 
deal with these complaints diplomatically either. One document reports: "Irrelevant 
24 Stuart Commission Report 1984. (1996). In Appendices to the African National Congress Policy 
Statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, August 1996, 10. While the Stuart 
Commission's report was fInished in March of 1984, before the second mutiny in May, the exploration 
of the causes of the first mutiny applies to the circumstances of the second as well. 
25 Programme ofTG [Treasurer General] in Angola- December 1984. 
26 Main Observations about situation in Angola- 27/12/84. 
27 Kodesh, Wolf1e. Meeting with office and Regional Command: 23/12/84, from notebook on projects 
in Angola. 












demoralising and sarcastic answers were advancer d] in reply to questions posed by 
the rank and file to those in authority. ,,29 Another report remarked on the changes in 
relations between the camp leaders and the rank and file: "The normal standard was 
that everybody does his own washing and cleaning their rooms, members of the 
administration included, but today with the youth in the administration they [want] to 
have soldiers working as domestic servants for them.,,30 This blatant disregard for the 
ANC policy of equality in the movement incensed the rank and file, and added more 
fuel to the fire that led to mutinies. These issues alone caused serious demoralisation 
and dissatisfaction among the comrades stationed in Angola's camps, but even more 
problems arose during this period to add to the already difficult situation. 
The ongoing involvement of MK soldiers in the war between the Movimento 
Popular de Liberta~ao de Angola (MPLA) and Uniao Nacional para a Independencia 
Total de Angola (UNIT A) further exacerbated the situation. The Angolan 
government's decision to let the ANC establish training camps within its borders 
rested on more than Pan-African solidarity. The complicated regional situation in 
Southern Africa drew many countries into intricate relationships. South Africa 
illegally controlled Namibia, as well as continuing policies of repression in South 
Africa. This gave them two main enemies in the vicinity of Angola: SW APO in 
Namibia, and the ANC in South Africa. The defense of Namibia was critical to the 
apartheid government's plan to keep countries bordering South Africa hostile to 
guerrilla infiltration routes. The MPLA, the main Angolan liberation movement 
during their own struggle for liberation, governed Angola, which had recently gained 
its independence from Portugal in 1975. Independence brought them more conflict, 
29 Document submitted for National Consultative Conference of 1985, from unit C-13. 











however, and a constant state of civil war between the government and UNIT A, a 
rival movement, plagued the country. South Africa, who wanted to keep the 
Namibian/Angolan border from falling into the MPLA's hands, which would allow 
SW APO access to the country, supported UNIT A with arms, money, and sometimes 
military force in order to keep Angola destabilised and to cause problems for both the 
MK and SW APO forces based there. 
The Angolan government placed the MK camps strategically, situating them 
as buffers around the capital city Luanda. While MK did not actively fight against 
. UNIT A during their first few years in Angola, they could not remain neutral. At 
first, MK took purely a defensive stance, fighting UNIT A nly when it directly 
threatened MK camps. However; as time passed, they eventually found themselves 
committing to assist the Foryas Annadas Populares de Libertayao de Angola 
(FAPLA), the MPLA's anny, in the fight against their rival movement. South 
Africa's support of UNITA made their involvement even more justifiable, as they 
were able to fight their enemy directly, though still far from the battleground of South 
Africa. 
The MK soldiers originally responded to this call for help from F APLA 
enthusiastically. The Stuart Commission report of 1984 remarked: 
At this early stage there were apparently no signs of unhappiness or 
unwillingness on the part of comrades. The early enthusiasm was due 
to a number of factors: 
a) The need to defend MK base camps developed into a general 
political understanding of the need to participate practically in the 
struggle against imperialism, against a bandit force- UNITA- which 
was used as an extension of the South African defence forces; 
b) The need to get out of the camps, away from the boredom of camp 
life because some comrades had been staying in the camps since 
1977; 
c) The need to gain combat experience.31 
31 Stuart Commission Report 1984. (1996). In Appendices to the African National Congress Policy 











--- --- ---- --- ------ -----
The first operations against UNIT A went very smoothly, and the soldiers felt a sense 
of victory and accomplishment in these early days. Later, however, this was not the 
case. F APLA forces lacked organization so many operations went badly. Supply 
lines were unreliable, reconnaissance was sporadic, and the troops often had little or 
no backup and support. One report for the National Consultative Conference 
asserted: 
In August 1983 when demoralisation had reached its climax almost the 
whole army was mobilised for the Eastern Front in Angola, even the 
comrades who were preparing to get home were diverted to this front 
instead of reinforcing the home front ... Some of our experiences in 
that front are alarming. There was no proper troop control, no reliable 
communication system, missions were not properly planned some 
times not planned altogether. Logistical distribution was not 
satisfactory; Our forces were reinforced by militia which was not 
properly trained and poorly equipped and relations were at the lowest 
critical level. 32 . 
These conditions led to many MK casualties. 
The soldiers began to question why they were involved in this fight at all, and 
their original enthusiasm evaporated to be replaced with dissent and hostility about 
the situation. A recent book on Cuban involvement in Angola noted: "The Cubans, 
SWAPO and MK. guerrillas would fight tenaciously (and often to the death) while 
Angolan units crumbled around them. Gradually resentment grew among the 
FAPLA's allies at the way they were being used to fight a proxy war.,,33 The Stuart 
Commission report noted one particular battle on 26th December 1983, in which the 
MK forces fell into an ambush. The F APLA forces supporting them ran away from 
the ambush, and 5 MK soldiers died. The commission reported: "Some time later, a 
decision was taken that the dead bodies of our fallen comrades should be retrieved, 
32 Document submitted for National Consultative Conference of 1985, from unit C-13. 
33 George, Edward. (2005). The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, From Che Guevara to Cuito 











and for the first time, our comrades saw death- with the dead bodies mutilated and 
some in an advanced stage of decomposition.,,34 The MK soldiers did not take these 
casualties well. 
Many of the soldiers who had been in the camps during this campaign 
remember their reactions vividly. One man explained that when the Eastern Front 
campaigns started, they found it very exciting. They saw it as a chance to gain 
experience and break the monotony of staying in the camp and waiting to return to 
South Africa. But as time went on, they experienced difficulties and started to think. 
about where they stood, where they came from, and why there were there. They saw 
some comrades die in ambushes and raids, some maimed ip. attacks, and some getting 
completely frustrated.35 Another man recalled: "after some few ambushes ... most of 
our people were injured. They start to say they can't fight in a foreign country ... 
Why should we fight Rhodesia, why should we fight here in Angola while we should 
go home and fight at home.,,36 The disillusionment and frustration of fighting against 
UNIT A became a substantial complaint in the mutinies that soon followed. 
The actions of the Department of Intelligence and Security (NAT)37 emerged 
as the foremost cause of dissatisfaction and anger. The ANC described NAT's origins 
and duties in its submission to the TRC : 
The roots of NAT [Department of National Security and Intelligence] 
can be traced to the establishment of a military intelligence unit in the 
1960s, tasked with undertaking reconnaissance missions to find routes 
for the infiltration of trained MK cadres; the establishment of reception 
34 Stuart Commission Report 1984. (1996). In Appendices to the African National Congress Policy 
Statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, August 1996, 18-19. 
35 Kodesh, W. Interview with Sipho Binda, 24 March 1993. 
36 Kodesh, W. Interview with Graham Morodi, 23 March 1993. 
37 Even in the ANC's own documents, NAT is referred to in many different ways, such as the 
Department of Intelligence and Security, the Department of National Security and Intelligence, etc. In 











areas inside the country for these cadres; and the selection of inanimate 
targets for armed propaganda attacks. At this time the Department had 
no counter-intelligence capacity: there was no structure specifically 
tasked with the screening of recruits and exposure of agents in our 
midst. In the 1960's, cadres were carefully recruited or selected by 
ANC branches inside the country before being sent abroad for military 
training. This screening and selection process inside the country 
resulted in a degree of complacency in the ANC's mission in exile.38 
The sudden influx of students and sympathisers in the wake of the Soweto uprisings 
made their job much more difficult. Rather than carefully selected and vetted recruits, 
a flood of unknown volunteers wanted to join, and among them there were occasional 
spies from the apartheid government: 
The new phase after the upheavels [sic] of 1976 saw the mass exodus 
of youth, seeking contact with the ANC driven by the desire to acquire 
the skills necessary to respond to the brutality of the regime with 
military force. It was critical for the ANC to set up the necessary 
structures to process all these new recruits: for ensuring proper 
deployment of cadres; for utilising information they passed on to the 
ANC, which could be used to build the underground; and to ensure that 
agents of the regime were weeded out. 39 
The purpose and duties of the security department were straight forward enough, but 
in practice, the lines blurred. With thousands of people arriving from South Africa 
and actively seeking out the ANC and MK in the wake of the Soweto uprisings, the 
security department faced a task larger than it could have anticipated. 
The recruits leaving South Africa would be asked to write an autobiography, 
including details on themselves and their political activities within the country, as 
well as details on people who they suspected of being involved with the enemy. In 
this way they would weed out some of the blatant enemy agents who came without 
38 ANe. (1997). Further Submissions and Responses by the African National Congress to Questions 
Raised by the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, 106. 











proper cover stories, and managed to catch many spies in this way. Others came 
much more prepared however. The TRC submission explained: 
Some agents were exposed because they were known within the 
country. Others were naive and inconsistencies in their biographies 
which all recruits had to write were easily spotted. However, some 
were well-trained in the fields of political, military, and intelligence 
work. This included briefings on how to aim at being deployed in 
certain positions of strategic importance, how to rise within the ranks 
of the ANC, how to identify key moments at which agitation against 
the leadership could serve to undermine the ANC, how to gather 
information for necessary assassinations and other attacks, or to carry 
out such deeds themselves.4o 
Many of these agents managed to escape the security nets and infiltrated the 
organisation undetected. Some caused great damage to the organisation before being 
caught. 
The first serious attack on MK's structures in Angola by South African agents 
occurred in September of 1977, at Novo Catengue camp in the south of the country. 
One spy managed to poison the food of almost the entire popUlation at this camp. 
One man who was there at the time related: 
So this chap came then with his poison, put poison in the food. You 
know we are poisoning 500 people that, that's how serious the enemy 
agents were. That was September of 1977 ... Fortunately because our 
kitchens were separated, Cubans were eating in their own kitchen. 
They were preparing their food on their own. We were preparing our 
food. So they were not affected. I mean they were there, fresh, helped 
us, came with their doctors- 30 Cuban plus 30 Cuban doctors coming 
to the camp. If you have an idea where the camp is. Camp is not a 
place that is easily accessible. But they came there. We were injected 
and whatever and whatever. That saved of us from dying. Not a single 
person died from that thing. Was it not [for] their quick response ... It 
was a slow poison that would have taken us.41 
Another woman remembered the poisoning, explaining that her group was going for 
night shooting practice, when people started complaining about feeling bad after 
40 ANe. (1996). Statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 68. 












eating the fish that night. Some thought it was a lack of good cleaning of the fish, and 
the Cubans thought that they just didn't want to go for lessons, but then everyone got 
sick. They had to call the Cubans from town by helicopter, and they nursed them 
back to health, but they were sick for most of that week.42 Another woman recalled 
the poisoning. She had not been so hungry that evening, and wasn't fond of the fish 
they had, so she didn't eat much. Then when everyone got sick, she was afraid that 
they would think: she had done it, since she wasn't sick, so she pretended to be sick 
and have the same symptoms as everyone else.43 The poisoning struck a huge blow to 
the morale of the trainees, and people remained suspicious for a long time about who 
had done it. The Security Department only caught the actual culprit in 1981. 
The second major strike occurred when enemy forces bombed Nova Catengue 
in March of 1979. One woman recalled: 
They raided the camp, ja, and they dropped more than five hundred 
bombs of different types there and then two comrades, in fact there 
were three, two of our South African comrades and one Cuban was 
killed in that raid and just about everything was destroyed within 
seconds. The operation lasted for three minutes . . . It was all over, 
there was nothing left of the camp at all. A camp which we had built 
up, you know, with our own hands, for over a year we had worked on 
that camp, within three minutes, it was all gone, razed to the ground, 
there was nothing, absolutely nothing. Even the chickens that were 
there burnt to death ... And the comrades were really brutally killed 
because I think they spotted them, when they tried to run to the defence 
post outside, there where we were hiding, they thought that the planes 
were leaving and they came out of the dugouts and then only to come 
and find that the planes were returning for a second round, to come 
back for a second time, and then they were spotted and they were 
gunned down by machine gun. One comrade's head was totally gone 
and you couldn't even pick up their bodies, because you would try and 
pick them up, the leg would come off, so they had to be picked up with 
spades ... So we just had to make graves and bury them there in the 
camp. And it was for the first time that it really dawned on me that 
now we are involved in war ... it was ... at that time that I really 
realised how vicious the Boers are, that, you know, if we were in the 
42 Kodesh, W. Interview with Thoko Mavuso, 7 April 1993. 











camp at that time, there wouldn't be a single one of us that would have 
survived.44 
The South African forces that attacked had clear intelligence about the routine of the 
camp, only available from someone on the inside. The camp had to be abandoned 
after the attack, as it was razed to the ground, and as a demoralising act, it was 
immensely successful, even though the raid occurred when the soldiers were 
elsewhere. If the soldiers had been in the camp it would have been completely 
devastating, taking out 500 of the trainees as well as their instructors two full 
countries away from home. 
NAT immediately consolidated the department and began to train and deploy 
new recruits, as well as to establish a detention centre, Camp 32, in Angola. One of 
the first tasks it set itself was the recruitment of more personnel to the department. 
Often the department would recruit youths coming out of the country, send them on a 
course in East Germany, and then deploy them to duties in security and intelligence. 
This became one of its biggest mistakes. Camp 32, also known as Quatro after the 
notorious 'number four' prison in Johannesburg, became the most notorious arm of 
the security department. 
The poisoning and bombing at Novo Catengue caused the department to worry 
about enemy spies but, two years later, another incident heightened this panic. In 
March of 1981, the ANC accidentally uncovered a spy ring that involved some people 
in very high positions in the organisation. The apprehension of one spy, known as 
'Piper', led the security department to many others. The men identified as spies 
included the commander of Quibaxe camp in Angola, the head of MK Security in 
Angola, and another man deployed in security. These men, some of the best and 












brightest of their group of recruits, had been above suspicion until a lucky break 
enabled the department to expose the ring. This 'Spy Scare' of 1981 led to serious 
tightening of security and eventually to such extreme measures on the part of the 
security people that the rank and file in Angola generally despised the security 
department and lived in a state of fear. The mutineers' statements' foremost 
complaints targeted the security department and appeared in almost every unit's 
report to the National Consultative Conference the next year. 
In the camps in Angola, this spy scare manifested itself as the idea that anyone 
who criticised the movement or committed breaches of discipline was an enemy agent 
who was trying to demoralise the cadres and move them to rebel against the 
movement. This was plausible, as sometimes the actual spies would purposely 
undermine conditions in the camps in order to cause dissatisfaction among the cadres. 
One man who was a company commissar in Mazimbu in the early 1980s recalled the 
problems he had with the commander of the camp. He often argued with the 
commander, who would issue unreasonable orders and refused to negotiate. The 
commander, his camp, and his company appeared to be dissenters. They found out 
later that the commander was a spy, and then understood why he had acted in this 
way. The cadres felt real frustration over these issues, which caused them much 
dismay. 45 Other spies encouraged their comrades to smoke dagga or drink illicit 
alcohol, among other breaches of discipline. With the unsettled conditions in the 
camps at the time, some of the comrades easily followed in this direction. However 
many people got in trouble when indiscipline arose from other causes. It reached a 
point where anyone caught smoking a joint, drinking alcohol, or just asking to be sent 
home to fight, would be branded an enemy agent by the security department. Many 











people found themselves so depressed about the long waiting period in the camps and 
the conditions they found themselves in, that they turned to dagga or alcohol to escape 
their problems. Earlier, the commanders and the security department tolerated dagga 
smoking and drinking. This idea that anyone breaching discipline must be an enemy 
spy changed this situation. 
If unlucky enough to be caught, a soldier faced severe punishment. One man 
remembered his own experiences when he was living in the camp at Malange. He 
hadn't smoked dagga in three years, though he had enjoyed the occasional joint earlier 
in his life. At one point he decided to have a puff from someone else's joint, which 
happened just when the security department started rounding up the smokers and 
punishing them. He and his fellow smokers were rounded up and beaten until they 
confessed their crime. They were also forced to tell the security men who else they 
knew who smoked dope. He was tied to a post and beaten, then left overnight in the 
cold. He was with a group of 40 men who were punished for this indiscipline, and he 
recalled hearing his commissar, Oupa Maloi, being beaten to death nearby for a 
similar crime. He served three months of hard labour, and then returned to the ranks. 
He went then to another camp, Caculama, with Zimbabwean officers, and recalled 
that there they were able to smoke dagga freely. These contradictions from camp to 
camp made it very difficult to figure out what actions would be punished at any 
particular time, and left many soldiers fearful and uncertain.46 Nor was this an 
isolated incident. Many reports point to severe torture of cadres who committed 
indiscipline. One report submitted for the National Consultative Conference pointed 
out problems with the security department abusing the cadres: "1- Cadres disappeared 
without trace at the hands of the security, 2-Individuals would kill without any 











accountability, 3-Beatings to death became rife, 4-Members of the security assumed 
enonnous power ... Persecution became the order of the day.,,47 The people in the 
camps reached a stage where they constantly feared what might befall them if they 
stepped out of line. Many felt this treatment was very unfair. As soldiers at Malange 
camp asserted to Wolfie Kodesh in 1984: "Not all mistakes are made on purpose.,,48 
The idea that any step out of line meant a purposeful attempt to damage the 
organisation caused countless difficulties for many of the MK cadres. 
Another issue that eventually led to the mutinies had similar roots. The 
Security Department interpreted any indiscipline or dissent as sabotage of the 
organisation. They viewed many other activities similarly: criticism of the conditions 
in the camps, complaints about the length of time spent in the camps or any other 
legitimate concerns. When the Treasurer General, Thomas NImbi, visited camps in 
Angola, he heard: "Frank and open talk [is] not tolerated at some camps and there is a 
fear of victimisation if you talk Up.,,49 This closure of official routes for legitimate 
complaints left the soldiers with no way to channel their frustrations and grievances, 
which led to further frustration and dissatisfaction in the rank and file, and contributed 
to the mutinies that were to come. 
Once branded an enemy agent for whatever reason, the stigma could rarely be 
escaped. And often security department personnel spread false rumours or distributed 
reports branding people as agents. They rarely corrected this false and unsupported 
infonnation. One report pointed out: 
Dissemination of wrong infonnation: This department [security] is the 
chief culprit, a number of comrades have been victims to this 
47 National Consultative Conference 1985: MHQ unit Lusaka, regional preparation document. 
48 Kodesh, Wolfie, notebook on projects in Angola. 











shortcoming. The members introduce unfounded allegations about this 
or that comrade being an agent or having deserted the organisation, this 
is spread in the rank and file officially and unofficially only to learn 
later when the man shows up that he/she was being deliberately 
destroyed. In some instances an official report is given only to learn 
the contrary is true. Facts enumerated here under bears testimony in 
that regard ... 50 
The document cited several specific examples of people the department reported to be 
spies, who were later cleared. It went on to say: 
Furthermore a number of comrades have been labelled only to discover 
later that they are instructing or doing some important duties 
somewhere. This information is leaked by the security deliberately or 
due to its inefficiency ... It has been our bitter experience that some of 
our cadres have remained suspects for too long. Further no checking 
and counter checking has been done. Unfortunately information has 
been forced out of them resulting in confession under duress or 
torture.51 
Many people found themselves branded as traitors and condemned to spend years and 
years in the camps, as, without security clearance, they could not deploy to the front. 
This led to even more demoralisation, particularly for those who had simply made a 
mistake but remained loyal to MK. and the ANC. Some have found that the stigma of 
being an enemy agent has followed them back to South Africa even today, where they 
still face suspicion and disgust. 
Many people had far worse problems with the security department. Abuse and 
torture of suspects became common. Some suspects found themselves sent to Quatro, 
the infamous prison camp in the north of Angola. The history of the abuse and torture 
of suspects at Quatro, or Camp 32, can be found in many documents released in the 
early 1990s which first broke the story of abuse in the ANC camps. The ANC 
admitted the systematic torture in their submissions to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. The Skweyiya Commission investigated the origins of the mutinies and 
50 National Consultative Conference 1985: MHQ unit Lusaka, regional preparation document. 











documented the conditions in Quatro. It cited overcrowded cells, inadequate health 
care, even worse food supplies than the other camps, harsh labour, and serious 
psychological and physical torture. Often the guards forced inmates to do hard labour 
until they collapsed, after which the guards severely beat them. 52 Systematic torture 
became endemic, and various torture practices became synonymous with Quatro 
camp. The Motsuenyane Commission, which also investigated the mutinies' origins, 
documented many common abuses: 
• lengthy isolation in solitary confinement; 
• regular beatings under the feet or elsewhere with guava tree sticks 
or with coffee tree sticks; 
• napalm- being rubbed with (or rolling naked on) hairy beans or 
leaves of a plant which caused itching; 
• pompa- blowing ones cheeks or pumping them up so that a guard 
would slap the cheeks causing excruciating pain to the ears; 
• pawpaw- being covered on the face with the skin of a scooped out 
pawpaw fruit and beaten; 
• Beirut- flogging while naked and lying in a face-down position; 
• helicopter- being tied hand and foot and suspended on a pole or log 
like a pig on a spit; 
• being tied to a tree and remaining there in public view for a long 
time; 
• red ants introduced into clothes one was wearing and being bitten 
by these ants; 
• Slaughter- digging a hole shoulder deep and being beaten on the 
head and hands as you obey the instruction to come out of the hole; 
• Starvation- being denied food as a form of punishment; 
• chopping wood for hours on end; 
• 1000 litre tank- drawing water and pulling a 1000 litre tank uphill 
with others and being beaten in the process; 
• Third degree interrogation- non-stop interrogation for two days or 
more.53 
These are only a few examples of the daily torture in the camp. Beyond these, 
suspects were often beaten and tortured until they signed false confessions, which 
52 ANC. (1996). Skweyiya Commission Report 1992. In Appendices to the African National Congress 
Policy Statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, August 1996. 
53 ANC. (1996). Motsuenyane Commission Report, 20 August 1993. In Appendices to the African 











were difficult to refute once signed. Some people remained in Quatro for many years 
under these circumstances, and many neither had charges brought against them, nor 
had a chance to have their day in court to refute the allegations. Some who were kept 
in these conditions remain loyal to the ANC today, despite the treatment meted out to 
them. Others found that their experiences at the hands of the security department 
disillusioned them with the movement and never supported it again. 
The security department's notorious behaviour emerged as the primary 
grievance of the mutineers,and one of the major issues which the MK soldiers raised 
in preparation for the National Consultative Conference that followed it. The serious 
problems between the security department and the rank and file soldiers caused a lot 
of hatred, animosity, fear, and unhappiness. Many used the Conference as their fIrst 
opportunity to strike back at the department, and attacked them in the harshest 
possible words. One unit asserted: 
The backbone of all armies is the Security department ... It is through 
practical experience that the security department more often than not 
and whether consciously or not is the source of a very serious source of 
catastrophy rather than security and fIrmness to the organisation . . . 
Following the sequence of events therefore it is clear to all genuine and 
freedom loving patriots in the organisation as a whole that the security 
department is rotten it is the source of ALL EVILS AND HENCE THE 
NERVE CENTRE OF REACTION instead of progress [emphasis 
theirs]S4 
The cadres particularly complained about the choice of personnel for the 
Security Department. Those cadres chosen for training and deployment as security 
officers were often very young and, after being sent on a course in the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR), they deployed with full powers over the rank and file 
soldiers. Many complaints came from the various camps about this. One suggested: 
"Age limit in the Security Department: Some operatives are too young and socially 











inexperienced to handle this task. Comrades suggest inclusion of older comrades to 
guide and assist them.,,55 Another remarked: "Political consciousness and maturity 
should be the prime qualification of appointment to the responsibility of recording 
officer [a security dept. position].,,56 The attitudes of the security men and women 
also created problems. One report noted: 
In the security all the 'yes men' type of cadres are serving, they first 
get the basic training sent to GDR, then work in this important 
department. Hence the chaotic nature of their working, beatings 
instead of persuasion because of ignorance and political immaturity ... 
[The] majority of their cadres ended being renegades and nothing has 
been done since 1977.57 -
The youth and political immaturity of the security cadres appeared in many 
submissions to the National Consultative Conference and emerged as a large part of 
the problem. 
MK soldiers also described the omnipotence of the department as a weakness. 
One report noted: "The security department works independently as a supreme body, 
is very negligent and also relaxed. It also has too much power.,,58 This power, 
unanswerable to any oversight or monitoring, became the security department's 
'blank cheque' to do what they liked. Often they failed to root out actual enemy 
spies, but rather abused their power and even hurt innocent bystanders. Another 
report purported: "Most are apolitical, inexperienced and even non-security officers or 
functionaries in their daily work. The best they do is to look for drunk comrades, 
come into love affairs of other cadres, and . . . use force at slightest provocation. 
55 Report submitted in preparation for the National Consultative Conference of 1995, from the Luanda 
District. 
56 Report submitted in preparation for the National Consultative Conference of 1995, from Viana 
Camp. 
57 National Consultative Conference 1985: MHQ unit Lusaka, regional preparation document 












Force is the primary in their activities. Their criterion is faulty to say the least."s9 
Overall, the hatred and fear of the security department affected all of the soldiers in 
Angola and became a primary cause of the mutinies that were to follow. 
The MK Mutinies 
The mutinies began in January of 1984. Dissatisfaction with the problems 
seen above finally crystallised into action on the part of some soldiers. Following a 
particularly difficult battle with UNIT A, many soldiers in camps in the Malange 
district began to shoot their weapons into the air, protesting their situation and 
demanding attention from the leadership. They demanded that Oliver Tambo, the 
A~C's president; Joe Slovo, MK's commander; and Chris Hani, MK's commissar, 
address their grievances. 
Though Hani met with the mutineers, the other leaders refused. The mutineers 
then decided to go to Luanda to confront their leaders. By February, the action spread 
to Viana transit camp just outside the city. Soldiers from all comers of Angola 
streamed into the camp to find out what was going on and decide whether they 
supported the mutiny. Some sources claim that the soldiers planned to storm the 
headquarters in Luanda, but diverted to Viana, while others say that the mutineers 
moved to Viana, and then others came of their own accord, sometimes 
commandeering vehicles to get there. The shooting in the air continued, and the 
soldiers refused to be disarmed, citing fear of the security department reprisals if they 
surrendered their weapons. Chris Hani met with the mutineers at one point, asking all 
those who supported the ANC to make themselves known. One man who was there 
recalled: 











Thereafter came the leadership, came Chris Hani, called a meeting in 
Viana and first of all the things, he asked that all the people who were 
there, comrades were there, he asked the people, look here, I want to 
know who are the people who are no longer interested to be within the 
ANC, they must step out so as they can go to the UN. None of the 
comrades left or went out, none. 60 
The mutineers did not care to abandon the struggle, but merely to change the 
circumstances in which they languished. They elected a committee of ten to present 
their grievances to the leadership. Among other things, the mutineers demanded a 
national consultative conference, a change in the attitude towards deploying people to 
the front, an intensification of the struggle inside South Africa, and disbandment and 
investigation of the security department. On February 16, FAPLA sent forces to take 
over the camp and disarm the mutineers, and a few casualties occurred on both sides. 
The Security Department sent many of the mutineers to Quatro, and some to other 
camps under a cloud of suspicion. 
At Pango camp in May of 1984, yet another revolt erupted. The mutineers in 
this second mutiny largely consisted of cadres transferred there from the mutiny in 
Viana. Again, the Security Department quelled the mutiny, but casualties occurred on 
both sides, and the fighting was more serious and had more severe consequences. The 
Security Department executed seven of the Pango mutineers, and another group 
sentenced to execution only received a reprieve at the last minute. More people went 
to Quatro and others faced discipline for their actions. This marked the end of the 
mutinies. 
The MK leadership responded to the mutinies inconsistently. Some leaders 
acknowledged that the mutineers had legitimate grievances, while others maintained 
that enemy agitators who preyed on soldiers delinquent in their political development 
had caused the whole thing. While the mutineers did have many legitimate 











complaints, they lacked the outlet to vent them in a constructive way. But regardless 
of whether the circumstances justified the mutinies, the leadership united in its 
response to the mutinies: they represented a serious breach of military code, and had 
to be put down severely in order to prevent it from happening again. The Stuart 
Commission shared this view, and noted: 
However, the Commission, while accepting that the cadres had many 
genuine grievances, strongly criticise the tactics adopted to solve these. 
Under no circumstances can we condone: 
• the indiscriminate shooting and terrorising of the Angolan people; 
• the total rejection and contempt of authority; 
• the breakdown of military discipline; 
• the orgy of drinking and dagga smoking.[during the course of the 
mutiny, many soldiers took advantage of the lack of authority to 
engage in drinking and smoking sessions].61 
Most of the mutinies' leaders were imprisoned at Cuatro, except for the seven 
who were executed. The effects continued to emerge over the next few years. 
However, things could not go on as before, and efforts had to be made to change the 
situation even if the form through which the protest came was illegitimate. The 
mutinies revealed the intolerable circumstances for the majority of soldiers in Angola. 
The grievances that led to the mutinies showed that many areas of the organisation 
needed reform and change. In the immediate aftermath of the mutinies, many 
investigations revealed what should be done to change things. The MK leadership 
implemented some of the recommendations, while they ignored others. 
In the months following the first mutiny, members of the Treasurer General's 
department, including Wolfie Kodesh, went to Angola to talk to the soldiers in the 
camps and investigate some of the problems. A report from the Treasurer General's 
office and Wolfie Kodesh's notebook on projects in Angola from the same visit refer 
61 ANC. (1996). Stuart Commission Report 1984. In Appendices to the African National Congress 
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to many problems and offer many solutions. The reports developed systems for 
keeping track of supplies and getting them to the camps where they were needed. 
They added suggestions for supplementing the logistics department's efforts with a 
system of bartering between the camps and the locals. They advised some personnel 
changes, such as replacing the illiterate man in charge of logistics in Luanda with 
someone more qualified to keep records and deal with requisitions. Problems of 
deployment, leadership, the security department, and relations between the rank and 
file and the leaders were also addressed and suggestions made to improve these. 62 
However, assessment of the degree to which any of these recommendations were 
implemented is elusive. The leadership never followed up some reports, but did put 
some suggested changes into effect. 
Following the first mutiny, the Stuart Commission investigated the causes and 
events of the rebellion. Their report is a detailed and well-researched look at the 
problems that led to the mutiny as well as the mutiny itself. Though it came before 
the subsequent action in Pango camp, the commissions' finding regarding the reasons 
for the mutiny and demands of the mutineers remained the same. However, once 
submitted to the leadership, it disappeared for many years. The leadership also made 
concerted efforts to conceal the mutinies and their origins, and no public knowledge 
of the revolt came to light until the early 1990s, when a few people returned to South 
Africa and began to bring issues of abuse to light. This was largely done as a way to 
discredit the ANC, but contained substantial truth in the accusations. Some rumours 
and leaks had surfaced before this, but the story of the mutinies remained largely 
suppressed until these people brought it to publication. The Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission provided a place for the ANC to answer its accusers, and the 
62 Programme ofTG [Treasurer General] in Angola- December 1984; and Kodesh, Wolfie. 











organisation submitted details about the abuses as well as the Stuart Commission 
report and other subsequent reports detailing abuses of ANC people by their own 
organisation. 
The most significant event following the mutinies was the calling of the 
National Consultative Conference of 1985. The rhetoric surrounding the conference 
denied that its calling had anything to do with the mutinies. But one of the mutineers' 
demands had been the calling of just such a conference. And even if the conference's 
origins had nothing to do with the mutinies, which is unlikely in the extreme, the. 
reports coming in from all comers of the organisation exposed the same problems that 
led to the mutinies and the mutinies itself almost universally. Further, many changes 
came in the course of the conference that directly addressed the mutineers' complaints 
and problems. Andrew Masondo, the National Commissar, one of the men who the 
mutineers wished to see removed from their lives in Angola, was redeployed to 
another position. Mzwai Piliso, the head of the security department and also a target 
of the mutineers' discontent, was redeployed the year after the Kabwe Conference. 
However, Joe Modise, the Commander of MK, who was also one of the mutineers' 
most hated characters, retained his position. The Conference drafted and adopted a 
Code of Conduct which put into writing the policies of the ANC to prevent abuses 
such as the ones that had taken place in Angola. And a Department of Justice, put 
into place as a way to monitor the security department and develop a system of checks 
and balances, would limit the powers of the security department to misbehave. 
No clear account, however, assesses the extent to which these changes had any 
real effect on the circumstances of the movement. The calling of the conference had a 
positive effect on many of the soldiers. A report from 1985 noted: 
As conference preparations started the morale of the comrades started 











from the National Preparatory Committee of the National Consultative 
Conference and the visit of the Anny Commissar and other leaders to 
the centres. 63 
Despite their initial support, the effectiveness of the process was limited. The Officer 
of Justice lacked co-operation from the security department, which largely neutralised 
his office. And abuses continued, though heightened awareness abated. Many of the 
soldiers did not welcome the process of contributing to the conference itself. One 
report from Angola expressed: "complete mistrust of the Regional Conference." This 
mistrust had a sound basis, as the regional report for the National Conference severely 
minimized the problems that occurred at the various Angolan camps. Some of the 
camp reports attacked the conditions in the camps, the war with UNIT A, and the 
security department in no uncertain terms, but the official report from the regional 
office neglected to deal with these issues seriously and omitted some altogether. 
While the conference did address some problems, in many cases the problems 
remained unresolved, and many practices that had caused problems for the soldiers 
continued. 
Some changes occurred in the aftermath of the mutinies and the conference. 
The post-1984 trainees mentioned a policy of 'criticism and self-criticism,' which in 
principle provided a forum allowing the cadres to air their grievances as well as to 
examine their own performances and to seek ways to improve them. However, one 
soldier remembers that while this practice occurred on a regular basis, the cadres still 
felt that they could not be open and honest in their criticism. More often they would 
just say that things were fine, or bring up petty gripes about other people in the 











camp.64 A report from early 1985 reported improvements in medical support, food 
supplies, and transport. It explained: 
There is a regular supply of eggs, meat and fresh fish in the Luanda 
District . . . The regular presence of qualified doctors in the region has 
also helped to alleviate the health situation. Added to this is the supply 
of mosquito nets coils and sprays which for a time being helped to 
fight effects of malaria .... Worth mentioning here is the alleviation of 
the transport shortages, especially, for the Luanda district by the arrival 
of donation of cars-scooters from Yugoslavia ... We have been selling 
to Angolans in Provinces extra clothing we get from Donors in 
exchange for local currency, meat, or things we require. 65 
The report also asserted: "Today we can say that relations are normalizing.,,66 
As for the mutineers, their lives would never be the same again. Of the ones 
who were taken to Quatro, some stayed there for years. Some not only didn't get out 
until the camps in Angola were vacated in 1989, but were then taken to Tanzania and 
remained under suspicion. Some remained in other camps, and never saw 
deployment. Some were seen as dissidents for the rest of their time in Angola. 
Others were 'rehabilitated' and found their way back into acceptance in MK. One 
soldier recalled dealing with the mutineers in his camp. They were difficult at first, 
would argue a lot, and resisted authority. But they would fight out the issues in 
discussion forums and try their best to go on with the programme of the camp. He 
recalled that eventually the camp was transformed, and things went back to normal. 
One of the mutineers went on to work as a political education officer, and some others 
eventually became instructors. 67 Others never escaped the wrath of the security 
department. Some of the mutineers who had been imprisoned in Tanzania, in the 
64 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Weziwe Ncame, 9 September 1998, University of the Western 
Cape. 
65 Report on ANC in Angola for the Year Beginning January 1984 to 8 January 1985 
66 Report on ANC in Angola for the Year Beginning January 1984 to 8 January 1985 











Dakawa camp, only emerged in 1988. A woman who was working in the 
communication department there remembered having the mutineers in the camp. The 
security men would warn them that these people were dissidents, that they shouldn't 
listen to them, and that they were enemy agents. But during interaction with these 
men, they seemed just like normal guys, so the other cadres didn't know where to put 
their sympathies. Many cadres ostracised the mutineers, and the people who 
encountered them didn't know whether to believe the stories the security department 
told them or to believe their own instincts that the mutineers were decent and loyal 
comrades.68 The mutinies marked the lowest point of the ANC and its struggle, and 
continued to effect many people long after it ended. 
Conclusion 
Existence in exile was difficult in the best of times for the ANC and the PAC. In 
harder times, the heightened circumstances of exile and struggle made feuds become 
crises and complaints become mutinies. In the process, some dedicated and 
committed cadres lost their way and became disillusioned. Some gave up on the 
struggle entirely. Others became casualties of the crises and at best found themselves 
tarred as enemies or expelled from their organisations. In the worst case, many lost 
their lives along the way without ever getting the opportunity to fulfil the destiny they 
had planned for their lives. The PAC's leadership crisis and the resultant problems 
lasted more than a decade and crippled the organisation's ability to pursue a 
revolution inside South Africa. The ANC's mutinies led to executions, human rights 
abuses, and the marginalisation of many loyal cadres. But the resolution of the crises 











saw both organisations and their annies ready to pursue the struggle in earnest by the 
mid- 1980s, just in time for an upsurge of resistance within South Africa. And despite 
the problems outside the country, MK and APLA emerged dedicated and ready to 





















MK in the Front Line States and South Africa 
TheMKOath 
I shall go: 
Where all men are deaf 
Whether dead or alive 
Where all sounds are all one 
An echo upon an echo 
Where bones brittle 
In a kiss with copper 
Where blood like crude 
Oozes from sabotaged lines 
Because I have taken oath 
In the People's Court 
To march forward into the Battle Storm 
I must go: 
As big guns roar 
And tanks rumble 
Whilst bombs thunder 
Like vicious volcanoes 
And pistols spit 
Like poisonous snakes 
And ricochets screams 
Like wicked witches 
Where rifles hiss 
Like cornered cobras 
And grunts and groans are common cries 
The signals of the silent world 
For I have taken oath 
In the People's Court 
To march forward into the Battle Storm 
I'll be gone 
To where sappers sing 
In solemn solos: 
"A mine a man" 
That's their sweetest song 
The only chorus with a safe note. 
Since I have taken oath 
In the People's Court 
To march forward into the Battle Storm. l 
1 Sejake, Wellington. (1979). The MK. Oath. In Dawn, monthly journal o/Umkhonto we Sizwe, Vol.3, 












When the Soweto generation of recruits and those who followed them chose to 
join Umkhonto we Sizwe, one goal was foremost in their minds: to go back to South 
Africa and fight the apartheid government. Many never saw this opportunity. They 
found themselves in countries allover the world, training or studying. They became 
instructors in the camps, or worked in administrative capacities. They found places in 
the diplomatic activities of the organisation. Some even abandoned the struggle and 
settled elsewhere, making new lives for themselves. However, some did find 
themselves deployed in the front line states, Botswana, Mozambique, Swaziland, 
Lesotho, and Zimbabwe, and others got the orders they had longed for: go home and 
fight. Some who operated inside had never been in exil , while others had served 
their time in the camps and waited, sometimes for years, to receive their marching 
orders. 
Receiving the orders 
The arrival of the truck that took soldiers back to Luanda for the first step of 
the return to South Africa always excited the soldiers stationed in the camps in 
Angola. When the truck pulled in to the camp, an immediate sense of anticipation 
permeated the soldiers, and a desperate hope that they would be called to go back. 
One man remembered: 
It started with the distant rumble of trucks. We always loved that 
distant rumble of trucks ... usually mChina was there hidden among 
the leaders and commanders and their aides and security comrades, 
clutching his little folder stuffed with pieces of paper all of us would 
give up a packet of cigarettes to see. mChina, who came to the camp 
far too seldom and far too secretly, to select comrades for the front, for 
the battlefields of Sasolburg and Koeberg and Silverton and Booysens. 
Whenever the rumbling trucks came, each of us would spend 











comrade from camp HQ to come and call us out of a topography class, 
or political discussion, or drag us away from our lunch? 
Another remembered the origin of the name and his own calling: 
The following weekend Madoda 'Isaac' Mnyamana told me that Um-
china had arrived and my name was on the list! Back in South Africa-
particularly in the Durban area- people played an illegal game similar 
to lotto. The 'china man' was the person responsible for paying out the 
winnings. hI this particular instance it meant that I was one of the 
lucky people chosen to leave for South Africa. 3 
If they were chosen they received little or no notice and were ordered not to tell 
anyone, so any friends in the camp had to be left in the dark. But usually the 
impending departure overwhelmed all of the other feelings and they looked forward 
expectantly to their pending return to South Africa to fight. 
Others left South Africa at the request of the organisation in order to undergo a 
faster and more specialised training program in order to expedite their return home. 
They were often sent to Quibaxe, Funda, or Caxito camps in Angola, which had fewer 
trainees, a faster program, and more stringent security and adherence to pseudonyms. 
They left for a short period of time, got trained, and returned to South Africa 
immediately. Some never even went that far for their training. Some took crash 
courses in the front line states or even inside South Africa itself. However one 
trained, the order to go inside or to the front as an operational soldier was exciting and 
often scary. 
The return 
For those who went outside to the camps in Angola or other training facilities 
before deployment inside the country, the return to South Africa closely resembled 
2 Wilson, Jimmy. (1991). Of Presidents and Pigs. In Umkhonto we Sizwe 3dh Anniversary Souvenir 
Magazine, 16. 












the passage out. They followed the same routes, and many of the same people 
worked to help them along the way. Many front line countries had safe houses in 
which to put them up on their way through to South Africa. One woman, who worked 
for MK in Lesotho and Swaziland, remembered that her family was involved with the 
ANC, and long before she became involved herself, she recalled men constantly 
coming in and out of their home in Swaziland. Often she found herself sharing her 
room with many MK soldiers or recruits who were on their way into or out of the 
country.4 One man remembered his mixed feelings upon crossing back into South 
Africa: 
Emotions vacillated between bravery and panic. I imagined myself 
liberating my people and saw their jubilation as they hailed all the 
freedom fighters as heroes. On the other hand, casualties _ around 
infiltration sites were high and I was afraid of being captured or killed. 
Here we were, given no choice as to our point of entry. Thoughts of 
friends and family went round and round in my head but I managed to 
compose myself. I was a soldier of the people's anny- prepared to die 
for a noble cause. 5 
The returnees, unless they had left the country with a good cover story, or been given 
false identification documents, would find themselves climbing the fences to get back 
into the country, entering illegally, just as they left. 
The Front Line States 
MK's struggle faced greater obstacles than other countries' liberation annies in that 
South Africa's neighbouring states sometimes provided obstacles for their struggle. 
Unti11975, Portugal still ruled Mozambique; Zimbabwe achieved independence from 
the white government only in 1980; and Namibia remained under South African 
occupation until 1990. Botswana and Swaziland were reluctant to antagonise South 
4 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Nosizwe Khumalo, 16 June 1999, Cape Town. 











Africa, as so much of their economies depended on South Africa's goodwill. Lesotho 
(called Basotholand until independence in 1966) often aided the ANC, but as a 
landlocked state, completely surrounded by South Africa and dependant for economic 
reasons, the access was difficult for MK's soldiers. The ruling party often influenced 
the level of support, with the Basotho National Party (BNP) allied with the ANC and 
the Basotho Congress Party (BCP) on the side of the PAC. The co-operation of the 
neighbouring states varied and changed over time. 
Until the independence of Zimbabwe, the guerrilla war raging inside its 
borders largely precluded MK access through that country. Once Zimbabwe won its 
independence, the ANC found things no easier, as the Zimbabwe African National 
Union (ZANU) had won the elections and the ANC had backed the losing party, the 
Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), so the new government had little interest 
in helping them. After a few years, the ZANU government's negative sentiments 
softened, and they pennitted the ANC to have a presence in the country, though MK's 
soldiers and commanders still had to operate underground there. If caught, they did 
not face serious punishment, but the agreement with the government meant that they 
had to keep a low profile. One woman who worked in Zimbabwe transporting 
weapons, money, and supplies into South Africa through Botswana and Swaziland 
recalled that she had to act as if she were an ordinary expatriate, and with her 
background as a student leader, many people criticized her, thinking that she no 
longer worked for the ANC. Meanwhile, she perfonned all sorts of work for MK and 
their special operations unit underground. She found that she had to cut herself off 
from South Africans who were in Zimbabwe, which made her feel rather isolated, as 
that was the community in which she would have felt most at home.6 Another man 











recalled his time in Zimbabwe, where he was supposed to hold media workshops for 
church groups. He would have to work his full day from 8-5 doing the workshops, 
then spend the nights going to secret meetings. 7 
Beyond this basic use of Zimbabwe as a crossing point into South Africa for 
anns, supplies, and personnel, at one point MK tried to open a guerrilla front on the 
Zimbabwean border. One of the commanders in that region recalled the process 
during 1985 and 1986. Many people infiltrated through Kruger Park, sometimes up to 
eight or ten people at a time, but the capabilities of the security forces dealt them a 
serious blow throughout the operation. He recalled: 
The process [has] largely failed. It's failed significantly. Not a single 
group of personnel to my knowledge have been located into the 
country, because of the enemy's capacities ... So, very little progress 
has been made by mid-1986 and you have moved towards a situation 
where the idea of establishing a guerrilla zone is almost subconsciously 
moving away, and you've moved into mine warfare and hit-and-run 
tactics- at best the movement of sections of MK cadres to ambush and 
carry out attacks on fanns ... By late 1986, 1987, there is very near to 
a 100 percent casualty rate. 8 
He recalled how horrible the situation was, for him to have to order people to go into 
the country in this process, knowing that their chances of surviving were nil. 9 As time 
went on, operating out of Zimbabwe became easier and easier, but with all of the 
concentration of South Africa's forces on that border, often it could only serve as a 
base from which to launch missions through other front line states. 
Botswana, Lesotho, and Mozambique were originally very lenient about 
letting MK operate out of their countries. Swaziland was a vitally positioned country, 
7 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Chris Vick, 10 February 1999, Melville, Johannesburg. 
8 Barrell, H. Interview with Garth Strachan, 5-7 August 1989, Harare. 












particularly given its shared borders with Mozambique, a staunch ANC ally, and 
South Africa. However, the environment was often difficult to work in, particularly 
after the death of King Sobhuza, an ally of the ANC and a father-in-law to one of 
Nelson Mandela's daughters, in August of 1982. Botswana did not officially allow 
the ANC and MK to operate in their country or use it as a base, and if an MK cadre 
were caught there with weapons, he might face a prison sentence. When it came to 
people working underground in the early 1980s, they did not face much trouble from 
the authorities who lacked the capacity to adequately police their activities, though 
they did have to keep their work secret. Mozambique accommodated the ANC more 
in the 1970s and early 1980s. They allowed ANC and MK cadres to operate openly 
as long as they did not infiltrate South Africa directly across the Mozambiquean 
borders, but rather crossed through Swaziland first. Lesotho was generally helpful in 
allowing MK and the ANC to operate in their coUntry, though their isolated location 
limited the usefulness of their more open policy, and the ruling party determined the 
level of support. When the Basotholand National Party (BNP) was in power, the 
ANC had an ally to count on, but the Basotholand Congress Party (BCP) had a long 
standing alliance with the PAC, and during their reign, the Pan-Africanists received 
preferential treatment. After the coup of 1986, however, the new government gave in 
to South African pressure and demands and expelled ANC cadres from the country.l0 
Swaziland, after the death of King Sobhuza, was never very accepting of the ANC, 
and refused to let MK operate in their country. Despite the general difficulties with 
the Swazi government, however, normal Swazi citizens often aided the ANC and MK 
in their struggle. The levels of government co-operation with the ANC on the part of 
the front line states varied considerably, but all housed a number of MK and ANC 
10 Edgar, Robert. (1987). The Lesotho Coup of 1986. In Moss, Glenn and Obery, Ingrid. (Eds). South 












personnel, with or without their knowledge or pennission, and all served as passages 
in and out of South Africa for personnel, supplies, money, communications, and 
weapons. And in all of the front line states, no matter what their official policies 
towards the liberation movements, ordinary citizens were the lifeblood of support for 
the MK soldiers. 
Whatever open operation or co-operation the ANC and MK enjoyed in the 
different front line states, their support waned in the early- to mid-1980s. -When the 
South African security forces started to attack the neighbouring countries in attempts 
to hit ANC and MK personnel, as well as to intimidate and destabilise the front line 
states, some of the countries yielded to the pressure to stop helping the ANC. South 
African forces attacked Mozambique in 1981, in the Matola raid, which killed several 
people. One man who was there at the time recalled: 
It was quite obvious it was the work of agents who had crossed over, 
one kilometre from South Africa . . . and this was the beginning of the 
terror campaign that was launched. We lived like rats. We had to run 
for our lives, we had to sleep [out of] the house often, we would get 
word from Frelimo that so many Boers were seen crossing over, don't 
sleep in your house ... It was a massacre, they attacked three of our 
houses . . . They killed 12 of our comrades in three houses. The 
thirteenth one died subsequently in hospital and they kidnapped two. 11 
Later, the South Africans attacked a jam factory with their planes, killing three 
Mozambicans, .and then attacked a Mozambican house, killing a number of 
Mozambicans and only one ANC member. 12 Many car bombs, assassinations, and 
raids followed. 
In December of 1982, South African commandos killed 28 South Africans and 
12 Basotho in an attack on Maseru, Lesotho's capital. One man who escaped death 
that night recalled seeing the house across the street attacked and fleeing: 
11 Bernstein, H. Interview with Indres Naidoo, no date. 











Around 1 a.m. there was a loud bang which seemed like a bomb. The 
vibration shook our little house. The second blast happened 
immediately after the first. I didn't know what was happening but I 
was dead sure that whatever it was, it was in my neighbourhood. I 
peeped through the window only to find the house opposite us, owned 
by Chris Hani, in flames ... We went for the door and started to count 
one, two ... my comrade was just about to dash out when the firing 
started. We quickly crawled back inside leaving the door open as it 
was. This time the firing was heavier . . . Again, the firing stopped. 
We repeated counting, one, two, three . . . my comrade dashed off. 
Immediately after, I followed him. We ran as fast as our legs could 
carry us. Behind us, the firing started. We wondered whether they 
saw us or whether they were continuing to destroy Hani's house. We 
didn't stop to look but ran in the direction of town. We arrived at the 
house of a comrade, who was terrified to open the door. Well, 
eventually he did and we told him what had happened. After some 15-
20 minutes, there was a knock at the door. We all froze, saying 'Well, 
they followed us and finally caught up with us' We asked who it was 
and, to our relief, it was some of our comrades. They told us that a 
house where some of our comrades were staying in Thamae, Maseru, 
had been attacked too. We were frightened, wondering how many had 
been killed but hoping that it should be either one or none ... Morning 
came and around 5 a.m. we walked back ." .. We soon discovered that 
more than two places had been attacked. The death toll was rising. 
There was sadness and bitterness in all our faces. We vowed to avenge 
their death. 13 
Gaborone in Botswana did not escape the raids. In 1983 South African commandos 
attacked that city, to the great surprise of those residing there. As one man 
remembered: 
The house across the road from me was attacked and I thought they 
were coming for me . . . I was woken up at about half-one in the 
morning by the sounds of shots. I immediately got up, looked out the 
window and saw SADF attacking the house across the road. I 
immediately knew what was going on but didn't know ... I knew there 
were comrades staying across the road . . . I thought that I was also a 
target, and my response . . . I had no means of defence, I was alone in 
the house and no way of escape because both exits from the house 
opened right into the view of the SADF soldiers who were just about 
ten/twenty metres from my front and back door. So I just sat it out. 
The next morning, of course, when we took stock, 12 people had been 
killed, quite a few of them locals, or non-ANC people ... about six 
ANC people had been killed. What it interesting about the raid is that 
this thing had been happening in Mozambique and Lesotho and the 
13 International Defence and Aid Fund. (1985). Fact Paper on Southern Africa No. 12: Massacre at 











problems in Swaziland had been starting and I think we had told 
ourselves that Botswana was somehow immune.14 
Swaziland also experienced ongoing problems. The Swazi government and police 
often co-operated with the South African government, allowing kidnappings and 
arrests of ANC personnel in Swaziland. One woman who operated in Swaziland and 
Lesotho recalled her boyfriend, who was an MK soldier, being kidnapped, taken back 
to South Africa, arrested and eventually tortured to death by the South Africans, 
though he was operating inside Swaziland. She was arrested with him, and taken to 
the border, and would have also been kidnapped if not for the timely intervention of 
her uncle at the border. She recalled that every time she returned to Swaziland from 
Lesotho, she would get scared wondering what was awaiting her there, and what 
would happen to her. 15 Unlike earlier South African attacks on MK camps in Angola 
these· unprecedented attacks on neighbouring countries shocked both the MK 
operatives and the front line states and their citizens. The countries' reactions to these 
raids varied. Mozambique faced a double pronged attack both through South African 
commando raids and through South African support for the rival army that fought the 
government forces in the south of the country. Eventually they succumbed to the 
pressure and signed the Nkomati accord in 1984, which ejected ANC and MK 
personnel from the country and refused to let them operate in Mozambique. 
However, Mozambique allowed a small contingent of six 'non-military- personnel' to 
remain and continued to support activities in this country. Rather than move the 
personnel to another front-line state or back to Zambia, MK took advantage of the 
situation as an opportunity to infiltrate as many soldiersas possible directly into South 
Africa, and a resulting jump in operations ensued. 
14 Bernstein, H. Interview with Barry Guilder, no date. 












In Botswana, things got more difficult after the raid. One man related: 
It got to a situation where we would frequently get arrested by the local 
police, jailed, held for two weeks, maybe more, deported to Lusaka. 
Lusaka's position was that it couldn't afford to send new comrades 
back and we got sent back illegally and this carried on indefinitely. It 
was a sort of, in fact you could use the term, I know its sexist-
gentleman's agreement- we would get arrested, deported, they'd know 
we would come back and it would be a cat-:and-mouse game, until we 
got arrested again ... But the effect of that was that the more often you 
got arrested and deported the better known you became to the local 
police and the more difficult it was to even go down to the shops for a 
packet of cigarettes. 16 
In Lesotho, the raids and South African economic pressure played a part in the coup 
that ousted Leabua Jonathan as the leader of the country. In the wake of the coup, the 
new government expelled ANC members from the country. While the dangers of life 
in South Africa far exceeded those in the front line states for MK operatives, raids, 
bombings, assassinations, and the like often occurred in the front line states as well, 
making the people operating there constantly fearful for their lives. Despite the 
difficult circumstances at the time, however, infiltration into South Africa continued 
apace. One source estimated that 40-50 MK cadres entered South Africa per month in 
1986,17 strengthening MK's presence inside South Africa and bolstering their 
operative capacity. 
Operating inside South Africa 
Operations inside South Africa took a number of forms. In the early years 
following the Soweto uprisings, missions were often hit-and run operations, with units 
entering the country, hitting a target, and then escaping back into the front line states. 
Later, some units became established inside the country and carried out operations for 
16 Bernstein, Interview with Guilder. 
17 Davis, Stephen M. (1987). Apartheid's Rebels: Inside South Africa's Hidden War, New Haven: Yale 











long periods of time, until capture, death, or until their covers were blown and they 
escaped back into the neighbouring countries. 
Originally, MK largely focused on sabotage of government installations. 
Railway lines, police stations, and government offices formed the majority of targets, 
though they also attacked some security police. After the ANC conference in Kabwe 
in 1985, the focus changed, and MK deemed more targets as legitimate. MK also 
designated SADF and SAP personnel and installations and those working with the 
government as legitimate targets. IS ANC policy stressed the avoidance of civilian 
casualties, and most of the interviewed MK personnel who participated in operations 
mentioned this policy. Occasionally civilian personnel, or "soft targets," died at the 
hands of MK units, but more often they practised restraint and the units made major 
efforts to avoid these types of casualties. 
The hit-and-run operations largely involved orchestration and logistical 
support from outside of the country. The units established inside South Africa at the 
time often lacked external support. One man who operated inside in the immediate 
aftermath of the Soweto uprisings recalled that he had no contact with any other ANC 
cell or structure inside the country, and that he basically generated his own ideas 
based on his experience.19 Another operating at the same time recalled: "We were 
entirely self-reliant . . . They picked us up at the border and dropped us at 
Komatipoort, that was all." His group came in for reconnaissance, left, came back in 
for the operations, and then left again.20 This procedure worked well, but neglected to 
build up a serious presence inside the country, or to establish relationships with the 
18 ANC. (1996). Statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 49-51. 
19 Barrell, H. Interview with Jeremy Cronin, no date. 











populace inside South Africa. Even later, in the early- to mid- 1980s, a special 
operations unit organised and carried out hit-and-run operations of a spectacular 
nature, including attacks on the Sasol plants, a rocket attack on Voortrekkerhoogte Air 
Force Base, and other major MK successes. In his statement to the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, one member of this unit explained their process for 
carrying out an operation: 
Initially we would have perhaps documentary information which we 
would pick up on- do some studies around it. For instance if one took 
the whole question of the power grid etc., a lot of the initial 
information was gained from documentation, the entire pylon grid was 
gleaned from documentation [outside of the country]. On the basis of 
that we would then send initial reconnaissance to determine hether 
the information that we had gleaned from documents was accurate, 
reasonably accurate and on the basis of that we would get those 
reports, we would then draw up initial plans, we would then send units 
to say: "We are thinking of tackling the following targets, go inside 
and carry detailed reconnaissance on these. The units would then go to 
the actual targets, determine what they were able to do and at the same 
time they would find areas where they could base in, they would begin 
to look at drawing up a plan of action as to what they were going to do 
at every point. And each time the cadres then came back to 
headquarters and reported on what was happening and what they were 
able to do, we then talked to them about what happens in this case or 
another case, you know:" Will you be in a position to survive should 
you face various contingencies"? Of course we couldn't plan for all 
the contingencies but we tried to look at an all round plan. We would 
then go into a situation or drawing up a proper plan, we would then 
infiltrate material that we thought appropriate for that operation, get it 
into the country ... then people would be sent into the country with the 
resources that they required, money, the weapons . . . they would then 
get to their operational areas. Prior to the time they would then check 
out the area that they were going to operate in, get to the base areas, 
establish that, if they needed any additional support they would 
establish that themselves. They would then go and draw the material 
from the caches, check the equipment, clean it if it required that and 
prepare themselves for the operation. They would then carry out final, 
a final reconnaissance prior to the operation and finally carry out the 
operation. They would then also withdraw and also trying to ensure 
that here was an alternative that existed at most times.21 












Later, the unit received free reign to choose their own targets. Another 
member of the same unit explained the process they went through in a real attack: 
I chose the Ciskei Consulate as it represented the discredited . . . 
system. The ANC led campaign to discredit the homelands 
governments was under way at the time. There also existed intense 
repression at the time which continued until 1994. This was deemed a 
legitimate target. Reconnaissance of the target revealed that all offices 
on the floors, on the particular floor, were vacated at the latest by 5.30 
pm. The cleaning staff only became active on the floor in the later 
hours around 8 pm. Mohammed Ismail and I reconnoitred the target 
the day before the operation was carried out. The following day, I on 
my own placed the charge at 5.30 pm. The explosion took place 
around 7.30 pm. According to reports one person was injured.22 
Many units used similar procedures and techniques to reconnoitre a target. If a police 
station were the target, an operative could go to report a fictitious crime and spend 
enough time in the station to get a clear idea of the layout, staffing, and hours. For an 
industrial target, a soldier could go in under the pretext of applying for a job and find 
out not only the lay-out but also infonnation about the staff, working hours, and the 
like. Casual conversations in these cases with police or workers could also reveal 
crucial infonnation. The units established the targets as legitimate, carried out 
reconnaissance to determine the routine of the place and the people who would be 
there at any given time so as to avoid unnecessary casUalties, and then finally carried 
out the operation. 
Other units had to enter the country, establish bases or safe houses, and 
undertake a number of tasks. These units were to stay active as long as possible. One 
source notes that in the mid-1980s: "The average MK cadre's period of survival in a 
unit which remained active was short- about six months, according to one MK 
22 Truth and Reconciliation Commission Amnesty Hearing, Mr. Shaik, Mohamed A. Ismail, Johannes 











officer's estimate.,,23 Survival referred to the unit remaining in action and undetected. 
A comrade's survival could end due to arrest, blowing of their cover, escaping to a 
neighbouring country, or of course death. 
The units served a number of functions beyond operations and attacks. 
Political education also played a part of their roles inside the country, as well as 
reconnaissance and intelligence. MK soldiers also recruited and trained new people 
as a crucial part of their underground work. Recruitment always involved risks and 
difficulties. Cadres had to develop clear instincts about people and recruiting them 
always carried the risk of a security breach. If a soldier approached someone and they 
Were not interested, his cover had been blown. While some people would not go to 
the police, others might. One man explained the process of recruiting: 
First of all, what you need to do is to acquaint yourself to a person. Go 
with him to a soccer game if you can, buy a beer or two, engage in a 
discussion, to have a feel of a person, as to ... what is his thinking and 
then you throw some ideas as well, not indicating where you stand. 
And then later on you can ask him. But if people come and say, 'No, 
you should join the ANC', what will you do? Then you get an 
indication ... there was no textbook that you'll use to recruit a person. 
It's a manner in which you judge a person and feel a person. Some 
people, okay, that we happened to know, that is just easier ... We 
could just be bold enough and say 'Chief, this is the situation. I would 
like you to be part and parcel of my outfit.' And then once he 
disappoints you it becomes a sad feeling because then it makes you 
feel insecure, because you have exposed yourself and the person didn't 
take what you were proposing to him. And you know, sometimes you 
would even think of killing that individual.24 
Once a person had been approached and accepted the proposition, a number of 
different paths lay ahead. They could be sent straight out of the country to train, often 
a crash course, or receive training inside the country. Crash courses worked very 
23 Barrell, H. (1990). MK: The ANe's Armed Struggle, London: Penguin, 60. 
24 TRC Amnesty Committee, Amnesty Hearings for Application AM6211197, General Siphiwe 
Nyanda, General Solly Shoke and Johannes Rasegatla, testimony of General Shoke, quoted in SADET. 











well for people who had a legitimate reason to disappear for a few weeks or months 
and could then return legitimately to South Africa after the training. This allowed 
them to remain in South Africa legally and work underground while staying under the 
radar of the security police and maintaining their normal lives. One man remembered 
his crash course in Angola: 
I went with other guys to Angola, but even there I stated my case, I'm 
not there to have a full training, but just the stuff to open my eyes, how 
to use, how to protect myself in case I should engage, you know fire 
and shootings and stuff. It was a crash course, so they call them, in 
guerrilla warfare. After that only three months that crash and then I 
said thank you guys I am alright now, I can now go back, because the 
war was inside not outside. That was one of my beliefs. So back 
there, home in the Cape where I was born, and even then now at that 
time the youth was already now also in the pipeline of the struggle, 
everybody involved, I also get involved now when I'm arriving back.25 
In Mozambique in the aftermath of the Soweto uprisings, they would single out 
people under the radar of the police in South Africa, and who were not yet missed. 
These people received two weeks training, covering firearms and guerrilla tactics, 
strategy and underground work, and explosives, then returned straight back into South 
Africa. In later years they might even receive a more rudimentary training covering 
security, weapons, communications, and dead-letter boxes?6 
Inside South Africa, particularly during the 1980s, MK units trained recruits 
closer to home. The places for the training would vary depending on what they were 
learning at any given time. One woman who received this training in the Transkei 
remembered: 
It depends now where was the weapons you had to train. Maybe you 
had to go to someone's house as a place for a meeting to learn some 
few things for that particular time, but you can't use someone's house 
for a long period of time, you know? So for certain things we have to 
2S von den Steinen, L. Interview with Lt. Comm. Mbulelo Mnyaka, 19 August 2004, Military Police 
Headquarters, Simonstown. 











go for a meeting for a few minutes there, but then as you know for 
training you need open space, a place where it's out of the city and 
because we use firearms and things like that so you really need 
something like a bush to do those things. Like the SAP or Defence 
Force, they don't like to use a small place for training. The part of the 
training that we had to do for a few months, you don't even know 
where you are going, you don't tell them so you go away, where, you 
don't even know sometimes you don't have to know the place. 
Because you leave at night and you go to this certain area where you 
don't see people and come back at night and you don't see the place so 
you can go and say that was a place if you get locked up or something 
like that, you know? So some things have to be secret you know, but 
we know you've been in a place like this even if he doesn't know 
which side of the country he was. 27 
The training inside the country covered most of the same topics as the more extensive 
and fonnal training in Angola. The same woman explained her training programme: 
It's just like nonnal things like physical training, so you have to be fit, 
teaching you weapons, how to use weapons, things like that, the most 
important thing to get involved in political education because if you 
don't know what you're doing is all about, then you end up doing the 
wrong thing. But if you know what is the motive of what you are 
doing, then you know what to do. So it was very important things to 
know: what you're fighting for, why you're getting involved in this 
thing, you know, what is this you're getting involved, you know? To 
know the theory before you jump to practical, because you can't like 
just take a gun and go and shoo  people without knowing what for and 
what is the reason and who the people you're shooting are, so political 
education was very important.28 
Others received only the basics of military training. One man recalled training people 
in his community: 
Part of the things that I was doing now, when I was back from my class 
training in Angola, I was also training them how to protect themselves, 
how to use the weapon. Assemble, disassemble, all the infonnation 
that I was having I shared with them. The people was protecting 
themselves in the whole situation.29 
27 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Chief P.O. Pumla Mapipa, 19 August 2004, Simonstown Naval 
Base. 
28 von den Steinen, Interview with Mapipa. 
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The recruitment and training of new recruits was crucial to advancing the struggle in 
South Africa. The use of internal training and crash courses made it easier to bring 
these new recruits directly into an operational capacity. 
The set up inside South Africa was a complicated one. A diagram suggested 
by Howard Barrell, a former ANC operative and author of several works on MK, 
gives an idea of how things worked:3o 
formal underground informal underground 
The 'underground underground' refers to those who were in the country 
illegally and operated completely as underground operatives. The 'formal 
underground' refers to those who were in the country with legitimate cover stories, 
perhaps with legitimate or forged ID documents, and who worked underground on the 
side. The 'informal underground' refers to those who saw themselves as working for 
the ANC and furthering its goals, though they worked without any guidance or 
contact with the organisation. Then the 'mass movement' refers to the general 
movement working against apartheid. 
Those who were working in the 'underground underground' had to work 
under stringent security and secrecy. They did not have cover stories and were in the 
country illegally, which placed them in far greater danger of being picked up by the 











police. They would stay in 'safe houses' or at bases they established themselves. 
One unit actually created a sort of urban dugout system, using tactics learned from the 
North Vietnamese. One of the members explained the structure, situated in an 
abandoned mine. They dug a space for 5-6 people and their equipment, shored the 
walls up with roofing beams, and added a ventilation pipe and entrance/exit. 
Camouflage became vitally important to their survival. They preserved the topsoil 
when digging, and religiously re-camouflaged the entrance whenever leaving or 
entering. He remembered how well they succeeded: "We did it in such a manner that 
some people at some point in time came and ... braaied meat on top of us while we 
were sitting underneath, without even noticing that there's anything unbecoming 
here.,,31 This was an extreme case, however. Most units working this far 
underground had to operate from safe houses. One woman who was part of a mixed 
race unit working in Cape Town explained that they usually rented a house in one 
area or another, and then made efforts to blend into the community. If they stayed in 
a Coloured area, she stayed in the house and out of sight, as she was white. If they 
stayed in a white area, the coloured and black members of the group remained out of 
sight. In this way, they avoided attracting undue attention.32 
Those working in the 'formal underground' usually had cover stories to 
explain their presence in the country and their lifestyles. They would either hold 
normal jobs or appear to hold normal jobs, and would be integrated into their 
communities as normal members of the area. One man explained that his contact 
found him a place to stay and he had to come up with a story of who he was and what 
31 Johannes Malekolle Rasegatla, quoted in Magubane, Bernard and Houston, Gregory. (2006). The 
ANC's Armed Struggle in the 1970s. In SADET, The Road to Democracy Volume 2 [1970-1980}, 
Pretoria: Unisa, 485. 











he was doing. He said he was James, from the Free State, and had happened to get a 
job in Johannesburg, so he would stay with these people until he managed to organise 
other arrangements. Every day he would have to wake up as though he was going to 
work and then come back in the evening as though he had just finished. Really he 
didn't have a job, and was doing underground work during the days, but in this way, 
he stayed in this home and looked like a normal member of the community. 33 The 
people in the 'informal underground' were very useful to the people working inside 
the country as contacts, couriers, and support personnel. While not necessarily 
directly involved in the organisation, they shared a common purpose, and as normal 
citizens, had more freedom of movement and connections with the communities in 
which the units were operating. They could also be given political education which 
would bring them closer to the folds of the ANC, and they provided a good pool of 
recruits for membership in and training for the ANC and MK. 
Supply routes and communication proved tricky aspects of working inside the 
country. There were practically as many different ways to communicate as there were 
operatives. Communication had to be possible between the units and their regional 
command and the leadership outside of the country. While many units operated 
largely autonomously, able to go for long periods without communicating with their 
leaders and authorised to designate their own targets, carry out operations, and do 
their other duties without checking in constantly with their higher ups, at times 
communication was necessary. Supplies needed to be brought into the country so 
operations could be carried out. Changes in policy or specific orders needed to be 
able to reach the units. Communication, though vital to operations inside the country, 











often became very difficult due to the long and insecure lines among the different 
levels of personnel. 
Supplies entered the country in various ways. Often one person or unit took 
responsibility for bringing anns, money, or messages into the country and locating 
them somewhere. They would then report back to someone in touch with the unit 
inside, who would receive information on the location of the supplies. This method 
maintained security, as the operational units didn't know the people who delivered the 
supplies, or even how to find them, and vice versa. Often the organization purchased 
vehicles and then fitted them with hidden compartments where the material to be 
brought in could be stored. The vehicles were then driven across the border without 
the material being found, and the supplies were hidden somewhere where the units 
could locate them. One woman involved in bringing supplies in from Zimbabwe 
explained: 
I used to travel maybe every 6 weeks, two months I'd go the whole 
Botswana route ... we were doing our own anns carrying. And I-
that's where I will drive the weapons down and hand them over ... 
they were all custom sort of- custom built DLBs [Dead Letter Boxes] 
as well- hidden caches in ... I would generally buy vehicles, generally 
in Botswana because it's cheaper and get back. We would deal with 
them, we had some very good people who are excellent ... at hiding 
these things. And then we had a very effective way of wrapping, it 
would all be sort of foil and then . . . gloves and seal everything . . . I 
mean our packing was just like a jigsaw puzzle. And it was that- some 
aspect of it was very professional ... Well I had to make contact with 
people and transfer or- in some occasions because things weren't set 
up we actually had to dig holes, bury these and generally ... so that 
[another] person's responsibility then to make sure that the person 
coming in from South Africa would then know exactly where it was.34 
Another woman who worked underground in Botswana in ordinance recalled the 
process: 











It came in a vehicle, and the vehicle we would park behind the back of 
the house and offload the vehicle. And then we would store it in the 
DLB in the house. And then when I was going to actually go on trips 
inside, there would be like an evening or two evenings where either 
myself or, ja, eventually I was loading DLBs on my own, into the car 
DLBs. But most of the time, Kate would come or Alex would come 
and we'd make a whole evening of it and we'd eat and we'd wrap ... 
I mean a lot of time, in the early days the stuff would come unwrapped 
so we had to wrap it, and Oh God, and you had to wrap it so tightly 
because you wanted to get the most that you could get into these DLBs 
and they were small compartments, but the amount of stuff we 
managed to fit in, like 12 Aks, you know, 10 limpit mines, 20, 30 
grenades, 1 ° pistols, you know things like that. You would never think 
that you could get these things in. So, the stuff would be brought out, 
you'd lay it all out, you'd count it, then we'd start this process of 
packaging tape and what else did we use, we used like, uh, it wasn't 
foil wrap, it was saran wrap, that plastic wrap, and then, I mean that 
used to take hours and hours and hours and I'll always remember the 
[makes sound like tearing plastic wrap], and I had this house that had 
almost no furniture in it and it would just echo and echo and we'd have 
to play music loud and it was just, but I mean those were some of the 
most fun times that we had because, ja, we would sit around and it 
would be freezing cold in the middle of winter in Botswana, fuck it's 
cold at night, and there's no heat in these houses and you know how it 
is, and you're sitting on this bare tile floor and it's fucking cold and 
you're wrapping this material. And then the material goes into the 
DLB and packing the DLB in itself is a bit of an art, and sometimes it 
would take hours to do . . . So ja, DLB construction was quite 
sophisticated, and it was never done, it was done by people who had 
that skill. And it was, in the early days the cars would come to me 
with DLBs constructed to fit ... And the ones that were constructed in 
the houses also, quite sophisticated. And they would try their 
damnedest to teach me how to build one of these things, and I mean I 
always built completely pathetic DLBs, completely. Ja, I think it's 
something, either you have the skill or you don't, you know? And it's 
like a carpentry thing, you've got to be able to figure out how to do 
things in very small spaces.35 
She also explained the process of locating the DLBS and what she had to do so that 
they would be found by the operatives: 
I had to write, I had to create maps, but I had to do it in code, and we 
had a book code. And don't ask me how it worked, because I don't 
remember but it was like certain, you'd take certain lines from a page 
of a book and you'd count the number of letters, I can't even remember 
how I did it, but anyway, I was taught that it was a standard book code. 
And then you would sort of draw a rough sketch and then you would 










code all the coordinates, and it wasn't really serious geographical 
coordinates, you would say, okay, you drive exactly 2.5 kms from this 
spot and on your left is X. And you'd have to find all these identifying 
marks in the middle of the bush. So that was another thing you had to 
consider when you were reconnoitring spaces, is how easy it is to 
explain to somebody how the fuck you find this place. It's a rock 
under a tree in the middle of Natal. How many rocks and trees are 
there? Well ... Ja. So everything was incredibly precise in that way. 
How many paces? And then you'd have to pace things out, and how 
long is your pace compared to somebody else's pace, so all that had to 
be sorted out beforehand. So you take 12 paces and then you stop and 
you turn directly right. And so you had to sort of map it out like that as 
you were doing it. And then digging the DLB, I mean there was a 
standard way they wanted you to dig them, like down and across, and I 
gave up on that very early on, thank you very much. I never told 
anybody I did, but you know frankly if I have to go down to my knees, 
dig to where I can stand to my knees and then dig across, fuck! This 
girl's got other things she can do. Ja, I wasn't slack, but I didn't dig 
custom DLBs I really didn't. And there were certain times when I was 
dropping a significant amount of material and I mean, as long as it's 
not noticeable and it's deep enough that people aren't going to fall into 
it, that's it. And also working on your own, I mean I worked on my 
own for, aside from I think there was about five months out of all the 
time that I worked which was about six, seven years, that I worked 
with other people. I did about four drops all together with other people 
and you know it makes a difference but it's also quite hectic because 
you're responsible for the other person and if things fuck out or they 
get noticed or, I had some hectic, I had some unnerving experiences, to 
the point where I didn't want to work, I felt much better working on 
myown.36 
Another example from Zimbabwe became famous when discovered. The 
ANC set up a backpackers touring company that operated out of Europe, doing 'Cape 
to Cairo' holidays in a bus. People on their holidays travelled on the bus, and when 
they stopped in Zambia or Zimbabwe to go sightseeing, the operatives loaded 
weapons into concealed compartments within the touring bus. The tourists then rode 
on top of these weapons into South Africa, where someone else unloaded them.37 
Another man recalled his experiences in bringing supplies in to the country. He went 
to Lesotho with another operative, and the ANC personnel hid pamphlets and 
36 von den Steinen, Interview with Meeson. 











literature in their vehicle. They weren't told where it was hidden or how it was done, 
and found themselves terribly nervous as they crossed the border, but they were never 
caught. 38 Many vehicles were adapted in these ways to bring in supplies for those 
who operated inside. 
The methods of communication also varied incredibly from sophisticated to 
very simple. Often communication went through couriers. One man who was 
supposed to be a student at the University of Cape Town had a room in a residence, 
and people dropped off a parcel or a newspaper with some message wrapped inside of 
it, and he picked them up at his residence. In this way many messages got through 
without compromising the couriers or the people sending and receiving the messages, 
as they never actually saw one another. Another very useful and successful method 
was the use of DLBs on a smaller scale than the ones that held weapons. With only 
two letters and a number, someone trained in this method could find a DLB anywhere 
in South Africa. One might receive a letter regarding a theatre production a friend 
had seen, or something else seemingly innocuous, with pinpricks under the key letters 
and number, or an ad in the newspaper that held the important information while 
posing as an innocent personal advertisement. With the two letters and a number, one 
could find the correct area, find a mark on a stone or wall or something, and find the 
hiding spot with the supplies, whether money, messages, or even weapons.39 This 
also enhanced security as the people planting things in the DLBs and the people 
receiving the supplies never met and couldn't compromise each other were they 
caught. 
38 Kodesh, W. Interview with Ayanda Ntsaluba, 20 April 1993. 










Another common method was that of a 'book code'. One person on each end 
of the communication had to have a copy of the same book to crack the code. 
Without knowing the book being used, the code could not be deciphered. One man 
who worked for the political underground and often did reconnaissance for MK's 
operations explained the process. He had been using a copy of The Omen: Final 
Conflict, and in order to write the letter he would have to find the word he wanted in 
the book, write the page number, line number, and word number for each word in the 
letter. This was particularly difficult in cases which involved place names or people's 
names, as he had to write the code out for each letter of the name in question. Once 
he completed the coded letter, he would photograph the paper with the coded report, 
process the pictures, and cut the negative into the smallest possible piece. He would 
then take a postcard, slice it open, slip in the negative, glue it shut, address it, and go 
to a post box away from his home to post it. The process of translating a report into 
code could take as long as three or four hours, and the whole process became terribly 
time consuming, but once done, the code could rarely be broken.4o Newspaper 
advertisements also became popular for arranging meetings. A simple classified ad in 
the Mail and Guardian that read: "Dear Ruby, dinner last Friday night was divine, 
let's do it again next week." would translate into a particular place and time for 
meeting, if one knew the right way to analyse it.41 These are but a few ways of 
communicating that allowed important information to be sent and received by the 
units operating inside the country without overly attracting suspicion or interception 
by the security police. 
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Combating any surveillance that the police might have on a soldier, 
particularly one who worked in the 'formal underground,' with a cover story and 
possibly a documented background in activism, also became important. Using public 
telephones or borrowing an acquaintance's phone could get around any phone taps 
that might occur. Phone taps could also be useful in spreading disinformation. If one 
suspected that his phone were tapped, but pretended to have no idea, it was possible to 
elaborate a cover story or send incorrect information to the authorities. Talking 
outside the home also avoided surveillance. One man who worked with his wife in 
the political underground recalls that whenever they wanted to discuss anything that 
would compromise them, they would go for a walk. 42 Others suggested that 
sometimes being blatant could confuse the security police. By having a high profile 
as a political journalist, the same man could say to the security police: "I would have 
to be really stupid to be drawing attention to myself by writing about the ANC if I 
was also working for them." 43 While this approach was dangerous, it did manage to 
get him out of trouble on occasion. The security police detained another woman and 
forced her to write a statement before being released. She had been trained to stick as 
much as possible to the truth, for example, not denying knowing someone if she could 
have been seen with them, but simply denying knowledge of their activities. Once 
she was released, she returned home and immediately reproduced her statement so as 
to remember exactly what she had told them. This came in handy when the police 
called her back each Monday to rewrite the statement. She reviewed the statement 
she had reproduced and then stuck to the same story.44 By switching around meeting 
42 von den Steinen, Interview with Barrell. 
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places, calling on different phones, and otherwise changing one's modus operandi, it 
was possible to escape surveillance in many instances. 
Another common method of communications and support for the unit was 
through couriers and contacts who were part of the 'infonnal underground' or who 
had been recruited for the purpose of communications. One woman who operated in 
Lesotho enrolled at Roma University and actively sought out South African students 
to recruit in this way. She would befriend them, then give them political education to 
bring them to the side of the ANC. Once this had happened, with a little training as 
well, she was able to give their names and details to incoming MK soldiers as 
contacts, or to send them to South Africa with messages for the units inside. As 
legitimate South African students, they were able to get in and out of the country 
easily and without suspicion, and they knew the communities inside well.4s Many 
people came in to the folds of the ANC and MK this way, starting out as friends or 
often, in the case of women, lovers ofMK soldiers who would mould them into ANC 
supporters and then employ them as couriers or contacts. This same woman often got 
into long debates and arguments with some male comrades, arguing that when one 
recruited men, they merely talked to them, but when recruiting women, the men often 
entered into relationships with them and then gradually brought them into the folds of 
the ANC in this manner. She herself had become involved this way, and didn't think 
it was necessary to have these double standards.46 Foreigners also provided a good 
source of operatives, and the ANC often recruited people abroad to work in the 
support structures inside South Africa. Conny Braam explained her role in the book 
Operation Vula. She had been recruited in the Netherlands to help devise disguises 
45 von den Steinen, Interview with Khumalo. 











for the MK soldiers who would be going underground, but also recruited people who 
could go work in South Africa, establish a life there, and provide a safe house and 
support for the operatives. Usually white and foreign, with no obvious connections to 
the anti-apartheid movement, these agents often eluded the South African security 
forces.47 Another girl who went on to work in ordinance in Botswana and then inside 
South Africa, was a Canadian student who had been recruited at her university in 
Toronto. She remembered: 
By the middle of the first year, we invited the ANC rep in Toronto to 
come and give a speech for something ... and he came to speak and 
then afterwards he took us for drinks in the Grad pub. And I think I 
stayed afterwards and we just chat chat chatted. And then, you know, 
he was good at chatting up women. Our Yusuf. Anyway, so then he 
contacted, I mean that, he said, you know, I'd like to speak to you 
about something, can I call you and we'll have a meeting, blah blah 
blah. I said ja, okay sure. And I kind of forgot about it after that. 
Then three weeks later I get this phone call. And he says, no, let's 
have a meeting so I go and have supper with him and I remember it 
very clearly, I think it was a Greek restaurant we had supper in and he 
was, he said to me, asked me whether I would be willing to come to 
South Africa for three weeks to distribute political material. So, well, I 
thought what the hell, why not, you know. So I said yes, and then as 
the conversation progressed, the time that I would spend here increased 
more and more and more, then he said would I be willing to come for 
three months or so and do the same thing. And so I think, I mean I 
can't remember my response, but obviously in the end I agreed to 
consider it. And it meant of course that I would have to not go back to 
university. And in the end, by the end of the supper, he was talking 
about me coming for sort of very long term. And how this was going 
to work, I'd have to get a job, I'd have to, you know, set up a life here, 
I mean, he didn't say actually where but. So I was left to consider all 
this and then another, I think it was another two weeks later we had 
another meeting where he said if I decided to go ahead with it then a 
lot of things in my life in terms of who I associated with, how many 
political meetings I went to, blah blah blah blah blah, you know he 
wanted to know my affiliations with different political groups on 
campus, you know, the person that I was involved with was a member 
of the communist party, so there were all kinds of those considerations. 
And so I, you know, slowly but surely, this was in probably Janua:;(' 
February of 1986 I think. And by October 1986, I was in Botswana.4 
47 Braam, Conny. (2004). Operation Vu/a, Bellewe: Jacana. 











Through couriers and contacts who were recruited to help in this way, whether South 
African or foreign, messages and support became available to the units working in the 
country. 
Despite all of these different methods of communication and supplies, units 
sometimes lost their connections to the outside when the police captured someone in a 
crucial position in the lines of communication. In some cases the units had to come 
up with money, contacts, and even material for weapons on their own. Some used 
contacts with people they knew in the area, while others called on the informal 
underground to find support. One man who operated a unit in Cape Town for two 
years, which was an unusually long time, found his unit cut off for a period. He. 
explained: "After some time, communication between us and headquarters was cut 
off, we had to fend for ourselves, to go look for money, contacts, support, and all. We 
succeeded. We relinked with headquarters again later, and supplies came in, 
especially arms and explosives, and our operations grew in scope and quality." 49 In 
this way some units lengthened their survival by remaining in action even without 
support from the outside. 
The Effects of Working Underground 
Working inside the country involved terrible danger. Some lucky few MK 
soldiers managed to escape back out of the country if their covers were blown or the 
police caught on to their activities. Shoot-outs with police happened on occasion, and 
many soldiers died in such confrontations. Even if a soldier were caught without 
violence, he often faced torture at the hands of police. 'Accidents' in police custody 
48 Kodesh, W. Interview with Tony Yengeni, 13 January 1993. 












were common, and many activists died at the hands of the police or in their custody, 
due to excessive torture, neglect, sickness, or even purposeful murders. Even if an 
operative survived police custody, a trial could see him imprisoned for lengthy 
periods of time or even executed if the crime was deemed serious enough. A few MK 
soldiers lost their lives through judicial decisions during this period. Working inside 
the country even as a political operative was terribly dangerous, and working as a 
soldier, actively attacking the apartheid government and structures led to the deaths of 
many MK cadres. Conditions like this made life underground exceedingly stressful 
and taxing. Many people who operated inside the country have severe emotional and 
psychological scars that remain unhealed to this day. 
The first few months or even years of operation could often be as exciting as 
they were stressful. Finally getting the opportunity to put training to use and make.an 
active contribution to the struggle was enormously exciting, and often very fulfilling. 
Many ex-soldiers cite an intense rush of adrenalin and a major high that came with 
carrying out an operation. The stress, danger, and excitement that came with 
executing an attack often left one seriously excited for a period after completion of the 
attack. If an operative worked in the 'formal underground,' and lived as a normal 
member of the community, this could be a dangerous condition, as it was hard to 
explain this post-operation rush if people met this person and wondered why he was 
acting so strangely. 
Eventually, however, the elation and excitement gradually wore off, and stress 
and fear took the upper hand. One woman recalls that the first year she worked 
underground the excitement was foremost but then the stress became too much for 











depression and fear engulfed her. 50 Another man who worked in the political 
underground remarked that living under constant stress and paranoia was very 
draining. It made him very tired, terribly worn down and lonely. 51 Immense stress 
often eroded an operative's emotional strength, and some of those who worked inside 
the country and in the front lines eventually found themselves burning out on the 
work, and many had to move on to other po stings far away from it all to recover. 
Those who worked in South Africa and in the front lines always had to 
maintain vigilance about security. Secrets became a huge part of their lives, and lies 
became second nature. If an operative had a rough experience, he simply could not 
__ share it with someone else due to security considerations, and often people ended up 
feeling horribly isolated and alone. The need to keep people from knowing too much 
also fed this isolation. A cadre sometimes only had contact with one or two other 
people, and sometimes had rare and sparse communication with superiors, though 
most people worked in units of three or so, had their comrades to support them. 
People in the front lines often had contact with the leaders and visits from them, 
which could keep up their morale, but the people working inside the country 
necessarily lacked this support. 
While remembering that hundreds of other people existed in the same situation 
and thousands outside supported his work could be easy enough for a soldier 
underground, it was much harder to believe that and feel the support when isolated 
from the rest of his comrades. One man who worked in the political underground, 
carrying out reconnaissance for MK's operational units as well as doing political 
work, noted that due to the very nature of his work he never really received feedback 
so von den Steinen, Interview with Khumalo. 












and it was often very discouraging and disheartening not to have any affinnation of 
his work. While he knew the value of what he was doing, he had no idea of how 
much his work really helped, or whether it effected anything at all. 52 This lack of 
support led to a deep feeling of isolation and depression in some individuals. By the 
very nature of the work most of the underground soldiers undertook, the feeling of 
having a huge organisation and thousands of people behind one just wasn't there most 
of the time, and many soldiers became very discouraged. 
Some also had problems due to their personalities. One woman who worked 
with a unit in Cape Town explained that she was a very talkative and outgoing person, 
and life underground was really terrible for her because she had to suppress that side 
of her. Another man in her unit was more introverted and solitary, and didn't have so 
much difficulty with the situation, but for her it was really horrible. 53 The emotional 
drain that life underground had on the soldiers often devastated them, and many found 
themselves burnt out after even a short period in operations. 
Many people who were involved in the underground have underlying 
problems which stem from their time underground and still affect them today. For 
those who worked inside the country under a cover story, adaptation after 
demobilization often became very difficult. By the very nature of working 
clandestinely while maintaining an above-board identity, they had to lie all the time. 
Each operative working in this way had to build up a legend around himself, and 
constantly support it and embroider it. Some people who went through this found 
their lives profoundly affected. One man who worked in the political underground 
noted that he would have a partner, and couldn't tell her the truth or unburden himself 
52 von den Steinen, Interview with Vick. 











to her, and had to lie constantly. Even today, he finds it hard to deal with 
relationships. With all of the lies, legends, secrets, and deceptions he used while 
underground, it all became a way of life. Now he finds it hard to have a close and 
trusting relationship, and even to this day, he finds it hard to tell the truth when lying 
comes so naturally to him.54 Another woman who worked in the front lines finds that 
since she made friendships as a way of recruiting people, and picked people to be with 
who would be useful to the struggle, she ended up without many legitimately close 
relationships. Even today she finds it hard to get close to people, and rarely allows 
herself to get involved in serious friendships. 55 
Some others feel that they missed out on life by being involved in the struggle. 
One woman mentioned that while she was involved with MK, she would sometimes 
wonder whether it was all worthwhile. She knew that other people she had grown up 
with had made something of their lives as she herself wanted in earlier years: 
received an education, found a good job, made money, or settled down to marriage 
and children. She doesn't regret what she did, but often found herself plagued by 
self-doubt during her time in the struggle. 56 Another woman realised that she never 
really had a normal youth. She spent all of her time involved in politics. Instead of 
thinking about boys or a spotty face in her teenage years, she went to rallies and only 
knew people involved with the struggle. She feels like she wants to do things now 
that she was not able to do when she was younger. 57 Many people who worked 
underground and spent their whole lives doing this sort of work find themselves 
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working through severe emotional problems today as a result. But few would change 
the routes their lives took if they had the chance. 
The constant fear and stress also took a toll on many people. Fear of arrest, 
fear of failure, and uncertainty about the future hung over the heads of these soldiers 
constantly, and drained them emotionally. One woman who worked in the front lines 
around the time of the raids into neighbouring countries recalled that every time she 
returned to Swaziland she found herself wondering what awaited her. She went to 
sleep not knowing if someone would attack and kill her during the night. Every time 
she went to the border, the Swazi officials there harassed her, and the whole situation 
became very depressing and trying. Eventually she simply had to get out, and left to 
go overseas for many years. 58 
Conclusion 
For the MK soldiers working inside South Africa and in the front line states, life 
involved danger, fear, and excitement. Some found themselves eventually arrested 
and put in prison. Others had to flee the country. Some had breakdowns from the 
stress of the circumstances they found themselves in. Many remain affected by their 
experiences today. But they were lucky in that they had the chance to do what they 
had intended all along, and are secure in the fact that they accomplished something 
important and notable. Many lost comrades and friends to death at the hands of the 
security forces. Many others simply did not survive to tell their stories. 












APLA in the front line states and South Africa 
Lets Liberate the South 
Lets liberate the south 
Lets march forward resolutely! ! ! 
Lets wipe out the racist Boers 
And their clique of traitors _ 
Oh!! They have broken our bones 
Shed our blood- for our Azania 
Our hatred for them rises to the sky 
For many years- our country has been divided 
Sharpeville- Soweto- Langa- Nyanga 
Urge us to go and annihilate the enemy. 
Shoulder to shoulder-lets march. 
Rise up- heroic people of the south! ! ! 
Rise up- face storms and tempests!!! 
Lets swear to save the motherland! ! ! 
Lets swear to sacrifice all! ! ! 
Swords and guns in hand- lets march forward 
The hour of glory has come for our country 
Lets build a lasting-
Bright future for our motherland. 1 
While the Azanian People's Liberation Army had many well trained and 
disciplined fighters waiting to deploy inside South Africa, they were unable to 
establish a presence inside the country until the rriid-1980s. The leadership crisis 
crippled the organisation for many years, but by the early 1980s efforts to reorganise 
the army and push the home going programme were well underway. Zimbabwe's 
independence in 1980 provided the PAC and APLA with a staunch ally in a country 
bordering South Africa. Inside South Africa, PAC members worked for years to build 
up the underground presence of people loyal to the organisation and ready to assist 











incoming insurgents. By 1986, almost a decade after the Soweto generation joined 
the fight and more than two since Poqo attacked its foes, APLA finally began to 
operate against its enemy inside South Africa. 
In the front line states, Botswana and Zimbabwe emerged as the jumping off 
points for many APLA cadres infiltrating the country and the best places to smuggle 
arms and materials across the South African border. Botswana did not allow freedom 
fighters to operate openly, but its long border with South Africa made it a strategic 
rear base for many APLA cadres and the Botswana authorities lacked the capacity to 
police much of the activity. Vusi Make, the chairman of the PAC from 1979-1980, 
remembered that they would occasionally receive intelligence from the Botswana 
government, and that APLA cadres deployed there were instructed to avoid 
confrontations with the Botswana authorities, and if cornered, to surrender 
peacefully.2 The PAC's close relationship with the Zimbabwe African National 
Union (ZANU), which ruled independent Zimbabwe from 1980, allowed for open 
operation, support, and infiltration routes. Lesotho remained a convenient base from 
which to operate, though its isolated nature limited its usefulness. The Frente de 
Liberta~ao de Mo~ambique (FRELIMO)'s strong alliance with the ANC precluded 
APLA operation through that country, and the route through Swaziland so often used 
by MK cadres did not become a major route for their APLA counterparts. 
Inside South Africa, APLA cadres carried out a number of tasks. Their units 
had a responsibility to recruit and train new members, capture arms, ammunition and 
funds for the continuation of the struggle, and carry out operations. APLA's policies 
on what constituted a legitimate target varied notably from those of MK. Policemen, 
soldiers, farmers, and even white civilians faced attack from the APLA soldiers. 











While the media and the more moderate South Africans vilified their policies, the 
attacks often sparked enthusiasm and support from the more militant masses. In the 
early 1990s, APLA came into its own. With MK's armed struggle suspended, APLA 
remained the only armed wing still operating. With many high profile attacks that 
received copious media coverage, their star rose in the minds of many people. Their 
popular slogan: "one settler, one bullet" entered into the national lexicon and drew 
large support from more militant South Africans opposed to the compromises 
promised in negotiations with the apartheid government. However, the PAC failed to 
turn this support into votes when the first democratic elections occurred in April of 
1994, and the ANC emerged as the most popular organisation and the new 
government of South Africa. 
The Front Line States 
The nature of the armed struggle in South Africa was such that people and 
material needed transportation across bordering countries in order to reach South 
Africa. Zimbabwe was a useful ally for the PAC given its proximity to South Africa. 
As early as 1979, a summary of an APLA meeting in ltumbi in Tanzania reported 
cooperation with ZANU in obtaining and caching weapons. The report noted: 
With regard to arms and equipment, any such supplied to the P.A.C. 
are to be delivered to the Eastern Front through ZANU (starting with 
those held by the Tanzanian Government) and the P.A.C. will strive to 
assist ZANU in obtaining supplies of heavy weapons. 3 
Once Zimbabwe gained independence it served APLA well as a rear base and a 
transport hub. One man recalled that the illegal movement of troops from Tanzania 
through Zambia led to an advantageous situation in the 1980s: 











~~-~~--~~----~--~---~-----~-~-------~- -- ~- ~--~ -- ~--- --~-- -
But then because of the thousand three hundred that we took out of 
Tanzania illegally, the good thing that came from that is that the 
African Liberation Committee, the structure of the Organisation of 
African Unity [OAU] , they made a decision that we are no longer 
allowed to travel by road. If we need to take people back into South 
Africa, they are ready to buy us air tickets. I think it became also a 
luxury because then everybody who wanted to infiltrate into the 
country they would be flown from Tanzania to Zimbabwe, then 
Zimbabwe, that is why again the core of our leadership, the military 
leadership, moved away from Tanzania to be in Zimbabwe where it 
was coordinating and running the whole business.4 
The move of the high command to Zimbabwe allowed better communication and 
shorter routes for infiltration. Letlapa Mphahlele recalled moving back and forth 
between Botswana and Zimbabwe to communicate with the high command, and 
transporting weapons and supplies from Zimbabwe to Botswana for infiltration.s 
The close relationship between the PAC and the Basotholand Congress Party 
(BCP) also provided a reliable base. While changes in government influenced the 
degree of helpfulness on the part of the Lesotho government, with the Basotholand 
National Party (BNP) an ally of the ANC, and the expulsion of many PAC operatives 
after the coup of 1986,6 the PAC received much support from that country throughout 
their struggle. Once the OAU established the rule that the PAC must infiltrate via 
flights rather than roads, Lesotho also became useful as a transit hub. One man 
explained: 
We could also recruit other people from South Africa into Transkei 
and from Transkei we would take them through Lesotho, from Lesotho 
then they would fly to anywhere in the world to train and then a similar 
system was in operation. They would finish their training, back into 
Lesotho as refugees there, then infiltrated back into Transkei and into 
South Africa. 7 
4 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Brigadier General Barney Hlatswayo, 16 August 2005, Pretoria. 
5 Mphahlele, Letlapa. (2002). Child of this Soil: My Life as a Freedom Fighter, Cape Town: Kwela 
Books, chapter 15. 
6 Edgar, Robert. (1989). In Moss, Glenn and Obery, Ingrid. (Eds). South African Review 5, 
Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 243. 










With the proximity to the Transkei, one of APLA's strongest areas, Lesotho was also 
useful for meetings between commanders inside South Africa and the members of the 
high command who remained in exile. Lesotho passports were also convenient for 
operatives as they could distance themselves from the struggle in South Africa by 
claiming to be foreigners and thus avoiding police attention. 8 
Botswana was one of the most vital front line areas of operation for APLA. A 
well-structured system of support for the cadres developed, allowing them to cross the 
borders home and supplying them with arms and funds to begin their operations. 
Letlapa Mphahlele recalled the situation when he worked in Botswana in 1985: "We 
had arms and personnel but we didn't have the right network to infiltrate them into 
Azania. We had a network of professional people who were not familiar with 
guerrilla methods and ended up in the hands.ofthe Boers.,,9 He and his compatriots 
set out to remedy the situation and facilitate the movement of soldiers by sending a 
scout to reconnoitre the border: 
In the village of Pitsane Molopo, John drove to an old friend of his, 
who was extremely happy to see him ... He left me in the village and, 
using his Botswana passport, went to chat up the police and the 
immigration officials on both sides of the border. He crossed to 
Makgobistad, the village in the erstwhile Bophuthatswana on the other 
side of the border. He came back and told me what he had found out-
the lie of the village, the bus services, the places for crossing without 
having to go through the border post, and the village code of hanging 
white washing on the line when there was no police patrol and 
coloured washing to warn of one. lO 
He reported this development to his superiors, and received orders to help two men 
infiltrate across the border. He remembered: "1 left for Botswana with the two but 
8 Mphahlele, chapter 19. 
9 Mphahlele, 114. 











Mchana wasn't there. He surfaced after weeks, beaming with smile. 'Mchana, the 
mission was successful,' he said, puffing at a cigarette. 'The route is clear and people 
are ready to receive the cadres. ",11 They then commenced the crossing: 
As we stood by the border fence shortly after nightfall, I gave the final 
instructions. "Comrades," I said. "This moment has eluded many 
cadres. You have to regard yourselves as lucky because you're now 
about to cross. In that village across the border, you'll find a car with 
its park lights on. You'll travel to your destination by car. Any 
questions?" . . . I watched the two scale the fences and disappear into 
the dark, into history. 12 
Sometimes there would be problems on the other side, and those soldiers responsible 
for the routes would blame themselves. While there were strict rules to follow, in the 
midst of actually working underground, cadres would disregard the rules. Mphahlele 
remembered one instance when things went wrong. He received word that cadres he 
previously helped across the border were ready to receive more, but did not know that 
they had been captured .and turned by the South African police. When the night came: 
There was no sign of the car that was to meet the cadres. We decided 
they should take the smaller guns, the Scorpions, and walk to a bus 
stop on the other side of the border. They left me with the rifles. Just 
before dawn, as I was walking back to Lindela in the car, I heard rifle 
fire from Mokgobistad across the border, rattling with demonic 
ferocity . . . I cursed myself for not having called off the mission. It 
had been drummed into me and I in turn had taught others that if a 
courier failed to turn up, the entire mission had to be aborted.13 
In time, they were able to establish a reliable route and successfully infiltrate cadres 
and arms across the border. One soldier remembered his crossing: 
We went in through the fence of course, illegally, then a bakkie which 
was driven by one Ndebele old man, I've forgotten his name. He went 
into the borders legally then met us somewhere. And we saw the boers 
11 Mphahlele, 116. 
12 Mphahlele, 116 










crossing. After some time then we jumped into this bakkie and we 
were safe. 14 
Unlike the MK soldiers, who generally crossed the border without weapons, 
and received them on the other side, APLA soldiers generally carried their weapons 
and some funds with them when they crossed, and kept them at the ready. One man 
recalled his crossing, and they brought: "two scorpions, machine pistols, two Chinese 
grenades, stick grenades, and two grenades, ordinary grenades. We had some cash 
with us, maybe about R2000 or SO.,,15 Mphahle1e remembered another crossing: 
Zonyane and Themba each stuffed a bag with two Scorpion machine 
pistols, six fully loaded magazines, two stick grenades, TNT slaps and 
extra ammunition. I wanted all the anns concealed, but Mchana said 
each fighter had to have a gun ready for action if the need arose. 16 
As time went on, the crossings became more efficient and faster. When Mphahlele 
crossed himself years later, he noted: 
As we neared the border, I told him I admired his efficiency and that of 
our other operatives based in Botswana, and the way they worked with 
contacts in Azania. In the past it took one month to get a person from 
home to come and fetch literature or weapons. This time it took 
Modiegi less than a week to alert his internal contact to fetch me from 
the border.17 
Once safely across the border, anned and with some funds, the APLA soldiers were 
ready to being their operations and got the chance to do what they had set out to do so 
long ago. 
While the PAC suffered fewer attacks than the ANC in neighbouring 
countries, the threat of attack stayed in the forefront of operatives' minds. Mphahlele 
remembered the raid on ANC houses, and recalled an alann that came afterwards. He 
14 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Blacks Joyi, 21 November 2002, Cape Town. 
IS von den Steinen, Interview with Joyi. 
16 Mphahlele, 116. 












had been watching a boxing match with a number of other people, when they received 
a warning: 
Just as we were fuming and insulting the referee for denying us 
victory, we heard an agitated knock on the door. Odirile Moalafi had 
run to tell us that he had heard that the Boers were going to raid 
Botswana that night. Within seconds we evacuated the flat. The 
unwritten rule prohibited anyone from asking another where he or she 
was going to hide. 18 
Constant vigilance was necessary not only to protect against South African cross 
border raids, but also to maintain the operational security and avoid being jailed by 
the Tswana police. The successful machinery in Botswana facilitated the infiltration 
of many soldiers and their arms to South Africa and provided support to the soldiers 
inside the country. 
Operating Inside South Africa 
Once a soldier received the order to deploy inside South Africa, his dream of 
fighting the apartheid government began. Soldiers usually crossed illegally along the 
same routes that most had taken out of the country. Support personnel assisted them 
in crossing the border, and picked them up once they arrived in South Africa. The 
moment of return excited and moved the soldiers. One man recalled his feelings upon 
crossing the border to return home after an absence of a decade: "Mixed feelings. 
And you'll be surprised that one found himself sort of excited that you get home. But 
with a different reason. To fight, not to meet people and hug, no no. To fight the 
enemy. So this time had ultimately come after 10 years.,,19 Another man recalled his 
nervousness and false confidence: 
"This is the last fence," Thabo said, and leapt over. I handed him my 
bag and followed. Joy, fear and hope electrified my whole being. I 
18 Mphahlele, 110. 










unzipped the bag and took out the Scorpion machine pistol. "You look 
nervous," Thabo said. "Is this your first time in the country since you 
left?" ''No, this is not my first time," I lied to cover my nervousness. 
He didn't pursue this further. "Okay, you remain here. I'll be back 
with the transport." He disappeared into the dark night. 20 
Once inside the country and established, the cadres went to work. 
While APLA soldiers infiltrated in small numbers in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, attacks were nonexistent. Only when the police captured APLA cadres did the 
media mention them. One newspaper report from 1979 announced the arrest of 
several PAC members trained in Libya and China. It reported their mission in the 
Transkei as: 
• Study the local situation and familiarise themselves with the 
people. 
• Assist the locals in order to gain their confidence. 
• Establish pockets so that mobilisation could be effected when 
the time became ripe for the onslaught against South Africa, 
Transkei and BophuthaTswana ... 
• Prepare recruits for guerrilla warfare against South Africa- and 
after the defeat of South Africa, they foresaw no problems in 
defeating Transkei and BophuthaTswana. 
• Establish contacts and safe places for militarily trained 
members of PAC. 
• Establish anns caches. 
• Report regularly to the "high command" on progress made in 
the campaign.21 
While that particular group failed in their tasks, many others paved the way for the 
APLA units that began attacking in earnest in 1986. The efforts of Pokela, and then 
Mlambo as chainnan finally began to payoff. Mlambo recalled: 
My main thrust was then to say we have to consolidate the good work 
that [Pokela] has been doing, particularly strengthening the links 
between the organisation outside and the [home] front . . . So I would 
say then that to me, I was particularly pleased to see that the home 
going programme definitely came much more to the forefront during 
my chairmanship. I was not inventing anything new, I was merely 
carrying out the programme which was well led out by the central 
20 Mphahlele, 138-9. 












committee already piloted by [Pokela]. So APLA's activities and 
presence and profile became more and more during my time when [sic] 
which went even beyond that. We also helped the internal PAC to 
fonn structures which could mobilise the masses inside the country, 
not just to mobilise and work with a few for APLA but politically to be 
able to say something under those difficult conditions?2 
The changes in leadership and the emphasis on rebuilding the anny in the 
early 1980s finally led to a force able to take the struggle back to South Africa. 
When APLA first arrived back on the scene in South Africa, a few operations 
and units gained media coverage and stuck in the minds of the masses. A number of 
attacks in Alexandra, a Johannesburg township, carried the trademark of Scorpion 
machine pistols, which became synonymous with APLA as the years went on. 
Referred to in the press as "The Scorpion Gang," this unit attacked policemen and 
soldiers in the township in late 1986. Mphahlele remembered helping two of those 
cadres cross into South Africa, and their influence: 
I watched the two scale the fences and disappear into the dark, into 
history. With Themba Phikwane in command, within a week the 
Yugoslav-made Scorpion machine pistols set Alexandra Township 
ablaze. On December 16, 1986, the Scorpion fatally stung soldiers 
deployed in the township to enforce the state of emergency. 23 
One PAC publication claimed up to 15 security force members as casualties of this 
unit,24 and its operations brought the PAC and APLA back into the public eye as 
combatants for the first time in two decades. 
In 1987, APLA began a programme of "grenade warfare," in which swift 
attacks with hand grenades became common. A particularly notable attack was 
carried out on 21 April 1987, when APLA soldiers lobbed a grenade over a security 
22 Interview with Johnson Mlambo, Interviewer unknown, no date, from the SADET oral history 
project. 
23 Mphahlele, 118. 











fence from a moving vehicle and struck recruits at the Tladi police training camp in 
Soweto, killing one and injuring 64. In a single attack, they quadrupled casualties at 
the hands of APLA in the first few months of 1987.25 An APLA publication claimed 
34 raids involving the use of assault rifles in 1988, compared with 74 grenade attacks, 
showing the popularity of this new strategy. Quick attacks characterized APLA units, 
as explained by an APLA publication that explained the basic elements of this kind of 
attack: 
• Typical guerrilla attacks; 
• Only hand-grenades were used; 
• The targets were security forces; 
• The attacks were well-conceived, well-planned and well-
executed; 
• The guerrillas involved were mainly those trained and armed 
inside the country; 
• Their attacks were not followed by arrest and invited no 
reprisals against innocent people in the immediate vicinity; 
• And there was no claim of responsibility. 26 
In the wake of this new approach, the popular APLA slogan "one settler, one bullet," 
was amended in some circles to, "one hand grenade, ten settlers." 
APLA attacks in the mid to late 1980s focused on policemen and soldiers, 
often finding them outside of work and attacking them unexpectedly. One report 
notes an attack on four policemen drinking in a shebeen in Atteridgeville outside of 
Pretoria. Attacks of this sort were usually of short duration and allowed for the 
escape of the APLA unit. Azania Combat explained: "The attack was carried out with 
speed, precision and meticulousness that have become the operational trademark of 
the boys ... It is now becoming an APLA operational pattern to carry out attacks that 
25 Mazambane, Willie. (1987). APLA operations increase as record 65 cops are hit in single PAC 
guerrilla attack InAzania Combat, Issue 4,3. 











roadblock in Lichtenburg in 1988 received much press coverage. While accounts 
differ as to the number of casualties, hand grenades and gunfire from the APLA side 
met with gunfire from the police. One soldier recalled the policy of 'no surrender': 
People [ are] not allowed to surrender ... If I am fighting I only have 
one bullet, I can shoot myself, because I destroy the information that 
police want from me. APLA members ... must know that you like or 
not, if you have only one bullet inside your pocket, then if that round if 
fInished, then take that round and shoot yourself. The information is 
dead. 30 . 
While it was much easier to operate inside the black areas of South Africa, 
occasionally the fIght came to the white areas. In the mid to late 1980s, APLA's 
attacks on police and security forces generally led to black casualties, but they aimed 
to take the battle to the white areas and attack white police and security forces. In 
August of 1987, a battle occurred between security forces and APLA cadres in the 
white Johannesburg suburb of Bramley. Azania Combat hoped this would become 
common: 
We have to ensure that if there is no peace in the townships, there can't 
be peace in the white suburbs ... The war theatre is steadily but surely 
expanding to cover even areas which have hitherto been quiet. This is 
how it should be because before the war moves to such areas, the white 
community will not understand what is happening in the African 
townships.31 
Mlambo explained the policy, "Hardly a week passes without a funeral in the black 
townships ... Let us make whites bury their own dead.,,32 By the early 1990s, 
attacks in white areas on white civilians became more prevalent and a main 
component of APLA's strategy. 
30 Luvuyo Kulman, quoted in Foster, Haupt, and de Beer. (2005). The Theatre of Violence: Narratives 
of Protagonists in the South African Conflict, Cape Town: Institute of Justice and Reconciliation, 247. 
31 (1987). APLA operations shift to white SA. In Azania Combat, Issue 5, 6. 
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APLA also worked on politicising and recruiting people in the rural areas, and 
saw them as a vital place for operations. One claim from the PAC secretary for 
defence in 1987 said: "APLA combatants have, in the period under review, been able 
to mount guerrilla operations and carry out extensive mass political work in the rural 
areas. ,,33 He also noted: "In South Africa, the rural areas are just that weakest point 
because the enemy's communication network and operational mobility are very 
limited there.,,34 Recruitment and politicisation in those areas gave APLA a strong 
base of supporters and became a common characteristic of their operations. One 
APLA cadre remembered his own training and the emphasis on politicising the rural 
areas came into use when he deployed inside South Africa. After a time in the Free 
State he and his unit moved towards the rural areas of the Eastern Cape: 
It's because we were destined for the rural areas, because we believed 
in our military line as APLA, that we want to be based on the military, 
on the rural areas. Fight from rural, but have some urban guerrillas, 
few urban guerrillas, who are training people, workers and semi-
workers and students and other people around the urban areas. And 
then we from the rural areas, some commanders would come from 
there, will train people from there, and send them in undercover. So if 
you look at it, our main aim was to encircle the cities, because the 
enemy is powerful in the urban areas. He's got powerful 
communication lines and he's less powerful in the countryside, 
because of these reasons. So that was our strategy. Encircling the 
cities. Tactically we had small units that were hitting the enemy in 
vital points. That's the strategy that was used by Mao Tse Tsung in 
China. And we were taught that strategy. 35 
By the early 1990s, in the Eastern Cape and Transkei partiCUlarly, APLA had a strong 
presence outside of the main urban areas. This also assisted training, as lessons in 
33 Mazambane, Willie and Daniels, Romero. (1987). APLA's guerrilla activity goes to rural South 
Africa. InAzania Combat, Issue 5, 4. 
34 Mazambane, Willie and Daniels, Romero. (1987). APLA's guerrilla activity goes to rural South 
Africa. In Azania Combat, Issue 5, 4. 










fireanns were less likely to face discovery by security forces when they took place far 
from populated areas. 
This upsurge in APLA guerrilla activity in the 1980s received recognition in 
the notoriously censored South African press. While usually vilified, the increasing 
reporting of their actions showed the effect they were having. In 1988, the Financial 
Mail recognised the upsurge: "In 1987, say the police, 85 PAC terrorists were 
captured; in previous years there was scarcely any sign of them. They have accounted 
for at most 1 % - 2% of terror attacks in SA rn. the Eighties. This seems to be 
changing.,,36 While the police originally dismissed them, the attacks grew so common 
that statements about APLA began to emerge and its name featured in more and more 
news reports. 
APLA did not distinguish between 'hard' and 'soft' targets, as MK did, and 
often claimed superiority to MK in their choice of targets, as they were actually 
striking the personnel of the apartheid system rather than just blowing up symbols. 
Though MK did extend "hard targets" to include police and security forces, the PAC 
often brought up its legacy of sabotage without casualty. In the 1980's APLA largely 
targeted policemen and South African Defence Force soldiers. Fanners also came 
into the firing line, and white civilians were considered fair game, and both became 
common targets in the early 1990s. Often PAC literature would stress their 
superiority over MK in striking at useful targets, and taunt the ANC for blowing up 
buildings and railway lines. A quote in Azanian Combat in 1988 asserted: "We (in 
the PAC) have never suffered from a psychosis of what constitutes soft or hard 
targets.,,37 While targeting the policemen and security forces directly attacked 
apartheid government personnel, the PAC and APLA often faced condemnation for 
36 (1988 July 29). Pan-Africanist Congress: Getting Active Again. In Financial Mail, 48. 












attacks on farmers and civilians. One APLA delegate at the TRC explained their 
strategy as one of proportionality: "To put as my grandmother would have put it, you 
do not attack an elephant with a needle nor do you attack an ant with a hammer.,,38 
Once established within the country, more and more APLA units undertook 
operations. Strikes at the police and army formed only a part of the responsibilities of 
the units though. A crucial part of the operatiomil work was recruitment and 
politicisation. With the emphasis on Chinese style guerrilla warfare prevalent in 
APLA, it was vital to the struggle to convert people to the PAC and recruit them both 
as soldiers and for support structures. Mlambo explained the importance of 
policisation: 
And so the home going programme, although it was a military 
programme principally, but within APLA we understood one thing that 
it is politics that are in command of the gun, politics are in command 
of the gun and war is necessary because conflicts that are there could 
not be resolved by other means and the only ultimate resort is war you 
see. So that now mobilisation of the people in various fronts, to be 
aware and to be active and to participate in their own struggle, that 
became a critical element, teaching our people of course that they must 
be able to fight ultimately and the youth were particularly keen on 
that. 39 
APLA cadres often involved themselves in areas of society that could reap large 
numbers of recruits. Mlambo explained the importance of reaching as many parts of 
society as possible: 
Therefore this political battle, the political war in which we were 
involved was to be fought on various fronts. We had to work amongst 
the working class people in the urban areas, the students on both urban 
and rural areas, even amongst religious people, you have to interact 
with them and work with them and show them that at least if we are all 
made in the image of the one God, to accept to be treated otherwise by 
other creatures who are also made in the same image of the same God 
is really out of the question, it's unacceptable. And we had therefore 
38 TRC, Truth and Reconciliation Commission Armed Forces Hearing: PACIAPLA, 7 October 1997, 
CapeTown. 










to try and go to all segments of the population and influence them in 
that fashion but of course we know that the youth were a bit much 
more impatient and felt that they must hit at the enemy at the nearest 
opportunity, at the first opportunity.40 
One man maintained a presence in student circles while operating underground and 
explained this part of his duties: "But it was not about attacking only, you must open 
cells for political classes, maybe every week, but if possible every day you meet at 
night and discuss party politics, the aims, objectives, and goals, then they must go to 
school during normal hours and try to recruit other students.,,41 Another man who 
worked in a mine in the Free State explained: "We joined the miners there, so our 
cover was to join the miners and be part of them, politicise them, which we did.,,42 
Another man remembered his own recruitment. He was involved in gangsterism and 
crime, but met an APLA member who politicised and recruited him: 
I stayed with Moss and he let me into the secrets of the PAC and also 
made me politically aware and conscious of the political climate that 
existed at that time. He told me that the enemies were police, soldiers, 
as well as all the other people who were working for the previous 
regime. He explained to me that he wanted myself, Lulamile as well as 
Doctor to be members of the PAC who were going to fight for the 
black nation against the oppressive Government rather than being 
criminals.43 
Often the recruitment process occurred slowly and gradually. One man remembered 
his own recruitment in the mid-1980s. While battles raged in the townships, some 
older guys convinced students to come with them on small missions aimed at making 
the areas ungovernable. After a while, they built up trust and offered them guerrilla 
warfare training. Once trained, the new cadres would replicate the process. He 
40 Interview with Johnson Mlambo. 
41 von den Steinen, Interview with Bongco. 
42 von den Steinen, Interview with Joyi. 
43 Truth and Reconciliation Commission Amnesty Hearing, 17 September 1998, Nkosinathi 












eventually developed a keen instinct for whether someone was trustworthy and might 
make a good soldier, or if they were not right for the job and might be a security 
risk.44 
Once recruited to APLA, the new members received training from the 
stalwarts. If a unit trained abroad, then infiltrated, they could then recruit and train 
people inside South Africa or in the Transkei and then have the newly trained soldiers 
form their own units, who would recruit more, increasing their forces exponentially. 
One man explained the process: 
Okay, what they usually do,the APLA operatives, at that time, those 
were from exile, the idea was to identify people that they can trust, and 
train them. Because they were small units, maybe they come as a unit 
of six, if I may say, then they operate as that unit. After some time, 
they dissolve, each one open his own unit, recruit people, then they 
become six. Then after that six operate for one, maybe six months, 
when you gain confidence, then you open your own, you know 
spreading like that, that was the structure that was used at that time.45 
Training often took place in the Eastern Cape or Transkei, two traditionally strong 
areas for the PAC. The independent status of the Transkei allowed them more 
freedom of movement, and the government there sometimes supported their efforts. 
Though traditionally seen as a supporter of the ANC, the APLA Chief of Staff 
remembered Bantu Holomisa, who led the Transkei from 1987, as helpful to their 
efforts as welL He recalled: "Really I think another good development was when 
Bantu Holomisa was the leader of Transkei. [He] openly aligned or declared his 
support to the liberation struggle. Then we made good contacts with them.',46 One 
author explained the relationship: "In the Eastern Cape, APLA units were based in the 
Transkei, where the Holomisa administration tolerated their presence in return for the 
44 von den Steinen, L. Interview with P.O. Zwelakhe Christopher Ndlovu, 19 August 2004, 
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use of APLA training facilities in East Africa by members of the Transkeian Defence 
Force.,,47 
The trained members took the recruits to various places for political lessons, 
weapons training, and basic training in operating underground. One man delineated 
the procedure in an amnesty application to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: 
So these Africans were trained because every member of the crash 
course who would be recruited will be asked questions and we would 
want to see whether this African does he have understanding of the 
country's political situation. If we are satisfied that they do have the 
understanding, great understanding of politics within the country it is 
only then that we can treat them as fit and proper people to take 
participation in the task force and undergo a crash course. It has two 
parts, ideological and political, then follows the military part of it, 
weapon handling, battle formations and such other things. Due to the 
limited time and place where at that time we were not able to render, 
especially at the locations, proper training to these members because 
the enemy was all over looking for us. They were given important 
facts, those that were necessary to take the struggle forward.48 
Another man remembered his training near Butterworth in the Transkei. He received 
political lectures and military training: "The way I was trained to fight in the forests, 
to protect myself when being attacked, methods to attack, to ambush and raids, such 
thingS.,,49 The training programme became well structured by the early 1990s. One 
recalled his training which took place at a camp outside of Sterkspruit in the Transkei, 
where they stayed in tents for the six months of training before being deployed as a 
unit. He remembered that the tents were quite full and many people trained there at 
47 Lodge, Tom. (1995). Soldiers of the Storm: A Profile of the Azanian People's Liberation Army. In 
CiUiers, Jakkie and Reichardt, Markus. (Eds). About Turn: The Transformation of the South African 
Military and Intelligence, Johannesburg: IDP, 113. 
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the same time. 50 In the urban areas, training had to be more adaptable. One man who 
received training in Soweto recalled: "The training was done allover the place. It's 
just that the places were supposed to be secret so that nobody knows what's 
happening there. We would be taught guerrilla warfare, taught intelligence, how to 
spy and get some info and that.,,51 
Once trained, the new APLA members began to participate in operations until 
they were ready to operate on their own and recruit new members. One man 
explained this probation period: 
At some stage when you gain confidence and you've committed some 
ops, like a gangster you must commit a crime of some sort, after that 
they can be sure that no, they can operate on their own. Then they 
leave you and just give you guidelines, do A, B, and C, and hit police 
stations. Then maybe you go and observe sometimes, just depending 
on his trust, then when you gain that confidence that you can operate 
on your own, then you operate on your own. Maybe for a couple of 
months, maybe four, five months, then they divide you, okay go and 
recruit your own people and open your own unit. Then operate on 
your own and become a commander of that new unit. And then this 
thing goes on and on and on. 52 
With this method, APLA managed to increase its fighting force inside South Africa 
without having to send recruits abroad for training. Once mentored by experienced 
soldiers, the new cadres expanded the army and recruited their own members. 
The support of the Transkeian people went beyond provisions for training 
recruits. In some cases, APLA units undertook attacks armed with weapons from the 
Transkei. Mphahlele related: 
Transkeian soldiers and police were the main source of weapons for 
ApIa. Polite Xuma and Sandile Njikelane brought us a lot of arms and 
ammunition from members of the Transkei Defence Force based in 
50 Truth and Reconciliation Commission Amnesty Hearing, 13 October 1998, Phakamele Cishe, Port 
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Umtata. Misile Stemela and Sichumiso Nonxuba regularly fetched 
grenades and ammunition from members of TDF Special Forces 
stationed in Port St Johns. I was once approached by the Transkeian 
police in Sterkspruit, offering to lend ApIa their service arms. They 
said we could use the weapons for a mission and return them after the 
operation. They were disappointed when I told them the arrangement 
would compromise them- anything could happen to those arms, and if 
they landed in the hands of the Boers they would be traced back to 
their origin. However, ApIa operatives in Sterkspruit enjoyed the 
support of the Transkei police and army. 53 
Beyond armaments, APLA cadres also held a degree of freedom when in the 
Transkei. The apartheid government had given the area independence, and so 
sometimes support for APLA included protection from the South African police and a 
safe place from which to launch attacks into South Africa. Occasionally an APLA 
cadre might even get Transkei police protection when moving through parts of South 
Africa. Mphahlele remembered his experiences with the Transkeian police: 
Earlier, when I was arrested at a police roadblock in Thabalesoba in 
Herschel with rifles, grenades and ammunition, I was taken to 
Sterkspruit police station. On learning that I was an ApIa cadre, the 
station commander, Phenduka, invited me to join him and other senior 
police officers for a barbeque . . . After the feast of meat, the 
commander of the local riot squad, Captain Skwatsha, took me to his 
home, where I spent three days. He then drove me to Umtata through 
hostile South African territory. He assured me that no South African 
Boer would dare arrest me, because I was under Transkeian protection. 
To quell my fears, he gave me a fully loaded gun with spare 
magazines, and said in the event of South African Boers attempting to 
arrest me, we would both fight them. We arrived in Umtata safely and 
government officials returned the weapons to ApIa. When Thapelo 
Maseko and I were arrested with a large quantity of weapons at a 
roadblock in Umtata, we identified ourselves as ApIa and were 
immediately released. The weapons were returned to ApIa the 
following day. 54 
With the support of some members of the Transkeian army and police, APLA had a 
valuable ally to assist them in their struggle. Homemade weapons also augmented 
their capacity to carry out operations. Mphahlele noted: 
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The fighters struggled to get arms, but that didn't dampen their spirits. 
Instead they made petrol bombs, and spiked PVC pipes with nails- to 
throw across roads when retreating after an attack. At the time the 
armed struggle was abandoned, ApIa cadres were developing a petrol 
bomb launcher. We realised late in the day that in guerrilla warfare, 
every fighter had to be a weapon manufacturer. 55 
With the constant recruitment and training of new members inside the country 
came the need for more weapons and funds for the APLA cadres to conduct 
operations. One crucial task for the soldiers was that of "repossession." APLA 
cadres often lacked the reliable supply lines that benefited their MK counterparts. 
Though the leadership recognised the necessity of funding and supplies for the 
operatives, they were often unable to follow through. One report on a meeting of the 
PAC central committee in 1982 noted: 
The defence department needed funds to lay the infrastructure in 
Azania. This has not materialised because of lack of funds . . . The 
grand total of defence budget is $8.8 million [this is the amount 
needed, not the amount available]. This was itemized under transport, 
reconnaissance, infiltration etc. Money was to be sent to the front 
posts at the three operational areas: Botswana, Lesotho and Zimbabwe. 
Each bank account was to have deposits of$100,000 for a start. At the 
rear base readily available liquid cash was needed so as to be infiltrated 
over a certain period. Money for transport, couriers, self-help projects 
was needed ... These needs are only for the start. When the flow 
starts we will probably need more. 56 
Despite the early recognition of the funds needed to carry out the armed struggle, the 
organisation remained unable to raise them. Even the assistance from the Transkei 
could only support certain units, predominantly operating in the Eastern Cape. APLA 
training emphasised the Chinese style of guerrilla warfare, focusing specifically on 
self-reliance. When originally infiltrated into South Africa, the soldiers usually 
brought some weapons and money, but once inside they normally had to fend for 
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themselves. With the exponential increase of their ranks through the recruitment and 
training system inside South Africa, the need for weapons and funds to equip new 
units became vital. With the Pan-Africanist Congress' stance that Africa had been 
robbed of land, resources, and wealth, repossession meant the reclaiming of what was 
rightfully theirs. In this way, APLA units often repossessed arms and money from the 
"settlers" or white people, as well as their agents, in order to carry out their struggle. 
Policemen and farmers came at the top of the list of enemies targeted by the 
APLA units, and since both groups carried or owned weapons, the natural progression 
of these attacks allowed for both a legitimate target and a source of arms and funds. 
One man related an operation to the TRC: 
We were at the Katlehong Police Station. I had conducted 
reconnaissance from Monday to Thursday. What happened was that we 
had not targeted Mr Mashamahite specifically. We had targeted any 
policeman who would come out of the police station whether alone or 
in groups. Therefore on the 21st of January, the Thursday, we were 
standing nearby there and he came out at about four and he proceeded 
towards the direction of the swimming pool. We immediately followed 
him and there were three of us. And as he approached the swimming 
pool I decided to rush so that when he actually emerges out of that 
place I will be in front of him and Gift and the other person will be 
following him from behind. I rushed and as he came I drew my gun 
and I pointed my firearm at him. And the only thing he attempted to 
do, he tried to grab me so I shot him and as he fell Eugene and Gift 
advanced. One of them removed his gun and at that time I was on the 
lookout for anybody who might approach. We removed that gun and 
retreated. 57 
In an operation of this nature, units were able to target an enemy policeman and 
provide weapons for their newly formed unit: 
After killing Mr Mashamahite, I reported the incident to my highest 
commanders. I told them that I had killed a policeman and the gun that 
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we removed from him, we had just opened a unit in Katlehong, 
therefore we needed weapons and the way to obtain such weapons 
would be to kill and disarm policemen, and I would inform the chief 
director of national operations of how my unit was operating, and they 
will decide how they handle the matter. 58 
Another man recalled his transition from trainee to soldier and the need to capture 
weapons from the enemy: 
Well in the night they used to, okay they used to train us in small 
weapons ... these small sub machine guns and AKs. They train and 
train and train and train and train. Then after sometime, after two 
months or four months, they gain confidence in you, we used to raid 
the police stations in our townships, and take arms there, we'd disarm 
them and take arms. Because they told us they train, they have their 
own arms so we must get our own and the way we get our own, is to 
take them from the police so we used to raid police stations most of the 
time . .. so we used to raid these police stations and disarm, ja, arm 
the people, liberate our area, disarm the enemy and arm the people. So 
we used to disarm the police, when we see them patrolling, then we'd 
disarm them. 59 
Attacks on farmers yielded similar results. While often vilified for attacking 
. white civilians in the form of farmers, APLA saw this group as legitimate targets. 
The Chief of Staff for APLA in the 1990s, Barney Hlatswayo, explained the targeting 
of farmers: 
And then the next target then, although officially not sanctioned at the 
highest level was to target the farmers. Again this stems from the 
belief and the theories to the philosophy of land as being the most 
important thing and that the war was basically the war over the land 
rights . . . but remember also in our own understanding, the white 
community was not purely or cleanly a civilian, because they were 
forced by the law that they should have either been conscripts, served 
for a certain period in the military, and then they were necessarily the 
reserve of the defence force. So they were part of the military structure 
so in that light then really one had no problem in targeting them 
because surely if you take the commando system, it's more of local 
people in their area guarding their own property and so on. But they 
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were issued weapons by the defence force and directly or indirectly 
they were still a commando.6o 
As the fanners often received weapons from the South African anny and formed 
commando units, APLA considered them targets and seized their weapons to advance 
their own operations. One man recalled such an operation: 
So I was caught in that kind of a situation and at the same time we 
were harassing fanners. Making the situation unbearable for them ... 
You know sometimes, you'd bum a fann, bum the crop and attack and 
confiscate his weapons and money of course, because according to our 
programme that was repossession.61 
Another man explained an operation to the TRC. They attacked a fann, captured the 
fanner and his wife, and demanded weapons and money. They received two fireanns 
and a trunk full of money, which were then used to support future operations.62 
APLA units also stole cars to use in the execution of attacks. In that way, operations 
and repossession tasks combined both to attack the enemy and provide resources for 
the units. 
While this was the general policy for all APLA units, the commanders singled 
one unit out particularly as a repossession unit. This unit focused on seizing weapons 
and funds from the enemy on a larger scale. Many attacks on annoured cars came 
under their operations, or they would attack white shops or white people and take the 
money to fund operations. One man explained: 
The unit that was termed the repossession unit was the special unit 
which was formulated by the PAC as well as the high commander of 
APLA and our main job functions were to repossess, especially money, 
cars, jewellery, every article or item that was valuable in order to 
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generate income for APLA and to be able to buy arms and ammunition 
in order to further our struggle. 63 
When his unit successfully gained money or other items, he would take them to 
Botswana and hand them over to commanders there. If the money was not enough to 
cover a trip that far, then it would be used to fund further operations of his unit.64 The 
general rule in APLA was that money seized in an attack went to the unit commander, 
and then if large amounts are involved, the money went to a higher commander for 
distribution to more units. The armed robberies carried out by some APLA units 
became a point of contention. The media and other organisations branded the APLA 
cadres as criminals, and many struggled to get amnesty for their operations from the 
TRC in later years. Hlatswayo explained the policy of armed robberies: 
Yes, the other aspect we also mentioned in the Truth and 
Reconciliation Committee, was also the question of the armed 
robberies. And for sure, being a poor organisation we never saw that 
as a crime. For us to be able t  expand, to sUPfs0rt, the growing 
numbers, we had to look at other alternative sources. 5 
These alternative sources often supported the units, but many APLA cadres 
still find a stigma attached to them for their repossession activities. This lack of 
weapons and funds, and the policy of repossession sometimes backfired. Without 
adequate support from their parent organisation, many APLA cadres found 
themselves destitute, and a few even abandoned the struggle and turned to crime. 
Mphahlele recalled visits to various units: 
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Cadres were literally starving. They complained that most PAC 
members were not taking care of them- a fact 1 was later to establish 
myself. Members urged the cadres to commit robberies to survive. 
When they refused to do that, they were called cowards who were 
beaten by mere criminals who had not been given military training 
abroad. It's a sad record that during the nineties ApIa suffered more 
casualties on 'repossession missions' than on combat with the enemy.66 
While many repossession operations were legitimate, some APLA cadres· did descend 
into criminality as a result of their lack of support. 
Evasion of the police always worried the minds of the APLA cadres. 
Sometimes blatant admittance to other crimes was enough to keep people from 
reporting a cadre to the police as a terrorist. One man remembered using this strategy: 
We were using taxis ... which was a risk, but we managed because we 
used to suffer on the way. Sometimes the driver would say, "I suspect 
you guys, you look like terrorists." And then 1 would say, no, we are 
smugglers. And fortunately for us we had about four, two 
whatyoucallit, something like diamonds, I've forgotten their names, 
two red stones and blue stones, two blue ones, two red ones. So we'd 
tell the guy no, look, we are selling these. So he said, it's fine. 
Because at that time if you had a guerrilla in your [taxi] or a terrorist, is 
what we used to be called by the system, you'll get a high sentence. 67 
Hiding in plain sight was a risky strategy, but often a successful one. The same man 
remembered living on a farm when farmers were at the alert: "Then Fort Beaufort, 
that's where we were operating from. We were living in a farm. And the owner of 
the farm, it was a boer.,,68 Another man recalled living in the backyard of a house 
where a policeman lived. A fellow APLA cadre stayed with him and their rent was 
paid by a sympathetic group: 
They even paid the rent for the backroom he shared with me, from 
which I'd peep out and see a police uniform flapping on the washing 
66 Mphahiele, 144. 
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line. Under our bed there would be AK47 rifles and plenty of 
ammunition. Nothing could have been better than that- being housed 
by a member of the police force, who didn't know what we were 
doing. 69 
Mlambo recalled a particularly successful cover story: 
I remember a story of one comrade . . . he spent time in the 
underground, several years,. it could be four years or so, and he had 
even taken up some job just to give himself cover ... and when he was 
ultimately arrested, the boer for which he was working for was saying 
"no you are making a terrible mistake, this man is not a terrorist, etc. 
etc." So the question of camouflage and working quietly amongst the 
people.7o 
In most cases, however, cadres had to choose their lodging carefully and attempt to 
stay under the radar of security forces and informers. Dividing up a unit was one way 
to do this. One operative recalled: 
For instance, if it happened that they arrested one of our soldiers, we 
do not accommodate ourselves in only one house. We separate our 
units. We were six, divided in tw s. Two guys will be in their own 
house which is known only by the commander ... We only meet when 
we supposed to conduct an operation. 71 
This strategy limited the effectiveness of police action and allowed for the 
continuation of a unit's operations even if some cadres were caught. The same soldier 
remembered the policy of preparing for attacks: 
The only person who liaise with us is the commander. The soldiers do 
not know exactly what their mission will be, nor when the mission will 
be executed. They only wait for the commander to tell them, 'Prepare 
yourself, we are now going' ... In fact, the reasons for the commander 
not to disclose or not to tell the soldiers is for . . . security . . . I might 
discuss with my soldiers that on a particular date we will be going to 
operate on the area so and so and so. Maybe it happened that the 
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person might be arrested and then he will disclose all that information 
and then the mission will fail. 72 
Security was always a vital consideration for the units. 
Communications were also a crucial aspect of APLA operations. From the 
newest recruit starting with a unit for the first time up through the echelons to the high 
command of APLA, communication was vital to coordinate attacks, identify targets, 
report on operations, and organise supplies, funds, and support. However, often units 
had to fend for themselves and lines of communication were difficult to maintain. 
The structure of APLA aimed for every unit to have a commander, commissar, and 
logistics person, but in the 1990s, when recruitment and training inside South Africa 
grew by leaps and bounds, this was often not possible. Each unit would have a 
commander, and then local and regional commanders above them, then a Director of 
Operations in charge of all activities inside the country, then the high command 
situated in exile. While most APLA soldiers recalled reporting to their immediate or 
regional commanders, and occasionally to the Director of Operations, communication 
with the high command was much more difficult. Cadres usually reported on their 
operations to their immediate commander in person, though occasionally via phone or 
written report. One man recalled: 
The question of the written report would take a lot of time. It will 
require maybe three days to reach their place. Sometimes I have to go 
there and report in myself, in my person in front of them. Sometimes I 
have to use the phone as there, as it is a fast way of communication. 
So, in this incident, I used the phone. 73 
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On the ground, APLA recruits received the basics of the political stance and 
APLA policy, then carried out operations on their own. APLA's Chief of Staff, 
Barney Hlatswayo, explained that the upper levels of leadership had communication, 
largely through student couriers, and met four times a year with the high command. 
The exile-based commanders would also visit South Africa to communicate wjth the 
internal commanders. Telephones also featured as methods of communication, but 
not for sensitive issues.74 But at the lower level of the units operating on the ground, 
communication was largely non-existent. APLA's hearing with the TRC noted: 
And we have indicated here, that from that level downwards, 
cortununication was very, very difficult. Not only communication but 
the level of skills seemed to deteriorate- rather as it went down towards 
the what's-you-call-it, the ground operative.75 
Given the lack of communication, APLA operatives often found themselves without 
support from their parent organisation, and sometimes their attacks even faced 
condemnation from the PAC leadership. Mphahlele, the Director of Operations at the 
time, explained his feelings about the communication problems and lack of support: 
I have mixed feelings, if you are a child you enjoy if you are not 
having responsible parents, because they don't check if you are doing 
your homework, if you are doing this, you feel freer you know, if your 
parents are not responsible. So in the PAC we had that joy you know, 
that we derived from that lawlessness, you know and lack of discipline 
from the leaders, because they would give you money without asking 
what you have done with the money, so that is the things that, you feel 
that they have given you more room to manoeuvre. But on a serious 
note, when you see that we are going nowhere, then it was very 
difficult. Difficult in the sense that, when the ANC was deploying its 
cadres in the country, it would budget for them, and they would get 
periodic supplies, and their reports and everything would be 
monitored. But with us they just said, go inside the country, see how 
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you survive, and as a result we had many cadres involved in armed 
robberies, in criminal activities, and at some stage you know we lost 
more APLA cadres during robberies than during combat. 76 
He also remembered the problems that came with distrust between the leadership and 
the cadres on the ground in the aftermath of the leadership crisis: 
We had this problem, we had a big gulf between the cadres and the 
leadership. In the majority of cases the cadres would pretend to be 
loyal to the leaders, so long as they were in Tanzania, or in the camps, 
but as soon as they were unleashed, or thrown into South Africa, they 
would immediately not communicate because they did not trust their 
leaders, and unfortunately for a long time PAC never had a serious 
leadership. We had people who were just exhibitionists, ultimate 
clowns, people that one would feel you are risking your life if you are 
reporting your operations inside the country to them. But all you can 
do is, you know, falsify you know, t1J.at in case he's working for the 
enemy, he should give the enemy that piece of false information. So 
that was the problem through and through. 77 . 
This lack of trust often saw justification in the .eyes of the cadres when the leadership 
withheld their complete support: 
So conveniently for them they said cadres on the ground can choose 
targets for themselves. And maybe people on the ground, we chose 
targets for ourselves, and controversial targets for that matter, in the 
eyes of the world, and the leadership condemned you know, those 
operations. But when we confront them, why did you condemn it, they 
say for diplomatic reasons, for these reasons, etc. So that again was 
something that we had anticipated all along, that a war is just a 
continuation of politics by other means, and if you were politically 
indecisive, you cannot wage a decisive war.78 
This became particularly problematic in the early 1990s, when APLA units carried 
out attacks on white civilians that led to large amounts of news coverage and debate. 
One internal report from the time explained the problem: 
We agreed that the King Williams Town [discussed below] and other 
incidents were badly handled and that, among other things, lack of 
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consultation on a matter or action that constituted a departure from 
PAC's tradition, policy and norms of behaviour contributed to the 
confusion that became endemic with all sorts of statements.79 
Though these attacks often faced condemnation even from the PAC leadership, they 
inspired many of the more militant South Africans and raised support for APLA 
among the masses. 
The varied tasks of an APLA unit led them to carry out a number of operations 
of different types and use their own discretion to establish targets. Many applicants 
for amnesty to the PAC noted a IS-point code that dictated their behaviour, 
particularly towards the masses among whom they operated. The code read: 
1. Do not surrender to the enemy or hand over arms or information; 
2. Do not make a [false] statement or accusation in all your reports; 
3. Obey orders in all your actions; 
4. Do not focibl[y] take or demand anything from the masses of the 
people; 
5. Report and surrender to your officers everything that is either 
captured from the enemy or collected from the people; 
6. Speak politely to all persons; 
7. Pay fairly for all you buy; 
8. Return in good condition anything you borrow; 
9. Pay for or rei ace anything you damage; 
10. Do not hit or insult people; 
11. Do not misuse or damage people's private or public property; 
12. Do not take unfair advantage over anyone; 
13. Men should not take liberties with women, and women should not 
use femin[ ine] beauty or charm to lure men into compromising 
situation; 
14. Do not ill-treat captives or anyone in your charge, and 
15. Do not malinger or l[o]iter around.so 
One man explained his operations when deployed in 1992: 
In August we attacked off duty soldiers in Ga-Mothapo killing one and 
injuring the other . . . In October myself and three recruits of which 
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one was later sent to Transkei went on a fundraising mission and killed 
a farmer and his wife in a poultry farm near Bendron in the Bochum 
area ... In December I together with Sporo and two SDU's went to 
Zonke squatter Camp where Inkatha people were killing PAC 
members and attacked an Inkatha base killing three IFP members All 
the other operations that followed were targeted to the Internal 
Stability Unit of the SAP that was killing the people of Thokoza and 
were not specific APLA operations.8l 
During this period the man was also recruiting new members, training them, and 
sending them to various places to operate. 82 Another man recalled that his unit 
mainly focused on farmers but also sabotaged government buildings, attacked police 
stations, and seized arms from the police. 83 Each operation also required careful 
reconnaissance. One man's unit focused on getting information on strategic enemy 
installations so that. they could attack: "We used to do political campaigns, and just 
sabotage. Stealing weapons from police stations, getting a connection somewhere 
where there's military hardware, like police stations, and getting some information 
from places like Koeberg, this place here, or other relevant places of importance.,,84 
Cadres also used insiders as a source of information for attacks. If the target were a 
farm, a soldier would befriend one of the farm workers. If a country club, they talked 
to the staff. If a unit planned to hit a police station, one operative would report a 
false crime in order to see the layout of the station and the number and distribution of 
the officers. One man explained his process: 
In fact, to be an APLA soldier you had to be so flexible. It was so 
difficult for the police to identify us, because we wore clothes that are 
similar to those weared by the civilians . . . We are so young as you 
have noticed ... So it is difficult to identify exactly that person is a 
81 Report of an operative dated 20 July 1994, name of the operative and the commander are simply the 
initials M. and R. respectively. 
82 Report of an operative dated 20 July 1994, name of the operative and the commander are simply the 
initials M. and R. respectively. 
83 von den Steinen, Interview with Joyi. 











soldier. The same applies when we conduct our reconnaissance. You 
will think that I am just having some looks or I am just looking for a 
job, so sometimes the police had difficulties in identifying our units.85 
The APLA cadres had diversified skills and the leeway needed to decide on targets 
and plan operations. A unit had to be able to vary its approach, and attack police, 
soldiers, and farmers, recruit and train new members, defend against the violence 
going on in the townships, and adapt to any conditions they came upon. Some units 
even had their own traditions. One man remembered his unit's preparations for 
attacks: 
In fact, it is an old, old thing that were used even by Shaka and those 
heroes, the late heroes. They used to sing a song before attacking that 
particular place. So we also do the same thing. Before we go to our 
target, we boost our morale by singing songs and make sure that 
everyone is comfortable. Even when we share our firearms, we spread 
our firearms; if we are spreading them [ on] the table, we spread them 
here, you will take a firearm which you will feel is comfortable for 
you. Then as a commander you will ask your forces ... 'Everybody is 
he comfortable? Everybody is he ready?' Then you will command a 
unit, a happy unit. No one had a fear in that unit. They all accept what 
might happen during the course of the operation. 86 
While the PAC's policies were non-racial and allowed membership for all 
Africans, defining anyone who owed their primary allegiance to Africa and accepted 
the idea of majority rule as Africans, in practice the membership was predominantly 
black and African. Though the PAC had a white member representing them in 
Algeria87 four years before the ANC allowed whites to become members, in practice 
few white people joined the PAC. Mphahlele remembered the issue of white 
membership arising while he was in prison in Botswana: 
85 Luvuyo Kulman, quoted in Foster, Haupt, and de Beer, 246. 
86 Luvuyo Kulman, quoted in Foster, Haupt, and de Beer, 247. 
87 Patrick Duncan, a former Liberal Party member. For more information on Duncan, see Driver, C.J. 











We established that ANC cadres warned the whites who entered the 
prison against PAC racism ... Truth is that white people are allowed 
into the PAC. In recent years Dr Costa Gazi, for example, left the 
ANC to join the PAC. Even after Pedro, a White man and an ApIa 
operative visited us in prison before we were convicted, the ANC 
cadres continued to spread the lie that we excluded whites from our 
ranks . . . However, the PAC hasn't done enough to recruit white 
members. 88 
APLA Chief of Staff Barney Hlatswayo remembered three white APLA cadres, but 
all worked for the external mission in exile, and he does not remember any white 
cadres who worked inside South Africa. 89 More APLA cadres came from the so-
called "coloured" population, particularly in the Western Cape. Qibla, a militant 
Muslim organisation, for example, had a long-standing relationship with and 
cooperated with the PAC and APLA, and even received training through their efforts. 
Many other "coloured" people also joined APLA as individuals. Women were 
welcome in APLA, but few joined. One source suggested that APLA had 200 female 
members in total.90 Hlatswayo estimated that as much as 25% of APLA cadres 
trained externally were women, but the majority saw deployment in administration 
structures or went to study abroad. During his stay in Tanzania from 1979-1980, he 
recalls only ten or fewer women in a camp in the Mbeya region. He remembered that 
a few APLA women insisted on deployment inside South Africa, stood their ground, 
and received it, and paid them tribute for their strong convictions.91 While women 
trained just as men did, some concessions were made. A document laying out the 
procedure for corporal punishment of indisciplined APLA cadres noted that while 
88 Mphahlele, 130-131. 
89 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Brigadier General Barney Hlatswayo, 5 February 2007, telephone 
interview supplementary to earlier interviews. 
90 Mashike, Lephophotho and Mafole Mokalobe. (2003). Reintegration into Civilian Life: The case of 
former MK. and APLA combatants. In Track Two, Vol. 12, Nos. 1 and 2, 14. This estimate was 
provided by a senior APLA Veterans Association Official. 











physical discipline was warranted in some cases: ''No female member of the PAC 
shall under any circumstances undergo corporal punishment of any kind.,,92 When it 
came to deployment however, women rarely got the opportunity to operate inside 
South Africa. One prominent PAC member explained that women most often worked 
as couriers, in communications, or in security. 93 APLA publications note one 
prominent woman who participated in Poqo in the 1960s94 and two who died in battle 
in the 1980s. In 1986, Lesotho troops attacked a unit of six APLA cadres in Qacha's 
Nek near the South African border, including a woman named Boniswa Ncukana,95 
and early reports from the Lichtenburg battle between APLA cadres and the South 
African police claimed one of the APLA soldiers killed in the fight was female.96 
Despite an open policy, PAC official statements and documents often take a very 
patriarchal attitude towards women. In the special hearing on APLA for the TRC, one 
PAC participant explained: 
ApIa has a record of treating the women well and equally. I know 
there are some instances where it is reported that women were abused 
in the liberation movements camps. In the ApIa camps there is no 
record of that happening. Instead our young men married those girls 
that they loved and some of them sitting behind me have the wives 
who are comrades in arms. We have this on record and I think we are 
proud of that record that we kept our ladies as ladies and when we 
loved them and they loved us we married them.97 
92 Corporal Punishment (C.P.) in the PAC, as a Disciplinary Measure, February 1986. 
93 Conversation with Mxolisi "Ace" Mxgashe, 5 July 2006. 
94 Mazambane, Willie. (no date). And it's Aluta Continua for PAC's Nomvo Booi, a former POQO 
fighter. In Azania Woman, Special Issue, 6-7. 
95 Toboti, Waters (1986). PAC woman leaves indelible imprint on Azania battlefield. InAzania 
Combat, Issue 1, 16. 
96 (no date). A woman among PAC fighters, in Azania Woman, Special Issue, 3 and 5. 
97 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Armed Forces Hearing, PACt APLA, 7 October 1997, Cape 











While women did train and occasionally operate as APLA cadres, their deployment 
was limited and many did not get the chance to participate as fully as their male 
comrades. 
APLA in the 1990s 
When F.W. De Klerk announced the unbanning of the ANC and PAC and the· 
release of Nelson Mandela and other imprisoned leaders on 2 February 1990, the 
beginning of the end of the apartheid government commenced. However, many 
people distrusted the government's motives for the negotiations that started soon 
afterwards. The early 1990s saw unprecedented violence inside South Africa, which 
took the form of rival black political organisations attacking each other's members. 
The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) members clashed with members of the ANC and 
their staunch ally the United Democratic Front (UDF) in many areas and, to a·lesser 
degree, members of the PAC. Later years confirmed the apartheid government's 
involvement in arming, training, and supporting IFP forces. ANC and PAC members 
also clashed in some townships. Suspicion of the motives of the apartheid 
government predominated, and their position of military strength upon their entry to 
the negotiations was worrisome. The PAC saw an opportunity to win support in the 
early 1990s. Bilateral negotiations between the ANC and the South African 
government left them out of the "talks about talks" and they decided to make their 
own way in the new political environment. While the ANC suspended the armed 
struggle in 1990, APLA continued to operate until 1994. APLA attacks increased, 












APLA in 1990,98 and a 34% jump in police deaths in APLA attacks in 1991.99 One 
author asserted: 
Certainly, before 1990, the PAC's military made only a minor 
contribution to a guerrilla insurgency, the historical importance of 
which was to be chiefly symbolic. In the years which followed, 
though, their scale of operations and the fo0litical impact of these began 
to rival Umkhonto's earlier deployment. 00 
The PAC stood against the type of negotiations commencing, as they 
explained in an article in 1993: 
• The present negotiations will not automatically lead to the transfer of 
power from the minority to the majority. The talks, it says, are 
intended to entrench white minority 
• Precisely because of this, the PAC believes armed struggle should 
continue until a "mutual cessation of hostilities" is declared with the 
government 
• Until this happens, the PAC intends to stay in negotiations with one 
main purpose: To point out the dangers to the other participants. 101 
The PAC also called for a closely monitored process to keep control of the process 
out of the hands of the apartheid government: 
The PAC has also demanded a transitional authority in the run-up to 
constituent assembly elections. It sees this authority as being made up 
of representatives from the liberation movements and the existing 
government, with some international participation. The body will take 
over control of the budget, electoral Erocesses, state media and security 
forces during the transitional period. 02 
98 (1990). 'APLA is killing ten SA cops a month' says report. In Azania Combat, Issue No. 11,6. 
99 (1992).150 policemen are killed as PAC guerillas intensify the war. InAzania Commando, 
supplement to Azania Combat, 5. 
100 Lodge, Soldiers of the Storm, 115. 
101 Mantzaris, Evange10s. (1993 September). Trying to keep out of being too far in. In Work in 
Progress, 16. 











The emphasis on land that had served them well over the years and had drawn many 
adherents also came up in their rhetoric, and they insisted that redistribution of land 
needed addressing in any legitimate negotiations: 
High on the agenda of the Constituent Assembly must be the land 
question, which is the core of our struggle. We note that the present 
"ownership" of that land by the settlers is provided for in the present 
South African Constitution. The Contituent Assembly, as adopted and 
formally endorsed by the PAC, will leave the settlers with no basis 
upon which to cling to that land and, therefore, to power. 103 
With the strength of the ANC at the time, and their burgeoning negotiations with the 
government, the PAC had to find a way to capture the masses' attention and gain 
strength for the organisation. One way to do this was to continue the ~ed struggle 
after the ANC abandoned it. 
The justification for continuing the armed struggle featured in many PAC 
statements at the time. They asserted: 
We cannot just be told by F.W.de K1erk and his regime that we must 
stop fighting. Who are they to give us orders? We believe that there 
should be a negotiated mutual cessation of hostilities, and we have 
defined such cessation as "the stopping of war and achievement of 
peace." The process of the mutual cessation of hostilities must include 
joint monitoring of all armed formations during the transitional period, 
under a neutral authority. This should also involve international 
scrutiny and through investigation of the location and size of the 
weapons now in the hands of the South African Defence Force 
(SAD F), the police and other security forces. 104 
More succinctly, the PAC and APLA often pronounced: "We cannot abandon the 
bullet until the ballot is secured.,,10S In a time of increased violence in the townships, 
continued police and SADF actions, distrust of the apartheid government, and 
uncertainty about the future, this stance resonated with many South Africans. In an 
103 (1991). APLA backs Consituent Assembly. In Azania Combat, Issue 13,2. 
104 (1993). The war goes on. InAzania Combat, Issue 16,2. 
105 Anny Leadership Discussion Paper on Current Party- Programme, dated 1992. This slogan can also 












additional move, APLA created a Task Force dedicated to the safety of PAC members 
in the time of turmoil. Occasionally, units acted directly to address the problems of 
violence, though the APLA policy was to avoid internecine violence when possible. 
Another popular move on the part of APLA was the continued targeting of 
white people, including many civilians. While condemned soundly by most media, 
the South African government, and many moderate organisations and citizens, this 
aspect of the campaign met with approval from some more militant elements of 
society. The PAC and APLA often expressed their reasoning behind the attacks. In 
one article, the author asserted: "The racist media have made great play that APLA 
was attacking so-called "soft" targets, including children, although there is no 
evidence of this. But as Cde Phama points out black people killed by the regime are 
never considered "soft" targets."I06 After an attack on a golf club in King William's 
Town, an article in the Sowetan agreed: 
But the media, shapers of opinion and society ran "outrage" stories . . . 
for four white deaths when at least 20 other black people died on the 
same weekend. Sure, the white people were dining (harmlessly) in the 
golf club . . . What on earth were the five black people doing in 
stokvels in the Vaal on Sunday night? Plotting the overthrow of white 
domination? No. They were harmlessly enjoying themselves. One 
cannot but conclude from the response of the Government, the police 
and the media (Sowetan included) that indigenous Africans have 
metamorphosed from being inanimate dispensable objects to 
innocuous dispensable people. I07 
Three operations in particular received attention: the attack on the King 
William's Town Golf Club on 27 November 1992, the attack on the st. James Church 
in Cape Town on 25 July 1993, and the attack on the Heide1burg Tavern in Cape 
Town on 30 December 1993. Mphahlele recalled the emphasis of the media on these 
particular incidents: 
106 (1993 July). APLA goes on the offensive. Azania Today, 12. 










On the night of the attack on the tavern, an army base and a police 
station were also attacked by ApIa, but the media, and later the TRC, 
chose to focus on the tavern attack. This was part of the attempt to 
paint ApIa as a bunch of cowards who were good only at attacking 
innocent revellers. 108 
That attack marked a retaliation for an attack on schoolchildren in the Eastern Cape: 
At the time the Heidelberg Tavern was attacked I had issued an order 
suspending. attacks on civilian targets. However, I had waived this 
order after the murder of five schoolchildren by the SADP in Umtata. 
Even then I said the security forces had to be our primary targets. 109 
Though loudly condemned from many sides, these attacks on white civilians proved 
popular with the more militant Africans who took offence at the continuing violence 
in the townships and the slow progress of negotiations. Mphahlele recalled: 
The ApIa attacks on the St James Church and the Heidelberg Tavern in 
1993 had been condemned locally and internationally. The PAC was 
among the first to condemn the attack in the church, and some 
members of the ApIa High Command distanced the guerrilla army 
from the attack. On the other hand, prominent businessmen in Umtata 
gave their nod to the attacks when they delivered large supplies of 
groceries to the ApIa cadres in the town. They always did this after 
any spectacular ApIa operation. 1 10 
Another writer noted African support for the operations: "The PAC observation- that 
it took white deaths to make the government take political violence seriously- struck a 
chord with township dwellers which spread far wider than the traditional support base 
of the PAC."lll In the special hearing on APLA for the TRC, one delegate related: 
Within the oppressed African communities, it was something that was 
seen to be very, very, very right because it was at the time when there 
was a lot of violence committed against ordinary people, innocent 
people, because these people had never undergone any training. They 
were never a threat to anyone, but they were just being massacred, 
senselessly. 112 
108 Mphahlele, 202. 
109 Mphahlele, 202. 
110 Mphahlele, 202. 











The attack on the St James Church, in which 12 people were killed and 148 
wounded,l13 particularly met heated arguments and condemnation. The idea of a 
religious service as a target offended many. But as APLA representatives explained 
to the TRC: "The psyche actually which was informed by the operations of the brutal 
apartheid system, where our people, innocent as they were, were actually attacked in 
churches, attacked in schools, attacks on the roads, attacks in- attacked in buses and 
churches.,,1l4 While contentious and debated, these attacks brought about much 
discussion and brought sympathy and support to the PAC and APLA. One author 
noted: "Opinion polling later suggested that a substantial minority of young people 
living in cities strongly approved of APLA's activities."lls Even today, these attacks 
remain in the minds of people, and still define the public's views of APLA, both 
positively and negatively. 
noted: 
APLA units undertook many other operations during this period. One writer 
In 1992 APLA insurgency more than quadrupled. Newspaper reports 
suggest that its members participated in 45 attacks on, or exchanges of 
fire with, police ... In his new year's address, Sabelo Phama promised 
that 1993 would be 'The Year of the Great Storm'. Police statements 
confirm a significant stepping-up of the scale of operations with 
reports of 142 attacks, the great majority of them, 128, directed at 
farms . . . Twenty eight of these farm attacks were in the Eastern 
Transvaal, a region hitherto unaffected by APLA operations. 116 
112 Truth and Reconciliation Commission Armed Forces Hearing P ACI APLA, 7 October 1997, Cape 
Town Day 1. 
113 Lodge, Soldiers of the Storm, 112. 
114 Truth and Reconciliation Commission Armed Forces Hearing PAC/APLA, 7 October 1997, Cape 
Town Day 1. 
lIS Lodge, Soldiers of the Storm, 114-5. 











Public support for their actions continued to rise, even earning Joas Magolego of the 
Sundowns football team the nickname of "APLA."l17 In the midst of this surge of 
operations and spread of support for APLA, the PAC decided to suspend the armed 
struggle in January 1994. This announcement came as quite a surprise to many 
APLA cadres. Rather than receiving the information directly from their leaders, most 
members heard the announcement through the press. Mphalele remembered the 
moment he heard the announcement: 
'Shh, it's time for the one o'clock news," I said, increasing the volume 
on the radio. The voice of a newsreader droned: "The PAC has 
suspended its armed struggle, the organisation's leader, Mr Clarence 
Makwetu, told a press conference in Johannesburg today." ... "Since 
when does the PAC use the media to communicate with its fighters?" I 
said ... I didn't believe the radio report, and reminded myself that the 
media have always been mischievous, stuffing words into the mouths 
of our leaders to sow confusion and distrust among us. But the evening 
TV news bulletin vindicated the radio reporter. There were Makwetu 
and his lieutenants, dressed in suits and ties, posing in front of cameras 
and a host of journalists and calling off the armed struggle. I IS 
Some APLA attacks continued to occur after the suspension of the struggle. The PAC 
maintained this was a problem of communication because some APLA soldiers had 
not yet heard of the suspension. However, Mphahlele remembered a more considered 
continuation of attacks: 
Everyone agreed to defy the PAC leadership. It was a short meeting, 
and we agreed to formally inform the cadres throughout Azania to 
ignore the order and continue with their operations. On their side, the 
leadership of the PAC didn't condemn the attacks that occurred after 
they suspended the armed struggle . . . The PAC merely attributed 
these to ApIa cadres who had not yet heard of the suspension because 
they were operating in remote areas. I believed we should not suspend 
the armed struggle until we had wrung out some concessions from the 
other side, like amnesty for all ApIa cadres and the release of all those 
who were in prison. 119 
117 von den Steinen, Interview with Mphahlele. 
118 Mphahlele, 170. 











Hlatswayo, the Chief of Staff based in Zimbabwe, recalled the problem: 
And then the political leadership . . . made a decision to suspend the 
anned struggle. But then we had people who did not want to comply. 
Again it was our duty as commanders to ensure that they complied. 
And again the need was there, and again I think my . .. visit was again 
to try and prevail over them and tell them you are only correct if you 
have political cover. If you don't have political cover, then you are 
criminals. And then other members they started appreciating that, and 
the issue of the suspension then became a reality. Only one or two 
incidences after that happened. But on the whole one had to accept 
that even when you say cease fire it does not happen overnight. The 
message must filter through. 120 
In the end, all APLA operations stopped by the time of the first democratic elections 
in South Africa in April 1994. The soldiers then had to find their way in the new 
South Africa. 
Rivals or compatriots? 
Though they fought a common enemy in the apartheid government, the ANC and the 
PAC were rival organisations. They had to compete for international support, 
funding, recruits, and support from the masses. In exile, the two organisations often 
vilified each other in an attempt to secure more support. People who left one 
organisation to join another often faced suspicion and might be branded as spies. In 
the 1990s inside South Africa, in some townships the ANC and PAC supporters 
fought bloody battles with each other. But when it came to the trained MK and 
APLA soldiers on the ground, respect for one another was more common. On 
occasion they even assisted each other or undertook joint operations. 










When in prison, ANC and PAC members often put aside their rivalry and 
became friends. Letlapa Mphahlele remembered the camaraderie in Gaborone 
Central Prison in Botswana. 
News of daring action by both ApIa and MK combatants reached us. 
Our spirits soared when we heard of clashes between Azanian 
guerrillas and the South African forces. One afternoon Radio 
Botswana boomed from the giant prison speakers that MK cadres had 
fought fiercely with the South African forces at a roadblock in 
Lichtenburg in the Western Transvaal. We shook the hands of ANC 
comrades and congratulated them. The whole prison buzzed with the 
news of MK heroism . . . The next day we were itching to read the 
details of the battle of Lichtenburg in the newspapers from South 
Africa. We usually borrowed newspapers from ANC comrades. 
Bongo lent me his newspaper after reading it. He smiled, patted me on 
the shoulder and said, "It was ApIa that fought the Boers in 
Lichtenburg. Well done comrade." The other ANC comrades also 
congratulated US. 121 
Mphahlele also noted the generosity of his ANC compatriots: 
We PAC members rarely got visits and supplies from outside. We 
sponged off ANC cadres, who shared everything with us, including 
their s'mokolo- foodstuffs, especially meat, smuggled from the kitchen 
for the prison currency of cigarettes. I hated it that we had become 
parasites, but I rationalised it by telling myself that everything the 
ANC possessed was raised on behalf of the victims of apartheid, 
including US. 122 
While heated debates often ensued on policy issues and ideology, when they found 
themselves locked up together, MK and APLA soldiers focused on their 
commonalities, rather than their differences. 
On the operational side, some APLA and MK cadres planned andlor carried 
out joint operations. When the ANC suspended the armed struggle, some MK 
members supplied weapons to APLA cadres who were still fighting the apartheid 
government. One man remembered planning an operation with an MK counterpart: 
121 Mphahle1e, 123. 












This comrade . . . was an MK soldier, he said to me, can we please 
make a joint operation. I said yes. That was, to me, very important, it 
was a significant gesture, you know. Of unifying people in Azania. 
But then it never happened because I was arrested before they were 
arrested . . . So that APLA and MK used to be one in some 
operations. 123 
Mphahlele remembered assistance which APLA cadres received from MK soldiers in 
the early 1990s: 
Umkhonto we· Sizwe (MK) gave us limpet mines, a bazooka and an 
assortment of arms and ammunition. ApIa regional commander Polite 
Xuma was the link between ApIa and MK and he received the 
consignment. He also arranged for MK comrades to train ApIa cadres 
in the handling, transportation and setting of limpet mines. One of the 
people that were trained was Hasp's brother Vuyani Namba. he 
successfully used a limpet mine in Queenstown, but was killed by one 
in Durban. The bazooka was used by a unit of five ApIa cadres against 
a petrol depot in East London.124 
Mphahlele elaborated in an interview: 
It was highly commendable. Actually it was done at a time when the 
two political parties were at each other's throats. On the ground they 
were killing one another but thanks to [sic] maturity prevailed. They 
felt that they should help us in the operations but that would be 
disobedience to their political leaders who had suspended the armed 
struggle. But they gave us the weapons that they had. They not only 
gave us to hit, but we did not have training of Russian limpet mines, so 
they would train our cadres for that. So there was that close 
cooperation. 125 
The APLA Chief of Staff, Barney Hlatswayo, also confirmed the cooperation. He 
received several reports about cooperation, particularly the arming of APLA units by 
MK soldiers in the early 1990s.126 Despite the ongoing enmity between the two 
organisations, the soldiers of MK and APLA showed respect and support for each 
other, recognising their common cause and enemy. 
123 von den Steinen, Interview with Joyi. 
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Though its operational presence inside South Africa became effective only in the mid-
1980s, APLA left a clear mark on the history of the struggle in South Africa. Their 
more militant attacks on security personnel, farmers, and white civilians led both to 
support from many parts of the black population, and condemnation from more 
moderate and white parts of society. Many strikes remain controversial, and their 
memories intrinsically link with the APLA name. Despite less support from exile, 
unreliable supply lines, and often lack of communication, the APLA cadres soldiered 
on in the face of difficultY,and continued to attack the apartheid government. Their 
star rose in the early 1990s, as the only organisation still actively fighting, and their 
actions drew many sympathisers and supporters. The political arm of the PAC 
remained ineffectual, and any sympathy and support people felt for APLA's 
operations did not translate into votes. It would have taken a miracle to challenge the 
juggernaut of the ANC and Nelson Mandela's bid for the presidency. In the end, the 
ANC emerged triumphant as the first democratically elected government of South 
Africa, and the PAC languished in the elections, winning less than two percent of the 
votes. The APLA soldiers then had to find their way in the uneasy peace and 






















Now that the dust has settled on the grubby roads of the townships, the 
battle is over. The distinctive "mellow yellow" police Casspirs have 
long since withdrawn and activists no longer fear the dreaded 4am 
Security Branch knock on the front door. Yet the war is not yet won. 
There are combatants who survived the armed struggle who have been 
unable to find a place in South Africa's new army and are still battling 
for some form of recognition; others are already on the slippery slope 
downhill. Still others have long since crumbled under the strain of 
unemployment. 1 
Introduction 
On February 2, 1990, F. W. De Klerk delivered a speech that shocked the world. He 
announced the imminent release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, and 
the unbanning of the ANC, PAC, and the Communist Party. Though secret 
negotiations had been going on for several years between the ANC and the apartheid 
government, this was the first most people heard of a possible negotiated solution to 
the struggle between liberation movements and the apartheid government. As 
recently as 1985, one document submitted to the leadership in Lusaka noted that 
people working against the liberation movement were spreading false rumours about 
possible negotiations and that this idea was abhorrent and would never come to pass.2 
In exile, the speech was largely unexpected, particularly for the rank and file of the 
liberation movements. In a matter of months, circumstances changed dramatically. 
The ANC leadership returned to South Africa, and the suspension of the armed 
struggle in 1990 led to many ANC and MK members beginning to go back from 
1991. The PAC's circumstances differed: while some of its political leaders returned 
to South Africa soon after the speech, most of APLA's leadership and cadres 
1 Fakier, Yazeed. (1998). Jobless MK. fight poverty. In Grappling with change, Cape Town: Idasa, 
Cape Times, Western Cape Education Department, 94. 











remained in exile or operated underground inside South Africa until 1994, as their 
armed struggle continued. 
This was a period of great upheaval and change, and proved a difficult 
transition for many people. As time went on and people returned to South Africa or 
normalised their situations inside the country, many more problems emerged, and the 
transition to a democratically elected government did not bring the results the soldiers 
expected. The integration of liberation forces, homeland armies, and the South 
African Defense Force (SADF) proved problematic for many. The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) process was often flawed and contentious. After 
many years of dependence on their organizations, many soldiers struggled to adapt to 
the need to provide for themselves. As the years have gone on, problems remain 
unresolved. Support from the government and development programmes are limited, 
though some ex-soldiers have created non-governmental organizations to address 
their problems. Even today, many former MK and APLA soldiers live in a state of 
abject poverty and lack employment and opportunities for further education or for the 
psychological and physical care some greatly need. For these people who were 
willing to give their lives, and who did give years of their lives for the hope of a better 
situation in South Africa, the "new" South Africa is fraught with problems. 3 
The situation in MK 
F W De Klerk's speech surprised most ANC and MK cadres. Many were flat out 
shocked when the announcement came. Some were in the middle of training 
3 While many studies have been done on the situation of ex- MK. and APLA soldiers, and several are 
quoted in this chapter, one in particular made an effort to use the ex-soldiers' own words to tell their 
stories. For this reason, Sasha Gear's (2002). Wishing Us Away: Challenges facing ex-combatants in 
the 'new' South Africa, Violence and Transition Series, Vol. 8, Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation, is cited extensively in this chapter. All of the studies cited reached similar conclusions, 











programmes when they heard, and were in countries so far away that the news 
received minimal coverage. One woman remembers being in Russia when the news 
arrived and how little they focused on this announcement: 
I was not aware. Because what I, what was happening in Russia, it 
was during that time of the, the war between Iran and Iraq, so you 
know the whole world was interested in the Middle East, what was 
happening in the Middle East. So the only news we heard about South 
Africa was the question of negotiations, Mande1a is out, it ends there. 
So I was not interested about that because that will make me homesick, 
the only thing we were interested was the question of the Middle East, 
you know, we used to, to know what was happening there. Russians 
were not familiar with the, the South African history and the South 
African news. And most of them, they went to Middle East and came 
back so they used to brief us what was happening over there, so we 
used to take sides, you know, against America and all that. So that was 
the feeling in Russia.4 
Others recall a great feeling of elation. One man who was in Zimbabwe when the 
announcement came remembered: "In February 1990 when we heard the news, none 
of us could believe it. We had a huge party that night."s Some members felt let down 
when they heard about the peaceful negotiations. After so much training and planning 
for taking the country by force, the announcement of negotiations was an anti-climax. 
One man expressed his expectation, which was very common: "I imagined riding into 
Pretoria on Russian tankS.,,6 Reactions to the announcement varied from great 
optimism to distrust and fear. 
Shortly after the announcement and Mandela's release, much of the leadership 
returned to South Africa and set up headquarters in Johannesburg for the first time in 
just under thirty years. Most of the rank and file soldiers remained in exile, however, 
4 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Weziwe Ncame, 9 September 1998, University of the Western 
Cape. 
S Majodina, Zonke. (1995). Interview with Johannes Van Vuuren. In Exiles and Homecomings: The 
untold stories, Johannesburg: Heinemann Publishers,A8. 












where a state of confusion dominated. The woman who had recently returned from 
training in Russia and found herself in Lusaka at this time related the problems she 
encountered once the leadership had moved back into South Africa: 
What frustrated me, when I came back [to Lusaka], things have 
changed also, you find that the headquarters are in Johannesburg, and 
you are lost. There is nobody to report to, in fact there's nobody who 
is interested to know, you know? So you are having those things in 
mind that when you come back you must write a report to say I've 
done this and this how am I going to use it, I mean, there was 
absolutely nobody. The commanders were in Pretoria, so I stayed 
there in Lusaka not knowing what to do, because everybody's busy. 
Then I decided to, to go to school, I wanted to do, er, radio 
communication in aviation, the only things that they wanted was a 
letter from the ANC to say I've done blah blah blah blah, for them to 
give, for the ANC to give the Zambians certificates and all that. But 
there was nobody to do that, so I was frustrated and couldn't get the 
course.7 
Many people found this lack of leadership and state of uncertainty disturbing. Still in 
exile, they were unable to pursue the things they wanted to do, and yet they were 
unable to return to South Africa. Many found themselves at the end of their training 
programmes or assignments with nobody left in the exile leadership to tell them 
where to go next. 
Inside the country, the situation also remained uncertain. Many of the units 
inside did not know what was actually going on, and whether they should continue 
their missions or wait to see what happened. With the focus on 'talks about talks' and 
the way forward unclear, many of the units found themselves without guidance, 
supplies, or instructions, and yet not demobilised and still in the country illegally and 
underground. This period was very difficult for these units. One man remembered 
returning from exile for a consultative conference, and deciding simply to stay in the 











country instead ofleaving as he intended to. As a fonner leader of the underground in 
the Western Cape, people there looked to him for answers. He recalled: 
When I was in Cape Town [in 1991], I connected with our under 
[ground], because at that time we still had MK units underground. 
When they heard that I'm around they just made a communication, I 
had to go and see them. Complaining, all of them, because things at 
that time were, were not proper, because these talks, the preparation for 
coming in, leadership being in, involved in all these preparations. 
There was some confusion, units inside the country didn't know what's 
actually happened, there was a question of, which was a very you 
know hot issue, the question of the suspension of the armed struggle, 
because we didn't know it outside, the units inside the country didn't 
know it, and we heard it in Zambia on the BBC, when it was 
announced and papers, all of us, ay, it was a really tense and tough 
situation ... So when I came in, they contacted, I had to go to them, to 
the underground units and brief them what's happening. What's 
happening, the confusion is what's happening inside, what are the 
resolutions of the conference, whilst I had to organise, well they didn't 
have money, I had to organise money for them through people I know. 8 
All of the MK soldiers, both inside the country and in exile, found this period of 
confusion and disorganization extremely difficult. The question of a possible 
suspension of the armed struggle and the lack of leadership and support, whether 
simply for new assignments, or more importantly, material and monetary support for 
the units inside made life during this period of limbo a great hardship for some. 
Eventually, however, when the armed struggle was officially suspended in 1990, 
conditions became clearer, and many cadres began to make their ways home. Upon 
their return, they often found their homes plagued by violence. In the early 1990s, 
more violence erupted in South Africa than ever before. Fights between the ANC and 
the IFP were common in many areas, and some communities developed Self Defense 
Units (SDUs) to protect themselves. While these units were not a fonnal part ofMK, 
many soldiers participated and even armed and trained the people. Others gave 
support to the APLA cadres still fighting. Returned MK soldiers also faced 












harassment and arrest by the security police, despite the clearance and indemnity 
given them by the government. By the elections in 1994, however, most of the 
upheaval had settled down. 
During 1991 and 1992, many MK cadres returned to South Africa for the first 
time in years. Those who had left in the immediate aftermath of the Soweto uprisings 
had left the country as young, idealistic school children and returned as adults. Some 
of them had lived in exile nearly as long as they had lived inside South Africa. But 
almost all were excited at the prospect of going home. 
One of the worst trials of this time was waiting for the clearance to be able to 
return to the country. Those in exile needed clearance from the South African 
government to be able to return, and amnesty for many of their 'crimes' such as 
leaving the country illegally, joining the banned liberation movement, and some for 
more serious crimes of treason and sabotage. Without the clearance, their return 
would lead to their arrest. One woman recalled waiting in Lusaka to get her 
clearance. She remembered that the faxes came in all the time, and every time one 
arrived, they would search for their names, anxious to hear that they could go home. 
Every time their names did not show up, they were greatly disappointed.9 Once their 
names finally arrived, and they received their clearance, people faced the process of 
returning to the country. 
Returning to South Africa was a daunting enterprise. Getting on a plane in 
Lusaka, or Europe, or any number of other places, and knowing that one would arrive 
in a country that held so many memories and dreams for them brought incredible 
excitement. However, the realisation that a year previously, had they taken the same 
plane, they would likely have faced arrest, torture, trial and even death, added tension 











and fear to the flight. Many people had trouble believing that the apartheid 
government would allow them back. The government had not proved trustworthy in 
the past, and some doubted that the clearance was legitimate. Some found their fears 
substantiated when they encountered difficulties entering the country. One woman 
recalled that upon her arrival in Johannesburg, the special branch of the police 
harassed her for seven hours. They told her that her clearance was not there, though it 
actually was. They questioned her about where she had been, what she had done, 
where she had come from, and whom she had seen. The person who was supposed to 
meet her there did not arrive, which made matters worse. Eventually, a senior person 
in the special branch arrived, and arranged for her to get through, but it was a difficult 
and frightening experience. 10 Others recall their arrival in Johannesburg as a 
surprisingly pleasant experience. Another woman remembered being apprehensive of 
the police and informers who might be at the airport to meet her. However, upon her 
arrival, the white women working at the airp rt were very polite and even called her 
"Ma'am," which she could never have imagined. ll This arrival home was very trying 
and scary for many of the comrades who returned during this period, but for most it 
was thrilling to be back. 
MK was officially disbanded at a ceremony in Soweto on 16 December 1993, 
thirty three years to the day since its inception. One man remembered his feelings at 
the event: 
I was overwhelmed with excitement and nostalgia when we finally 
disbanded uMkhonto weSizwe at Orlando Stadium on 16 December 
1993. I shall never forget this event and was so proud of wearing my 
MK combat uniform freely in my own country. I met up with a 
number of soldiers, some of whom I last saw in Angola. All of us 
fought to free our people from oppression. The military commands 
10 Kodesh, W. Interview with Mpho (Veronica) Msimanga,17 August 1993. 












and drills brought back great memories. We may not have been paid 
for our services in money- but we were certainly rich in our souls. Ex-
soldiers mingled together and shared great moments. It was indeed a 
fitting ending- the final page in our book. 12 
After the celebrations, however, the ex-MK soldiers faced a hard road ahead. 
The Situation in APLA 
For the APLA cadres both in exile and inside South Africa, the situation was 
much less certain. Surprise at De Klerk's speech ruled, but reactions varied. Letlapa 
Mphahlele recalled the debate: 
It was 1990 and exciting things were happening on the home front. De 
Klerk had lifted the ban on the PAC and other liberation movements. 
He was talking about negotiations with the ANC and the PAC. Tata 
spoke excitedly about changes in South Africa, and was looking 
forward to returning home after thirty years in exile. His friend 
Twenty Million didn't share the excitement ... "What do you think 
you'll benefit out of going home to the same oppressive system?" 
Twenty asked Tata with a frown. 13 
Although the PAC had been unbanned, the organisation refused to enter into 
talks until the apartheid government met certain conditions. The bilateral 'talks about 
talks' between the ANC and the government excluded the PAC and other 
organisations. While some of the political leadership returned to South Africa, and 
many of the political structures inside the country resumed above ground activities, 
the APLA soldiers had no intention of stepping down, much less orders to do so. The 
PAC's stance against negotiations and continuation of the armed struggle lasted 
practically until the 1994 elections and meant that those in exile had either to remain 
there or infiltrate back into South Africa illegally. Those inside the country remained 
underground and not only continued but escalated their activities. The recruitment of 
12 Matakata, Jama. (2004). Hills o/Hope, Pietermaritzburg: Nutrend Productions, 
109. 












new soldiers continued, and while some trained inside South Africa, others left for 
Tanzania to undergo training, mirroring the return of the MK soldiers. Supplies and 
funds became even scarcer as the world questioned their refusal to suspend the armed 
struggle when the ANC had done so. Mphahlele recalled the response when he asked 
for more supplies to support their ever expanding operations: 
I briefed Barney about the political and military situation in Azania. I 
also asked him to send more cadres and weapons into Azania as 
quickly as possible. He told me lack of funds had halted the movement 
of cadres from the rear to the front. He also said that most African 
states, including our main backers, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, were 
irritated by PAC's continuation of the armed struggle. They had 
reduced their support. At the time the ApIa camps were overflowing 
with militant youth, and this had resulted in starvation and disease. 
Barney said several cadres had recently died of malaria and that HIV-
Aids had begun to take its toll in the camps. "So, comrade, do your 
best in Azania and don't expect much from outside," he said bleakly. 14 
Though he received some money, the message struck home, and he realised that they 
could not rely on the organisation for support. When he went to visit the cadres on 
the ground, he found disturbing trends: 
Only a few of the cadres were well-off -those who had been embraced 
by generous members of the PAC who were outside ApIa. Some of 
these dressed well and called theit suits 'city camouflage'. Starvation 
drove numerous cadres to their old family homes, where they were 
warmly welcomed and well looked after. Some of these continued to 
operate from their homes, while others simply disengaged and applied 
for indemnity. I guess it was a combination of homesickness, poverty 
and the lack of direction in the PAC that drove them home. This led to 
tension and suspicion in the units. I was warned by some cadres to 
avoid others. As a result, I sometimes met only two members of a unit 
of seven and avoided those who were not trusted. IS 
In the midst of their most successful years operationally, APLA cadres faced huge 
problems and uncertainty, and some abandoned the struggle in the face of this 
adversity. 
14 Mphahlele, 152. 











In the end, APLA operations ceased by the first democratic elections in April 
1994, and the soldiers faced a long process of normalising their lives in South Africa 
and trying to integrate into a society from which they now felt distanced. The APLA 
soldiers also tread a thin line when it came to legitimacy. While most MK members 
received clearance and indemnity from the police before they returned to South 
Africa, the APLA members had continued their armed struggle and many faced arrest 
due to their activities even after the new government took power. 
The consequences 
Getting back to South Africa after so many years in exile was an incredible 
experience for most of the soldiers who returned. Setting foot on the soil of their 
motherland, seeing their families again, and looking forward to a new future, the 
returned soldiers were largely happy to be back. One man remarked, "Well, it was 
good to be back and be sitting in South Africa again. Well, when one was in prison, 
we didn't think really it will be so soon.,,16 Another remembered the relief and sense 
of freedom that came with his return from a camp in Tanzania: 
That life that I was living there and compared to the life with all those 
restrictions, you don't have to go there, just lie in a confined space for 
all those years and you're not even allowed to go to town, it was just 
like freedom on its own. One of the happiest moments of my life: 26 
of June 94 when I came back to South Africa. I7 
16 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Lerumo Kalako, 10 June 1998, Cape Town. 
17 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Lt Mfanelo "Zola" Bongco, 19 August 2004, 










One man remembered a great feeling of relief: "It was a great feeling, realising that 
no, everything comes to an end at some stage." 1 8 For most returnees, their 
repatriation brought hope for the future and a wish for some peace in their lives. 
One of the greatest moments many people experienced after their return to 
South Africa or their emergence from underground was the reunion with their 
families. Many family reunions were happy ones. Some parents, loved ones, and 
friends had long since thought the soldiers dead. Those in exile were often forbidden 
to contact their families, and those who worked underground avoided their families to 
prevent both their own arrest and their families' harassment. Having their loved ones 
return to them alive and well answered their prayers. Many soldiers received a warm 
welcome from their families. One man recalled: 
Father opened the gate amid shouts of "Hallelujah" and "Amen" from 
Mother. We hugged and kissed and neighbours woke up to join in the 
jubilation. Aunt Ramasela pinched herself to see if she was not 
dreaming. Each person woke his or her neighbour up and Manaleng 
became lively in the middle of the night. Women, some with children 
strapped on their backs, sang and danced and ululated. Malose went to 
Maralaleng and other villages to tell other relatives that I had returned 
home . . . The congregation dispersed after four and I stru~g1ed to 
sleep. Barely two hours later, a new wave of visitors rolled in. 1 
Another man recalled the good reception upon his return. His family met him at the 
airport and took him to his uncle's home for a traditional gathering. Many members 
of his family wanted him to stay with them, but he was busy working for the 
organisation, and stayed in a hotel. He visited everyone though, for two days here, a 
day there, a weekend there, and eventually reconnected with his extended family.2o 
Yet not everyone was welcomed like a prodigal son, one man remembered: "My 
18 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Brigadier General Barney Hlatswayo, 11 January 2007, telephone 
interview supplementary to earlier interview. 
19 Mphahlele, 194-5. 
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mother acted as if I just went behind the house and came back.,,21 For many, their 
homecoming and reunion with their families marked a high point in their lives. 
However, some homecomings brought disappointment. Many came home to 
their families only to find that though they had made it through their trials, their loved 
ones had died. One woman recalled the heartbreak of coming home to find her 
mother dead: 
My twin brother came to fetch me from the Spar Hotel. It was very 
exciting to think I would see my mother and siblings again. On the 
way home, I stopped at the a K Bazaars to buy my mother's favourite 
sweets. When we got home, I went straight to my mother's bedroom. 
I looked around for a long time and I knew that she had died a long 
time before. I was numb. All the excitement just left me. My brother 
said, 'Sit down, let's tell you what happened.' I was very angry and 
said, 'Why did you lead me on all this time?' I blame my family for 
not letting me know the truth. They were writing all the time saying 
my mother was waiting for me. Had I known, I would never have 
bothered to come back. 22 
Another man recalled: 
Then of course I had my own disasters you know, my family had been 
[decimated], my mother had gone and so on, so I had no stable home 
because now I could only go to my auntie's house, imagine other 
people who came back and found no home, after all these years, you 
ought to be hunting for relatives and the relatives would like you at a 
distance, when you are here now you are a problem. 23 
Deep and horrible pain faced those who returned home only to find their loved ones 
absent. Even those whose families remained intact often found the return home a 
painful one, with their families in dire straits and their own contributions 
21 Mashike, Lephophotho and Mokalobe, Mafole. (2003). Reintegration into Civilian Life: The case of 
former MK and APLA combatants. In Track Two, Vol. 12, Nos. 1 and 2, 26. 
22 Majodina, Zonke. (1995). Interview with Johanna Matlala, In Majodina, Exiles and Homecoming: 
The Untold Stories, Johannesburg: Heinemann. 
23 Maaba, Brown. Interview with Peter Molotsi, 7 January 2001 in Kroonstad, as part of the SADET 











and they returned long after the MK soldiers who had received support. In the 
townships in the early 1990s, a new slang term emerged that referred to people who 
spent carelessly or excessively: 'exiles.' 
Even those who remained in South Africa during the armed struggle lacked 
the skills and knowledge to support themselves. The MK soldiers operating inside the 
country·also received support from the ANC. The APLA soldiers practiced self-
sufficiency during their operations and found themselves better suited to getting by, 
but what used to be called repossession soon became crime and was not an option for 
most cadres. 
The lack of money and employment created considerable tension between ex-
soldiers and their families. While most of the soldiers did not expect simply to 
receive work and money on a platter, many of their family members expected them to 
get compensation for their work in the liberation struggle with prestigious government 
jobs and money. Many told tales of family conflict that ensued from this problem. 
One man noted: "Everyone in my family expects me to buy them a leather jacket.,,29 
A female soldier remembered: 
You see I came from a family of seven, all of them useless and leading 
unproductive lives. What's happening now is that we are all fighting 
over this little four-roomed structure we call home. It was all right 
when I still had money and was buying groceries. When my money 
ran out, things turned sour. When my sister bought soap and I was 
having a bath, she would ask, 'How many times do you bath a day? 
We only bath once a day to save soap.' On top of that, my children did 
not get food. They would come back from school to nothing.3o 
Politics, University of Cape Town Department of Political Studies, 98. NB: Mokalobe's 
interviewees remain anonymous in his article. 
29 Cock, 5. 











She eventually left her family home and struck out on her own: "It was not easy to get 
started. I had no money to buy a stand, to get material and to build the shack I'm 
living in now. I had to live like a slave with another woman while we tried to put the 
shack together. My children had to live with friends as I had nowhere to send them 
... Luckily we now live on the food parcels we get from the Red CrosS.,,31 Another 
ex-soldier remarked: "My sister-in-law makes it clear that I am a burden on them.,,32 
Another man said: 
I live on begging. I drink and smoke. People are tired of buying me 
these things. They used to do it freely when I arrived back ... Now 
they run away every time they see me. They mow that I am going to 
ask for a smoke or a drink. I have overheard some complaining that 
they did not send me into exile, so I should not become their burden. 
Only my sisters care. How long will they care for an old man [38 
years] like me? I do not know; I am scared. 33 
Another ex-soldier remarked: "For six months I didn't hear one good story. Most of 
my friends had been thrown out by their families once their repatriation money had 
run OUt.,,34 Life for the returned soldiers was difficult enough without adding this 
huge stress on their family relations. Many split from their families entirely, and 
others live in a constant state of conflict with them. 
The SANDF and integration 
Some ex-combatants found an opportunity for employment in the South 
African National Defense Force (SANDF) which aimed to integrate members of the 
SADF, soldiers from the homeland armies, and MK and APLA members. But the 
31 Majodina, Interview with Matlala. 
32 Cock, 5. 
33 Cock, 4. 











integration process did not run smoothly. Negotiations for integration of the armed 
forces initially involved ANC and MK leaders on one side, and SADF leaders on the 
other. APLA came into the process very late and had little say in the way integration 
occurred. One man who was involved in the negotiations for APLA recalled that on 
the arrival of the APLA negotiators they got a raw deal, and were forced to accept all 
that had been decided. They received a heap of papers over a metre high, divided 
them among themselves according to infantry, air force, logistics, etc., and tried to 
find any contentious issues.35 
Ex-combatants presented themselves at various assembly points and many 
found this experience daunting. Philip Frankel's book, Soldiers in a Storm: The 
Armed· Forces in South Africa's Democratic Transition36, documents the entire 
process from negotiation to fruition. He noted the fears of some soldiers: 
It is a measure of the level of mutual suspicion that some MK leaders 
believed that the Wallmansthal [Assembly Area] was a concentration 
camp where they were to be cordoned prior to an SADF military 
onslaught. Either way, confusion was rife and living conditions were, 
at least at the outset, sufficiently poor to justify some of the worst MK 
suspicions. Adequate tents, bedding, and clothing were in short supply 
for much of 1994, and each delay tended to confirm [MK] suspicions. 
Food was initially poor and unvaried, except for that provided to 
SADF personnel. This fueled conflict until the NDF eventually 
provided a common catering system contracted out to a civilian 
company. Ablution facilities were initially poor, overcrowded, and a 
danger to public health.37 
He goes on to note that the APLA assembly area at De Brug had better conditions, but 
the unease of many soldiers remained. Notably, despite APLA's leadership problems 
and the large number of people who received training on the ground in South Africa, 
35 von den Steinen, Telephone interview with Hlatswayo. 
36 Frankel, Philip. (2000). Soldiers in a Storm: The Armed Forces in South Africa's Democratic 
Transition, Oxford: Westview Press. 











British observers at the assembly points noted that a group of APLA leaders were: 
"smarter, better disciplined and more political-oriented". Frankel further noted: 
"Very few of its members were rejected by the NDF and then largely on medical 
grounds.,,38 Some soldiers did not pass the bar for integration due to levels of 
training, age, physical abilities and the like. Demobilisation gratuities were available 
for ex-combatants who did not choose to join the defence force, but they were one off 
payments and many failed to receive them. One study showed that over a third of 
their respondents received no gratuity, due to: "not having been part of the official 
integration and demobilization process; having joined the SANDF and then resigning, 
or having been dismissed, administrative problems, or having been informed that they 
did not qualify for the demobilization package.,,39 Many ex-combatants continued 
with the process of integration despite the difficulties. 
The assignment of ranks proved a contentious point for many ex-MK. and 
APLA soldiers. MK. never instituted a ranking system for its soldiers, and anyone 
below the high command held the same position. APLA recognised the importance of 
ranks and created the Siyaya commission in the mid-1980s to explore the imposition 
of ranks on a liberation army. The Chief of Staff recalled the process: 
I think their job, their work lasted for over six months, but finally when 
they presented all their work was recommended and adopted. We then 
started with the rank structure. I think that also gave us a better edge 
and a better understanding of how to carry on with warfare . . . I think 
at first there was confusion and uncertainty, but with time I think the 
more, also the regimental discipline, the way we had organised it in our 
camps, people began to appreciate and comply with the requirements. 
And I think to a greater degree that also assisted us in maintaining 
absolute discipline within our ranks. Then this, maybe later on as I 
will comment, there was a plus for us when the negotiations for 
integration took place, because we were more than experienced, more 
than prepared to handle that, the problem of how do we rank or what 
38 Frankel, 76. 











are the ranks that are applicable of APLA members who were to 
integrate.4o 
Despite the existence of ranks in APLA, both MK and APLA members received ranks 
they considered beneath them. A number of people appealed the decisions and 
fought, in some cases for years, for the rank they felt they deserved. Members of the 
SANDP have many stories of this fight. One man who joined the navy recalled the 
problem: 
I must say integration went very well but from the start it wasn't a 
success because there was a lot of things needs to be redone like most 
of the guys were not given their ranks properly, so we actually started 
as a group from seamen, all of us. Instead of giving a higher ranking 
officer which were working under us and their ranks but that has been 
reviewed and everything hasbe sorted out up to so far.41 
Soldiers also had to go for bridging training to augment their training in 
guerrilla warfare with training for a formal military structure. Those who received 
specialised training in exile faced a much smoother integration process. The Chief of 
Staff of APLA recalled a bridging course undertaken by several MK and APLA 
soldiers in Zimbabwe in the lead up to the 1994 election, but this signified the 
exception rather than the rule.42 
Once integration began in earnest, many more problems developed. One of 
the most critical of these emerged in the attitudes of many white commanders. 
Racism flourished in the early years of the integrated force. One man explained: 
What I would like to emphasise is that in the defence force, the boers 
were harassing us a lot ... If we had problems, they told us that MK 
no longer exists [and that] this army belongs to SADP. So we were not 
able to work together with them because they were harassing us; doing 
all sorts of things to us ... We were even training in Afrikaans. So 
these are some of the problems we were getting in the camps. 
40 von den Steinen, Interview with IDatswayo. 
41 von den Steinen, L. Interview with MK. veteran who wished to remain anonymous, 19 
August 2004, Simonstown Naval Base. 











Sometimes the comrades were even beaten during training in the 
camps. It was those problems and many others I cannot explain. They 
are quite a lot, you see ... I can talk about them maybe till sunset 
brother, they are quite a 10t.43 
Incidents occurred as a result, including one in 1999, when a black soldier shot and 
killed six white soldiers and a white civilian at Tempe Military Base in the Free State. 
Other shooting incidents took place in Phalaborwa and Simon's Town.44 While these 
incidents were rare, some ex- MK and APLA soldiers were disillusioned with the 
army and opted to leave their best employment opportunity behind. One man 
expressed his difficulties: "Things were getting worse day by day. I could not stand 
what the SADF members were doing to us. I decided to leave. Many did leave too. 
Few were fortunate to get employment but many of us are still unemployed.,,45 
Another explained: 
We were discriminated by the entire integration process under the 
hands of former SADF members. Remember these are our former 
enemies. How can anyone trust them? What they wanted was to 
make the process so difficult that some of us should leave. Even if we 
complained about their behaviour to our senior comrades, nothing was 
done. There was just no hope in that system.46 
One man decided to embrace the opportunities available to him in the SANDF and 
went for counselling. However his experiences there only exacerbated his problems: 
I requested counselling in the SANDF. Because of racism I 
encountered, I left. It was not worth it. In the consultation room there 
43 MK. veteran quoted in Gear, Sasha, (2002). Wishing Us Away: Challenges/acing ex-
combatants in the 'new' South Africa, Violence and Transition Series, Vo1. 8, Centre for the 
Study of Violence and Reconciliation, chapter 3,8. NB: Gear's interviewees remain 
anonymous in her article. 
44 Mashike and Mokalobe, 13. 
45 Quoted in Mokalobe, 77. 











was a filing cabinet with files written blacks, whites, coloureds and 
Indians. How could you expect such a racist person to counsel yoU?47 
Even today, difficulties persist in the SANDF. One man recalled problems 
with his rank, and had a civil case still pending against the army in 2002: 
Nineteen Ninety-Five I joined the SANDF as a Colonel. And that was 
refused to be that rank and settled for a Lieutenant Colonel, but I then 
appealed and won my appeal as a full Colonel. I was at 44 Parachute 
Brigade ... till the time when I had a case, a civil case which is still on 
right now, that is why I'm here. Ja, so maybe I'll be back, I'll go back 
to the army, or maybe I'll look for another private company post.48 
Another man lamented the ongoing problems in the navy: 
No it's okay. I'm happy, but not that happy. The navy's got its own 
problems. And I don't think we're going to sort them out no , it's 
going to take a while. Sometimes you ask yourself why am I wasting 
my time here, because this is not what I was fighting for. It happens. 
Sometimes I ask myself why because everyday you must come here 
and fight, you must come here and argue, because people they just put 
obstacles· in your way deliberately I don't know for what. There are 
government policies but they just disregard them. I don't know what 
reason, they don't know who they are working for. So there's a 
problem but we are facing it now. It's not like the olden days where 
you know who is your enemy. Now you don't know who's with you 
and who is your enemy. You're in the dark.49 
Others found the armed forces better, and are satisfied in their positions. One 
woman explained: 
So even South Africa we have things that is going to take a long time 
to come right, but I'm glad that like here in the navy, they're giving us 
opportunity, like female, it's not like before there were females, we 
don't have to do this training, we can't go on this course, you know? 
It's just equality to everything, and we're looking forward to the 
challenges, you know, like if a man can do that, then why can't she, all 
of us can do, you know? Even in a promotion wise, it's really going 
fine because now they're trying to make up to the standard of male and 
female in the same equality, like the way they were talking about the 
41 MK veteran quoted in Lamb, Guy and Mokalobe, Mafole. (no date.) 'Soldiers of Misfortune '; The 
Forgotten Warriors of South Africa's Liberation Struggle, Centre for Conflict Resolution, University 
of Cape Town, Paper to be presented at the conference on "Re-Conceptualising Democracy and 
Liberation in Southern Africa," 10. 
48 von den Steinen, L. Interview with Bandile "Blacks" Joyi, 21 November 2002, Cape Town. 











other day in the parliament, the one of 50% of women, 50% of men. 
So I'm just hoping that one day in this defence force it's going to be 
like that. But it's still male dominated you know environment, Ja. It 
still is, but we're getting there. We're getting there. 50 
For some ex- MK and APLA soldiers, the armed forces have become a career, and 
though their attitudes vary, they rest assured of a stable job. However many others 
did not integrate, or did not remain in the armed forces. 
No Economic Miracle 
Unemployment in South Africa was and is a nationwide problem. No 
guarantee of jobs awaited the ex-combatants, and many still struggle to survive. The 
Soweto generation and their successors are particularly at a disadvantage in the job 
market. So many people joined as school children, before even matriculating. Most 
abandoned their education, only trained in military and guerrilla warfare, and lack 
skills and job experience. In a country in which many college graduates cannot find 
jobs, finding employment is extremely difficult for the uneducated and unskilled. 
Some found careers in the new South African National Defense Force, others gained 
positions in government as ministers or as support staff, and some found work with 
their organisations. A few received money from their organisations to study, though 
most did not. One man explained his difficulties: "I completed my matric two years 
ago and it has always been my desire to go to university to study law. 1 have been 
trying without any success to get funding from the government even though promises 
were made that we will be financially assisted.,,51 Another lamented: "When 1 was in 
exile, 1 trained as an electrician and when 1 came into the country 1 wanted to further 
50 von den Steinen, Interview with Chief P.O. Pumla Mapipa, 19 August 2004, Simonstown Naval 
Base. 











my studies in electrical engineering through a technikon. Unfortunately, funding has 
been hard to come by. I finally gave up. Now I am unemployed.,,52 For the majority 
of the MK. and APLA soldiers, once the initial financial help some received ran out, 
they had to fend for themselves. One survey of ex-MK and APLA soldiers found: 
"Only 16% indicated that they were involved in income generating projects, such as 
waged/salaried employment or as entrepreneurs.,,53 One report quoted a man who 
expressed his meager wishes: "I would like any job as long as it will help me to 
survive and contribute at home.,,54 Unemployment and its consequences remain the 
biggest problem facing most of the ex- MK. and APLA soldiers in South Africa .. 
Some people were able to make their own luck, and dedicated themselves to 
finishing their education and obtaining skills with which to find a job. This was not 
always easy. One woman described her experiences in going back to school: 
So they were afraid of me, they didn't want to take me to school, 
because they said I'm going to corrupt their children, there was that 
feeling within the community. That their children can't stay with that 
terrorist. So it was interesting really. So I just told them no, there's 
nowhere that I'm going, I am going to study, your children are going to 
study, their own books, and things like that. Because they called a 
meeting, I was called, that I'm going to frustrate and corrupt their 
children. So I said, no you must relax, I'm just here for my, you know 
I'm having my own agendas, they must just forget about me. Because 
they knew me in 1982, '83, I was in Port Alfred, you know, I used to 
come from Fort Beaufort, to organise meeting, maybe to say that 
nobody's going to school and all that, so they know, you know, so I 
just told them no, I, I'm the other person now, having another agenda. 
People relax, I'm not going to do anything. 55 
Those who attained some schooling and skills training in exile could sometimes use 
that training to find jobs or to create their own businesses. One woman returned to 
S2 APLA veteran quoted in Mokalobe, 101. 
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South Africa with her family, and though well trained, the sorts of jobs offered did not 
satisfy her. She joined forces with another woman who worked for the ANC 
underground, and joined her business. 56 Others had skills, but faced discrimination in 
the job market due to their membership of MK or APLA. One man explained his 
approach to this problem: "I just say I am from the SANDF not MK. Whites still hate 
US.,,57 Another admitted: "I never tell. Guys who do that have never been employed. 
I know Boers hates APLA members. They say we kill farmers. How can such people 
employ yoU?,,58 One study noted the prevalence ofthis problem: 
To avoid possible discrimination from potential employers, many 
fonner combatants said that when applying for employment they do 
not mention their military background. Some said they keep two sets 
of curriculum vitae, one with a military background and another 
without. 59 
But for most, the future was bleak, and unemployment and poverty became a way of 
life. 
This lack of opportunities and options led some ex-MK and APLA soldiers to 
turn to crime. Many others considered it as an option. As Jacklyn Cock pointed out: 
"Discontented demobilized soldiers represent a considerable security threat as 
evidenced by the experience of Uganda, Burundi, Nigeria and the current situation in 
Mozambique.,,6o One man explained the problem: 
It was APLA and MK people [that] were demobilised. That is what 
shows that . . . they want to drive us into crime, because if we just sit 
doing nothing with just a gun as a skill, we will suffer. If we do not 
join the police or security companies, it is then we form gangsters or 
such groupS.61 
56 von den Steinen, Interview with Mhlambo. 
57 MK. veteran quoted in Lamb and Mokalobe, 5. 
58 APLA veteran quoted in Lamb and Mokalobe, 5. 
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Another former cadre shared his personal experiences: 
I have personal knowledge of people in crime who haven't been 
caught. You know, we were trained for such things as guerrilla warfare 
and [now,] being left there at the ledge - you are a time bomb really, 
you are just ticking away because all the skills and all the suffering that 
you had to go through and how you [ were] made to develop yourself 
under those conditions, you utilise that tool to [the] maximum. It's 
unlike people who have been trained . . . You were trained to be 
devious, [to] do things and not get caught ... You know, some even go 
to court and get acquitted because [of] how they do this: they think, 
they plan. 62 
Beyond the desperation that leads some ex-combatants to consider turning to crime, 
some criminals realised the advantages of having a trained guerrilla soldier on their 
side, and tried to recruit ex-MK and APLA cadres to join their efforts. One man 
related: 
[The area where I grew up] has lots of tsotsis and they know me. A lot 
of them have approached me to help them out and I tell them that I 
wasn't born a thug. They want me to help them with car hijacking and 
bank robberies. I tell them that the only thing I know is politicS.63 
Not all are able to. stand on principle however. One man told an interviewer: "Some 
guys approached me and told me that I should help them . . . because I don't have 
money and I'm suffering. I said, 'Yes, we can go'. I'm ready anytime because I can't sit 
around when I don't have money.,,64 Another showed his good training while still 
considering the lure of crime: "I [ was] approached last week but I don't trust some of 
the guys [so] I won't go with them. If they were people I trusted, I would gO.,,65 One 
man recognised both the dangers of neglect and the possibility of an alternative: 
61 MK. veteran quoted in Gear, Wishing us Away, chapter 5, 50. 
62 MK. veteran quoted in Gear, Wishing us Away, chapter 5, 56. 
63 MK. veteran quoted in Gear, Wishing us Away, chapter 5,51. 
64 MK. veteran quoted in Gear, Wishing us Away, chapter 5,53. 












Young cadres are now unemployed. There are many of them who are 
consuming drugs because of frustration. They should be educated. 
They have skills and can combat crime in our country. If they are not 
assisted, they will be involved in crime as others are still doing. Others 
have guns and they know the areas where arms were hidden during the 
liberation struggle.66 
For some, the lack of opportunities, support, and education leaves them little choice 
but to use their training to find their own illegal sources of money. 
The Psychological Legacy 
Psychological problems are also endemic to many of the returned MK and 
APLA soldiers. For some these are small and manageable. Many ex-combatants find 
their lives influenced by their time in MK and APLA. While it might only manifest 
itself in small ways, like one's approach to relationships, the effects still endure. One 
female cadre explained: 
But ja, you know psychologically I think that's the thing that interests 
me because I think that's the thing that's least explored. I mean you 
don't allow yourself to absorb how that's effected your life, how it's 
effected your ability to have relationships, how it's effected the choices 
that you made, I mean the choices that I made about having children, I 
mean fundamental things that I've done in my life have been impacted 
very very clearly from that experience. And I think that the other thing 
is that you realise in retrospect, there's fuckall romantic about armed 
struggle. There's really nothing romantic about being in that kind of 
situation. I mean I think for us to be recruited and to be asked to serve 
in that kind of way, ja, I mean we were, it was something that was 
really significant. And it felt good to be acknowledged that way as 
somebody who could do something purposeful, on that level. But in 
another way, you just went into it with like, with these doe eyes 
almost. And you had to be hardcore, you had to, I mean I was pretty 
hardcore before I went there, but I wasn't hardcore in the sense that I 
really believed. 67 
Another man explained a general change in his personality: 
66 MK veteran quoted in Lamb and Mokalobe, 8. 











I believe that even with those ex-combatants who are above water 
[employed] there's a commonality. Before the violence I used to be 
somebody who cheered up somebody else. But I'm no longer that 
person. .. I realise I prefer to be very much on my own. I sit in the car 
and watch them partying ... I don't feel like laughing ... [We need] 
something to make those who are still alive to be like relaxed and 
happy and be able to integrate with the community nicely. 68 
Others developed substance abuse problems to attempt to escape their problems. One 
woman escaped her habits: "I used to say it was better to stay drunk and now 1 realise 
how bad this thing is. Most of [my APLA colleagues] have passed away. Before 1 was 
in the Service Corps, 1 was frustrated and took a lot of alcohoL 1 just wanted to drink, 
to find solace in drinking.,,69 Another man remarked: "Other guys get involved in 
smoking dagga, others in drinking [because] when they look, their families are poor. 
A person thinks about such things, such as, 'Maybe if 1 did not go to exile 1 would 
have finished my education and be able to help my family,.,,7o Some feel the pressure 
of family expectations, and turn to substance abuse to escape. One man explained: 
"Society sees us as heroes and expects too much from us. When they see some of our 
comrades driving in beautiful cars, they expect the same from us. This is a real 
frustration to me. To escape this pressure of heroism 1 spend most of my time 
drinki· ,,71 ng. 
Still others have much deeper problems. Many have resorted to suicide. One 
man related: 
I have ... about ten [friends] - oh, when 1 count correctly there's 
another one ... There was our fellow comrade who drank poison. He 
killed himself. .. I have a cousin-brother who 1 was with in Transkei, 
68 MK. veteran quoted in Gear, Wishing us Away, chapter 6, 10. 
69 APLA veteran quoted in Gear, Wishing us Away, chapter 6, 12. 
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who was a PAC. He also killed himself by drinking poison. Many 
others have shot themselves because of the situation that we are in.72 
Another man explained: "It's like this Saturday we buried a friend of ours who shot 
himself last Monday. His problem was that the government was using us as their tools 
and at the end of the day they dismiss us and don't care about us anymore.'.73 Others 
direct their problem at others. One man noticed that his temper is much closer to the 
surface: "I'll react more impatiently to any situation ... 1 wouldn't hurt anybody but 
my emotions will boil very quickly.,,74 Another recognised the violence that resided 
within him and acted to save those he cared about: "I felt that 1 was going to kill my 
girlfriend, that's why 1 decided to go far away, so that 1 can think clearly.,,75 Others 
did not manage to rein in their tempers and hurt people around them. One man 
related: 
J a, this thing happens . . . Maybe we would sit at a shebeen and drink, 
and we would drink and drink. When we are drunk maybe you talk to 
me badly. It means what would solve [it would be] if we talk about it 
verbally, but now eish! 1 would grab him. It just happens. 1 would take 
a bottle and hit him with it, things like that. 76 
Others remain ticking time bombs, and their family members live in fear. One man 
recalled: 
Sometimes you feel like you want to cry. The other day 1 had a sister 
of one of the comrades 1 was arrested with. She was hysterical, telling 
me that she is finding it difficult to live with him because, what 
happens is, the poor fellow is so demoralised that he is no longer 
thinking straight and all he wants to do is to party. He's becoming a 
party animal. He doesn't care anymore because he believes that no one 
72 MK. veteran quoted in Gear, Wishing us Away, chapter 6, 13-14. 
73 MK. veteran quoted in Gear, Wishing us Away, chapter 6, 13. 
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cares for him so why the hell should he care? He is trying to find some 
kind of consolation and he is doing a lot of wrong things. He becomes 
so aggressive that they have to leave the house.77 
As for any military veterans, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is also a worry. 
Qne study noted many problems soldiers experienced that fit this diagnosis. They cite 
nightmares, substance abuse, flashbacks, strong reactions to loud noises, insomnia and 
detachment as common symptoms.78 However, ex-combatants rarely recognize or 
know about PTSD, though many suffer its effects. 
The ANC, PAC, and the current government do not provide psychological 
help for these soldiers. A few managed to find ways to get counseling, such as one 
man who was attending a university that provided free psychological help to its 
students, but most had noway to get help. One study noted: "None of the respondents 
experiencing psychological problems indicated that they have received treatment 
andlor counselling.,,79 An ex-soldier explained the problem: "A person is traumatised 
but the issue is that there are no places where one can go and seek help. This thing 
ends up affecting you." Money problems exacerbate this lack of services, as well as a 
feeling of pride, and a desire to conquer their problems alone. 
For many cadres who have avoided the pitfalls, the most disheartening 
situation is to see their comrades living on the streets and losing themselves to 
substance abuse and psychological problems. One journalist remarked on the plight 
of many ex-soldiers: "You've probably already met some of them under irritating 
circumstances in town- guiding your car into a parking space for a few cents. Or 
77 MK. veteran quoted in Gear, Wishing us Away, chapter 5,82. 
78 Mashike and Mokalobe, 18-19. 











lying sprawled across your path on the pavement.,,80 One ex-soldier started tracking 
down the people from his neighbourhood who had been members of MK. He 
commented: 
By then, many of them had become bergies and hoboes. It was sad for 
me as their commander to see what was happening to the people who 
fought with me in the struggle. These were trained MK soldiers who 
had gone down the drain. They had ended up in the gutter. Some of 
them became addicted to drugs because there was no help after 1992 
when things quietened down. They are now drug addicts, alcoholics, 
gangsters- in and out of jail. After the elections, people were power 
crazy and crazy for positions. There was totally no help from anybody 
... I always say the cops couldn't break me, either in interrogation or 
harassing my family or whatever they did, they couldn't break me. But 
to see guys I recruited living in the streets, being parking attendants, 
and at the other end seeing people integrated into the army with jobs 
and positions . . . who never lifted a finger for this new democracy-
that's what breaks me personally.8l . 
Another woman noted that occasionally she runs into an ex-comrade on the streets of 
Cape Town, begging for money or parking cars for money, destitute, demoralised and 
broken, and how difficult it is for her to see these people who have fallen into this 
state.82 Many of the soldiers who have managed to make a life for themselves find 
themselves horribly depressed and demoralised upon seeing their fellow comrades in 
such dire conditions. 
Some ex- MK and APLA soldiers have not had the chance to readapt to 
society. Many remain in jail for operations they carried out under the auspices of 
their organisations. While both the ANC and the PAC insisted on the unconditional 
release of all freedom fighters before negotiations with the government commenced, 
this demand fell by the wayside. 
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Neither Truth nor Reconciliation 
Some secured their release through applying for amnesty to the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, but not all of these received amnesty. The PAC 
particularly took exception to many of the conditions of the amnesty process. One of 
their main complaints concerned the equal treatment of freedom fighters and those 
who supported apartheid under the TRC. As apartheid was condemned as a 'crime 
against humanity' by the United Nations, they did not believe that the forces fighting 
against it should be equated with those who had supported the regime. Police raided 
the PAC Umtata office in May 1993, and they never returned the documents seized. 
This complicated the PAC's participation in the TRC as many crucial documents 
necessary to support their members' claims could not be obtained. 83 The APLA 
Director of Operations, Letlapa Mphahlele, refused to apply for amnesty and has 
faced threats of prosecution off and on for years. He explained his stance: 
Morally and politically, I felt that I was not going to go to the TRC, if 
they say I should go there to confess my crime, my commission and 
omission. I said no ways. That I'm doing symbolically. At least there 
must be someone who is challenging it. And every time there were 
charges against me, murder, attempted murder, terrorism, possession of 
arms, explosives, ammunition. But I said, I'd better take this route 
than go before the TRC and say I'm sorry. So then this is the stance 
that I have taken. 84 
On a realistic level, however, he encouraged all the APLA cadres in prison to apply 
for amnesty and supported their applications, as he recognised this was the best 
chance to gain release from jail. He also rejected the idea of legislated reconciliation, 
but independently sought reconciliation with some victims of APLA attacks quite 
83 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Armed Forces Hearing P AC/ APLA, 7 October 1997, Cape 
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successfully. 85 Even the idea of truth became contentious as well. A few ex-
combatants have indicated to this author that they only admitted to the actions they 
knew could be proven or had been witnessed, but kept many other actions to 
themselves. Others also admitted to crimes they served sentences for, but had not 
committed, simply to facilitate their release. 86 Many did not apply for amnesty unless 
they had to. One man asserted: 
I will not go and open a case that I have killed a person before they 
write me a letter [calling me] ... Why must I get myself arrested? I 
will never get myself arrested [by saying] that I killed a person on a 
certain day. What if that case is taken and turned into a criminal case, 
and not a political case? So we must be intelligent when we talk about 
things such as these. 87 
Some ex-soldiers still sit in jail after their amnesty applications failed. One man 
lamented: 
Since my comrades have been released, I have felt bad. In fact, I feel 
down, because there is no one in my organisation who has yet come to 
console me and my comrades have not come since they have been 
released just to console me, but I hope they will come to boost my 
morale. 88 
Even those who received amnesty still feel enmity towards the process. One such 
man remarked: 
I'm an ex-political prisoner who has been released by the TRC . . . I 
tried by all means to apply to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in 1996 [but it] took so long to respond. I [was] released 
only in November 1998 ... Some people are released, some are not ... 
Most of our people are lying in jails allover South Africa ... They are 
angry and they ridicule the TRC.89 
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The treatment the fonner apartheid personnel also weighs heavily on the minds of 
many ex-combatants. One man expressed: 
Justice was not done at the TRC hearings. Some of those murderers 
are living in luxury and occupy high positions in the present 
government. Nothing was done to those Generals in the SADP who 
committed acts of terror. While these Generals were let free despite 
the atrocities they committed, many of our comrades who liberated this 
country are still injails.9o 
On the other side of the TRC fence, many ex-combatants made submissions as 
victims of crimes against humanity committed by the apartheid forces. They, as well 
as many other victims, expected promised reparations for their suffering, but this 
!lever occurred. One man lamented: "Reparations have not been forthcoming. The 
government is silent about the issue. This is an indication that the efforts of many 
people who suffered under apartheid are not valued in a democracy.,,91 Many ex-
combatants still bear ill will towards the process. 
A Bitter Legacy 
All of these conditions combined have led to bitterness, disillusionment, and a 
sense of betrayal on the part of many ex-MK. and APLA soldiers. They feel that the 
organisations to which they committed their lives have let them down. While most 
did not expect a free ride once liberation came, many assumed they would get the 
opportunities to become active and contributing members of society. One man 
explained his expectations and dreams: 
One of our expections as soldiers during the time of the struggle was 
that the government would be overthrown through the use of weapons. 
We believed that, immediately after this was achieved, we would seize 
property and land and given them to our own people. We would 
choose the houses we wanted to occupy. Others expected to own 
90 APLA veteran quoted in Mokalobe, 159. 











farms, believing that the new government would distribute the 
country's resources. We were so sure that they would take care of the 
soldiers who fought for liberation as well. We would empower our 
people ... We expected a hero's welcome for returning soldiers and 
imagined all the smiling and excited faces, families reuniting and old 
friendships re-activated. Sharing information and talking about our 
experiences, we intended to defend the gains of our revolution and 
were eager to sacrifice and die in the same manner as we did during 
exile. All this was nothing Plore than soldier-talk ... They still expect 
past values and principles to be upheld yet that appear to be something 
only a handful of men adhere to today. It has been a toughjourney.92 
One study explained: 
The majority of respondents indicated that they had expected to 
achieve sustainable financial security so that they could enjoy a 
relatively good standard of living following the end of apartheid. They 
had envisaged achieving this through a combination of mechanisms, 
such as skills training, access to education, secure employment, 
resources to establish businesses, pensions, government subsidized 
housing and access to land.93 
For many, their sense of betrayal runs deep. One man expressed his bitterness: 
You'll notice that today our cadres are lying in the streets, loitering in 
the streets, no jobs, no nothing . . . They find themselves being 
regarded as rotten rubbish which may be thrown into the dirty bin. We 
were surviving under a terrible situation during the apartheid regime, 
but now this is a new regime [and] our people are regarded as useless 
. . . I can say: big fishes, they entertain themselves, small fishes are 
going to be food for big fishes.94 
Another man expressed his view: "This thing that [the] ANC has done to us has 
destroyed us. For such a long time [we were] working for the ANC [but] the ANC has 
thrown [us] outside like morning mucus.,,95 Another noted: 
Some of our comrades are getting richer and richer. They are less 
concerned about the ordinary people. They only care about themselves 
and their lavish lifestyles, and forget it is through our blood and sweat 
that they are where they are today because of us. Some of those who 
92 Matakata, 130-131. 
93 Mashike and Mokalobe, 20. 
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benefit today were never part of the struggle. When we were fighting 
they were doing nothing and enjoying themselves. Now they earn 
large salaries and the poor keep on getting poorer. 96 
The leadership's motives are often called into question. Mphahlele expressed it well: 
And one other thing, I don't think our leaders, whereas, I'm not 
supposed to talk about ANC, but generally speaking, PAC, ANC 
leadership, I don't think they had faith in the revolution we were 
involved in. Because if you take their personal lives, behaviours and 
inclinations, whereas they were commanders in chief, but they would 
always make it a point that their children go to the best universities in 
the world, most preferably in Europe and America, and children of 
peasants and workers like me would be stampeded to the military 
training, and these who are being prepared to run the country, and we 
are being prepared to be run, even after the country has been liberated. 
So we had such type of a leadership, people who would be in Dar es 
Salaam, but have his family based somewhere in Europe or in 
America. And come and visit the camps, dressed in military fatigue, 
you know, tell us how much he loves the country, how we should be 
prepared to lay down our lives, but that same person would not let their 
son or daughter be part of that. So we could read that our leaders did 
not have faith in the cause that they were encouraging people to 
pursue. 97 
This particular complaint is a common one. Even during the struggle many soldiers 
resented the lives of lUXury they felt many leaders led in exile. In the aftennath, the 
continuation of this problem exacerbated the divide between the leadership and the 
cadres. Many former soldiers feel deeply the sense of betrayal and disregard by their 
organizations for their contributions. 
In the immediate years after the unbanning of the ANC and PAC and after the 
first democratic elections in South Africa, many studies and recommendations 
recognised the necessity of providing services for demobilised soldiers of MK and 
APLA. At their 48th National Conference in 1991, the ANC resolved: 
That the NEC take full responsibility for the transferring of funds to 
regions for the maintenance development and general welfare of all 
96 MK. veteran quoted in Mokalobe, 151. 











MK cadres, both inside and outside the country and that proper and 
appropriate binding mechanisms be established to ensure thiS.98 
In 1993, Nelson Mandela elaborated at an MK conference: 
The issue of welfare is not one that can be reduced to the handing out 
of money for services rendered. The welfare of our combatants and 
that of our returned exiles in general is directly linked to a commitment 
on the part of the .ANC to recognise the incredible sacrifices and 
commitment to liberation by generations of our people who found their 
way into the ranks of the ANC and MK. Those of our people who 
have been denied the opportunity to lead normal lives by virtue of the 
commitment to the liberation of our people must be given access to 
pensions, health care, housing, education, skills training and 
employment. It is imperative that we are committed to redressing the 
historical injustice of apartheid and racism . . . I want to state 
unequivocally that the ANC is committed to ensuring that any future 
democratic government will be committed to providing the necessary 
means to address this issue.99 
The constitution of the Veteran's Association of South Africa, which focuses on ex-
combatants, returned exiles, and ex-political prisoners, but leaves the option open to 
include other veterans, recognized the need for medical care, pension/compensation, 
rehabilitation and education, commemoration, repatriation of mortal remains, housing 
support, improvement of the public image of veterans, job provision, and insurance. lOO 
Many studies in the early years, including several already cited in this chapter, 
focused on the plight of veterans and the services they required. However as time 
went on, most of these resolutions, recommendations, and pledges fell by the wayside. 
Other African countries managed to institute successful reintegration 
programmes for demobilized soldiers. One example is Uganda, which introduced 
such a plan from 1992-1995, in the same years South Africa faced a similar problem. 
One study explained their efforts: 
98 ANC 48th National Conference, Durban July 1992, Adopted Resolution on Umkhonto we Sizwe. 
99 Keynote address of the President of the African National Congress- Cde. Nelson Mandela: Eastern 
Transvaal 3rd and 4th September 1993. 











The programme had two elements. Firstly, a settling-in-kit' was 
designed to cover the first six months after discharge. The package 
consisted of the provision of shelter, food, clothing, transport, medical 
care and education for veterans' children. The second element, the 
'long-term package' included reintegration measures such as 
vocational training and credit facilities. . . . Soldiers and their 
dependents went through pre-discharge orientation briefings, intended 
to provide them with information on how to open a bank account, how 
to start income generating activities, environmental and legal issues, 
basic health and child immunisation, civic duties, legal rights of 
women in civil society, along with family planning and AIDS 
prevention. A 'transitory safety net package', in cash andlor kind, was 
provided to assist former soldiers in the initial stages of resettlement. 
These packages included food, civilian clothing, household utensils, 
building materials, seeds and agricultural implements. The package 
also included funds for the payment of school fees for children for a 
period of 12 months. IOI 
Another study showed the positive effects of this programme for former child 
abductees who served as soldiers: 
One of the boys who had never been through a centre felt that it was 
easier for former abductees to readjust if they had been to a centre. He 
indicated that they had been cared for, given things such as 
resettlement kits and received education. For youth who had been 
through the centres, the one thing they most appreciated was education 
and skills training, since this facilitated their transition into the labour 
market. 102 
South African efforts, however, fell far short of this example. 
In 1996, the South African government passed the Special Pensions Act, 
which provided pensions for people who participated in the struggle against apartheid. 
The act meant to include not only the armed wings of the ANC and the PAC, but 
anyone who worked full time for an organization that worked against the system, 
anyone jailed or banned as a result of their activities, anyone disabled due to their 
101 Shelton, Garth, Monyue, David, Pullinger, Ann, Simmonds, Matthew, and Williams Rocky. (2001 
August). Demobilisation and its Aftermath I: A profile of South Africa's Demobilised Military 
Personnel, Institute for Security Studies, ISS Monograph Series, No 59, 30. 
102 Veale, Angela and Stavrou, Aki. (2003 November). Violence, Reconciliation and Identity: The 
Reintegration of Lord's Resistance Army Child Abductees in Northern Uganda, Institute for Security 












participation in the struggle, and the dependents of deceased activists. However 
several complications arose during the implementation of this act and many who 
should qualify for special pensions under the spirit of the law have been denied, while 
some who do not qualify are receiving benefits. An official at the Special Pensions 
office in Cape Town explained the emotional highs and lows of his position: 
You know when somebody is turned down, not approved, you know, 
you feel bad about it. Sometimes, it's a person who, it's a guy who 
could qualify but it's a guy who can't articulate some of the things, or 
is scared of putting some of the things down. But once a person is 
approved, you say, "shoo, it's been approved," it really makes me very 
happy. Especially for the elderly people, you know? Some of them 
are dying, many of them are dying now, and when you get people 
before they die, especially it makes you feel very very good. Because 
some of them can't walk, some of them are at home, some you have to 
go and see, you must fill in the bank form and so on, but once they get 
paid, approved and paid, ja, that's very good. But you feel down when 
somebody is turned down, eh, but you can't do anything about it, 
maybe because of his age he doesn't qualify, but sometimes you do, 
you could have qualified, but some minor thing, maybe some of them 
they are not able to get information to prove what they claim. Then 
you encounter a problem. Some of them, their political parties will not 
verify them, that they were full time active members. And sometimes 
there's a record, he was a member, but not qualified as full time active, 
he was working, he was, you know, teaching or whatever, also what 
happens is by full time, if for example you were working for the 
government at that time, and you were in the struggle, fighting, for 
example, then you don't get paid because they said you can't be full 
time in the struggle and full time at work.103 
A study by the Human Rights Media Centre identified several problems. The 
act excludes anyone under the age of 35 as of 1 December 1996, which leaves out 
many ex- MK and APLA soldiers, particularly the large number of young people who 
joined APLA in the early 1990s. The Special Pensions officer described this problem 
as one of the worst: 
And I think that the most problematic and difficult one is the one of the 
age thing, under 35. Now many people feel this is completely unfair. 
For people not to qualify simply because they were young. And they 











argue that basically now, in fact, the people that were at the forefront 
of the struggle are the youth. They were there carrying the bombs and 
the guns, they were doing the actual work in the country. They would 
train in most cases with the older guys, they would come into the 
country using the same guns, the same grenades, the same tactics and 
so on, and now when it comes to pay time they are not eligible. That's 
a very sensitive one. And initially these guys, even now guys are very 
angry with that. Very very angry.l04 
A process is currently ongoing to find a way to address this problem, but it lies 
outside of the Special Pensions Act. A research group established to seek out ex-
activists and arm them with information about the act failed miserably, though they 
were well paid. The language of the act is vague and various offices and members of 
the board interpreted it differently, excluding some people who should have qualified. 
The application process was difficult as well, and many offices made their own 
decision to discourage some people from applying, which was not their mandate. 
Even some of those who received the Special Pensions faced difficulties when they 
originally received overpayments, then had to pay back the monies given them, which 
caused further hardships. Financial transparency and audits have been limited, and 
mismanagement may have occurred. 
In some offices, ex-combatants volunteered to work for no pay in order to 
assist their comrades in the application process. For ex-MK and APLA members who 
joined the SANDF, the matter becomes even more clouded, as any who spent time in 
the armed forces has a choice of a military pension or a special pension, and need 
considered advice as to which will benefit them more. The ongoing process of 
amending, clarifying, and applying the Special Pensions Act continues, and 
applications have closed and then re-opened on several occasions. However for many 
ex-MK and APLA soldiers, the bureaucratic process, unhelpful officials, and long 
wait has caused them grief. Some have given up on the process, while others missed 












years of payments due to their problems with the application process. lOS Hopefully 
this process will eventually become accessible and more people can benefit. As for 
the younger cadres, they must simply wait and hope that a way to address their needs 
comes to fruition. 
Other official attempts to address the plight of former soldiers have been 
limited at best. The South African Defense Force's Service Corps aimed to help 
demobilized soldiers, and far undershot their goals. One study explained: "The skills 
training offered by the Service Corps was often abundantly offered in civil society, for 
example, motor mechanics and bricklaying, and finding a job was therefore nearly 
impossible.,,106 Another ex-combatant explained: "Most of our members who 
received their training in the SC are unemployed. This tells you much about the kind 
of training and the manner in which it is conducted.,,107 Despite their best intentions, 
veterans' associations are chronically under-funded, and are not able to address the 
problems of their constituents. lOS One man noted: 
We were initially provided with R500 a month for 3 months, but we 
were later told that funds have dried up. As far as I know, MKMV A 
[MK Veteran's Association] has not provided any training to anybody. 
To some of us, it is only a place where you meet your comrades and 
share your memories. 109 
With the lack of government sponsored programmes, some former soldiers have 
started their own Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to help their comrades. 
lOS Information in this section is based on research done by this author for the Human Rights Media 
Centre, and a draft pamplet on Special Pensions written in the process. 
106 Liebenberg, Ian and Roefs, Marlene. (2001 August). Demobilisation and its Aftermath II: Economic 
Reinsertion of South Africa's Demobilised Military Personnel, Institute for Security Studies, ISS 
Monograph Series, No. 61, 55. 
107 APLA veteran quoted in Mokalobe, 99. 
108 Mashike and Mokalobe, 23-24. 










One organization provides training in skills needed to run a small business, and sets 
up former soldiers to do so, often matching MK and APLA soldiers as partners in a 
business, usually run from a container in the townships.110 Another has a Combatants 
Support Initiative as one of its programmes, focusing on the psychological and social 
problems of ex-combatants and providing life and vocational skills training. l11 Other 
organizations or even small infonnal groups of ex-combatants make attempts to 
address the problems as well. But much more needs to be done to support fonner MK 
and APLA soldiers, as well as other activists from the struggle against apartheid. 
Conclusion 
When De Klerk delivered his speech in February of 19·90, apartheid's end was 
iniminent. Hope and victory stood side by side with uncertainty and fear in the minds 
of both MK and APLA combatants. Many MK soldiers soon returned from exile or 
emerged from underground, reunited with their families, and tried to start the business 
of adapting to the 'new South Africa'. APLA cadres mainly remained underground or 
in exile until 1994, and then faced the same tasks. Problems stemming from their 
time in the anned wings of the ANC and PAC often persist today. Some integrated 
into the new South African National Defense Force, a process that was rife with 
difficulties. Many had to apply to the TRC for amnesty or possibly face prosecution 
for their actions during the struggle, or were already jailed for their actions and 
applications for amnesty were their only way to get out of prison. However, the TRC 
process was fraught with difficulties for many of them. Poverty, unemployment, 
psychological and physical problems, and a sense of betrayal still hold tight on the 
lives of many ex-combatants. As things stand at the moment, too many of these 
llO von den Steinen, L. Conversation with the founder, Meshack Mochele. 











people who dedicated themselves to transfonnation in South Africa and have much to 
contribute to the country are sleeping in the streets, are addicted to alcohol and drugs, 
are struggling with their psychological problems, and are oppressed by dire poverty 
and unemployment. The applications· filled out when people joined APLA provide a 
haunting picture of what could have been. One question asks about the recruits' 
future ambitions, and the answers show the dreams so many liberation struggle 
soldiers once held for their futures. To mention just a few, answers to that question 
included doctor, engineer, professor of architecture, lawyer, historian, builder and 
draughtsman, musician, farmer, carpenter, economist, photographer, archeologist, 
electrician, teacher, accountant, public relations officer, theologist, motor mechanic, 
and war-correspondent. 1l2 For many veterans of the armed struggle, these echoes of 
their youthful ambitions are now just dreams deferred, perhaps forever. While it is 
true that these people could be a great asset to the country, they could also become a 
dire threat. With thousands of disillusioned, demoralised, desperate and destitute men 
and women, who are highly trained in military and guerrilla warfare tactics, this 
population has the potential to hurt the country as well. Many of the people who 
chose to give up everything to fight for liberation are now feeling betrayed by the 
government and their organisations as they are being discarded by the wayside. 
Substantial damage is already done, and it is likely that some of the ex-soldiers have 
slipped beyond the reach of programmes to help them. But it is not yet too late. 
Policies such as the one professed by Nelson Mandela can and must still be instituted, 
or a great injustice will have been perpetuated on those who gave their lives to fight 
another one. 











The men and women who joined Umkhonto we Sizwe and the Azanian 
People's Liberation Anny came from all corners of South African society. What they 
all held in common was a commitment to defeat a brutal and unjust regime and a 
dream of a brighter future and unlimited opportunity for themselves and their 
children. When negotiations led to the first democratic elections and new government 
ruled by the majority in 1994, many believed their dreams would finally be realised. 
But that freedom has been an uneasy one. While South Africa has emerged as a 
leader on the continent, the economy continues to grow, and many have attained 
success, the large majority of South Africans have yet to see improvement in their 
lives. 
While South Africa never experienced a war of liberation on the scale of other 
African countries, the armed wings of the ANC and PAC vitally contributed to the 
liberation of the country. The South Africans who joined the struggle in droves in the 
aftennath of the Soweto uprisings of 1976 and those who followed them in the 1980s 
and 1990s swelled the ranks of the liberation movements and contributed a 
revitalising lifeblood of militant and dedicated freedom fighters. Their actions 
increased the support from the masses, inspired others to take up the mantle of 
struggle, and laid siege to the apartheid government's economic and psychological 
strength. Though MK and APLA cadres failed to ride into Pretoria on tanks and wrest 
power from the hands of their oppressors, their contributions forced the apartheid 
government to recognise its ensuing demise and take a seat at the negotiating table. 
In the aftennath of apartheid and the dawn of the "new" South Africa, 
however, their leaders have neglected, abandoned and forgotten them. While a few 
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out humble but comfortable lives, the huge majority remain in dire straights. Having 
abandoned everything to join the struggle, they now find themselves without 
education, skills, job experience, homes or support. The added burdens of 
psychological and sometimes physical scars from their experiences make them even 
more vulnerable and crippled. Despite lip service paid to their heroism and 
contributions in the form of speeches and monuments, the tangible support they so 
desperately need and so plainly deserve is not forthcoming. The sense of betrayal at 
the hands ofthe leaders grows continuously in the light of this neglect. 
Since the current government of South Africa started as an organisation 
fighting for not only a change in government but also for the opportunities and 
improved living conditions their people lacked, the dangers of marginalizing and 
neglecting people should be clear to them. As the last country in Africa to throw off 
the yoke of white rule, they have abundant examples of the consequences of 
neglecting their veterans. One report pointed out protests and riots by disgruntled ex-
combatants in Namibia in the mid-1990s in the aftermath of independence, and 
Zimbabwe in 1997, a full 17 years after theirs. 1 Further away, lessons can even be 
learned from Sudan, for example, where one book noted: 
Many of these ex-military men, whose livelihoods had been ruined by 
the economic crisis or the drought became very frustrated and turned to 
violence. Known locally as gata el turuk or bandits, they attacked 
passengers in western Sudan, stealing their properties. A second, 
equally violent and more politically destablising coping strategy, was 
for ex-Ansar to mobilise themselves as part of the Arab tribal militias 
who were fighting their Dinka neighbours over pasture and water 
resources.2 
1 Dzinesa, Gwinyayi Albert. (2006 January). Swords into Ploughshares: Disarmament, demobilization 
and reintegration in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, Institute for Security Studies, ISS Paper 
120. 
2 Gakmar, Chol Gidion. (2002). Disarmament and Demobilisation.1n Ajawin, Yoanes and de Waal, 










The neglect of former soldiers there and the ongoing wars have led to more deeply 
seated problems there: 
The culture of violence and use of force alone to resolve problems has 
become embedded in Sudanese society. Throughout large swathes of 
Sudan, traders must carry guns to defend themselves from armed 
bandits. Kalash bijiib kash (' AK47 brings cash') is a motto heard in 
western Sudan. Inter-tribal disputes that would earlier have been 
resolved peacefully, or would at worst have deteriorated into fights 
with local weapons, are now likely to involve militiamen armed with 
modern weapons. 3 
While South Africa has not experienced wars on the level of Sudan's, the 
neglect of its former soldiers, their guerrilla training, knowledge of arms caches still 
unearthed, and ever present sense of betrayal could well lead to crises in the future. 
Many have refused to yield to the temptations of crime. But the more time that passes 
without sufficient programmes to aid, assist, retrain, and employ this group, criminal 
options on the part of ex-soldiers become increasingly tempting. If the current 
government ever reaches the point where the majority perceives it as unjust, 
oppressive, or even just neglectful of its constituents, this pool will be a natural base 
from which to work against the government. As Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 
espoused in 1830: "What experience and history teach us is this- that nations and 
governments have never learned anything from history or acted upon any lessons they 
might have drawn from it.',4 And as Karl Marx, once taught to all MK sol diers in 
their Angolan camps and a smaller component of APLA's political education later 
elaborated: "Hegel says somewhere that all great events and personalities in world 
history reappear in one fashion or another. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, 
3 Gakmar, 106. 
4 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. (1872). Lectures on the philosophy a/history, London: Bell and 











the second as farce."s One can only hope that the government of the "new" South 
Africa takes its lessons from history, and reaches out to their abandoned soldiers. 
Perhaps the organisation once led by Nelson Mandela, who became an icon for justice 
all over the world, will heed his own words: "True reconciliation does not consist in 
merely forgetting the past.,,6 
The full history of MK and APLA's soldiers has yet to be written. Many 
interviews conducted by the author and other researchers provide a rich base of stories 
that illuminate the human dimension of the history of the struggle against apartheid. 
However, thousands of people have yet to tell their stories. Researchers must 
continue and intensify the collection of oral history. With more time, contacts, and 
funding, oral history projects and individual researchers can persist in revealing new 
aspects of South Africa's turbulent history. An emphasis on training in oral history 
collection for speakers of all South African languages would deepen the pool of 
material collected. Dissemination of this information is also a crucial task. Access to 
oral interviews, writing of books and articles, and opportunities for the ex-combatants 
to talk to the public about their experiences are all essential areas that cry out for 
development. 
This study has provided vital insight into the rich experiences of South 
Africa's freedom fighters. The political awakening of those who went on to join MK 
and APLA came from diverse influences. Life under apartheid, experiences in the 
system of Bantu education, and family influences, whether through apathy or 
activism, politicised many ·young South Africans and instilled them with a driving 
need to commit themselves to the fight against apartheid. While many of the South 
S Marx, Karl. (1926). The eighteenth Brumaire o/Louis Bonaparte, London: Allen and Unwin. 
6 Statement of National Executive Committee of the ANC on the occasion of the 84th anniversary of 











Africans of the Soweto Generation were too young to remember previous campaigns 
against apartheid, the early 1970s saw a resurgence of resistance that caught the minds 
of the youth and intensified their political awareness. Waves of strikes and the 
resultant police oppression of workers, the rise of the Black Consciousness Movement 
and its ideology of psychological liberation, unity of the oppressed masses, and 
community involvement and activism, and the Portuguese coup in 1974 which led to 
the independence of Angola and Mozambique the following year all served to 
galvanise a generation into action. 
The Soweto uprisings brought a youthful militancy to South African 
resistance, and a visibly brutal response from the apartheid authorities. A rush of 
people fled into exile to join the liberation organisations and gain the skills needed to 
combat the apartheid government with force of their own. While the ANC and PAC 
had little influence on or control over these students and their activities, they found a 
militant, dedicated, and impatient pool of potential activists ready to reinvigorate their 
stagnant struggle, though their weakened states precluded a rapid and strong military 
response to support the uprisings. This Soweto generation of MK and APLA soldiers 
marked a decided break from their predecessors in their intense militancy and 
determination and their huge numbers revitalised resistance to apartheid, swelled the 
ranks of both liberation armies, and marked the beginning of an unprecedented level 
of armed operations aimed at defeating the apartheid state. 
In the mid-1980s, the townships exploded again, and a wider subsection of 
South African society dedicated itself to the struggle and joined MK and APLA both 
in exile and inside the country. Community organisations of students, workers, and 
women became involved and even sports and religious organisations joined the fight 












PAC faced a unique opportunity to augment and support the community struggle with 
armed action. MK units often attacked targets chosen to complement community 
actions, and APLA units operated for the first time in two decades, striking directly at 
the personnel who enforced apartheid. Both organisations drew recruits to their 
armed wings, and the resultant operations applied greater pressure than ever before.7 
Their politicisation and the periods of unrest inside South Africa caused 
thousands to flock into exile to join the ANC and PAC. Once politicized leaving 
home faced the prospective cadres with difficult decisions. Some had strong impetus 
to leave South Africa while others simply became fed up with the situation inside 
South Africa and actively sought military training from the ANC and PAC outside the 
country. The road they faced was long and difficult and the loved ones they left 
behind were forever changed by their absence. Once they arrived in the neighbouring 
countries, they found a process in place to facilitate their arrival, and most went on to 
join MK and APLA to obtain military training. They encountered new ideas and felt 
the intoxicating freedom of independent black ruled countries. And they looked 
forward impatiently to the chance to train in guerrilla warfare and return home to fight 
the apartheid government. 8 
The recruits to MK obtained training in the Angolan camps in politics, history, 
and guerrilla warfare. The APLA recruits often spread to diverse and far-flung 
countries, and received training in politics, the Chinese Communist model of guerrilla 
warfare, and self-sufficiency. Their varied training allowed the opportunity for a rich 
exchange of ideas in the Tanzanian camps. Life in the ANC and PAC camps was 
often difficult but a sense of purpose, camaraderie and patience made it tolerable. 
Life in exile was challenging, however, and crises facing both the ANC and PAC in 
7 See Chapter One. 











exile threatened the continuation and intensification of the struggle against apartheid. 
A leadership crisis in the PAC in the 1970s, and an MK mutiny in Angola in the early 
1980s marked low points in the history of the organisations. Some unlucky souls 
never returned home, and died in exile due to disease, accident, South African attacks 
or UNIT A activity, or even execution by their own organisations. 9 
The animosity felt by many cadres towards the leaders and their lifestyles 
during this period remains relevant today, and a sense of betrayal still haunts many 
ex-combatants. While an existence in exile was necessary for the ANC and PAC to 
wage the struggle, the very circumstances of exile led to enduring problems and 
sometimes diverted the emphasis from the war they were fighting and focused scarce 
resources and support away from their purpose in order to address and resolve their 
circumstances. 
Some soldiers received the opportunity to deploy in the front line states and 
inside South Africa, actively combating the apartheid regime. MK operations were 
characterised by sabotage of government facilities and, after 1985, direct attacks on 
apartheid personnel. Their policies stressed the avoidance of civilian casualties at all 
costs. They had effective communication with their leaders, and reliable lines of 
supplies and funds to support their operations. APLA operations targeted police, 
soldiers, farmers and white civilians. Their training in self-sufficiency proved vital, 
as lines of communication and supplies from the organisation were unreliable. 
Operations focused on not only attacks, but also the "repossession" of arms and funds 
from the enemy to support future operations. Clashes with the police, operation in the 











rural areas, and attempts to take the battle to the white areas also characterised the 
APLA strategy. 10 
F.W. De Klerk's speech in February 1990 announcing the unbanning of the 
ANC, PAC, SACP, and other organisations, and the release of Nelson Mandela and 
other political prisoners stunned most MK and APLA cadres. Suspicion of the 
negotiating process and of the apartheid government's degree of sincerity mixed with 
excitement and joy at the idea of ending the struggle, attaining their goals, and 
returning home. 
For months, life in exile for MK soldiers became chaotic, as the leadership 
relocated to Johannesburg and abandoned the rank-and-file outside of the country. 
Chaos also ruled inside, as units operating underground did not know whether to 
continue or to suspend the armed struggle. While the leadership's seizure of the 
opportunity for a peaceful settlement is understandable, their precipitate return to 
South Africa abandoned their cadres in the early days. By 1991, many MK soldiers 
began to return home after the suspension of the armed struggle in 1990. 
In the early 1990s, APLA therefore became highly visible on the South 
African scene after MK suspended its armed struggle. The PAC opposed the format 
of the negotiations and insisted on minimum requirements and concessions from the 
apartheid government with international monitoring. While they continued with their 
normal operations, several high profile attacks on white civilians gained notoriety in 
the media but were welcomed by more militant circles of black South African society. 
The PAC suspended APLA's operations only in early 1994, but most units heard the 
development through the media rather than from their own leaders. The Director of 
Operations and several of the internal commanders decided to continue armed actions, 










believing that the PAC leadership had betrayed the struggle. But APLA activities 
finally ceased and by the elections in April of 1994, their anned struggle ended. 
When the APLA soldiers suspended their activities, they were too late to take 
advantage of indemnities from the apartheid government, and some still faced arrest 
and imprisonment for their activities even under the new government. The disconnect 
between the PAC leaders and the APLA members manifested itself in an enduring 
mistrust of leadership and a deep seated feeling of betrayal for many former APLA 
members, which only intensified in the "new" South Africa. 
When they returned from exile or emerged from underground, most MK and 
.APLA soldiers thrilled at the reunion with their families. Some families hailed their 
returning heroes, while others rejected them. Initial payments of some money from 
their organisations or from the National Co-Ordinating Committee for Refugees ran 
out quickly, and the pleasure of reunion often descended into resentment and 
rejection. These ex-soldiers faced problems adapting to life back in South Africa as 
ordinary citizens. Many of the veterans lacked education, skills, and job experience 
and struggled to find employment. Nor did the option of integration into the new 
South African National Defence Force offer a panacea for many. Ex-MK and APLA 
soldiers often received ranks they felt beneath them and struggled for years to correct 
the problem. Others rebelled against the racism still deeply embedded in the SADF in 
the early days of integration. Some did remain and pursue careers with the Defence 
Force, but many found that option unacceptable. 
For those who failed to find employment, crime was tempting. Some 
succumbed and used their skills in guerrilla warfare to find illicit sources of money. 
Some criminals recognised their skills and attempted to recruit ex-soldiers. 












difficult to obtain. Many ex-combatants express despair and bitterness at seeing their 
fellow comrades reduced to desperate circumstances. 
Those who remained imprisoned after the change in government had to turn to 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the hope of gaining release. Problems 
with the TRC were common and many people still resent their treatment. The PAC 
publicly opposed the parameters of the TRC, but many of their soldiers applied for 
amnesty for lack of other options. Those who received it could resume their lives, but 
many of those denied remain in prison today. Peelings of betrayal run deep in many 
ex-combatants who, while they did not expect a free ride after democracy arrived, did 
expect assistance with education, skills training, housing, and job placement. 
While many studies took place in the early years of negotiations and freedom, 
and all relevant organisations professed their intentions to provide services for ex-
combatants, very little has been implemented. The Special Pensions Act provided for 
pension payments to former activists, but problems have plagued the process and 
many who should qualify do not receive pensions. Some ex-combatants took it upon 
themselves to help their comrades, and started Non-Governmental Organisations to 
assist and provide services for ex-combatants and other activists. But far too little has 
been done to help MK and APLA veterans, and many continue to exist on the fringes 
of society, destitute and bitter. While it is true that these people could be a great asset 
to the country, they could also become a dire threat. With thousands of disillusioned, 
demoralised, desperate and destitute men and women, who are highly trained in 
military and guerrilla warfare tactics, this popUlation has the potential to devastate the 
country as well. 11 











The veterans of MK and APLA, for the most part, are dedicated people who 
committed themselves to work for the overthrow of an unjust system. Many have 
wide-ranging experience with foreign countries and people and the discipline that 
comes from military life. The benefits they could bring to a democratic and changing 
South Africa are immeasurable. While the country has passed out of the reign of 
apartheid, and now subscribes to the one man, one vote ideal, many challenges 
persist. Poverty, lack of services, racism, crime, HN I AIDS, and many other 
problems still permeate the society. Yet these dedicated people are not utilised to 
fight these problems. While some activists transferred their fervour to other arenas, 
many more are available to contribute to transformation. 
Delivery is a vital component of the government's mandate, but occurs too 
slowly in the eyes of the people. The government could recruit ex-combatants and 
other activists to assist in the provision of housing and essential services, providing 
them with skills training while working towards one of the goals of the revolution. 
Additional funding from foreign donors and big business would allow for sustainable 
employment for the soldiers and deVelopment for the communities. The devastating 
effects of HN/AIDS in South Africa might be curtailed by enlisting veterans in the 
fight and providing training in HNIAIDS education and care for the afflicted. Crime 
in South Africa continues to increase, and dominates the headlines. Militarily trained 
and committed soldiers wasting away in unemployment are a natural pool of recruits 
to combat this trend. In the mid-1980s many organisations had street committees to 
combat crime and policed the townships effectively. This background is a natural 
complement to police efforts in the battle against crime. The possibilities are endless, 
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and APLA soldiers have proven their dedication and discipline in fighting injustice, 
and deserve the opportunity to continue working for change in South Africa. 
Museums and schools could also provide opportunities for employment of ex-
combatants. At Robben Island Museum, ex-political prisoners serve as teachers and 
tour guides who add their own experiences to the history of the island. The Apartheid 
Museum, Freedom Park, and other public venues for the history of the struggle could 
provide employment for ex-MK and APLA soldiers, whose stories would enrich the 
programmes. Outreach programmes could also bring personal testimonies to schools, 
allowing the students to learn about the struggle from participants. As time passes, 
more children will grow up outside of the shadow of apartheid. As one character in a 
book explained to his grandson when asked why he fought in Zimbabwe's liberation 
struggle: "We fought because life wasn't worth living as it was. We fought so we 
could look each other in the eyes, heads high. We fought so that you would never, 
never, understand why we fought.,,12 One day, the children of South Africa will have 
trouble understanding what their grandparents went through, but they must learn 
about the country's past and the qualities of dedication, sacrifice, and commitment 
that led many to fight apartheid. Personal accounts add a vital human side to history 
that is unavailable simply with books and official views of history. South African 
society can only benefit by learning from the experiences of the people who sacrificed 
all they had in order to fight a system they knew to be wrong. 
Job training and placement are also crucial to the former MK and APLA 
cadres. Businesses could introduce mentoring programmes allowing the ex-soldiers 
to receive on-the-job training at businesses so that they can gain the skills and 
experience necessary to find employment. Publicly funded psychological counselling 











and medical care for those who need it would not be prohibitively expensive, and 
would reap huge benefits for society. There are many options available in 
reintegrating these soldiers into society and, as seen in the previous chapter, they are 
desperately needed in order to keep this group from fading from view, or falling into 
substance abuse, crime, and poverty. 
The MK and APLA leadership knew how important it was to be able to study 
the experiences of other annies allover the world. Trainees learned about the Russian 
Revolution, Vietnamese soldiers in the Vietnam War, Cuba and China's revolutions, 
and the liberation struggles of many African countries. The history of the MK and 
APLA soldiers who fought against apartheid offers no less vital knowledge for future 
study. 
The history of the liberation struggle has focused on the leaders, politics, 
strategies and tactics, and details of the struggle. It is also both necessary and 
desirable to approach the history from more revealing angles. Social history and oral 
history have entered the mainstream of historical inquiry, and have proven very 
valuable methods to study the past. With the use of oral history, a much deeper 
understanding of the people involved in South Africa's struggle is possible. 
Oral interviews with MK and APLA soldiers and other members of the 
liberation struggle do exist in South Africa. However, much more extensive work 
needs to be done in this area. Many interviews took place even before De Klerk's 
speech in 1990 or in the years immediately following it. Though memory can fade 
over time, hindsight also allows people to reflect on their experiences and provide 
deeper analysis of their experiences. Interviews conducted today could provide much 
more information than those that came before. Furthermore, now that negotiations 











incrimination, and security have diminished. Researchers can now discover much 
more information, particularly about the operational side of the veterans' experiences. 
The South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET) has already undertaken 
many interviews with activists to add to the history of the struggle. Their initial two 
volumes add new perspectives to the public consciousness.13 But the approach of 
specific academic articles written by knowledgeable experts neglects some of their 
research and omits valuable information they have collected. For example, they failed 
to use the interviews conducted by the author and co-workers about the 1976 
uprisings in Cape Town for their volume on the 1970s, and access to the interviews in 
their collection remains restricted to many researchers. 
Also crucial is the issue of language. Most interviews done with ex-soldiers 
and liberation struggle activists have been conducted in English, but if people with 
skills in vernacular languages were to receive training in oral history methods and 
interview the soldiers, the interviewees would be able to express themselves in 
whatever language they are most comfortable speaking, thus allowing much greater 
clarity and detail. The use of all South African languages in the collection of oral 
history would also expand the possibilities of dissemination and reach a wider 
audience. 
Collections of oral history have become common all over the world to 
preserve people's stories long past their lifetimes. Steven Spielberg, together with the 
Simon Wiesenthal Center, has undertaken the recording of as many interviews as 
possible with survivors of the Holocaust. 14 This project is almost too late, as the 
remaining survivors are few and very old. However in South Africa, there is still 
13 South African Democracy Education Trust. (2004). The Road to Democracy Volume 1 {1960-1970}, 
Cape Town: Zebra; and (2006). The Road to Democracy Volume 2 {1970-1980}, Pretoria: Unisa. 










ample time to record people's experiences while the memories are fresh in their minds 
and most are still alive to tell their stories. A project like this would allow the 
recording of memories for use in the future. South Africa has the unique experience 
of being able to re-write its history. The official history during the period of apartheid 
rule focused largely in the Afrikaner Nationalist tradition, neglecting and demonising 
the experiences of other people. Official ANC and PAC histories necessarily 
supported the organisations and glossed over their problems while emphasising their 
good points. In the wake of ANC victory, historians have largely neglected and 
marginalised the PAC and APLA's stories. Oral history provides a unique and 
irreplaceable point of access to the experiences of those South Africans who devoted 
their lives to bringing about the downfall of apartheid. Today, the opportunity exists 
to change the face of South African history, and the seizure of this opportunity will 
prove crucial to its future. 
There is still time to address the problems presented above. Programmes to 
develop and support ex-combatants remain vital to the future of the country. The re-
integration of ex-combatants and the opportunity for them to participate fully as 
citizens of the "new" South Africa remain critical to the future development and 
security of the country. They provide a rich source of talent, skills, and commitment 
that must be harnessed to combat the persistent problems plaguing the country today. 
The post-liberation experiences of other African countries provide a diverse 
selection of examples and solutions, some to avoid and some to attempt. The 
collection and dissemination of the stories of apartheid era activists and soldiers must 
be augmented and prioritised to add a crucial element to the history of the South 
African struggle. Development of researchers in all South African languages is also 











South Africa both to provide vital support to ex-combatants and to promote the 
collection and dissemination of the oral history of the struggle participants. All that 
remains to be realised is the determination and will to do so. This study provides a 
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